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This work empirically examines six structural models of the term structure of credit risk
spreads: Merton (1974), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) (with and without stochastic in-
terest rates), Leland & Toft (1996), Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001), and a constant
elasticity of variance model. The conventional approach to testing structural models
has involved the use of observable data to proxy the latent capital structure process,
which may introduce additional speciﬁcation error. This study extends Jones, Mason &
Rosenfeld (1983) and Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004) by using implicit estimation of
key model parameters resulting in an improved level of model ﬁt. Unlike prior studies,
the models are ﬁtted from the observed dynamic term structure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit
spreads, thereby providing a pure test of model speciﬁcation. The models are imple-
mented by adapting the method of Duffee (1999) to structural credit models, thereby
treating the capital structure process is truly latent, and simultaneously enforcing cross-
sectional and time-series model constraints. Quasi-maximum likelihood parameter esti-
mates of the capital structure process are obtained via the extended Kalman ﬁlter applied
to actual market trade prices on 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds for the period 1994 to 2000.
We ﬁnd that including an allowance for time-variation in the market liquidity pre-
mium improves model speciﬁcation. A simple extension of the Merton (1974) model
is found to have the greatest prediction accuracy, although all models performed with
similar prediction errors. At between 28.8 to 34.4 percent, the root mean squared error
of the credit spread prediction is comparable with reduced-form models. Unlike Eom,
Helwege & Huang (2004) we do not ﬁnd a wide dispersion in model prediction errors,
as evidenced by an across model average mean absolute percentage error of 22 percent.
However, in support of prior studies we ﬁnd an overall tendency for slight underpredic-
tion, with the mean percentage prediction error of between -6.2 and -8.7 percent. Un-
derprediction is greatest with short remaining bond tenor and low rating. Credit spread
prediction errors across all models are non-normal, and fatter tailed than expected, with
autocorrelation evident in their time series.
More complex models did not outperform the extended Merton (1974) model; in
particular stochastic interest-rate and early default accompanied by an exogenous write-
down rate appear to add little to model accuracy. However, the inclusion of solvency ra-
tio mean-reversion in the Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) model results in the most
realistic latent solvency dynamics as measured by its implied levels of asset volatility,
default boundary level, and mean-reversion rate. The extended Merton (1974) is found
to imply asset volatility levels that are too high on average when compared to observed
ﬁrm equity volatility.
Weﬁndthat theextended Merton (1974) andthe Collin-Dufresne &Goldstein (2001)
models account for approximately 43 percent of the credit spread on average. For BB
rated trades, the explained proportion rises to 55 to 60 percent. For investment grade
trades, our results suggest that the amount of the credit spread that is default related is
approximately double the previous estimate of Huang & Huang (2003).
Finally, we ﬁnd evidence that the prediction errors are related to market-wide factors
exogenous to the models. The percentage prediction errors are positively related to the
VIX and change in GDP, and negatively related to the Refcorp-Treasury spread.
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xChapter 1
Introduction
Understanding credit risk is central to the smooth operation of capital markets and sta-
bility of the banking system. Credit risk is the risk of unexpected value changes of
debt instruments due to changes in perceived default risk of the issuer, that is, the ﬁrm’s
inability to meet promised debt payments in a timely manner. Financial claims that rep-
resent a promise to pay include a risk premium to compensate the holder for lost value
in the event of default by the obligor. Structural credit models describe default risk in
terms of unexpected movements in total ﬁrm value, where total ﬁrm value comprises the
market value of debt and equity instruments issued by the ﬁrm.
This study presents empirical tests of alternative structural models of the defaultable
bond credit spread, in which we adopt a novel approach of estimating the models directly
from observed credit spreads. We incorporate a test of the Merton (1974, hereafter
Merton) model, and compare its predictive accuracy against a representative sample of
recent theoretical extensions that have relaxed the strong assumptions of the original
Merton model.
Robert Merton ﬁrst proposed a structural approach in 1974 by drawing on the sem-
inal option valuation model of Black & Scholes (1973). Since then, there has been a
plethora of theoretical extensions that can be jointly classiﬁed as structural models. The
essential characteristic of a structural model is that the default risk premium is a function
of the potential for the latent ﬁrm value process to reach a lower default boundary. In this
respect, the problem of defaultable debt valuation is akin to the problem of valuing an
option in which the unobserved ﬁrm value is the underlying variable, and an unobserved
lower value of the ﬁrm is the strike price.
Structural credit models are central to ﬁnancial theory and credit risk-management
practice. For example, because structural models relate observable debt prices to as-
sumptions about the ﬁrm’s asset risk, leverage, and dynamic behaviour of management,
they offer a link between capital structure theory and asset valuation theory. Testing
alternative structural models is an indirect test of capital structure theory to the extent
that the market anticipates and prices into the term structure of credit spreads, expected
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management behaviour.
For ﬁnance practitioners, the recent growth in traded credit derivative markets and
development of portfolio credit models has been supported by use of variations of the
Merton model. For example, one of the most widely used commercial structural models
is Moody’s-KMV Credit Monitor, which is used by banks and traders to guide risk-debt
valuation and the risk management of debt portfolios. As observed in the ﬁnancial press,
‘... Merton models are now so frequently used that they are actually driving the credit
market’, (Ferry 2003).
Importantly, structural models also hold a central position in modelling the adequacy
of bank capital and estimation of bank solvency. Crouhy, Galai & Mark (2000) describe
a common method for constructing economic capital models for credit risk based on
particular assumptions about multiple obligor default consistent with the Merton model.
Recently, this method of capital modelling has been embedded in global bank regulation
issued by the Bank for International Settlements, commonly known as Basel II. Under
recent changes, the minimum capital formula to be applied by all internationally active
advanced banks is based on a result obtained by Gordy (2002). He derives a closed-form
solution for the risk weighting of each loan in a bank’s portfolio under the assumption
that joint defaults are explained by a structural model incorporating a single source of
common ﬁrm-asset return.
The competing method of defaultable debt valuation is termed ‘reduced-form’ and
is exempliﬁed by Jarrow & Turnbull (1995), Madan & Unal (1999), Dufﬁe & Single-
ton (1999), Duffee (1999), and Bakshi, Madan & Zhang (2001). Reduced-form models
value defaultable debt instruments by assuming that the ﬁrm may default at any instant
of time. The rate of instantaneous default is assumed to evolve stochastically through
time by an exogenously speciﬁed stochastic process. There is no relationship assumed
between the instantaneous default rate process and ﬁrm value. Reduced-form models of-
fer mathematical tractability, and have achieved success at valuing defaultable debt. For
example, Duffee (1999) reports an ability to predict bond yields reasonably well using
a translated two-factor square-root diffusion model of the instantaneous default rate. A
similar result is reported by Bakshi et al. (2001) who consider alternative speciﬁcations
and conclude that reduced-form models, which include leverage and book-to-market ra-
tio ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, offer the best ﬁt.
However, reduced-form models do not attempt to explain credit spreads by ﬁrm cap-
ital structure theory and are therefore less rich in their implications. We therefore focus
attention on empirical testing of structural models in preference to reduced-form models.
Despite the central role of Merton-style structural models in ﬁnancial theory, market
practice, and global bank regulation, the models have to date been unable to accurately
predict observed levels of credit spreads. The empirical weakness of the model at asset
valuation is well established in a series of studies. Commencing with Jones, Mason &3
Rosenfeld (1983, hereafter JMR), who ﬁnd that a Merton-type model is unable to price
investment-grade corporate bonds better than a naive model that assumes no risk of de-
fault. The Merton model is found to generally overvalue bonds and underestimate credit
spreads. Pricing errors are related to equity variance, leverage, maturity, and time pe-
riod. A subsequent study by Lyden & Saraniti (2000, hereafter LYS) tests whether the
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995, hereafter LS) model, which includes a more realistic spec-
iﬁcation of the default process and includes a stochastic risk-free rate, improves on the
performance of the Merton model. Their study is the ﬁrst to explore the broader class of
structural models in a systematic manner. Like JMR they ﬁnd an overall underprediction
of credit spreads with prediction errors related to coupon and remaining time to maturity
of the bond. Signiﬁcantly, the LS model was found to not improve prediction accuracy.
Finally, the most comprehensive test of structural models was most recently conducted
by Eom, Helwege & Huang (2004, hereafter EHH). Using a similar method to JMR and
LYS, EHH test a version of the Merton model and four subsequent theoretical exten-
sions. Conﬁrming the prior studies, the Merton model underpredicts credit spreads on
average, however, they also ﬁnd that the other models tend to overpredict credits spreads
on average. Valuation prediction accuracy is found to be very poor with the newer struc-
tural models tending to severely overstate credit spreads on ﬁrms with high leverage
or high asset volatility, yet underpredict credit spreads on safe bonds. Thus, it is well
founded in the extant literature that the Merton model underpredicts credit spreads, and
more so for short-tenor debt, and debt issued by default-remote ‘safe’ ﬁrms.
We therefore face the problem that the fundamental economic model for valuing
default risk, which has immense practical and social value in its application, has failed
to pass its most basic test; to explain real world credit spreads. Recently, a plethora of
theoretical extensions have been proposed to address the underprediction problem. A
line of inquiry pursued by the extant theoretical literature has been to relax the simplistic
assumptions of the Merton model. Notwithstanding, these theoretical enhancements, the
empirical literature has conspicuously lagged and failed to provide conclusive guidance
on which model is superior. Further, LYS and EHH’s results suggest that some of these
enhancements have not increased valuation accuracy over and above the original Merton
model.
Despite performing poorly at debt valuation, structural model predictions have been
found to be highly correlated with other measures of ﬁrm default risk. Ogden (1987)
uses probit analysis to regress ﬁrm credit ratings against ﬁrm volatility and leverage as
an indirect test of the Merton model. He ﬁnds that their two variable model explains 79
percent of the cross-sectional variation in issuer ratings and the predicted credit spread
explains nearly 60 percent of the variation in observed market spreads. Delianedis &
Geske (1998) extract risk-neutral probabilities of default from the Merton and Geske
(1977) structural models and perform an event study with rating migrations. They ﬁnd4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
ﬁrst that these implied probabilities of default, from both structural models, possess
signiﬁcant and very early information about subsequent credit rating migrations. Tudela
& Young (2003) further show that the implied probabilities of default from a Merton-
style model are successful in discriminating between failing and non-failing rms. Their
implementation of the Merton approach outperforms a reduced-form model based solely
on company account data. Thus, practitioner use of structural models is supported by
these studies when used as an early indicator of default risk and rating migration, or for
assessing relative credit spreads between ﬁrms.
A possible reason for the contradictory performance of structural models may be due
to the common use of proxy variables to represent latent variables, thereby introducing
a source of estimation error. A proxy variable is a physical representation of a latent
variable that is used in place of indirect estimation of the latent variable. A proxy for
ﬁrm asset value is usually calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book
value of debt, with the default boundary arbitrarily set to be variously: the book value
of liabilities; the book value of debt; or, some proportion of either. The proxy method
has been extensively used in the extant empirical literature by JMR, LYS, EHH, and
partially by Huang & Huang (2003, hereafter HH). Since the total market value of the
ﬁrm is rarely traded, it is not possible to directly estimate the stochastic process of the
ﬁrm through historical observation of the ﬁrm’s return. Similarly, it is even less clear
where the default boundary of the ﬁrm may be as this is not observable unless ex post
after the ﬁrm defaults.
Incontrast, the reduced-form literature, has followed adifferent estimation approach.
With no theoretical relationship posited between the stochastic default process and ﬁrm
capital structure process, researchers have relied on implicit estimation of parameters
from observed bond prices. For example, estimation methods such as quasi maxi-
mum likelihood using the extended Kalman ﬁlter (Duffee 1999), or maximum likelihood
(Dufﬁe, Pederson & Singleton 2000). These methods ensure that the models are cali-
brated with minimal average prediction bias. An obvious advantage of such an approach
is that the models are ﬁtted as well as they can be to the data. The residual errors are
therefore related to model speciﬁcation and not introduced by choice of proxy variable.
Maximum likelihood estimation methods have been applied in alimited wayto struc-
tural credit models, and suggest that prediction errors can be controlled to levels found in
reduced-form model implementations. Ericsson, Reneby & Wang (2003) ﬁt a structural
model on the time-series of ﬁrm equity prices using a maximum a likelihood method
from Duan (2004). They test only one structural model speciﬁcation but ﬁnd predic-
tion errors to be smaller and distinctly less variable than those found in previous im-
plementations of structural and reduced-form models. Bruche (2005) repeats Ericsson
et al. (2003) and achieves a similar result with a non-linear simulated maximum likeli-
hood method. He shows that a maximum likelihood method, using non-linear ltering,5
is superior to the exact maximum likelihood method of Ericsson et al. (2003) because
measurement error can be explicitly included, thus avoiding serious bias in structural
model parameter estimates. Given the presence of market micro-structure, taxes, and
price recording errors, it is unreasonable to assume zero measurement error. We adopt
a similar method to Bruche (2005) and include speciﬁc allowance for measurement er-
ror, but use the more widely practiced estimation method of the extended Kalman ﬁlter
(Cumby & Evans 1995, Claessens & Pennacchi 1996, Duffee 1999, Keswani 2005).
Secondly, the proxy method treats the capital structure of the ﬁrm as observable,
however, the ﬁrm’s observed debt-ratio is unlikely to be a sufﬁciently precise measure
of ﬁrm solvency to be accurate in debt valuation. In an examination of defaulted ﬁrms,
Davydenko (2005) reports that ﬁrms default, on average, when their assets are 72 percent
of the value of the face value of debt. However, as many as one-third default when asset
values are above this point, and an equal number of ﬁrms below it avoid default for
at least a year. He concludes that, ‘even if boundary-based models can be calibrated
to predict the average probability of default, they are still likely to lack accuracy in
the cross-section.’ Further, in the presence of recapitalisation costs, Fischer, Heinkel
& Zechner (1989) show that ﬁrms will be unwilling to adjust their debt-ratios unless
there is a sufﬁciently large shock away from their desired target. The term structure of
a ﬁrm’s credit spreads contains information about expected changes to the ﬁrm’s future
debt levels, but in the presence of costly capital reorganisation costs, we can expect a
large cross-sectional variation in the credit spreads of longer dated bonds not explained
by current gearing ratios. A better method of estimation is to cast each model in state-
space form, in which the transitional density of the ﬁrm’s observed time-series of credit
spreads is represented by a measurement equation with error, that is dependent upon the
transition of the ﬁrm’s latent capital structure process. The latter is determined by the
theoretical form of the structural model and is implied by the observed pattern of credit
spreads.
Finally, another weakness of the extant empirical literature is the failure to control
for non-default related premiums. It is widely accepted that the credit spread contains
premiums for more than default risk, for example, tax and liquidity (Delianedis & Geske
2001, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann 2001). Without control for the these components
of the credit spread, the proxy estimation method will result in underpredicted credit
spreads, and a maximum likelihood method will overstate asset volatility and understate
solvency. To understand the inﬂuence of non-default components of the spread on model
estimates and performance, we ﬁt the models with three different empirical equations:
no premium assumed as abase case; aconstant premium per bond; and ﬁnally aconstant,
and time-varying premium combined, where time-variation is controlled by inclusion of
the Refcorp ten year constant maturity spread in the measurement equation.
While Ericsson et al. (2003) and Bruche (2005) demonstrate the advantages of maxi-6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
mum likelihood methods over the proxy estimation method, neither study systematically
tests a range of structural models. The question of whether theoretical developments
have improved the Merton model, remains open to question. There is therefore a gap in
the literature between the extant discussion of corporate structural model speciﬁcation
by EHH, and the advantages of improved estimation techniques suggested by Erics-
son et al. (2003), Bruche (2005), and as implemented in the reduced-form literature by
(Duffee 1999).
Our hypothesis is that the apparent poor prediction accuracy observed in the ex-
tant empirical literature is the result of estimation methods that assume that the ﬁrm
asset process is observable, or is otherwise closely correlated with an observable proxy.
Furthermore, it is hypothesised that the prediction errors evident from structural credit
models are related to omitted factors that can be inferred from the extant theoretical and
empirical evidence concerning the dynamic behavour of ﬁrm capital structure.
To test the ﬁrst part of our hypothesis, we ﬁt ﬁve different structural models similar
to EHH, but on ﬁrm speciﬁc term structure of credit spreads. Unlike the extant litera-
ture, we infer model parameters from the term structures directly, thereby avoiding the
potential errors introduced in model estimation from proxy variables. We then compare
our prediction errors with those of EHH and HH. The second part of our hypothesis is
tested by regressing independent variables against the model prediction errors where the
selection of variables is guided by stylised facts gathered from a review of the capital
structure literature.
This study extends EHH with the introduction of alternative estimation methods and
data. We therefore continue the line of enquiry that commenced with JMR and LYS. Our
estimation method is a non-linear extended Kalman ﬁlter adapted from Duffee (1999)
for the use with structural models. A unique feature of our study is that we estimate
the models directly from ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit spreads measured across the term structure,
with constant and time-varying controls for the liquidity premium. Speciﬁcally, our
study introduces the following enhancements to the EHH method:
1. the use of high frequency real trade data. Frequent data observations are more
appropriate when estimating the speciﬁcations of the ﬁrm’s continuous latent asset
process;
2. the use of more than one bond on issue by the ﬁrm. We ﬁt the models to the term
structure of credit spreads thereby enforcing both cross-sectional valuation and
transitional distribution model constraints;
3. models areestimated viaquasi maximum likelihood, withcontrols for unexplained
components of the credit spread, thereby ensuring the best possible ﬁt to the data.
Any biases that remain are therefore attributable to model speciﬁcation and not ad
hoc proxy variable selection;7
4. missing data and measurement error is explicitly allowed for by the transformation
of the models into state space form and subsequent ﬁltering.
There is strong evidence that the credit spread is unlikely to contain compensation
for default risk alone; liquidity, tax, and other non-credit related factors have been found
to be embedded in credit spreads (Elton et al. 2001, Delianedis & Geske 2001, Longstaff
2002). When referring to ‘credit’ spreads we refer to the difference in yield between the
yield to maturity of corporate bonds and the yield to maturity of same maturity Treasury
bonds, and acknowledge that there may exist some compensation for other factors.
The models chosen for examination are similar to EHH and HH and enable compar-
ison with their results. We select models where tractable solutions are available. Firstly,
we implement the extended Merton model of EHH. This serves a useful comparison
between our results and EHH. Secondly, we implement two versions of the LS model.
This model represents an exogenous boundary model, and is the ﬁrst major extension
of the Merton model which includes many features subsequently adopted in the theo-
retical literature. It has also been studied by EHH and LYS. The ﬁrst version, hereafter
referred to as the LS1 model, holds the risk-free rate constant, and is comparable to the
base case model of HH. The second version, hereafter referred to as the LS2 model,
incorporates a stochastic risk-free rate. An endogenous boundary model is represented
by the Leland & Toft (1996, hereafter LT). This model has also been ﬁtted by HH and
EHH. Next we consider the most commonly studied dynamic boundary model of Collin-
Dufresne & Goldstein (2001, hereafter CDG). Finally, an alternative to the usual asset
distribution assumption of geometric Brownian motion is tested by way of a constant
elasticity of variance model (hereafter CEV). This model has the property that asset
variance increases as default is approached, thus consistent with hypothesised manage-
ment behaviour under the agency theory of (Jensen & Meckling 1976). A structural
CEV model of capital structure was ﬁrst proposed by Barone-Adesi & Colwell (1999),
and has been independently suggested for valuing equity default swaps (Albanese &
Chen 2005, Campi & Sbuelz 2005).
This study is the ﬁrst to systematically compare a range of structural models for
miss-speciﬁcation using quasi maximum likelihood methods, thus limiting the inﬂuence
of estimation errors introduced by the use of proxy variables. We ask which of the
theoretical extensions tested, if any, have improved model speciﬁcation. Secondly, we
ask whether the prediction error biases are consistent with the prior literature, and what
theoretical developments can be inferred from their presence after consideration of the
biases and the related capital structure literature. Further, we provide a comparison to
HH by asking how much of the credit spread is explained by structural models, when the
structural models are ﬁtted directly from credit spreads. Finally, we determine where the
implied default boundary is relative to the ﬁrm’s debt level.
We ﬁnd that all models underpredict short-term spreads on low leveraged ﬁrms and8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
on short-term debt. Recent theoretical extensions to include stochastic interest rates and
ﬁrm target debt management behaviour do not appear to have signiﬁcantly improved
model performance. Prediction errors across all models are non-normal and fatter tailed
than expected with autocorrelation evident in their time series. Inclusion of dynamic
recovery risk, linked to an observable business cycle proxy, and a ﬁrm asset jump, appear
to be necessary theoretical enhancements.
Chapter 2 sets out a review of the theoretical and empirical literature, related capital
structure theory and evidence, and a summary of extant research methods and ﬁndings.
In Chapter 3, the data and econometric estimation method is discussed including an ex-
planation of the empirical forms of the models to be tested. Findings are detailed in
Chapter 4, including a discussion of diagnostic results, comparison of implied and ob-
served solvency, a quantiﬁcation of the extent to which credit spread levels are explained
by default risk models, and testing for potential missing variables. Chapter 5 concludes.Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) the theoreti-
cal credit literature has grown rapidly, however, empirical studies have been relatively
few, particularly in the comparison of competing models. The aim of the chapter is
to summarise past empirical work, showing where this study contributes to the extant
empirical literature, and to describe the choice of models and potential sources of miss-
speciﬁcation that may exist in the extant models.
In this chapter we review of the extant credit risk models placing particular focus on
assumptions made about ﬁrm asset process and capital structure dynamics. The central
difference between a reduced-form approach to bond valuation, versus the structural
model approach, is that the latter posits that credit spread dynamics are a function of
management decisions concerning the ﬁrm’s physical capital structure. Underpinning
all structural models of credit risk is a hypothesised relationship between the dynamic
process of the ﬁrm’s solvency and its credit spreads; ceteris paribus, short-term credit
spreads are a function of present debt levels, long-term spreads are also a function of the
ﬁrm’s expected future debt-ratio, and the change in credit spreads is a function of the
ﬁrm’s expected rate of change in its debt-ratio. For the sole purpose of bond valuation,
it is not necessary that the structural model be based on an accepted theory of the ﬁrm;
reduced-form models are an example of a valuation approach that works without seeking
theoretical justiﬁcation. However, a theoretically well-founded speciﬁcation is more
likely to prove a more robust valuation model.
We therefore review the related capital structure theory and evidence, in order to
place the structural models in perspective of the theory of the ﬁrm. We classify the
theoretical literature by the manner in which the ﬁrm’s default boundary is assumed to
evolve; distinguishing between those where the default boundary level is assumed to
be exogenous to the model, and those where it is determined by management reacting
endogenously within the model. We further distinguish between the assumption of static
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and dynamic variation of the default boundary.
We show how the theoretical models of capital structure and empirical evidence of
capital structure dynamics have inﬂuenced the design of extant structural credit models.
We summarise the capital structure evidence into a set of stylised facts. Gaps and incon-
sistencies in the application of capital structure theory are identiﬁed as possible sources
of structural model miss-speciﬁcation suitable for further testing.
The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows. The difference between reduced-
form and structural credit models is explained in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 describes the
Black-Scholes-Merton model, its assumptions, and their limitations. In Section 2.4 we
review a sample of main structural models, classifying models by the assumed properties
of the default boundary. Section 2.5 brieﬂy reviews the two main theories of capital
structure, Pecking-Order and Trade-Off theory, describing the static and dynamic forms.
A set of stylised facts are gathered and their implication on debt valuation and structural
model design is discussed. Finally, in Section 2.6 the extant empirical literature on
structural model testing is reviewed noting the contribution of this study.
2.2 Reduced-Form versus Structural Models
There are two theoretical approaches to the valuation of default-risky bonds. The ﬁrst,
termed ‘structural modelling’, characterises default as the result of the ﬁrm’s asset value
failing to exceed a future critical value, termed the default boundary, at which point
default is triggered. Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton are the earliest examples.
Credit spreads result from a theoretical model describing the ﬁrm value process and
its lower default boundary. Equivalently, a structural model can be described as having
an underlying ratio of ﬁrm value to the default boundary that represents a measure of
economic solvency.
The second approach does not impose a theoretical structure to the speciﬁcation of
default. In the reduced-form literature, default is assumed to be a random event with a
probability governed by a known intensity, or hazard rate, process. Default is therefore
always anunexpected surprise. There isnoattempt toparameterise default intensity from
any underlying theory of the ﬁrm and the dynamics of the ﬁrm’s underlying solvency,
instead the intensity is derived directly from credit spreads or other observable data such
as credit ratings. Examples of this approach include: Jarrow & Turnbull (1995), Jarrow
(1997), Dufﬁe & Singleton (1999), and Madan & Unal (1996).1 In contrast, the default
event in structural modelling depends upon the ﬁrst passage of a continuously diffu-
sive state variable to a ﬁxed boundary. In continuous time, default is instantaneously
predictable and therefore never a surprise.
1Nandi (1998) gives an overview of earlier reduced-form models. Dufﬁe & Singleton (2003) and
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Where pricing data is readily available, the reduced-form approach is able to repli-
cate observed credit spreads relatively simply and in a manner consistent with no arbi-
trage. Thus, it ﬁts neatly into the ﬁnancial engineer’s toolkit for relative debt pricing.
Of course if price data is limited (the market is not complete), reduced-form models are
of limited assistance. This is a particular problem for credit modelling where there are
often insufﬁciently similar assets available to fully span the market on default risk for
an individual issuer. Litterman & Iben (1991) demonstrate how different ﬁrms can be
grouped into cohorts of similar rating agency grades and industry, under a strong as-
sumption of homogeneity, in order to achieve sufﬁcient data points to construct a term
structure of hazard rates.
On the other hand, structural models are well known for being difﬁcult to estimate
since the underlying stochastic process driving the risk of default is unobserved. Despite
this, structural models are worthy of study for two reasons. Firstly, they are valuable in
their own right as tools for theoretical development. Structural models relate debt valua-
tion to an underlying theory of the ﬁrm directly, or to stylised facts that obtain from our
understanding of how the ﬁrm manages default risk and bankruptcy costs. Credit spread
term structures are the market’s perception of how management will balance the costs
and beneﬁts of debt, over time, responding to shocks in the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows,
and the value of its assets. Direct measurement of the ﬁrm’s debt management policy
is difﬁcult since the ﬁrm’s capital structure target, if it exists, is not directly observable
and may be masked by the inﬂuence of transaction costs. Robust structural models,
estimated from market prices, could bring additional information to the problem of un-
derstanding dynamic capital management, and whether ﬁrms do target a debt-ratio or
not, as perceived and encapsulated in prices by the debt markets. Secondly, structural
models are ﬁnding uses in risk management for the estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc default
risk, pricing of credit, and portfolio modelling of joint default risk including being the
basis for the setting of regulatory capital for the largest international banks operating
under the Basel II supervisory accord.
We focus our attention on structural models of credit risk, and in particular, the
empirical estimation of several competing models, using a latent variable approach that
minimises the potential confounding error present whentheﬁrm’ssolvency isincorrectly
assumed to be observable, and well approximated, by accounting and stock information.
2.3 The Black-Scholes-Merton Model
Black & Scholes (1973) ﬁrst proposed that debt and equity are contingent claims on the
assets of the ﬁrm. Their argument is elegantly simple. In a leveraged ﬁrm, shareholders
have a claim to the residual value of the ﬁrm with a payoff analogous to a call option.
Assume the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced by equity and a single zero-coupon bond and there are no12 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
transaction costs, taxes, and other market imperfections. At maturity of the bond, if ﬁrm
value is insufﬁcient to pay the bondholders, the shareholders will rationally default to
ﬂoor their loss at zero, and allow ownership of the ﬁrm to transfer to the bondholders. If
ﬁrm value exceeds the face value of debt, shareholders maximise their wealth by paying
bondholders and receiving the value of the ﬁrm in return. Therefore, a share represents
the right to buy the ﬁrm’s assets from bondholders contingent on the future value of the
ﬁrmrelative to theface value of debt. Thevalue of thedefault-risky debt isestablished by
put-call parity arguments to be equivalent to the value of a riskless bond and a short put
option on the ﬁrm’s assets. Credit risk is a function of the capital structure and dynamics
of the ﬁrm. This simple insight represents the classic economic model of credit risk that
links debt and equity valuation to the rational behaviour of shareholders, the volatility of
the ﬁrm’s assets (its operational risk), and the level of ﬁrm gearing. For different bond
maturities, a term structure of bond values, or credit spreads, can be fully determined.
A shortcoming of the model is the simplicity of its assumptions. While the model
can show how bond value will change in response to leverage and therefore the inﬂuence
of gearing on borrowing costs, it does not explain what the optimal choice of debt for
the ﬁrm should be, or why the ﬁrm has the present level of debt. Without the presence
of taxes and bankruptcy costs, there is no beneﬁt of debt to offset the increased costs
of borrowing. The model is therefore unable to satisfactorily link asset value to capital
structure theory. In Section 2.3.1 we discuss the model’s assumptions, and limitations,
more fully.
2.3.1 Theory
Merton applies Black & Scholes (1973) directly to the valuation of default-risky bonds.
To keep the debt valuation solution tractable, he makes the following simplifying as-
sumptions:
[A1] Markets are complete and frictionless; no transaction costs, taxes, or other market
imperfections including bankruptcy costs. Trading of the ﬁrm’s assets takes place
in continuous-time;
[A2] The value of the ﬁrm is independent of the capital structure of the ﬁrm. This is
the Modigliani & Miller (1958) theorem. It follows from [A1] that, in the absence
of taxes and bankruptcy costs, ﬁrm value is independent of the level of debt;
[A3] The risk-free rate, r, is the same for all maturities over time;
[A4] Firm value return is stochastic described by geometric Brownian motion with drift
dV(t)
V(t)
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whereV(t) is the stochastic market value of the ﬁrm, r is the risk-free rate, d is the
net payout to other claimants (for example, dividend payments), sv is the time-
invariant volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets, and W(t)Q is a standard Weiner process
under the risk-neutral measure;
[A5] The ﬁrm is leveraged by a single-zero coupon bond liability with face value F,
payable at maturity T.
The assumptions imply a simplistic theory of capital structure. The ﬁrm’s market
value leverage will evolve stochastically up to the point of maturity of the debt. Share-
holders are indifferent to the intermediate levels of gearing, and passively wait for the
outcome of whether ﬁrm assets exceed the face value of debt or not. Likewise, bond-
holders are indifferent to the ﬁrm’s intermediate levels of gearing, and hold no solvency
covenants that may have otherwise enabled them to trigger early default.
At maturity of the bond, t = T, if assets fail to exceed the required repayment
on debt, F, it is rational for value maximising shareholders to not pay, thereby lim-
iting their payoff to zero. Otherwise, if V(T) > F, it is optimal for them to pay F
and receive V(T)−F. The payoff at maturity to shareholders is therefore given by,
E(T) = max[0,V(T)−F]. Conversely, the value at maturity of the bond is obtained
from put call parity as P(T) = F −max[0,F −V(T)]. Thus, the payoff to bondholders
is equivalent to a portfolio comprising a riskless bond paying face value, F, and a short
‘put-to-default’ option on the ﬁrm. From (Black & Scholes 1973), Merton shows the
























and N( ) denotes the area under the standard cumulative normal distribution and the
conditioning parameters are Q = {r,sv,d}. The bond’s credit spread is deﬁned as the










Itshould benoted thatthe underlying capital structure process isrisk-neutral. Thatis,
under the assumption of no-arbitrage, debt valuation can be performed as if investors do
not require a premium for the uncertainty of their investment, and require only the risk-14 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
free rate of return. The probability of the ﬁrm’s assets crossing the default boundary (i.e.
the ﬁrm defaulting), and the expected payoff in default, do not include any compensation
for arisk premium. Fordebt valuation purposes it isnot necessary to distinguish between
risk neutral and real-world probabilities, however, the latter is strictly lower due to the
additional premium for risk taking by risk-averse investors. It follows that parameters
of the asset process obtained implicitly from asset prices will overestimate the true real-
world (or physical) probability of default.
2.3.2 Firm solvency dynamics
LS ﬁrst noted that for the purpose of valuing debt, it is not knowledge of the stochastic
process followed by the ﬁrm’sassets per se, but rather knowledge ofthe process followed
by the ratio of the ﬁrm’s value of assets, V, to the default boundary, K. We deﬁne the
ﬁrm’s log-solvency ratio to be x(t) = lnV(t)−lnK(t), and following LS, a description
of the stochastic differential process for x(t) is then sufﬁcient to value debt without
knowledge of the ﬁrm’s asset value or the default boundary level. The log-solvency
ratio, x(t), can be interpreted as a continuous measure of the ﬁrm’s solvency. The larger
its value, the greater the buffer between the ﬁrm’s present value and its default boundary,
hence the increased ability of the ﬁrm to absorb unexpected shocks and remain solvent.
A similar measure, popularised by Moody’s-KMV for the purpose of default prediction,
is the ‘distance-to-default’, or DD(t) (Crosbie & Bohn 2002). This latter measure is
the number of standard deviations the ﬁrm’s assets are from the default boundary, when









where m is the expected rate of return on the ﬁrm’s assets. The ﬁrm’s risk-neutral prob-
ability of default, measured from time-t to time-T, is given by N(−DD(t)).
The distance-to-default nests the log-solvency ratio. Thus, log-solvency ratio is eco-
nomically equivalent to an unstandardised distance-to-default, measured instantaneously
relative to immediate asset values, and not projected to the maturity of the bond, or other
future date. Compared to the distance-to-default statistic, the log-solvency ratio is inde-
pendent of bond maturity and does not require estimation of the ﬁrm’s expected rate of
return. However, unlike DD(t), the log-solvency ratio is not a sufﬁcient measure of de-
fault risk without knowledge of the ﬁrm’s asset volatility. So whilst theoretically correct
in use as a state variable for our purpose of debt valuation, it is not a complete a measure
of ﬁrm default risk for the purpose of default prediction.2
2The empirical performance of the distance-to-default measure as a predictor of future default events
has been assessed by Bharath & Shumway (2004), as contributory factor explaining forward risk-neutral
hazard rates by Dufﬁe, Saita & Wang (n.d.), and on ﬁrm equity return and prediction of default by Vassalou
& Xing (2004). Since the liabilities of the ﬁrm vary over time, and bond maturities vary between ﬁrms, it is2.3. THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTONMODEL 15
Merton assumes the default boundary is equal to the face value of debt, which is
constant for all time. Therefore, K(t) = K = F∀te[0,T] and x(t) = lnV(t)−lnK.
A simplifying assumption of Merton is that default can only occur at T, if x(T) ≤ 0.
From Ito’s lemma and equation (2.1) it follows that the stochastic differential equation
of x(t) is arithmetic Brownian motion with constant drift
dx(t) = (r−d −s2
v/2)dt +svdW(t)Q . (2.7)
With no loss of generality, we let K = F = 1 so that equation (2.2) is more compactly
expressed as being conditional on the ﬁrm’s initial log-solvency ratio, x(0). The present,
time t=0, value of a zero-coupon bond, with a one dollar face value payable at time t=T,
is then














2.3.3 Default and Recovery
The Merton model deﬁnes a functional relationship between the risk-neutral probability
of default and the risk-neutral expected payoff to bondholders in the event of default.
This is illustrated in this section by expressing the Merton model into the notation of an
equivalent reduced-form model. Let Q(0,T;x(0),Q) be the risk-neutral probability of
default at time T, and (1-w)K be the risk-neutral expected payoff to bondholders in the
event of default. Using the terminology of LS, the fraction of bond face value lost in
bankruptcy, w, is termed the ‘writedown rate’ and 1−w the ‘recovery rate’.
Given the ﬁrm’s asset return is assumed to be normally distributed in the Merton
model, the risk-neutral probability of the ﬁrm defaulting at time-T, measured from t=0,
is the area under the standard normal distribution where V(T) < K. The risk-neutral
probability of default is therefore given by
Q(0,T;x(0),Q) = N(−d2) . (2.9)
The risk-neutral expected recovery rate is the expected value ofV(T), given that the ﬁrm
usual to set T=1, and replace K with K(t), measured as the rms book measure of short-term debt, plus one
half of its long-term debt, based on its quarterly balance sheet.16 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW










Once again, we generalise with F = K = 1, and recognising that x(0) = lnV(0)−lnK,
the risk-neutral expected recovery rate, per dollar of face value, is compactly expressed
in terms of the log-solvency ratio as
(1−w) = ex(0)+(r−d)T N(−d1)
N(−d2)
. (2.11)
Thefair value ofthe default-risky bond isthe present value oftherisk-neutral expectation
of the bond’s payoff at time-T. The bond will pay either its one-dollar face value if the
ﬁrm is solvent at time T, or the expected recovery, (1−w) if in default. The fair value
is therefore the given by 3




Thus, we show that the Merton model implies that a ﬁrm’s risk-neutral default prob-
ability and its risk-neutral expected recovery rate are endogenous and are negatively
correlated. A rise in default risk caused by an increase in asset volatility, or reduction in
solvency, or lower asset growth, will also result in reduced expected bond recovery. An
increase in leverage increases the likelihood of default and decreases the expected recov-
ery for bondholders. An increase in volatility increases the value of the put-to-default
option and therefore increases the credit spread by similarly increasing the probability
of default and reducing the recovery for bondholders. The short rate and net payout
jointly inﬂuence the drift of the ﬁrm’s assets; the greater the positive drift the lower the
likelihood of default and better recovery for bondholders.
Real-world, or physical probabilities, can be obtained from the Merton model with
an adjusted drift rate. All previous results hold with the difference that the drift rate of
the ﬁrm is adjusted upwards by the addition of an asset risk premium, p, so that the
log-solvency process of the ﬁrm evolves as
dx(t) = (r+p −d −s2
v/2)dt +svdW(t)P, (2.13)
wherePdenotes aphysical probability distribution. Thisresult isused by HHto calibrate
the Merton model parameters to observed historical default rates.
3Note that equation (2.8) can be obtained by substituting into equation (2.12), the risk-neutral expected
default (equation (2.9)) and risk-neutral expected recovery (equation (2.11)).2.3. THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTONMODEL 17
2.3.4 The Predicted Term Structure of Credit Spreads
A ﬁrm’s term structure of credit spreads is the set of credit spreads, observed jointly
at time-t, for bonds issued by the same ﬁrm with different remaining maturities. The
Merton model predicts that a bond’s credit spread at time-t, is a function of its term to
maturity, T −t, the log-solvency ratio of the issuing ﬁrm, x(t), the ﬁrm’s asset return
volatility, sv, the risk-free rate, r, and the net payout to other claimants, d. and By
varying the remaining maturity, holding all other parameters constant, the Merton model
























































































































(c) Risk-neutral expected recovery rate
Figure 2.1: Shown in ﬁgure (a) is the credit spread term structure predicted by the Merton model at different
initial levels of log-solvency, x(t) = lnV(t)/K. The risk-neutral default probability is shown in (b), and
the risk-neutral expected recovery rate is shown in (c). Initial log-solvency levels of 1.44 (low risk), 0.775
(medium risk), and 0.367 (high risk), areequal tothesample quartilelevels of the logof the market solvency
ratio. The market solvency ratio is calculated from CRSP and COMPUSTAT data as the sum of the ﬁrm
equity value and book debt over book debt. Other parameters are sv = 25 percent, r=6 percent, and d=5
percent.
credit spread term structures, assuming different levels of initial solvency, for a repre-
sentative ﬁrm. Figure 2.1(b) shows the implied risk-neutral probabilities of default, and
Figure 2.1(c) shows the risk-neutral expected recovery rates, corresponding to the model18 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
parameters and solvency levels. The initial level of unobserved log-solvency, x(t), is set
equal to the quartiles of our sample of observed log-solvency ratios, measured across
trade dates and ﬁrms. For illustration only, we use the observed log-solvency ratio as a
proxy for the unobserved latent ﬁrm solvency, x(t). Table 3.5 reports the market credit
spreads observed in our sample, pooled across time and ﬁrms, by quartiles of the market
log-solvency ratio.
The observed log-solvency ratio is calculated as the ﬁrm’s market value of equity
plus book value of debt, divided by the book value of debt. Computation of the observed
solvency ratio is explained further in Section 3.2.6 where we use it to drive our initial
ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimate of the latent log-solvency ratio, and to derive a ﬁrm-speciﬁc initial
estimate of asset volatility. Other parameters are chosen for illustration.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the shape of the term structure of credit spreads is a function
of the term structures of the default probability, expected recovery rates, and the time
value of money. For the safest ﬁrms, at the upper quartile of solvency at x(t)=1.44,
credit spreads are low and increase monotonically with maturity from zero at time-t to
approximately 50 basis points at (T −t)=30 years. The default probability is the lowest
for the safest ﬁrms and rises approximately linearly with respect to maturity from zero
at time-0, to approximately 25 percent at (T −t)=30 years . The expected recovery rate
for the safest ﬁrms is the highest, beginning at 100 percent at time-t, and decreases with
maturity to approximately 50 percent at (T −t)=30 years. Thus, the combined effect of
increasing default probabilities and decreasing recovery rates, causes the credit spread
to increase with maturity. The negative correlation between default and recovery with
maturity, is caused by the increasing volatility of the ﬁrm’s future asset value over time.
As maturity is lengthened, the range of possible asset values that may result at maturity
increases, causing a greater chance of asset values ending below the default boundary.
If the ﬁrm defaults, the expected asset value available to pay bondholders in recovery is
also lower.
For the highest risk ﬁrms, illustrated in Figure 2.1(a) by the lower quartile of sol-
vency ratios, the credit spread term structure initially increases rapidly caused by the
very steep rise in default rate as shown in Figure 2.1(b). The default probabilities are
the highest for this quartile, rising from zero at time-t to approximately 60 percent at
(T −t)=30 years, and the recovery rates, as shown in Figure 2.1(c), are the lowest falling
to approximately 40 percent at (T −t)=30 years. Higher default risk and lower recov-
ery is due to the initial ﬁrm value starting close to the default boundary. The default
probability rises with maturity but at a decreasing rate. The resulting ﬂattening of the
default probability results in a falling credit spread for medium and long-term bonds due
to the inﬂuence of discounting; the present value cost of default outweighs the marginal
increase in default probability. Figure 2.1(a) shows the peak credit spread for the highest
risk quartile of ﬁrms to be at approximately (T −t)=5 years. Thus, the Merton model,2.3. THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTONMODEL 19
and structural models generally, predict a characteristic ‘hump-shape’ to credit spread
term structures of high risk ﬁrms. Empirically there is mixed support for this predic-
tion. Sarig & Warga (1989) average credit spreads across ﬁrms and time and report
downward sloping term structures for ﬁrms rated B and C. However, Helwege & Turner
(1999) show that this does not hold when term structure is measured from bonds issued
by the same ﬁrm on the same date. They conclude that most speculative grade ﬁrms
exhibit positively sloped credit spread term structures.
The Merton model, like all structural models, is a dynamic model of the credit spread
term structure. The term structure, at a given time-t, is a result of the model’s predic-
tion at time-t by equation (2.8) for for different remaining maturities as shown in Fig-
ure 2.1(a). The term structure will also vary in time as a function of the path taken by
the ﬁrm’s log-solvency ratio as modelled by equation (2.7). For a given maturity, the
credit spread is expected to change over a ﬁnite time step as a function of the ﬁrm’s
expected future log-solvency ratio. Knowledge of a ﬁrm’s model parameters, therefore
facilitates prediction of a credit spread term structure and the likely transition of the
credit spreads between time periods. We refer to the former model property as a cross-
sectional constraint and the latter as a time-series constraint. The distinction is important
when implicitly estimating parameters from term structure models. If we were to aver-
age spreads over time, or ﬁnd the best ﬁtting parameters to match a ﬁrm’s term structure
at a single point in time, then parameters are ﬁtted using only cross-sectional informa-
tion without regard to how well the time-series of observed credit spread movements is
explained by the model. If we were to ﬁt the time-variation of constant maturity bond
spreads then we would select parameters that are maximised to only explain the time
series transition of credit spreads without regard to how well the model jointly ﬁts bonds
of different maturity. Geyer & Pichler (1999) show that in the context of risk-free term
structure modelling, the state-space estimation method, ‘simultaneously integrates time
series and cross-sectional aspects of the model. Since this approach is consistent with
the underlying economic model, and can utilise all available information, it provides a
powerful test’, (Geyer & Pichler 1999, p.1). Therefore, in order to provide the strongest
test of model speciﬁcation, we transform the credit models into state-space form as de-
scribed further in Section 3.2, and estimate the models on panel data.
2.3.5 Limitations of the Black-Scholes-Merton Model
In this section we describe the main simplifying assumptions of the Merton model. In
particular, the Merton model assumes an unrealistically simple capital structure, and ig-
nores dynamic capital management. As discussed further in Section 2.4, efforts to relax
these unrealistic assumptions has motivated the development of the broader structural
modelling literature.20 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3.5.1 Complex Debt Structures
Firms are usually funded by many individual coupon-paying bonds, together with bank
ﬁnance, trade credit, leasing, and other forms of credit. Unlike the Merton model, the
aggregate payment pattern for the ﬁrm requires almost continuous partial liquidation of
ﬁrm assets. Consequently, neither F nor T is unambiguously observable. In practice,
researchers have approached estimating the Merton model by several methods.
Firstly, samples may be restricted to include only ﬁrms with relatively simple capital
structures that are close to the single-payment zero-coupon bond ideal of the Merton
model. This approach is widely adopted in the empirical literature, for example JMR
select ﬁrmswith ‘asmall number of debt issues’, LSinclude ﬁrmswith only one publicly
traded bond, and EHHselect ﬁrmswith no more than twopublicly traded bonds on issue.
Anobvious problem with restricting the sample is that the sample is biased towards ﬁrms
that are less actively traded in the market and are less representative of ﬁrms that access
the bond market.
Secondly, the levelof F maybeestimated byaproxy variable thatattempts toinclude
a weighting across maturities. The proxy adopted by Moody’s-KMV, for the purpose of
default probability prediction, is to set F to be one-half of total long-term debt plus all
debt due inone year (Crosbie &Bohn2002, Vassalou & Xing2004). Therationale isthat
the short dated liabilities contribute more to default risk, however, Bharath & Shumway
(2004) show that default prediction accuracy is relatively unaffected by whether F is the
face value of debt or a more complex proxy.
Unlike default prediction modelling, where average calibration error is mitigated by
mapping the measured DD(t) to historical default rate data, the predicted credit spread
obtained from the Merton model is sensitive to the choice of default boundary. The dif-
ﬁculty in choosing a default boundary is reﬂected in the various approaches followed in
the literature with no single method dominating. EHH assume the ﬁrm’s default bound-
ary to be equal to the book value of total liabilities. Theyobserve that the Moody’s-KMV
rule of thumb for weighting debt by maturity results in a lower default boundary com-
pared to using total liabilities, and therefore a much lower predicted credit spread that
compounds the underprediction bias of the Merton model. LS tested alternative mea-
sures of the default boundary and found the ‘Equal All’ approach gives the lowest price
prediction errors. This assumes that all debt is retired at the maturity of the bond, with
equal priority given to all creditors in the event of default. JMR assume that the default
boundary is equal to the face value of the bond being valued.
Finally, the Merton model has been extended to value coupon-paying debt in an ad
hoc manner by EHH. They sum the default-risky present value of the bonds promised
payments assuming independence between the payments. The default boundary is not
the face value of the promised payment, but rather the total of the ﬁrms liabilities. The
approach is simple in practice to apply and is shown by EHH to perform relatively well2.3. THE BLACK-SCHOLES-MERTONMODEL 21
compared to more complex structural models. We adopt a similar extension to the Mer-
ton model as EHH, but unlike all prior studies, we do not assume the default boundary
to be an accounting value, but rather let the log of the ratio of the ﬁrm value to default
boundary be an unobserved state variable that is recovered implicitly from the observed
term structure of credit spreads. The state variable and our extension to the Merton
model is explained more fully in Section 3.2.6.1.
The advantage of our method of implying the default boundary is threefold. Firstly,
we do not impose a bias due to ad hoc choice of the default boundary. In the absence
of any single proxy dominating in prior studies, it is far from clear what an appropri-
ate proxy should be. Secondly, accounting leverage is updated only quarterly whereas
our credit spread data is observed on a daily basis with approximately a week on average
between observations per bond. Our method enables an estimate of the underlying lever-
age of the ﬁrm on each trade date. Finally, the ﬁrm may not default when market value
hits the face value of debt. HH assume that the ﬁrm’s default boundary is equal to 60
percent of total liabilities when calibrating their base case LS model to observed average
default rates. HH argue that the default boundary must be below the level of liabilities,
on average, based on prior studies of bond recovery rates that show assets available for
distribution to bondholders are less than can be reasonably explained by the presence
of bankruptcy costs alone. Recently, Davydenko (2005) provides evidence that default
occurs, on average, when ﬁrm value is 72 percent below the face value of total debt.
However, since as many as one third of defaults happen above this boundary, while 54
percent of rms with market assets below the face value of debt do not default for at least
a year, and 38 percent never default throughout his sample period. For defaulted ﬁrms,
the mean ratio of the ﬁrm market value to the face value of debt is 65.1 percent with a
26.6 percent standard deviation.
Davydenko’s (2005) empirical observations cast considerable doubt on the accuracy
of empirical studies of structural model performance in which the default boundary is
assumed to be a simple observation of accounting debt. He poses the question,
How can models of credit risk be advanced, given this evidence regarding
empirical default triggers? One approach is to try to model more accurately
the boundary empirically, in the hope that its value can be explained if a suf-
ﬁcient number of ﬁrm characteristics are included as explanatory variables.
An alternative is to abandon hope of predicting default as a deterministic
‘cause-and-effect event, and assume that either the boundary or the true
value of assets is unobservable. (Davydenko 2005, p.25)
Our method of implicitly estimating the unobserved log-solvency ratio is consistent
with the suggestion of Davydenko (2005), and avoids adding unnecessary bias and noise
into the structural model estimation process that is likely to be prevalent in the extant
empirical studies of JMR, LYS, EHH, and HH.22 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3.5.2 Default Only at Maturity
In the Merton model, default can only occur at maturity of the bond, T, regardless of the
path followed by the ﬁrm’s asset value prior to maturity. Thus, ﬁrm net worth may be
negative prior to bond maturity, but since repayment of the bond is ﬁxed at time-T, the
ﬁrm will not default if the ﬁrm is otherwise solvent at time-T. However, in practice, it
is common that bonds include covenants designed to reduce the risk of wealth transfer
from bondholders to shareholders by specifying that the bond’s face value is to be repaid
immediately should the ﬁrm fail tomaintain minimum solvency levels at all times (Smith
& Warner 1979).
Black & Cox (1976) extend the Merton model default process to include a minimum
net worth ‘safety’ covenant. They assume that should ﬁrm value fall below the level K =
Fexp−r(T −t) prior to time-T, the ﬁrm is defaulted by bondholders. Unlike the Merton
model, default in the presence of safety covenants becomes a ﬁrst-passage distribution of
asset value to default boundary K. The default boundary is assumed to be exogenously
known and its dependency on time is purely arbitrary.
LS suggest that an exogenous default boundary may be used to model default under
alternative assumptions of the default process. In the simplest net worth insolvency
case, K may represent total liabilities. Alternatively, K may be the result of contractual
covenants agreed with bondholders as per Black & Cox (1976), or it may be the level of
ﬁrm assets associated with default by lack of working capital. The latter may arise where
the ﬁrm is net worth positive but has an insufﬁcient excess of current assets over current
liabilities to meet liabilities falling due. For bond valuation purposes, it is sufﬁcient that
K represent the lower level of ﬁrm value at which it is exogenously known that default
will occur. Unlike Black & Cox (1976), LS assume the default boundary is constant
through time.
Davydenko (2005) ﬁnds that the ratio of the market value of assets to the face value
of debt is the single most important predictor of default therefore providing empirical
support for LS’s contention. Unfortunately, it is not straight forward to exogenously
know what the appropriate level of default boundary, K, relative to ﬁrm value, V, is
ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm.
Rather than assuming an exogenous, continuous default boundary, an alternative
method for extending the Meton model to include early default is offered by Geske
(1977) (hereafter Geske). He models default-risky debt as a compound option. At each
promised payment date shareholders choose to pay a strike price for the right to continue
ownership of the ﬁrm, or otherwise allow the ﬁrm to default. However, the more com-
plex the ﬁrm’s debt structure is, and the greater the number and frequency of coupon
payments to be made are, the less tractable the compound option solution becomes. The
model has therefore experienced little empirical implementation (EHH being a notable
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2.3.5.3 No Bankruptcy Costs
TheMerton model assumes that there isno loss of ﬁrmvalue asa consequence of default,
that is, there are no bankruptcy costs associated with default. Since ﬁrm asset ownership
passes to the bondholders at default, any loss in value results in a reduced payoff to
bondholders. By ignoring bankruptcy costs, that are otherwise rationally expected by
bondholders, the Merton model may overprice debt and underpredict credit spreads.
Bankruptcy costs arise for a number of reasons. These can be either direct costs
(legal and other professional fees), or indirect costs (reduced management focus and
consequent loss in ﬁrm competitiveness, loss of key suppliers and markets and increased
operating costs). Direct costs are estimated to be ﬁve percent, three percent and four
percent of ﬁrm assets by Warner (1977), Weiss (1990), and Altman (1984) respectively.
While direct costs appear relatively minor, especially in a present value context, indirect
costs could be very substantial. This is particularly so if weconsider the underinvestment
agency problem raised by Myers (1977). Underinvestment occurs when shareholders in
a high default risk ﬁrm choose rationally not to invest in positive NPV projects, if the
future beneﬁts are likely to pass primarily to bondholders. Altman (1984) estimates to-
tal bankruptcy costs, including indirect costs, on large industrial ﬁrms to be 24 percent.
Alderson & Betker (1995) measures the difference between the going concern value,
immediately prior to default, and ﬁrm liquidation value. They estimate average total
bankruptcy costs to be 36.5 percent of the prior-to-default going concern value. Fo-
cussing only on highly-leveraged transactions, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimate the
total net cost of ﬁnancial distress to be 10 to 20 percent of non-distressed ﬁrm value.4
2.3.5.4 No Breach of Absolute Priority Rule
The Absolute Priority Rule (APR) describes an ideal outcome in bankruptcy law where
no claimant can receive payment from ﬁrm assets until more senior claimants have been
satisﬁed in full. A breach occurs where there is effectively an ex post change in priorities
of creditors resulting from the bankruptcy process (Franks & Torous 1989). The Merton
model assumes bondholders receive the value ofthe ﬁrmin theevent of default. A breach
of APR decreases the amount of ﬁrm assets receivable by the bondholders in the event
of default and increases the required credit spread, if expected ex ante by bondholders,
in a similar manner to bankruptcy costs.
Under U.S. bankruptcy law there are two possible methods of corporate bankruptcy:
Chapter 7 provides for the orderly liquidation of a ﬁrm’s assets by a court-appointed
trustee, and payment to claimants in order of priority is always maintained; Chapter
11 provides for reorganisation of the ﬁrm by which a plan of reorganisation must be
4Qualitatively, they concluded bankruptcy costs were mainly attributable to: curtailed capital expendi-
ture, asset disposals at depressed prices, and delay in restructuring.24 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
negotiated among the various parties and agreed with the court (Weiss 1990, p.291).
Importantly Chapter 11 provides protection from creditors for management acting on
behalf of shareholders, while a reorganisation plan is developed. Costs accrued during
this period are ultimately borne by creditors. Chapter 11 is the predominate method of
bankruptcy ﬁling. Because of the need for agreement amongst claimants, in Chapter
11 junior creditors and residual claimants have increased bargaining power and may
threaten to delay the ﬁnal resolution and to force the ﬁrm to incur additional costs. For a
reorganisation plan to be agreed, a majority in number and at least two-thirds by amount
owed to the creditors who vote in each class of impaired creditors must approve the plan
before it can be conﬁrmed by the bankruptcy court. Importantly, even equity holders
mustalso approve the plan by atwo-thirds majority, giving them some bargaining control
over creditors. In order to avoid costly reorganisation, creditors may therefore rationally
agree to violate the APR in order to speed agreement.
Weiss (1990) examines 37 listed U.S. ﬁrms that ﬁled for bankruptcy between 1979
and 1986. He ﬁnds that the priority of claims is violated for 29 of the 37 ﬁrms studied
and that the breakdown of priority occurs primarily between the unsecured creditors and
equity holders and among the unsecured creditors. The common occurrence of breaches
in APRis reported by Franks & Torous (1989) who examined the terms of reorganisation
of 30 ﬁrms that emerged from Chapter 11. Of their sample, 27 ﬁrms exhibited breaches
of APR, and in 18 cases shareholders received some consideration.
Eberhart, Moore & Roenfeldt (1990) examines the return to shareholders resulting
from 30 U.S. bankruptcy ﬁlings over the period 1979 to 1984. The average value re-
ceived by shareholders in breach of APR was found to be 7.6 percent of ﬁrm value.
Analysis of the share price before and after the ﬁling showed that the equity market an-
ticipated the breach of APR beforehand. A similar result is obtained by Betker (1995)
who examines 75 Chapter 11 U.S. corporate bankruptcies from 1982-1990. He ﬁnds
that the average value of APR gained by shareholders to be 2.86 percent of ﬁrm value,
measured at the ﬁrm’s emergence from bankruptcy. Eberhart & Sweeney (1992) show
that in the bankruptcy ﬁling month, bond prices incorporate the subsequent breaches of
APR in an unbiased manner.
The effect of breaches of APR and bankruptcy costs act to reduce the recovery to
bondholders in the event of default. The historical recovery rate on senior unsecured
bonds is estimated by Altman & Kishore (1996) to be, on average, 47.65 percent of the
face value of the bond, and includes average bankruptcy costs and breaches of APR. A
simple way to include the combined effect in structural model was suggested by LS who
specify an exogenously determined recovery rate, informed from bond recovery studies
such as Altman & Kishore (1996). Consequently, their model incorporates but does not
attempt to separately estimate the effect of bankruptcy and APR breach costs. EHH also
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51.31 percent of the face value of total liabilities.
2.3.5.5 Static Capital Management
In the Merton model the level of debt is ﬁxed regardless of the path taken by the ﬁrm’s
solvency. This has been criticised as being an unrealistically passive description of man-
agement behaviour by Taur´ en (1999) and Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) (hereafter
CDG). Observation of physical debt-ratio dynamics suggests management adjust their
issuance of debt versus equity, and dividend policy, in order to revert their ﬁrm’s debt-
ratios towards a preferred target debt-ratio over time (Taggart 1977, Marsh 1982, Jalil-
vand & Harris 1984, Hovakimian, Opler & Titman 2001).
By implication the risk-neutral log-solvency ratio, x(t), is also likely to be mean-
reverting to a target level to the extent that market bond prices factor in mean-reversion
of the ﬁrm’s future debt-ratios. With reversion to a debt target, management is unlikely
to let debt-ratios fall too far, should ﬁrm value rise unexpectedly, thereby acting to in-
crease debt and increase future default risk. Similarly, the ﬁrm value is less likely to
progress towards insolvency without management effort to reduce the level of the default
boundary by adjusting the ﬁrm’s operating plan and funding strategy to reduce its future
debt-ratio. CDG show that the effect on credit spreads of assuming mean-reversion in
the log-solvency ratio is to reduce long-term credit spreads levels and volatilities relative
to the Merton model. The credit spread term structure ﬂattens, and by controlling the
target-debt-ratio, offers more degrees of freedom to match observed credit spread term
structures.
By relaxing Merton’s assumption of passive capital structure management, an im-
portant new ﬁeld of capital structure model theory is revealed by CDG. We therefore
discuss more fully the literature related to capital structure management in Section 2.5.
2.3.5.6 Constant Risk-Free Rate
The Merton model assumes a constant risk-free rate. JMR suggest that this assumption
could bethe cause ofthe Merton model’s underprediction ofcredit spreads on investment
grade bonds. They infer this conclusion by regressing residual price prediction errors
against dummies for the year amongst other variables, and note the year of observation
is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable. A time-varying asset volatility or a time-varying
risk-free rate is suggested as possible sources of error.
LS describe more fully the inﬂuence of a stochastic risk-free rate on predicted credit
spreads. They show that default probability and credit spreads are positively related
to correlation between ﬁrm asset return and the risk-free rate. The risk-neutral future
distribution of ﬁrm asset value depends on the risk-free rate. If the correlation is positive,
changes in the risk-free rate tend to be in the same direction of the ﬁrm’s asset changes.26 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
For example, an increase in the risk-free rate is associated with a positive innovation in
ﬁrm value. Introducing additional future volatility by way of stochastic interest rates
tends to increase overall ﬁrm value volatility, thereby increasing the probability that
future ﬁrm asset value will reach the default boundary and the ﬁrm will default. If
correlation is negative, changes in the risk-free rate tend to dampen changes in the ﬁrm
asset values and the probability of default reduces. Consequently, ﬁrm asset volatility is
higher, in the presence of negative interest rate correlation, for the same predicted level
of credit spread.
Empirical evidence is conﬂicting as to whether interest rate correlation has a mate-
rial effect on explaining default risk and credit spreads. Clouding the evidence is the
presence of call provisions in some bond indentures, and the inﬂuence of the historical
interest rate environment in the sample period. JMR’s sample covered the period of high
interest rate uncertainty from 1975 to 1981. Also in the same period, most corporate
bonds were callable or subject to sinking fund provisions, thereby making the valuation
problem complex and incomplete within the Merton model. For example, Ogden (1987)
ﬁts the Merton model to bonds traded between 1973 and 1985 and ﬁnds that the risk-
free rate and yield curve slope partially explain credit spread prediction errors from the
Merton model. However, all bonds in his sample are fully callable or partially callable
via sinking fund provisions.
The conclusions of JMR and Ogden (1987) may have been unduly inﬂuenced by
the high proportion of callable bonds in their samples since corporates issued few non-
callable bonds prior to the mid-1980s. Duffee (1998) reports that in 1984 only 271
bonds, out of a population of 5,497 bonds issued by corporates, were noncallable for life.
The proportion increased dramatically post 1985, and by 1995, 2,814 from 5,291 were
noncallable. In the more recent studies of LYS and EHH, their samples have excluded
bonds that are callable and subject to sinking fund provisions. Both studies conclude that
adding correlated stochastic interest rates to structural models has not improved credit
spread prediction accuracy.
In contrast to JMR, EHHﬁnd no evidence that interest rate correlation is a signiﬁcant
omission from the Merton model since neither interest rate volatility, nor correlation with
ﬁrm asset return, differs between those bonds that underpredict and overpredict credit
spreads. However, the LS and CDG models, which include stochastic and correlated
interest rates, exhibit a systematic prediction error. Firms with very negative (positive)
estimated correlations have greater underprediction (overprediction) of credit spreads
relative to the Merton model. A similar result is offered by LYS who tests the LS model
with and without stochastic interest rates. With a constant interest rate they report a
mean credit spread underprediction error of 8.78 basis points. The error worsens to an
underprediction of 25.37 basis points when stochastic interest rates are introduced with
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be insensitive tothe choice ofinterest rate correlation assumption, suggesting that adding
ﬁrm-wise correlation to the model has not improved cross-sectional spread prediction
accuracy.
Lastly, researchers have attempted to measure the correlation between ﬁrm asset
value and interest rates using aproxy for theunobservable ﬁrmasset return. Forexample,
using the industrial stock index returns, as a proxy for ﬁrm asset return, LS report the
correlation in ﬁrst differences with 30-year Treasuries to be -27 percent. A similar value
was assumed by HH when ﬁtting the LS model to historical default rates. EHH also
assume stock return is a proxy for asset return, but their method is closer to the spirit
of the Merton model; they measure stock return at a ﬁrm and not index level, and use a
risk-free rate proxied by the 3 month T-bill as their risk-free rate. Using a 5 year window
of ﬁrm equity return they report a much lower average correlation of only -2 percent.
Similarly, LYS measure the correlation between monthly stock prices and the yield of
the on-the-run 10 year Treasury for the period January 1990 to June 1999. The average
interest rate correlation is found to be -7.2 percent.
It therefore remains unclear as to whether the absence of stochastic interest rates in
the Merton model is a serious omission. Attempts at measuring the level of correlation
directly suggests the correlation is small on average. Tests of predictive accuracy with
the LS and CDG models suggest that including ﬁrm-wise interest rate correlation has
not improved accuracy and may have decreased it. The theoretical models that have
included interest rate correlations, such as LS and CDG, have used a simple Vasicek
(1977) single-factor model, and perhaps this is not sufﬁciently descriptive of the risk-
free yield curve, since accuracy of credit spread predictions have not improved over the
single-factor structural credit models.
2.3.6 A Summary of the Merton Model
In this section we introduced the Merton model describing its theoretical foundation
as an option theoretic model of corporate bond valuation. The Merton model is parsi-
monious with few variables to be estimated, however, it has unrealistically simple as-
sumptions. We discussed the main theoretical limitations of the model and the empirical
evidence against the simplifying assumptions. In the next section we discuss the main
theoretical extensions to the Merton model that attempt to relax its assumptions.
2.4 A Survey of Structural Models
The structural model literature consists of extensions to the Merton model addressing the
aforementioned limitations. The plethora of models with minor variations is extensive
and so we restrict our discussion to main theoretical developments, which in turn, guides
a representative selection of models for testing.28 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Followingawellaccepted taxonomy (see Uhrig-Homburg (2002) andLeland (2004)),
we ﬁrst distinguish between models that assume that the default boundary is determined
from an optimal decision made within the debt valuation problem (endogenous bound-
ary models), or the default boundary is assumed to be exogenously known and is a given
input into the debt valuation problem (exogenous boundary models). We propose a fur-
ther sub-classiﬁcation in which we distinguish whether the default boundary is predicted
to change stochastically through time (endogenous-dynamic, exogenous-dynamic mod-
els), or whether the ﬁrm’s default boundary is assumed to be a non-stochastic function
of time, either constant or a deterministic function (endogenous-static, exogenous-static
models).
Set out in table 2.1 is a summary of the models discussed in this section classiﬁed
according to the aforementioned scheme. Abbreviations in bold refer to models that we



































Leland (1994) Merton (1974)(EM)
Leland & Toft (1996)(LT) Black & Cox (1976)
Acharya & Carpenter (2002) Geske (1977)
Kim, Ramaswamy & Sundaresan (1993)
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995)(LS1,LS2)
Briys & de Varenne (1997)
Zhou (1997)
Barone-Adesi & Colwell (1999)(CEV)
Dynamic
Fischer et al. (1989) Nielsen, Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara (1993)
Anderson, Sundaresan & Tychon (1996) Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara (1999)
Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997) Taur´ en (1999)
Leland (1998) Mueller (2000)
Fan & Sundaresan (2000) Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001)(CDG)
Goldstein, Ju & Leland (2001) Demchuk & Gibson (2006)
Moraux (2002)
Dangl & Zechner (2004)
Francois & Morellec (2004)
Galai, Raviv & Wiener (2005)30 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.4.1 Endogenous Boundary Models
Endogenous boundary models are a group of models in which the default boundary is
the outcome of an optimal decision made by shareholders within the bond valuation
model. Unlike the exogenous boundary model, such as Merton, shareholders not only
decide whether to default the ﬁrm, but also the level of the default boundary. The ﬁrst
group considered here is the simplest static boundary structural models in which the
boundary is assumed to be a deterministic function of time. We then discuss the second
subgroup of more complex dynamic boundary models where the boundary is assumed
to be stochastically time-varying.
2.4.1.1 Endogenous-Static
In an early extension of the Merton model, Black & Cox (1976) consider the valuation
of debt when management choose the timing of default, acting to optimise the value of
shareholder equity. In doing so the early default assumption of Merton is relaxed and
the level of the default barrier is determined endogenously. It is assumed that the ﬁrm
is ﬁnanced by equity and a single consol (inﬁnite maturity) bond paying a continuous
coupon. For large ﬁrms with many debt issues, this choice of bond payment is a more re-
alistic representation of the ﬁrm’s aggregate going-concern debt ﬁnancing requirements
than Merton’s single zero-coupon bond assumption. At each point in time, management
choose whether to pay coupons or otherwise default and pass the assets of the ﬁrm to
bondholders. Default will be avoided provided that the value of equity, after the coupon
payment, is not less than the coupon payment. Thus, default occurs if the value of the
ﬁrm falls to a point where new equity cannot be raised to service debt; in continuous
time equivalent to the value of equity equal to zero. An important result achieved by









where c is the coupon rate, and r is the risk-free rate. Equation (2.14) shows that the
default barrier is independent of ﬁrm value, and decreases as asset volatility and the
risk-free rate increase.
Leland (1994) extends Black&Cox(1976) toinclude theeffects oftax andbankruptcy
costs on the default boundary. Taxation presents management with an opportunity to
increase ﬁrm value by utilising tax savings on interest payments. An optimum value
maximising level of debt exists, at which point the marginal beneﬁt of the tax shield is
equalled by the marginal cost of increased bankruptcy risk. Like Black & Cox (1976),
Leland (1994) assume that management seek to maximise the value of the shareholder’s2.4. A SURVEY OF STRUCTURAL MODELS 31








where t is the tax rate.
Equation (2.15) shows that the default barrier is positively related to the after-tax
coupon rate, and is negatively related to the risk-free rate and ﬁrm asset volatility. The
default boundary is unaffected by bankruptcy costs, which are borne by the bondholders
in the event of default, and not by the shareholders, and therefore do not enter into con-
sideration by management when setting the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio. Bankruptcy costs reduce
the overall value of the ﬁrm, but leave the value of equity unchanged with the cost passed
to bondholders in a reduced value of the bond.
LT extends Leland (1994) and Black & Cox (1976) with the more realistic assump-
tion that the ﬁrm issues ﬁnite maturity debt. To ﬁnd a tractable solution for the value
of the ﬁrm’s debt, they assume debt is ‘rolled over’, i.e. reﬁnanced, in perpetuity at a
constant maturity, T maintaining a constant level of principal. The ﬁrm’s capital struc-
ture is assumed to be time-homogeneous and management choose the optimal debt level
only initially leaving the aggregate level of debt static thereafter. In addition to the ex-
planatory variables in equation (2.15), the default boundary is found to be an increasing
function of the debt-ratio, and bankruptcy costs, and a decreasing function of debt ma-
turity (refer equation (3.35)). Default only occurs when new equity cannot be raised,
which will generally occur when debt service costs equal the expected equity return.5
The LT model provides a plausible theoretical basis for Davydenko’s (2005) obser-
vation that ﬁrms default with negative net equity and not immediately at a zero equity
default boundary. The reason is related to the maturity of debt and expected equity
return. With long-term debt, the default boundary will typically be less that the debt
principal due to the potential for equity to appreciate before the debt is rolled over. The
longer the maturity of the debt and the higher the expected equity return, the greater the
opportunity for the ﬁrm to attract additional equity and avoid bankruptcy despite imme-
diate negative net worth. However, as maturity approaches zero, new equity will only be
attracted if the value of the ﬁrm, after bankruptcy costs, exceeds the par value of debt.
Thus, the default boundary is predicted to approach K = P/(1−a) as T → 0, where P
is the debt principal and a ≥ 0 is the bankruptcy cost. Thus, default is predicted to occur
when the ﬁrm has positive net worth if bankruptcy costs are non-zero.
5Debt service is deﬁned as the intertemporal change in ﬁrm value due to leveraging; includes after tax
cost of coupons and principal repayments at par, less funds from new debt issued at market value and cash
available for payout to shareholders generated from operations.32 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.4.1.2 Endogenous-Dynamic
The models of Black & Cox (1976), Leland (1994), and LT assume that management
make a single initial capital structure decision, with the level of debt principal remaining
time homogeneous thereafter for the remaining maturity of the bond being valued. In
practice, ﬁrms can be expected to adjust their level of debt over time, in particular to
preserve the value of tax shields should as assets grow over time as expected. The
absence of time-varying management adjustment of ﬁrm gearing is a weakness in the
endogenous-static structural models. In this section we consider a group of structural
models that permit the debt-ratio of the ﬁrm to adjust over time in response to asset
growth and exogenous shocks to the ﬁrm’s asset value. We refer to these as endogenous-
dynamic models since these models permit dynamic adjustment of the default boundary.
Endogenous-dynamic capital structure models retain the same basic assumptions
of Leland (1994), but assume management adjusts the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio in response to
changing ﬁrm value. Depending upon the importance of transaction costs associated
with adjusting the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio, the literature predicts different relationships between
current ﬁrm leverage and the term structure of credit spreads. Initially we discuss models
that ignore any bargaining between bondholders and equityholders.
Fischer et al. (1989) recognise that changing the ﬁrm’s capital structure is costly and
will not occur until there is sufﬁcient movement in the debt-ratio. Thus, it is hypothe-
sised that ﬁrm’s have a ‘region of no recapitalisation’ bounded by an upper and lower
solvency barrier. The ﬁrm capital structure policy follows a simple rule; gearing is in-
creased if the ﬁrm’s ratio of asset value to debt reaches an upper boundary, but default
occurs if the asset value of the ﬁrm reaches the lower default boundary. Compared with
Leland (1994), the option to recapitalise at an upper boundary causes an initially lower
optimal debt level and higher default risk. Importantly, Fischer et al. (1989) show that
ﬁrms may allow their debt-ratios to vary over time within a set of optimal boundaries.
Therefore, ﬁrms with similar recapitalisation preferences and similar default risks may
exhibit different observed debt-ratios on any given balance date. The cross-sectional ob-
served term structure of credit spreads may therefore be poorly explained by the use of
current balance sheet debt if used to proxy for the ﬁrm’s default point in the presence
of recapitalisation costs. This may be an explanation for the large ﬁrm-wise prediction
error variance reported by EHH who use balance sheet debt to estimate the ﬁrm’s default
boundary.
Using similar capital management rules as Fischer et al. (1989), Dangl & Zechner
(2004) show that default risk is monotonically decreasing with respect to rising solvency
under static analysis when incremental adjustments to capital structure are made. How-
ever, with signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs of recapitalisation, the ﬁrm is assumed to leverage back
to its initial optimum in the event that the upper boundary of ﬁrm value to debt-ratio is
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debt, therefore forcing the ﬁrm to retire existing debt and re-issuing new debt, or if rais-
ing debt has signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs that encourage large scale debt issuance in preference
to smaller incremental debt raisings. It follows that Dangl & Zechner (2004) predict that
the probability of default, at the upper solvency boundary, is equal to the probability of
default at the initial optimum solvency point. Thus, default risk is predicted to be ‘U’-
shaped with respect to solvency; initially it falls with increasing asset value relative to
debt, but then rises as the re-leveraging solvency boundary is approached. This hypoth-
esis does not appear to be well supported empirically. For example, structural models
that map a predicted distance-to-default to observed default rates, show monotonically
increasing default risk with respect to increasing leverage (Sobehart & Stein 2000, Cros-
bie & Bohn 2002).
Goldstein et al. (2001) provide a variation to Fischer et al. (1989) in which the state
variable is not the value of the ﬁrm, but rather the ﬁrm’s earnings before interest and
tax expenses. The EBIT state variable is therefore unaffected by the ﬁrm’s choice of
leverage, whereas the ﬁrm value state variable in other endogenous-dynamic models
must be interpreted as the pre-leverage ﬁrm value.
Like LT, endogenous-dynamic models also predict that default will occur below the
face value of debt. Unless debt is immediately due, shareholders will continue to service
debt until the expected value of the ﬁrm is not sufﬁcient to warrant paying coupons. For
bankruptcy costs of 5 percent, the equivalent of default boundary to face value of debt,
K/F, is reported to be: Fischer et al. (1989), 57 percent; Goldstein et al. (2001, Table
2), 51 percent; Dangl & Zechner (2004), 69 percent.6 Empirical support is provided by
Davydenko (2005) who ﬁnds that on average K/F is 65 percent, but varies widely in the
cross-section, depending on balance sheet liquidity, asset volatility, and asset tangibility.
An important theoretical result of the aforementioned endogenous-dynamic models
is the prediction of asymmetric debt-ratio adjustments. The result arises from assuming
that shareholders follow a second-best capital management policy in which they max-
imise their own wealth. Fischer et al. (1989) argue under a second-best policy it is never
optimal for debt to be repurchased when ﬁrm value declines. This is because the rising
cost of bankruptcy is fully borne by the bondholders. The implication is that capital ad-
justments are asymmetric and negative value shocks are not matched by reducing debt.
Under an alternative ﬁrst-best policy, shareholders maximise total ﬁrm value and may
seek to reduce some debt rather than default, thereby introducing some debt reduction
near the default boundary. This is only likely if there is a precommitment in the bond
indenture to maintain a minimum level of solvency.
Some support for the hypothesised asymmetric recapitalisation behaviour is given by
6Independently Huang & Huang (2003) estimate the default boundary to be 60 percent of the face value
of debt using the reasonable ‘back-of-the-envelope’ assumption that bond recovery is 50 percent of debt
face value with 10 percent total bankruptcy costs.34 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Gilson (1997) whoexamines the behaviour of leverage ratios before and after bankruptcy
proceedings. He ﬁnds that ﬁrms that proceed through Chapter 11 do experience a de-
crease in leverage after recontracting with creditors, but that the leverage ratios remain
well above the industry mean, and substantially above the levels ﬁve years prior to en-
tering Chapter 11. He concludes that the optimal target debt-ratio has most likely in-
creased. One possible reason cited is that restructured ﬁrms beneﬁt from the additional
operational discipline imposed by debt (Jensen 1986).
The predicted asymmetric capital adjustment behaviour is a consequence of assum-
ing strict second-best behaviour, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, with no voluntary
debt reduction agreed by bondholders. We now discuss a second group of endogenous-
dynamic models that consider the potential for negotiation between stockholders and
bondholders at the default boundary.
Working indiscrete-time, Anderson &Sundaresan (1996) estimates thedefault bound-
ary as an outcome from a non-cooperative game; shareholders make take-it-or-leave-it
offers of debt service to bondholders. In the presence of bankruptcy costs, bondholders
may accept to renegotiate a lower than contracted payment to preserve the value of their
claim on the ﬁrm and avoid the costs of bankruptcy. In other words, reduction in lever-
age occurs at a reorganisation boundary that is higher than the insolvency boundary in
the absence of negotiation. The resultant reduction in debt, due to the threat of default, is
termed strategic default. Shareholders have an incentive to offer below contracted debt
payments, but not sufﬁciently low to force rejection by bondholders and subsequent liq-
uidation. Bondholders will rationally accept a lower debt service payment up until the
point at which the concessions offered equal the expected bankruptcy costs. The greater
the potential bankruptcy costs the greater the concessions that will be accepted. Thus,
the assumption of negotiation in the presence of bankruptcy costs implies ﬁrms contrac-
tually default at a higher asset value than they otherwise would in the absence of the
opportunity to negotiate.
For a given level of gearing, the potential for future strategic debt service implies
higher credit spreads than predicted by Merton. Mella-Barral & Perraudin (1997) and
Anderson et al. (1996) work in continuous-time and solve the value of a consol bond
analytically. Fan & Sundaresan (2000) introduce taxes and assume equal bargaining
power between shareholders and bondholders. They ﬁnd that because shareholders have
some power to exploit bondholders, the default boundary is always higher than predicted
by Leland (1994) resulting in a greater probability of default.
Default may also arise from a breach of minimum cash ﬂow covenants. Fan & Sun-
daresan (2000) examine non-negotiable cash ﬂow covenants and their inﬂuence on the
bargaining process. They suggest that in the presence of cash ﬂow covenants, sharehold-
ers would rather sacriﬁce dividends to reinvest and avoid a premature liquidation of the
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before the cash ﬂow covenant becomes binding.
In summary, the endogenous-dynamic models provide a rich theoretical ﬁeld for
predicting the relationship between dynamic capital structure choice and credit spread
term structures. These are as follows:
1. In the presence of bankruptcy costs and taxes, shareholders will not allow the
ﬁrm’s debt-ratio to deviate to below a desired level of gearing necessary to protect
the value of tax shields. The option to increase leverage in the future results in
higher predicted future credit spreads relative to the endogenous static models;
2. Where there are costs of recapitalisation, the ﬁrm will resist increasing leverage
until the beneﬁt exceeds the cost, resulting in a region of no recapitalisation, mak-
ing inference of the ﬁrm’s target debt-ratio impossible from simply observing its
current debt-ratio. If the costs are largely ﬁxed, or bond indentures prevent in-
cremental debt changes, the ﬁrm will increase is predicted to change to increase
its leverage sharply from an upper solvency boundary to its optimal level. The
speed of mean-reversion in debt-ratios depends upon the size of recapitalisation
costs, and whether it is a smooth adjustment depends upon the proportion that is
variable as opposed to ﬁxed. Slower rates of mean-reversion will result in lower
future credit spread term structures more closely represented by the static models;
3. In the absence of bargaining between bondholders and equityholders, debt-ratios
may not revert as a result of downward shocks in ﬁrm value since the increased
potential cost of bankruptcy is passed to bondholders, when a second-best capital
management strategy is followed by shareholders;
4. If bargaining is permitted, then the theory of strategic debt service suggests that
default will occur at higher ﬁrm asset values, when bankruptcy costs are high and
impediments to renegotiation are low. Shareholders are able to extract a negotiated
debt service reduction orreduction in theamount ofdebt, by threatening to default.
This mechanism may cause the future debt-ratio to reduce in response to negative
shocks in ﬁrm value as a consequence of partial debt forgiveness by bondholders.
Credit spreads are predicted to be higher than in the absence of bargaining, a
consequence of the potential to default earlier, and the expected increased loss
associated with debt renegotiation.
Relative tothe Merton model, the theoretical extensions of the endogenous model lit-
erature suggest a greater likelihood of future default and higher future credit spread. For
empirical estimation, the implication is that the default boundary is not simply proxied
by the current balance sheet level of debt:
1. The presence of longer tenor debt encourages shareholders to maintain debt ser-
vice payments despite the ﬁrm value falling below the face value of debt;36 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2. If bankruptcy costs are high, the owners have bargaining strength, and the debt
can be easily negotiated, shareholders will seek to offer below the contracted debt
payment. Default, under the original terms of the debt contract, occurs earlier at a
higher solvency threshold;
3. Default can be triggered by breach of minimum cash ﬂow covenants, however,
the inﬂuence of liquidity default is contingent upon how binding the liquidity
covenant is relative to the strategic default threshold.
2.4.2 Exogenous Boundary Models
Exogenous boundary models abstract from the complexity of the endogenous boundary
models. Rather than specifying the default boundary level to be the outcome of share-
holder wealth maximisation, the default boundary is assumed to be known exogenously.
The default boundary may be assumed to be constant, or a deterministic function of time,
which we term exogenous-static. Alternatively, the default boundary may be assumed
to vary stochastically through time, in which case we deﬁne the model as exogenous-
dynamic. The difference between endogenous and exogenous dynamic forms of struc-
tural models is that the former speciﬁes the default boundary’s time variation as the con-
sequence of shareholders re-evaluating the ﬁrm’s capital structure at each point in time,
whereas the latter assumes that the default boundary varies through time in a stochastic
manner independent of shareholder choice.
The Merton model is an example of an exogenous-static model that assumes the
default boundary to be equal to the book value of the ﬁrm’s debt. By construction, the
default boundary is time-invariant. In some more recent exogenous boundary models,
the default boundary is stochastic. However, this leads us to two particular challenges
facing exogenous models. Firstly, there is a wide variety of potential underlying default
boundary processes that could be selected. The exogenous literature, does not in itself
provide a theoretical basis for one preference over another. A robust choice of default
boundary process should therefore be one that is consistent with the well established
capital structure literature. Secondly, as discussed in the previous section, due to the
complex ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors affecting the timing of default, the default boundary is not
readily proxied by observable variables. This raises the difﬁcult question of how the
models should be parameterised. We suggest this is best solved by latent estimation of
the models and an examination of the resultant prediction errors for miss-speciﬁcation.
In this section we review the extant exogenous boundary structural credit models
distinguishing between static and dynamic approaches. We show how the ﬁrm’s latent
solvency ratio is determined by the speciﬁcation of the default boundary and compare
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2.4.2.1 Exogenous-Static
We use the term exogenous-static to group models in which the ﬁrm’s default boundary
is determined independently of shareholder preferences and is a constant function of
time.
The simplest version of this model is to assume that the ﬁrm is funded by a single
bond and its default boundary is determined by the bond’s indenture. For example,
the Merton model assumes that the default boundary is equal to the face value of debt
payable only at maturity. Black & Cox (1976) permit early default where they let the
default barrier be equal to a minimum solvency level, as contained in the bond indenture,
which is assumed to grow over time at the risk-free rate. A more common method to
modelling the triggering of early default was ﬁrst suggested by LS. Their model assumes
the default barrier is constant through time but are silent on the level of the barrier.
Importantly, they show that the ratio of ﬁrm value over the default barrier is a sufﬁcient
state variable to value bonds with coupons and across multiple bonds issued from the
same ﬁrm. The spanning of multiple securities by a predeﬁned underlying state process,
is the deﬁning feature that makes the exogenous-boundary model form useful in ﬁnance,
and is the property we exploit further in Section 3.2 to to derive estimates of the state
process. To illustrate this property we ﬁrst consider the LS model in detail.
LSdeﬁne default as the ﬁrst passage of ﬁrm asset valueV(t) across aconstant default
boundary, K. Unexpected shocks in V are correlated by rr,V with a stochastic risk-free
rate r(t) that follows a mean-reverting stochastic process as per Vasicek (1977), thereby
characterising LS as a two-factor model of the log-solvency ratio x(t) = lnV(t)/K














r,t are Weiner processes, kr is the speed of mean-reversion for the
instantaneous short rate, q is the long-run level of r(t), and sr is the short rate volatility.
Deﬁning the ﬁrst passage stopping time by t = inf{t ≥ 0 : x(t) = 0} then the proba-
bility of default between t = 0 and T is
Q(0,T;x(0),r(0),Q) = Pr(t ≤ T|t ≥ t = 0) . (2.18)
With no explicit modelling of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and debt covenants, there is no spe-
ciﬁc bankruptcy cause ascribed to K; it is simply the value of the ﬁrm at which default
is triggered. This simpliﬁcation enables LS to value complex debt structures. At t = t
all debt is assumed to default under cross-collateralisation rules. Different priority lev-
els between debtors is accommodated by varying the writedown rate w. Valuation of a
zero-coupon bond then proceeds as the risk neutral expected payoffs in default and non-38 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
default states. The assumption that payment to bondholders occurs only at the original
bond maturity facilitates the valuation of coupon paying bonds by valuing each con-
tracted payment as a zero-coupon bond and summing together as a ‘portfolio of zeros’.
The division of assets in the event of default, is also exogenously speciﬁed. A pro-
portion (1−w) of F is assumed to be paid to bondholders at the original maturity of the
debt.7 The writedown rate, w, represents K/F, being the expected outcome from strate-
gic default and negotiation, or bankruptcy and liquidation including expected breaches
of APR. However, as noted by Briys & de Varenne (1997), there is nothing to limit the
payment to bondholders to be no greater than the value of the ﬁrm nor to ensure that the
value of the ﬁrm is sufﬁcient to cover the payment of the bond at maturity. They suggest
a more structured barrier equal to the present value of the ﬁrm’s single-zero coupon li-
ability adjusted for expected APR breaches. Unfortunately, the adjustment by Briys &
de Varenne (1997) prohibits valuation of complex debt structures since the boundary is
made a function of the face value of debt.8
A further weakness of the LS model is evident from examination of the latent log-
solvency process in equation (2.17). If r(t) is on average greater than (d −s2
v/2), then
the ﬁrm is assumed to deleverage ad inﬁnitum. Such behaviour is not expected in the
presence of tax shield beneﬁts (nor observed empirically).
The LS model has been extended to consider alternative asset processes. Zhou
(1997) extends LS to a jump diffusion model. The motivation to consider downward
jumps in ﬁrm value comes from the empirical observation that structural models under-
state short term credit spreads. The potential for the ﬁrm value at default, to jump below
the face value of debt, gives an endogenous variation in recovery rates. The ﬁrst-passage
crossing time is solved by Monte Carlo. HH describe an alternative jump-diffusion
model with the assumption of a constant risk-free rate. They adopt the same exogenous
default boundary and recovery assumptions of LS but let the asset value evolve with a
double-exponential distribution such that a semi-analytic solution for the crossing time
is known.9 The calibration of the jump component is difﬁcult considering that the ﬁrm
asset process is unobserved. HH and Delianedis & Geske (2001) demonstrate that by ad-
justing jump parameters the predicted credit spreads on short tenor bonds can be made
close to those observed, but the resultant jump parameters are found to be unrealistic.
Further, jump parameters have most effect at short tenors and without mean-reversion in
the leverage level, the previous criticism of the LS model remains. A simple compari-
son of Merton against a jump-diffusion equivalent derived from Merton (1976) by Hull,
Nelken & White (2004) showed that in all cases the non-jump Merton model provided
7Termed a ‘Treasury at Default’ assumption. Alternative writedown speciﬁcations are ‘Recovery of Par
at Default’ and ‘Recovery of Market Value’. The differences are explained further in Guha (2003).
8Formally, K = aexp(−rT)F where 0 < a < 1 is a scalar to accommodate expected breaches of APR.
9The probability of default requires numeric methods to solve for a Laplace inversion. Refer to Huang
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signiﬁcantly better predictions of default probabilities and credit spreads.
Drawing from agency theory, Barone-Adesi & Colwell (1999) propose a model for
valuing zero-coupon bonds where the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets increases as the ﬁrm’s
value approaches the default boundary. This is consistent with Jensen & Meckling’s
(1976) theory of asset-substitution that proposes that it is in the interests of shareholders
to take greater business risks, thus increasing the volatility of the ﬁrm, the closer to the
ﬁrm is to default. Using a constant barrier and risk-free rate, a closed-form value for a
zero-coupon bond is obtained under the assumption that the return on the ﬁrm follows
a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process as ﬁrst described by Cox (1975). Under
the CEV model the ﬁrm’s asset value has a local volatility that is a deterministic function
of solvency.
Barone-Adesi & Colwell (1999) propose the ﬁrm follows the CEV process
dX(t) = (r−d)X(t)dt + ¯ svX(t)rdW(v,t)Q, (2.19)
where X(t) =V(t)−K is the ﬁrm’s net worth, as measured by its equity value, and ¯ sv
is a constant scale factor for the instantaneous volatility. The local asset return volatility
is given by ¯ svX(t)(r−1) and is therefore time-varying with X(t). Default occurs at the
ﬁrst passage of X(t) to zero; t = inf{t ≥ 0 : X(t) = 0}. For the case where (r −1) < 0,
volatility increases with default risk and declines with solvency, which is the agency
theory predicted relationship. Because the ﬁrm’s level of solvency is time-varying, it
follows that the ﬁrm’s asset return volatility is also time-varying. However, the func-
tional relationship is constant through time, ﬁxed by the elasticity parameter r, and so
the ﬁrm’s volatility is assumed to have a rigid volatility skew.
Usefully, the probability of the ﬁrst passage time is known analytically for a 100
percent drop in value to zero. This result has been used by Campi & Sbuelz (2005)
and Albanese & Chen (2005) to value equity default swap contracts, and by Campi,
Polbennikov & Sbuelz (2005) to value bonds and credit derivatives.10
A weakness of the extant CEV models is that default occurs only when the ﬁrm
is market-value insolvent. This precludes the possibility of strategic default or default
with the ﬁrm having positive net worth. A more general approach is achieved in our
estimation method by letting K be the earliest unobservable default threshold whether
triggered by insolvency or strategic default. This implies that volatility increases as the
point of default is reached, but permits the value of equity to be strictly positive.
The aforementioned exogenous-boundary models assume the writedown rate, w, is
exogenously determined and unrelated to the ﬁrm’s asset value. Intuitively, it would
10Equity default swaps are a recent ﬁnancial innovation used as an alternative to credit default swaps.
Normally these instruments pay 50 percent of notional value if the ﬁrm’s equity price drops by 30 percent.
Campi & Sbuelz (2005) value the special case of a benchmark equity default swap that pays nothing in the
event of a 100 percent value drop. The instruments are described in more detail in Medova & Smith (2004).40 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
seem reasonable that the ﬁrm’s post-default recovery prospects would be tied to the
stochastic process that led todefault. However, the LSmodel and subsequent exogenous-
boundary literature, deﬁne the default barrier as an absorbing state for the ﬁrm value
process; the expected value of bond recovery ceases to be informed from the ongoing
dynamics of the ﬁrm post default, even though bankruptcy proceedings may take several
years to complete and the ﬁrm may not be liquidated. The distinction between imme-
diate liquidation, and continuation under Chapter 11 with court imposed renegotiation,
was ﬁrst suggested by Francois & Morellec (2004) in the context of extending the Leland
(1994) model. Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code ﬁrms can either liquidate assets immedi-
ately under Chapter 7, or renegotiate with their creditors under Chapter 11. The latter
is the predominate option chosen. Upon entering Chapter 11, the court grants the ﬁrm
a period of observation, protected from the actions of bondholders to liquidate assets,
during which time the ﬁrm renegotiates its debt. Consequently, liquidation does not
arise at the moment of ﬁrst passage under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the end of this
period, the court decides whether the ﬁrm continues as a going concern or not (Francois
& Morellec 2004, page 390).
Following Francois & Morellec (2004), Moraux (2002) separates default timing
from liquidation. The former remains as speciﬁed under LS so that default remains
exogenous and is triggered by the ﬁrst passage of ﬁrm value to a constant boundary. Un-
like LS, once the default boundary is hit the ﬁrm remains trading and the state process
continues for the duration of the period the ﬁrm remains in administration under Chap-
ter 11. Liquidation is then a separate uncertain event that occurs if the cumulative time
spent below the reorganisation barrier exceeds a given ﬁxed period of time. Francois &
Morellec (2004) assume liquidation occurs when the unbroken period of time spent in
default exceeds a ﬁxed period. Moraux (2002) deﬁnes liquidation by the total cumula-
tive time the ﬁrm value is below the reorganisation boundary. He shows that the effect
of delayed liquidation is bounded between the results of two well known models that
have analytic solutions. With inﬁnite delay, there is no early liquidation of the ﬁrm, and
the model approaches Merton; with coincident default and liquidation, the model ap-
proaches Black & Cox (1976). A further reﬁnement is suggested by Galai et al. (2005)
to trigger liquidation after the weighted cumulative time in default exceeds a maximum
time, where the weight is the distance of the ﬁrm value from the reorganisation bound-
ary. The model therefore weights the severity of the ﬁnancial distress. However, debt
can only be valued numerically. While promising in the suggestion that the writedown
rate should be endogenously related to the stochastic state process, no empirical tests of
these models appears to have been attempted. The models are limited to simple capi-
tal structures and involve time-intensive numeric solutions that discourage econometric
estimation of parameters.2.4. A SURVEY OF STRUCTURAL MODELS 41
2.4.2.2 Exogenous-Dynamic
Lastly, we consider a group of structural models in which the default boundary is as-
sumed to vary stochastically through time, but unlike the endogenous models, time-
variation in the default boundary is governed by an exogenously known stochastic pro-
cess and not by shareholders seeking to maximise their wealth at each point in time.
The ﬁrst group of related models that ﬁts this description belong to models that
share the assumption that the default boundary is a traded ﬁnancial instrument. Nielsen
et al. (1993) and Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara (1999) let the default boundary be the
exogenously determined market value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities. The default boundary
value is speciﬁed as a geometric Brownian motion under risk neutrality with correlated
innovations with the ﬁrm asset return and risk-free rate. The state variable, for pricing
purposes, isthe log ofthe ratio ofﬁrm value tothe default boundary, x(t), which is shown
to be an arithmetic Brownian motion with constant drift mx (Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara
1999, Equation 5)
dx(t) = mxdt +sxdWx,t , (2.20)
where sx isthe volatility of thechange in the solvency ratio, x(t), and dWx,t is aBrownian
motion correlated with the risk-free rate innovations. Default is triggered on the ﬁrst
passage of x(t) to zero. The constants in equation (2.20) summarise a larger number of
parameters that we do not reproduce here.11 Since we only need to estimate the joint
process in equation (2.20), the model has been criticised for its unwarranted complexity
by Uhrig-Homburg (2002, p. 54). Not surprisingly, the model shares some similarity
with a constant rate version of the LS model. The key difference between the two models
is that the drift rate does not vary with the risk-free rate, which it does in the LS model.12
A further difﬁculty with the model is that the market value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities must
approach the value of the ﬁrm in default; at some stage the two market assets V and K
become one. This does not appear to have been treated in the model. Recently, Hsu, Saa-
Requejo & Santa-Clara (2003) have redeﬁned the meaning of V to be the continuation
value of the ﬁrm in a non-default state and K to be the value of the ﬁrm in bankruptcy.
However, it still appears problematic to treatV and K as separate ﬁnancial assets when at
default they are the same asset, and it is conceptually problematic to correlate the return
on the same underlying asset in two mutually exclusive states of the world; V and K
cannot trade simultaneously. In contrast, K is usually treated as a threshold value of V
in the exogenous boundary literature, or alternatively, within the endogenous boundary
literature the value of the ﬁrm’s liability is valued coherently with ﬁrm assets and equity.
In neither case does the default boundary suffer from deﬁnitional problems.
11Refer Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara (1999, Equations (6)-(8)).
12If we were to ﬁt the two models implicitly from market prices, we would ﬁnd it impossible to dis-
tinguish between Sa´ a-Requejo & Santa-Clara (1999), with its correlated stochastic boundary and constant
drift mx, and a constant short rate LS model with its constant boundary and drift (r−dv).42 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The other type of exogenous-dynamic boundary model assumes that the default
boundary varies in a stochastic manner that mirrors the stylised facts of observed capital
structure dynamics. Thus, the models permit expected management driven capital struc-
ture changes, but the expected debt-ratio behaviour must be exogenously known before
debt can be valued.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1.2, there is good theoretical reason to suggest that man-
agement (acting on behalf of shareholders) dynamically adjust their ﬁrm’s debt-ratio
over time. Rather than attempting to fully explain debt-ratio dynamics as a consequence
of shareholder wealth maximisation, the exogenous-boundary models take an assumed
debt-ratio behaviour as given. The theoretical complexity is reduced, but the disadvan-
tage is that we must a priori form an opinion as to the most appropriate underlying
stochastic process for the ﬁrm’s capital structure process.
Further, the process for the latent log-solvency ratio (the state variable, x(t)) must be
parameterised. To date, the exogenous-dynamic empirical literature has parameterised
expected capital structure dynamics from observed changes in book debt-ratios. How-
ever, since we have shown that the ﬁrm’s book value of debt to be potentially unreliable
as a measure of the default boundary, using capital structure parameters sourced from
debt-ratio movements may also be ﬂawed. Alternatively, we propose to parameterise
the capital structure process implicitly from the credit spreads and avoid the potential
measurement error introduced by use of proxy variables.
Taur´ en(1999) propose astructural model inwhich the state variable istheﬁrm’sratio
of book liabilities to its market value of assets that follows a mean reverting stochastic
process. Thus, the default boundary, represented by the ﬁrm’s liabilities, is assumed to
be stochastic and governed by a known process that represents, in a reduced manner, the
dynamic behaviour of the ﬁrm’s management. Like the endogenous-dynamic literature,
permitting mean-reversion in ﬁrm-leverage captures the additional risk to bondholders of
management’s option to re-leverage the ﬁrm in the future. The effect of assuming mean-
reversion in ﬁrm leverage results in higher forward default rates, and a ﬂatter credit
spread term structure relative to the Merton and LS models. Longer-term credit spreads
are an increasing function of the ﬁrm’s target leverage and decreasing with respect to the
speed of reversion. In addition, short-term spreads are more sensitive to the current level
of leverage. It is argued by Taur´ en that capital structure mean-reversion results in more
realistic credit spread term structures.
Independently, Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) (hereafter CDG) suggested a
similar model, which has become the most widely known and empirically studied target-
leverage structural model, empirically ﬁtted by EHHand HH.CDG differ from Taur´ en in
their choice of state variable and boundary dynamics. The default boundary is assumed
to change dynamically over time. As in Taur´ en the ﬁrm adjusts its level of debt, mean
reverting to a long-run target level. Secondly, the ﬁrm will issue debt opportunistically2.4. A SURVEY OF STRUCTURAL MODELS 43
to time the debt market, issuing more (less) debt when the current risk-free rate is below
(above) the long-run risk-free rate level and therefore expected to increase (decrease) in











Thus, the default boundary is assumed to be a function of the current level of the log-
solvency ratio, x(t), a long-run target level of the log-solvency ratio, n, the speed of
mean-reversion to the target in the absence of debt market timing, kv ≥ 0, the sensitivity
of the ﬁrm’s debt issuance policy to the expected change in the risk-free risk-free rate,
f, and the trend in risk-free rate expectations given by the difference in the current short
rate, r(t), and its expected long-run level, q, as per Vasicek’s (1977) interest rate model.
The LS model is nested within CDG. For estimation purposes we restate the models to
be dependent on their log-solvency ratios x(t) deﬁned as the log of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s
market value to its default boundary (refer Appendix A for derivation). The dynamic
process for the log-solvency ratio in the LS model is given by

















where dWv,t is correlated with the short rate under the Vasicek (1977) model.
From equation (2.22), it is evident that the LS model has no mean-reversion; share-
holders donot invoke the option tore-leverage nor attempt toreduce bankruptcy costs. In
the other models, there is an assumed continuous adjustment towards along run solvency
ratio target, that is symmetrical above and below the target. Implicit in this speciﬁcation
is that capital structure adjustments are continuous and that shareholders actively adjust
debt-ratios downwards in response to rising bankruptcy costs. We can also see that the
log-solvency ratio drift is time-varying and positively related to the risk-free rate. An
increase in the short rate, ceteris paribus, decreases default risk and credit spreads. From
equation (2.23), the CDG model’s log-solvency drift rate is shown also to be positively
inﬂuenced by the level of target log-solvency, n, and to the size of the risk-free term-
structure slope; the latter is intended to capture management debt-timing behaviour.
Mueller (2000) shows that the drift rate in equation (2.21) can be expanded to in-
clude multivariate factors inﬂuencing the direction of capital structure decisions. The
resultant model has the disadvantage of a signiﬁcant increase in numeric processing
needed to solve the expected ﬁrst passage crossing time. More recently, Demchuk &44 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Gibson (2006) adapt the CDG model without a substantial increase in numeric complex-
ity. They assume that management adjusts debt levels continuously toward a target as
per CDG, but with the target a stochastic function of by recent past equity returns.
2.5 Capital Structure Theory and Evidence
As discussed in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, recent extensions of the Merton model have
either evolved to have endogenous default boundaries or exogenous default boundaries.
The former group of models is motivated by the hypothesis that shareholders adjust
capital structure tomaximise thevalue oftheir claim, balancing thebeneﬁts of taxshields
against bankruptcy costs. The latter group takes the dynamic process for capital structure
as given.
A possible cause of the credit spread prediction biases associated with structural
models, may be due to the model’s implied capital structure dynamic process spec-
iﬁcation being inconsistent with actual ﬁrm capital structure behaviour. In this sec-
tion we compare the underlying state variable dynamics assumed in the main structural
credit models with the parallel theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure
behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we examine the main theories of capital structure; the trade-
off, pecking-order, and market timing theories. From this review we identify potential
sources of miss-speciﬁcation for further examination in our model residual prediction
error testing.
2.5.1 Trade-Off Theory
In perfect and frictionless markets Modigliani & Miller (1958) prove that the choice of
capital ﬁnancing between debt and equity hasnoaffect on thevalue ofthe ﬁrm. However,
in the presence of taxes, ﬁrm value can be increased by borrowing and reducing the tax
burden by claiming a tax deduction on interest expenses (the tax shield). Borrowing
also introduces default and potential bankruptcy costs that can decrease ﬁrm value. The
static trade-off theory states that the ﬁrm chooses an optimal debt level that balances
the beneﬁt of tax shield with the added cost of potential bankruptcy. In other words, an
optimal ﬁrm maximising debt-ratio is predicted to exist.
The dynamic version of the trade-off theory states that ﬁrms will adjust their debt-
ratios towards an optimal debt-ratio target, but in the presence of recapitalisation costs,
the adjustment process may be slow. Firms are not likely to be currently at their target
debt-ratio, and are expected to mean-revert to it over time.
For the endogenous boundary structural models to be consistent with the trade-off
theory, the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio should be set by shareholders with regard to the effect of
tax shields and bankruptcy costs, and the default boundary of the ﬁrm chosen as con-
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ble 2.1 are all consistent with the trade-off theory’s prediction of the existence of an
optimal debt-ratio. However, the focus of the decision maker in the endogenous bound-
ary models is shareholder wealth maximisation and not maximisation of the ﬁrm’s value.
For the exogenous boundary models to be consistent with the trade-off theory, the
ﬁrm’s capital structure must be speciﬁed as a stochastic process with mean-reversion to
a target level. Most exogenous-dynamic structural credit models make this assumption,
with variations on whether the target is ﬁxed or time-varying. Taur´ en (1999) assumes
the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio reverts to a ﬁxed target debt-ratio, Mueller (2000) permits the ﬁrm’s
target log-leverage ratio to vary with business conditions contingent on macroeconomic
factors such as GDP, Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) vary the target log-leverage
ratio with the slope of the risk-free yield curve, Demchuk & Gibson (2006) assume
stochastic mean-reversion of the ﬁrm’s log-leverage ratio to a target that is negatively
related to the historic return on the equity market index.
2.5.2 Pecking Order Theory
The static pecking order theory states that a ﬁrm will ﬁnance its investment needs in
a preferential order of funding sources using those with the lowest information cost
ﬁrst (Myers 1984, Myers & Majluf 1984). The theory is based on the assumption that
informational asymmetry costs typically dominate other agency and bankruptcy costs
associated with debt. Management will therefore seek to ﬁnance investments in order
of decreasing information asymmetry. Retained earnings has no information asymmetry
and is preferred ﬁrst followed by collateralised debt, unsecured debt and lastly equity.
Unlike the trade-off theory, the choice between debt or equity is made in a predetermined
order according to the amount of external funding required. The lowest information cost
source is internal cash ﬂows, followed by debt, then followed lastly by equity. Thus a
ﬁrm will borrow, rather than issue equity, when internal cash is not sufﬁcient to fund cap-
ital expenditures. No target debt level exists and dividends are assumed to be ‘sticky’.
Thus, the ﬁrm’s observed debt-ratio is predicted to be simply the outcome of the cumu-
lative need for external funds. The main difference between the trade-off model and the
pecking order model is that the former predicts the ﬁrm to have an optimal debt-ratio,
and the latter predicts that there is no optimal target debt-ratio.
In the dynamic version of the pecking order theory, also offered by Myers (1984),
management are concerned with future as well as current information costs. Firms with
large expected future investments are predicted to maintain low default risk levels of
debt (i.e. maintain their debt capacity), to avoid the future cost of ﬁnancing with higher
premium debt or forgoing the investment. Thus, management are predicted to adjust
leverage to maintain a minimum level of expected future debt capacity dependent upon
their expected future investments and current debt capacity. When the ﬁrm is not debt
constrained, or its investment opportunity set is low, the ﬁrm is predicted to not actively46 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
manage its debt-ratio. If the ﬁrm is approaching its debt capacity threshold, reversion to
a safe region is predicted, even though there is no explicit debt-ratio target. Therefore,
in practice the ﬁrm may appear to have a ‘soft’ debt-ratio target resulting from anticipat-
ing future investment requirements subject to also maintaining sufﬁcient debt capacity
to provide ﬁnancial ﬂexibility (Fama & French 2002). Importantly, Shyam-Sunder &
Myers (1999) demonstrate that cyclical changes in operating earnings and capital ex-
penditure can lead to autocorrelated behaviour in the net external funding deﬁcit, and
therefore mean-reverting behaviour of the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio even when the pecking-order
theory holds. Consequently, mean-reversion of the debt-ratio is a consistent prediction
from both the trade-off and dynamic pecking order theories.
There is no endogenous boundary structural model explicitly based on the pecking-
order theory. If we were to construct such a model, we would have to specify the ﬁrm’s
stochastic net external funding requirement, with knowledge of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and
investment plans, in order to endogenously determine a projected path for the changes
in debt and equity funding over time. Clearly this is an daunting task for outside parties
to the ﬁrm to undertake.13
More simply we can value debt using an exogenous boundary model that speciﬁes
mean-reversion of the capital structure, whether by the trade-off or pecking order theory,
without resolving which theory holds. For example, Taur´ en (1999) specify the ﬁrm’s
debt-ratio to be mean-reverting under an Ornstein-Ulenbeck stochastic differential pro-
cess.
2.5.3 Market Timing Theory
Market timing theory proposes that managers, when deciding to issue debt or equity, are
predominately inﬂuenced by current economic conditions in the debt and equity mar-
kets, and attempt to lower their average cost of capital by timing the raising of capital.
As discussed further in Section 2.5.4, there is increasing empirical support for this be-
haviour.
The theory of equity market timing is contingent upon there being information asym-
metry between management and investors. Management must believe that equity is un-
derpriced relative to the ﬁrm’s value based on their own inside information, and the
market must react slowly to the information released from the equity issue announce-
ment. If these conditions hold, and management prove to be correct on average, then
extra value can be gained for the beneﬁt of existing long-term shareholders. Baker &
Wurgler (2002) propose that equity market timing is the predominant behavioural char-
13Goldstein et al. (2001) use the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow as the state variable but assume shareholder’s maximise
the value of their claim. A pecking-order based structural model could be developed from the same state
variable but replacing the assumption that the debt-ratio is the outcome of wealth maximisation behaviour
undertaken by shareholders, with the assumption that it is the cumulative result of the ﬁrm’s investment
strategy, net external funding requirements, and preferential access to funding sources.2.5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORY AND EVIDENCE 47
acteristic of management to such an extent that a ﬁrm’s present capital structure is the
consequence of past efforts to time the equity market. Their view is supported by survey
evidence gathered in an anonymous survey of 392 chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers by Graham &
Harvey (2001). They ﬁnd that one of the most important determinants of equity issuance
is management’s belief as to whether the equity market has, in their view, mispriced the
ﬁrm’s stock.
Debt market timing is based on the assumption that management attempt to exploit
expected changes in the level of interest rates. More debt is predicted to be issued when
the risk-free rate is low and expected to rise in the future. Following the expectations
theory of interest rates, this is expected when the slope of the yield curve is positive and
present risk-free rate is low. The survey of Graham & Harvey (2001) also ﬁnds quali-
tative support for debt market timing, particularly larger ﬁrms, with more sophisticated
treasury functions, who cite the level of interest rates as an important consideration when
making debt issues.
There is no endogenous boundary structural model consistent with the marketing
timing theory. However, the theory is readily implemented via an exogenous boundary
model because the target level of solvency is easily conditioned on external market fac-
tors. For example, debt market timing behaviour is assumed by CDG who specify the
risk-neutral target leverage ratio to be a decreasing function of the stochastic spot rate
and an increasing function of the stochastic slope of the yield curve. In a variation of
the CDG model, Demchuk & Gibson (2006) construct am exogenous boundary model
with equity timing capital structure behaviour. They assume that the ﬁrm continuously
adjusts its capital structure, i.e. issues either equity or debt, in response to the observed
past returns of the stock market index and to changes in its leverage ratio. They create
a stock market index variable that, in the spirit of Baker & Wurgler (2002), measures
recent aggregate equity market performance. It is a time weighted geometric average of
the historical stock market index return with a higher weighting placed on recent per-
formance, and is introduced into the CDG framework in replacement of the stochastic
risk-free rate.
Similar to Demchuk & Gibson (2006), Baker & Wurgler (2002) construct an index
of past equity returns designed to measure the extent to which the ﬁrm has historically
raised external funds when its equity return was high. Their ‘external ﬁnance weighted-
average’ market-to-book ratio is a weighted average of the ﬁrm’s past market-to-book
ratios which, for example, takes high values for ﬁrms that raised debt or equity when
their market-to-book ratio was high. The variable is found to be explain present leverage
ratios; ﬁrms with current low leverage are those that raised funds when their market
valuations were high, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, while high leverage ﬁrms
are those that raised funds when their market valuations were low.
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haviour in the valuation of risky debt. The CDG model includes debt timing behaviour
and Demchuk & Gibson (2006) includes equity timing behaviour. In a repeat the of the
HH base case exercise, the Demchuk & Gibson (2006) show that their model can po-
tentially explain more of the credit spread than existing models, for example, 40 percent
of the credit spread on Aaa bonds can be explained by their model compared to only 18
percent for the CDG model.
2.5.4 Empirical Evidence
Thatﬁrmsmean-revert theirdebt-ratios overtimeiswidely supported empirically (Taggart
1977, Jalilvand & Harris 1984). More recently, Fama & French (2002) show ﬁrm-
speciﬁc debt-ratios to be very slowly mean-reverting at a rate between 0.07 and 0.18
per annum. Frank & Goyal (2003) ﬁnd the average ﬁrm debt-ratio mean-reverts at 0.124
per annum on average. For small ﬁrms the rate was faster at 0.115 and slower for large
ﬁrms slower at 0.104.
What is unclear is whether leverage mean-reversion evidence supports the trade-off
theory or dynamic pecking order theory. If it is the latter, then the endogenous boundary
model literature is misspeciﬁed since it relies upon the existence of an optimal debt level,
whether it be to maximise ﬁrm value or shareholder wealth. Shyam-Sunder & Myers
(1999) show that such slow rates of debt-ratio mean-reversion can also be explained by
the dynamic pecking order theory. They are unable to reject the dynamic pecking order
model because such a slow rate may be due to autocorrelated net cash ﬂows or from
ﬁrms reserving debt capacity for future ﬁnancial ﬂexibility as posited in the dynamic
pecking order theory. The slowness of reversion is attributed to management giving low
priority to maintaining a target debt-ratio; an opinion supported by a qualitative survey
of ﬁnancial controllers undertaken by Graham & Harvey (2001).
Baker & Wurgler (2002) reject both the pecking order and trade-off theories. They
argue that if the trade-off theory holds, temporary ﬂuctuations in the market-to-book
ratio, or any other variable, should have temporary effects. However, their ﬁnding of
statistically robust persistence in past equity returns is not consistent with dynamic debt
management under the trade-off theory. Only an exogenous boundary model, such as
CDG and Demchuk & Gibson (2006), is consistent with the market timing theory. That
Graham & Harvey (2001) ﬁnd that two-thirds of surveyed Chief Financial Ofﬁcers claim
market timing inﬂuences their sourcing of funding, supports market timing behaviour
as the predominant explanatory model of the ﬁrm’s dynamic capital structure. If mar-
ket timing is the main capital structure behaviour, then only an exogenous boundary
structural credit model conditioned on past equity returns would be consistent with the
empirical literature supporting market timing behaviour.
That past stock prices inﬂuence ﬁrm leverage is supported by Welch (2004). He ﬁnds
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is inconsistent with the trade-off theory’s prediction that ﬁrms will increase leverage to
revert to a static debt-ratio in response to decreasing market leverage. Using a variation
of Baker & Wurgler’s (2002) market timing variable, Kayhan & Titman (2007) conﬁrm
that historical stock price changes and external funding deﬁcits have a signiﬁcant effect
on capital ratios over the short to medium term, but in the longer term there is evidence
of partial reversion back to target ratios based on traditional trade-off variables. Firms
are found to raise equity capital when their stock prices are high and tend to reduce
their debt-ratios subsequently. The persistence of the equity market inﬂuence partially
persists for up to 10 years.
Frank & Goyal (2003) and Fama & French (2002) argue that ﬁrms with more asym-
metric information should follow the pecking order of funding sources more closely.
However, small high growth ﬁrms issue signiﬁcant amounts of equity, in contradiction
of the pecking order theory. In contrast, the pecking order theory explains well the equity
issuance of large mature ﬁrms. The result is explainable if capital constraints are consid-
ered in the context of a dynamic pecking order model. Lemmon & Zender (2002) ﬁnd
that small high growth ﬁrms carry additional equity due to the presence of debt capacity
constraints. Similarly, Dissanaike, Lambrecht & Saragga (2001) show, on a sample of
UK ﬁrms, that those that did not target a debt-ratio were on average larger, more prof-
itable, have higher market-to-book ratios, and carry more tangible assets, than ﬁrms that
did target a debt-ratio. Debt targeting may therefore be a consequence of concern over
managing future debt capacity.
Instead of ﬁrm size, Chang, Dasgupta & Hilary (2006) use equity analyst coverage
as a proxy for information asymmetry. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms with low coverage and
high information asymmetry, are more affected by Baker & Wurgler’s (2002) external
ﬁnance weighted market-to-book ratio. In other words, these ﬁrms seek external funds
when their share price is high relative to recent history. The implication is that ﬁrms with
high information asymmetry, including small ﬁrms, will have term structures of credit
spreads that reﬂect the potential to re-leverage based on the expected evolution of market
equity returns.
Korajczyk & Levy (2003) consider the inﬂuence of macroeconomic conditions on
ﬁrm leverage and show that it affects ﬁrm behaviour via market timing subject to capital
constraints. Empirically they ﬁnd that unconstrained ﬁrms are more sensitive to market
conditions and are more likely to issue equity when the recent average stock price is
high. A constrained ﬁrm is deﬁned as not having sufﬁcient cash to undertake investment
opportunities and faces severe agency costs when accessing ﬁnancial markets. Con-
strained ﬁrms are more inﬂuenced by the deviation from ﬁrm-speciﬁc target, exhibiting
faster reversion, and were only marginally affected by macroeconomic conditions.
Hovakimian et al. (2001) ﬁnd that deviation from target is an important but not dom-
inant factor in explaining capital structure adjustments. The likelihood of issuing equity50 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
is positively related to the ﬁrm’s current and immediate past stock return, and ﬁrms with
a low market-to-book ratio tend to issue debt rather than equity.
In summary, the most recent literature emphasises the role of information asym-
metry, equity market timing, past external funding deﬁcits, and current debt capacity
in explaining changes and the level of ﬁrm capital structure. Where ﬁrms have high
information asymmetry, they access the external markets less frequently and equity mar-
ket conditions are more persistent. Firms with immediate debt capacity constraints are
less concerned with market timing and exhibit relatively faster debt-ratio reversion rates.
Large, mature ﬁrms are more likely to conform to the pecking order theory and be less
inﬂuenced by equity market timing. Finally, concern for maintaining future debt ca-
pacity may result in slow levels of mean-reversion to an apparent target even though an
optimal debt target does not exist.
Finally, the trade-off theory has limited empirical support in explaining short term
changes in capital structure, although evidence by Kayhan & Titman (2007) suggests
that the trade-off theory may hold in part over the longer term.
2.5.5 Implications for Structural Credit Models
Theearliest structural credit models assume passive capital structure management. Based
on the evidence of the capital structure literature, such a speciﬁcation is not supported.
The future path of thr ﬁrm’s capital structure is more likely to be the result of external
funding requirements, subject to capital constraints and information asymmetries.
Theendogenous boundary literature is premised on the existence of an optimal trade-
off between bankruptcy costs and tax shields, yet managing the ﬁrm’s deviation from an
optimal target is not supported as an imperative of management. On the other hand, the
exogenous boundary literature has been extended to accommodate market timing be-
haviour, and can accommodate differences in capital constraints and information asym-
metry across ﬁrms.
The essential characteristics of a model consistent with the empirical literature is one
that speciﬁes:
Mean-reversion of leverage to target: The speed of mean-reversion depends upon the
level of the ﬁrm’s debt capacity. For large and well rated ﬁrms the rate of mean-
reversion is likely to be very small, and higher for smaller or poorly rated ﬁrms;
Leverage depends on past equity performance: High historical equity returns are as-
sociated with lower leverage with the effect on leverage persisting well into the
future. Equity market timing is greater when the ﬁrm has higher information
asymmetries, for example, small ﬁrms.
Therefore, of the extant structural credit models, the dynamic exogenous boundary mod-
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the ﬁrm’s expected future leverage path, for example, CDG and Demchuk & Gibson
(2006). To the extent that existing models do not include such behaviour, but the bond
market expects it, credit spread prediction errors are likely to be related to these missing
characteristics. Speciﬁcally, the capital structure literature suggests the following errors
may exist in some structural models where they are absent:
Mean-reversion of ﬁrm solvency to a target: When theﬁrmisdebt constrained, inthe
absence of mean-reversion, the credit model will overpredict long term spreads
due to the absence of leverage reversion to a less constrained region. For un-
constrained ﬁrms (high credit rating), long term credit spreads are expected to be
understated due to the absence of mean-reversion to a soft target arising from au-
tocorrelated external funding requirements. Thus, a negative relationship between
credit spread prediction errors and the bond’s term to maturity is expected;
Firm solvency as a function of equity market timing: Whenthe equity market hasper-
formed strongly, future leverage and default risk is expected to be low due to ﬁrms
favouring equity over debt issuance. In the absence of equity market timing, credit
models can be expected to overestimate long term credit spreads when recent eq-
uity performance isstrong. Thus, apositive relationship between spread prediction
error and recent equity market performance is expected. The error is expected to
be higher for small ﬁrms since information asymmetry is higher.
We later test for the inﬂuence of these stylised facts on model prediction error in
Section 4.2.2.
2.6 Review of Prior Credit Spread Studies
While the theoretical ﬁeld has seen considerable research effort, the empirical testing of
structural credit models has not kept pace. The number of studies that directly assess
the performance of structural model predictions remains quite small in comparison. As
noted by EHH,
...the empirical testing of these models is quite limited. Indeed, only a few
articles implement a structural model to evaluate its ability to predict prices
or spreads. (Eom et al. 2004, p.200)
In this section we review the ﬁndings from prior empirical research, summarise
methods and limitations, and place our work in the context of addressing some of these
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2.6.1 Past Findings on Predictive Accuracy
Until recently, the most comprehensive empirical studies of a structural model’s pricing
accuracy wasconducted onthe Merton model byJMR.Their study has since been widely
cited as supporting the view that the Merton model underestimates credit spreads. Their
method of estimation pioneered ﬁtting of structural models and so we ﬁrst examine this
aspect of their work.
JMR collected Standard & Poors price data on 350 bonds, issued by 27 ﬁrms, sam-
pled over the period 1977 to 1981. They carefully selected ﬁrms to include only those
displaying a simple capital structure, close to the Merton ideal; with one class of stock
and mostly public, long dated bonds with limited numbers of issues outstanding. The
sample unavoidably included callable bonds due to the high prevalence on issue in the
sample period, and so the Merton model was modiﬁed to include the inﬂuence of call
provisions on bond value. As an additional control, a naive model was constructed in
which the bond’s promised cash ﬂows were discounted at the maturity matched relevant
risk-free rate plus the effects of call provisions.
To ﬁt the Merton model, JMR used two different methods to estimate the ﬁrm’s asset
volatility. The ﬁrst relies on constructing a monthly time series of the approximate value
of the ﬁrm. Firm value is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity, the market
value of traded debt, and the market value of nontraded debt. The latter was estimated by
assuming that the ratio of book to market values was the same for traded and nontraded
debt, and was then applied to the book value of the nontraded debt. Asset volatility
was then calculated as standard deviation of monthly ﬁrm value return measured over
the prior 24 months. This method is general and does not impose any model speciﬁc
assumptions.
The second method relies on inverting the implied asset volatility from the Merton
model. Since equity is a derivative of the ﬁrm’s assets we know from Ito’s Lemma that







where se is the equity volatility, E is the market value of equity, V is the market value
of ﬁrm assets, and sv is the volatility of the ﬁrm’s assets. For the Merton model the
partial derivative of equity value with respect to asset value is given by N(d1) where d1
is deﬁned in equation (2.3) and N( ) is the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution.
JMR use the time series method to obtain initial estimate ofV(t), E(t). The standard
deviation of equity is measured directly as the sample standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s
daily equity return observed over the last three months. An estimate of asset volatility is
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for asset volatility.
The ﬁndings of JMR give mixed support for the Merton model. For investment grade
bonds the modelwas unable toperform better than their naive model. Forsub-investment
grade bonds, the Merton model provided some incremental explanatory power over the
naive model. The mean percentage pricing error for the whole sample was 4.5 percent
and 10 percent on the sub-investment grade bonds indicating a tendency to overvalue
and therefore underestimate credit spreads. An examination of the residuals showed that,
across all rating levels, the higher (lower) the estimated asset volatility the more likely
the bond price was underestimated (overestimated). A year effect was noted as possi-
bly caused by time variation in the risk-free rate that a stochastic rate model may have
improved. Bonds paying larger coupons tended to be overvalued in the sub-investment
grade, which may indicate a possible missing tax effect related to default risk. JMR con-
clude that introducing uncertain interest rates and tax would improve the valuation of
corporate bonds. However, their results may have been inﬂuenced by the large number
of callable bonds in their sample and the high prevailing interest rate volatility caused
by a shift in Federal Reserve monetary policy during the sample period (EHH).
A further problem with the JMR sample concerns the lack of control over matrix
prices in the Standard & Poors bond price data set. Warga & Welch (1993) report that
the data contains mostly matrix prices and not actual trade prices. A matrix price is a
hypothetical price used where no trade was observed. It is calculated from, ‘rules that
specify the addition of a ﬁxed spread over either an actively traded benchmark issue of
the same company, another company’s issue with similar rating, maturity, and coupon,
or a U.S. Treasury’, (Warga & Welch 1993, p.963).
The JMR study was followed Ogden (1987), who selects 57 newly issued bonds
with maturities greater than 10 years, issued between 1973 and 1985. On the date of
issue, he ﬁnds credit spreads to be underpredicted, by an average of 104 basis points. A
similar call for the inclusion of stochastic interest rate was made, but is also potentially
inﬂuenced by the prevailing volatile interest rate environment.
A particular feature of structural credit models is the upward sloping term structure
of low-default risk bonds and the “hump-shaped” rise and fall of high-default risk bonds
(refer Figure 2.1). Sarig & Warga (1989) examined the Merton model’s predicted credit
spread term structure shape with observed data. Their data comprised trader quotes for
corporate zero-coupon bonds collected over the period 1985 to 1987. Matrix price data
points were removed. Over half the bonds in the sample were callable and a further ﬁlter
applied to remove bonds where the call option was likely to be economically valuable.
Treasury rates were then deducted from observed bond yields and the resulting yield
spread data averaged over time and across issuers grouping by similar ratings. The re-
sulting credit spread term structures showed a similar pattern to Merton. Their ﬁnding
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wege & Turner (1999), whose data was the primary issue yields, on matched pairs of
bonds of different maturities, issued on the same day over the period 1977 to 1994. For
speculative grade borrowers, Helwege & Turner (1999) ﬁnd that the term structure on
the day of issue was, on average, upwardly sloping by 14 basis points. However, ﬁve out
of fourteen cases of non-callable bond term structures were downward sloping as pre-
dicted by Merton, thereby demonstrating that the credit risk term structure is inﬂuenced
by ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.
Wei & Guo (1997) compared the accuracy of the Merton and LS models to predict
the credit spread term structure using weekly observations of Eurodollar yields sampled
during 1992. Five data points along the Eurodollar term structure, spanning seven days
to one year, were used to invert the models for the unknown parameters using maximum
likelihood. The models were reﬁtted each week cross-sectionally adopting a similar
approach to that pioneered by Brown & Dybvig (1986) in ﬁtting a single factor bond
pricing model to the risk-free term structure. The ratio of ﬁrm value to default boundary
V(t)/K was permitted to vary and re-estimated each week. Their paper is therefore
similar in spirit to our proposed latent estimation method except that we propose ﬁtting
parameters constrained intertemporally and cross-sectionally. They ﬁnd that the Merton
and LS models provide similar explanatory power, despite the additional number of
parameters in the LS model. When the volatility estimate in Merton is allowed to be re-
estimated each week, the model clearly outperformed LS, thus suggesting that implied
volatility is time-varying.
A difﬁculty with Wei & Guo (1997) is that they only consider very short-term debt
of one year or less.14 For tests of model predictive accuracy we are interested in com-
paring performance over longer time periods typical of corporate bond tenors. Because
structural models rely on diffusion of the ﬁrm value across a default boundary, very short
tenors do not provide a sufﬁcient period of time for differences in stochastic process to
be robustly tested. We would expect larger differences between models to appear over
longer term structure periods. The estimated parameters reported appear to be adversely
affected as a consequence. At a mean of 1.025, the estimated ratio of V(t)/K implies
that ﬁrmsare very close to their default boundaries and will almost certainly default. The
mean variance is correspondingly very low at a reported level of only 0.9 percent (refer
(Wei & Guo 1997, Exhibit 9)). To match the short term credit spreads in the sample,
with a mean of 45 basis points for a 7 day tenor, the ﬁrm is implied to be very close to
default in order to invoke a sharp non-linear rise in credit spreads as illustrated in the
upper plot for the highly leveraged ﬁrm in Figure 2.1. When estimating credit model
parameters by inversion, it is important to control for non default risk related pricing
factors. For example, in estimating a reduced-form model from bond spreads, Duffee
(1999) controls for the unexplained, non-stochastic components of the credit spread, by
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the use of an intercept term that implies a constant non-zero probability of default at
all tenors. It would have been informative to see what additional explanatory power the
credit models could provide over and above the assumption of a constant credit spread.
Unfortunately, Wei & Guo’s (1997) method of cross-sectional estimation precluded this;
without the additional time-series restrictions on the model, it would be impossible to
estimate a non-stochastic component of the credit spread.
The testing of credit models has been hampered by ‘poor quality and limited avail-
ability of corporate bond price data’ (LYS. p.3). This situation was partly remedied by
the introduction of the Bridge Information System’s bond database, ﬁrst applied to test-
ing the Merton and LS model by LYS. Their database comprised daily bid quotes shared
in a consortium by major U.S. investment banks (Bridge Information Systems). The
data is not without some potential error however, with the authors noting that, ‘Bridge
quotes reﬂect the informed judgment of Bridge personnel rather than results of speciﬁc
transactions’, (LYS, p.3). Firms were selected that had only a single bullet bond issued,
including banks, in the ﬁnal sample of 56 issuers. Model parameters were estimated
from observable proxies. Estimates of asset volatility are the annualised historical ob-
served quarterly value of outstanding stock plus book value of non-bond liabilities and
the market value of the bond. Various tests of different default boundaries for the Merton
model were attempted with the best performing found to be K equal to total book lia-
bilities. The LS model was estimated in two steps: ﬁrstly, just the introduction of early
default was incrementally tested relative to the Merton model by ﬁtting a single-factor
constant interest rate version of LS; secondly, the full LS model with correlated stochas-
tic risk-free rate model was ﬁtted. The asset-rate correlation was proxied by the sample
correlation between the monthly stock price and yield of on-the-run 10 year Treasury
bonds. Firm level correlations ﬂuctuated widely ranging from -44.7 percent to 28.9 per-
cent with an average of -7.2 percent. Recovery rates were tested using a single rate of
47.7 percent and varying by industry as per historical rates found by Altman & Kishore
(1996).
Theresults of LYSsupported earlier problems withthe Merton model and wasdamn-
ing of the performance of the LS model. Speciﬁcally, the introduction of early default
while, ‘certainly more realistic, does not seem to improve model accuracy’, (LYS, p.13).
The median spread prediction error for the Merton model was found to be 58.5 basis
points, and LS was 62.7 basis points using individual ﬁrm correlations and only 52.0
basis points with either a constant interest rate or assuming a stochastic rate with zero
correlation. The theoretical improvements made by LS over Merton were not supported
empirically. Introducing stochastic interest rates into the LS model did not improve price
prediction relative to the Merton model. The LS model prediction error biases were
found to be directionally the same as Merton but greater. Overall both models were
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coupon rates. Possible reasons suggested by the authors were the presence of a liquidity
premium, not controlled for in their experiment, and concerns about the appropriateness
of their brute force volatility estimation procedure. They state that,
The classical model could still be correct if, perhaps among other possi-
bilities, we have greatly mis-estimated future asset volatility. At the end
of the day, we are unable to distinguish two hypotheses: Either the model
is rejected or expected future asset volatility differs signiﬁcantly from past
volatility. (LYS, p.8)
Their ﬁrm selection procedure also limits the conclusions that can be drawn. Only ﬁrms
with single public bond issues were included. This precludes larger ﬁrms from their
sample where we would expect greater information to be contained in public bond and
equity markets, and their results to be more representative of the broader bond market.
Similar to preceding papers, their test is cross-sectional only, and with only a single bond
outstanding, the model’s ability to replicate the ﬁrm’s term structure of credit spreads
remains untested.
In the most comprehensive study to date, EHH extend the scope of LYS and un-
dertake a ‘horse race‘ amongst ﬁve structural models: Merton, Geske, LT, LS, and
CDG. Their data source is the Fixed Income Database (FID) containing month-end
ﬁrm-speciﬁc bid quotes made by Lehman Brothers bond traders over the period 1986 to
1997.15 The sample was restricted to senior noncallable bonds issued by non-ﬁnancial
and non-utility companies that had a simple capital debt structure with only one or two
public bonds on issue and were listed.16 To avoid biases due to infrequent trading,
bonds of remaining maturity of less than one year were omitted. The resultant sample
comprised 182 bonds, from issuers mostly in the manufacturing industry (68 percent of
sample) that tended to be large and of low risk.
The ﬁve models were implemented using observable equity and accounting data.
Thus, their study shares a similar method to JMR and LYS. The exogenous default
boundary was assumed equal to the ﬁrm’s total book liabilities, and ﬁrm asset value
equal to the sum of total liabilities and the market value of equity. A 10 year time se-
ries of observed monthly leverage ratios (total liabilities over ﬁrm value) was used to
estimate the parameters of the ﬁrm’s mean-reverting leverage process. For the LS and
CDG models, the mean-reversion of the latent leverage ratio, the sensitivity of leverage
to the risk-free term structure, and target leverage ratios, were all estimated by regress-
ing leverage on lagged leverage and interest rates. The sample correlation coefﬁcient
15Lehman Brothers maintain a comprehensive database of price quotes to support their widely published
bond indexes (refer Hong & Warga (2000) for description)
16Gas and electricity utilities were excluded on the basis that their return on equity and therefore default
risk is inﬂuenced by regulation. We see no reason to exclude the ﬁrms from our sample given that they rep-
resent an important source of debt in the bond market and market prices for bonds should fully encapsulate
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between asset and interest rate movement was estimated to be only -2 percent. Asset
volatility was estimated by equation (2.24) where the known Merton model analytic so-
lutions for the partial derivatives was applied across all models, although not strictly
correct, was considered a tractable approximation.
EHH’smain ﬁnding is that the ﬁvestructural bond pricing models tested all had difﬁ-
culty in accurately predicting credit spreads, demonstrating wide dispersion inprediction
errors. The single-factor models of Merton and Geske, on average underpredicted credit
spreads, but the other three more advanced two-factor models overpredicted. At the ex-
tremes, the Merton model was the worst at underpredicting and the CDG model was
the worst at overpredicting with mean percentage prediction errors of -50.4 percent and
269.8 percent respectively.17 The main point made by EHH is that the mean prediction
errors mask the true extent of their poor performances. Referring instead to the absolute
prediction errors the Merton and Geske models are fairly similar in having the lowest
errors (78.0 percent and 66.9 percent). Once again, the poorest performer was clearly
the CDG model at 319.3 percent. The LS model was found to overpredict with a mean
prediction error of 42.9 percent outperforming LT at 115.7 percent.
The results of EHH are surprising. Their conclusion that the LS model overpredicts
credit spreads is in contradiction to LYS.The absolute spread prediction error was nearly
double that of the Merton model indicating much wider prediction error variance. The
LS model showed a tendency to predict either very high or very low credit spreads with
most dispersion occurring with shorter maturities. The LS model is nested in the CDG
model and it is to be expected that many of the same error patterns were also evident
in the CDG model. With a mean percentage spread prediction error of 270 percent, the
CDG model overpredicted credit spreads by more than the LS model. However, with
its additional parameter control over long term credit spreads, and consistency with the
capital structure stylised facts, we would have expect the model to perform better than
the LS model. It is therefore important to understand whether this ﬁnding obtains in
other samples.
As these models contain a second stochastic factor for the risk-free rate, regression
testing of the errors against interest rate volatility was performed by EHH and found
to be signiﬁcant. When the interest rate volatility is high, the two-factor models tend to
overpredict credit spreads. Further, the correlation between asset return and interest rates
was found to have minimal inﬂuence on predicted spreads. Taken together, the results
suggest that introducing a stochastic interest rate factor has led to no greater prediction
accuracy and has introduced additional over-sensitivity to interest rates.
Because the CDG model nests LS, but contains more variables that are difﬁcult to
estimate, the worsening of performance may be due to measurement error. We can
identify two possible causes. Unlike the LS model, CDG requires estimates of the target
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leverage ratio and speed of the leverage ratio reversion to the target, estimated by a
univariate regression on the time series of observed leverage ratios. In small samples,
the estimate of the speed of mean-reversion may be biased downwards when the process
is close to being a unit root (refer Ball & Torous (1996) and references therein). The
second problem may reside with their method for estimating the target log-solvency
ratio, n. In general, the expected ﬁrst passage time is very sensitive to the level of the
drift rate. Their estimation method involves solving for the target ratio under the physical
measure using aregression onﬁrstdifferences oftheobserved market leverage ratio, then
estimating the real expected growth of the ﬁrm’s assets to back out n, which is deﬁned
under the risk-neutral measure.18 The expected growth rate is taken as the past 10 years
ofvalue growth. Since realised growth may differ from the expected an alternative is also
tested using a longer-term view of market-wide equity returns (15 percent return and an
equity risk premium of 6 percent is applied). Under the alternative estimation method,
the mean spread prediction error decreases to 79 percent, but still remains higher than
the LS model. Their results indicate that errors in the CDG model are very sensitive to
the target leverage ratio assumption, which of course, is unobservable. Consequently,
EHH suggest that,
An alternative to using estimates of mean asset returns and speed of adjust-
ment would be to simply estimate the implied risk neutral long-term mean
of leverage, which not only ﬁts the data to the spreads, but avoids estimation
of the mean asset return in the model. (Eom et al. 2004, p.523)
EHH ﬁnd the LT model consistently overpredicts credit spreads. The mean percent-
age spread prediction error is 115 percent. The problem is worse on high-coupon bonds,
short maturities, and for sub-investment grade issuers. Its behaviour is different to the
other models considered, tending to overpredict across all leverage levels and was not
sensitive to parameter estimates.
In summary, EHH ﬁnd that all models except LT, exhibit a similar pattern of error.
Prediction errors are positively related to leverage; overprediction occurred with higher
leverage and under prediction with lower leverage ﬁrms. The results conﬁrm a lever-
age bias consistent with the view of JMR that the Merton model overvalues safe bonds.
A similar result is found when spread prediction errors by bond rating are examined;
spreads are overpredicted for poorer rated issuers and underpredicted for investment
grade, with the exception of LT. This model exhibited the lowest leverage and no signif-
icant rating bias. No reason is apparent why the LT model should not exhibit the same
leverage bias as the other structural models, although it is interesting to note that it is
the only endogenous-barrier model tested. The other key latent variable is asset volatil-
ity. Here, a positive bias is generally reported; when asset volatility is estimated to be
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high from the use of 150 day historical window on stock prices, the credit spread is over
estimated and vice versa. The exception is again the LT model.
Structural models are sensitive to the choice of default boundary level and asset
volatility, both of which are estimated from observable proxy data. The spread under-
prediction problem with investment grade debt was found to be typically less severe
when the book value of leverage was close to the market value of leverage. Conversely,
the underprediction problem was worst for ﬁrms with high market-to-book ratios (ex-
cept for the LT model). EHH suggest debt markets are less sanguine about the future
prospects of high market-to-book ﬁrms; the debt markets imply a higher default bound-
ary or a lower leverage target to accommodate the risk of reversion. Since the default
boundary is unobservable, there is no empirical reason to consider the book value of
liabilities to be an accurate proxy for the default boundary. Recently, Davydenko (2005)
conﬁrmed in a study of defaulted companies, that the default boundary is typically less
than the face value of the ﬁrm’s total debt.
HH assess the ability of a variety of structural models to explain the observed credit
spread levels. The models examined included LS (with and without stochastic interest
rates), LT, CDG, Anderson & Sundaresan (1996), Anderson et al. (1996), Mella-Barral
& Perraudin (1997), and a jump-diffusion extension of LS. Using a mixture of implied
and observed variables, a novel calibration approach is performed. Rather than model
individual ﬁrmsand their quoted credit spreads, a representative generic ﬁrm was created
for different levels of default risk based on issuer ratings. The average 10 year cumu-
lative default rates for each rating class was obtained from Moody’s (data compiled for
the period 1973-1998), and a representative bond was assumed to be ranked senior un-
secured with a constant recovery rate of 51.31 percent of face value. Typical leverage
ratios and associated market equity premiums were matched to the rating agency levels.
For the exogenous-boundary LS, CDG, and jump-diffusion models, the default bound-
ary was assumed to occur at 60 percent of the value of liabilities. Corresponding mean
credit spreads on 10year bonds werethen obtained from LehmanBondindexes andother
studies. To ﬁt each model, model speciﬁc variables such as the asset risk premium, asset
volatility, and ﬁrm asset value are solved in order to match the known target variables
of leverage ratio, equity premium, and cumulative real default probability. The resul-
tant predicted credit spread for each generic ﬁrm was then compared with the long-run
average observed credit spread.
To compare the results of HH with EHH we calculate an equivalent credit spread
predicted error for HH by comparing the model predicted spread with the market average
level as reported by HH. Table 2.2 presents the difference between the extant studies.
EHH ﬁnd a wide disparity in percentage spread prediction errors across models. The
EHH ﬁnd that the CDG model excessively overpredicts compared to the other models.
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Table 2.2: Shown is the mean percentage credit spread prediction error reported by Eom et al. (2004)
(EHH) and Huang & Huang (2003) (HH). Results for HH are the author’s calculations and are computed
by deducting the reported model predicted credit spreads from the market average divided by the market
average. HH results are sourced from HH’s Tables 3, 4, and 6 for a single A rated bond. EHH mean
percentage error is sourced from EHH’s Table 3. EHH only report an overall sample average error, but







LS models also overpredict, yet HH ﬁnd underprediction of market credit spreads. In
contradiction to EHH, HH do not report wide variance of credit spreads predictions as a
problem,
We show a large class of structural models - both existing and new ones -
that incorporate many realistic economic considerations can indeed generate
very consistent credit yield spreads if each of the models is calibrated to
match historical loss experience data. (Huang & Huang 2003, p.3)
Therefore, it appears that by calibrating each model to match observed default rate levels,
some of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc discrepancies that may have been measurement errors under
EHH’s proxy method, appear to have been removed. If this result arises when models
are calibrated to loss rates, then calibrating to observed credit spreads could potentially
result in a similar ﬁnding.
However, the HH method is not without its own shortcomings. Firstly, calibrating to
real default rates necessitates a change in measure of the drift rate to include the ﬁrm’s
expected rate of return under the real measure as was discussed in Section 2.3.1. The
task of estimating the unobserved risk premium on ﬁrm assets is not a trivial exercise
and potentially introduces further estimation errors. Secondly, real transaction price
data is not used; the credit spreads are for hypothetical bonds only issued by a generic
representative ﬁrm. Thirdly, the representative ﬁrm and its associated default rate require
averaging of characteristics across ﬁrms and across time (for example default rates are
measured over a 25 year period and credit spreads are pooled by rating grade over time).
Finally, we note that this is not a test of a structural model’s prediction of the dynamic
term structure of credit risk. The full extent of a structural model’s predictions remain
untested.
Anderson & Sundaresan (2000) explore the relative ability of alternative endogenous
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bond yields for industrial corporations as reported in the Salomon Brothers Book of An-
alytical Yields. Models considered include Merton, Leland, and Anderson & Sundaresan
(1996) at an economy-wide level for a generic ﬁrm with characteristics constructed from
aggregate data; annual aggregate balance sheets of non-ﬁnancial corporations reported
in the US Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts, and monthly aggregate index data
from 1970 to 1996 for S&P ratings of AAA, A, and BBB. Financing by way of a single
consol bond is assumed so that analytic solutions are obtained for the various models
considered. In their regressions, an intercept term is used to capture a premium for the
illiquidity of corporate bond markets relative to Treasuries caused by a tax differential
between corporate and Treasury bond income, and any other systematic bias that may
be prevalent in the credit model. Their study is the ﬁrst to control for non-credit related
factors in the ﬁtting of structural models and the estimation of standard errors around
implied parameter estimates.
Anderson & Sundaresan (2000) ﬁnd that a consol version of the Merton model con-
tributes very little incremental spread prediction over and above the intercept term, how-
ever the models do explain intertemporal variations in credit spreads related to leverage
changes. The implied asset volatility was close to the S&P 500 and considered therefore
unrealistically high. Their study is useful in highlighting that econometric estimation of
structural model parameters can give superior information about relative model perfor-
mance compared to the cross-sectional methods employed by earlier studies. However,
the study does acknowledge limitations. The measurement of ﬁrm characteristics and
yield spreads is extremely coarse and limited only to investment grade default risk, ma-
turity is limited to 30 year bonds to match against consol bond predictions, no term
structure restrictions are enforced on the models (given the inﬁnite maturity assumption)
therefore dynamic term structure predictions of ﬁnite maturity structural models remain
untested.
2.6.2 Non-Default Components of the Credit Spread
There is evidence that the credit spread is unlikely to contain compensation for default
risk alone; liquidity, tax, and other non-credit related factors have been found to be em-
bedded in credit spreads (Elton et al. 2001, Delianedis & Geske 2001, Longstaff 2002).
As shown by Anderson & Sundaresan (2000), controlling for any non-credit related
components of the credit spread is important for unbiased estimation of structural mod-
els. Similarly, Duffee (1999) also estimates an intercept term when estimating implied
parameters for a reduced-form model. The difference between the two studies is that
Duffee (1999) assumes the presence of a constant non-zero instantaneous default risk,
whereas, Anderson & Sundaresan (2000) assume a constant non-zero credit spread pre-
mium without implying that the effect is the result of default risk. The latter speciﬁcation
is more consistent with the presence of liquidity and tax premiums and is adopted in our62 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
empirical testing discussed further in Chapter 3.
How much of the credit spread is related to default risk is an unresolved question
and estimates vary widely between studies. HH calibrate structural credit models to
the long-term average default rate for a representative ﬁrm, and suggest that structural
models account for only a small fraction of the observed corporate-Treasury yield. They
conclude that the LS model explains only 16 percent of observed AAA credit spreads,
increasing to 29 percent for BBB, and 83 percent for B rated ﬁrms. The LT model
achieves a better performance explaining 59 percent for AAA, 31 percent for Baa, and
87 percent for B rated ﬁrms. The CDG model exhibits explanatory behaviour similar to
the LS model.
Independently, Delianedis & Geske (2001) suggest that only 5 percent of the AAA
credit spread is related to default risk and 22 percent of the BBB credit spread, which
is of a similar magnitude to the LS base-case model of HH for mid-rated ﬁrms. The
remaining components are hypothesised to be related to taxes, liquidity, jumps in asset
values, and market risk factors.
Elton et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the level of credit spreads can be explained by three
components: i) compensation for default risk, ii) compensation for state taxes charged
on corporate bond income that is exempt on government bonds, iii) compensation for
additional systematic risk over and above that incurred by government bonds. They
conclude that on average, taxes and default risk account for at most 20 percent of the
credit spread.
How much of the credit spread is related to default risk requires an estimate of the
credit spread due to default risk. Elton et al. (2001) use historical real probabilities
of default obtained from rating agency data. HH calibrate various structural models
to similar rating agency default data, then obtain the predicted credit spreads from the
calibrated models. Delianedis & Geske (2001) use the predicted spreads from a Merton
model with parameters ﬁtted from observable equity market and accounting proxy data.
In all these studies, reliance is made on the predicted spreads from structural models
ﬁtted by proxy variables.
2.6.3 Contribution to the Literature
We extend EHH with improved estimation methods and data, thereby building upon
the extant literature of JMR, LYS, and EHH. We are also able to answer how much of
the credit spread is explained by the structural models, therefore providing a comparison
with HH using actual trade data and models calibrated with minimum average prediction
error.
As an alternative to the traditional ‘observed-proxy’ methods employed in the extant
literature, we adapt an estimation technique from the interest rate term structure mod-
elling ﬁeld. Using an extended Kalman ﬁlter (EKF) quasi-maximum likelihood method,2.7. SELECTION OF MODELS FOR TESTING 63
model parameters are estimated with asymptotic standard errors. A strong advantage
of this technique is that full use is made of cross-sectional and time-series predictions
of the models, thereby using more information and constraining the parameter solutions
to be truly consistent with the model’s stochastic asset value assumptions. Latent esti-
mation should provide the best opportunity for these models to perform in an unbiased
manner, and the resulting credit spread prediction errors, a more accurate guide to future
research direction. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst test between competing
corporate structural credit models where the credit model is ﬁtted as a latent process in
a state-space framework.
The use of Kalman ﬁltering toparameterise term structure models iscommon interm
structure model ﬁtting (Chen & Scott 1995, Geyer & Pichler 1999, Duan & Simonato
1999). In an approach related to that used in this study, Duffee (1999) applies EKF to
estimate a reduced-form hazard rate model of the term credit spread term structure. Our
empirical method follows closely, but is applied to structural credit models. We also use
actual trade data, instead of bid-quotes, and therefore have an additional complication of
dealing with unequal time steps between trades. Other researchers have applied EKF on
panel data in different contexts. Cumby & Evans (1995), Claessens & Pennacchi (1996),
Keswani (2005), and Dufﬁe et al. (2000) apply EKF to estimate models of sovereign
bond prices. Despite a long-history of application to sovereign debt modelling, state-
space methods have seen little application in corporate debt modelling. The notable
exception in corporate debt modelling is the ﬁtting of a single reduced-form model by
Duffee (1999). A similar, but unrelated method of maximum likelihood estimation is
presented by Ericsson & Reneby (2002). They derive a likelihood function for the ﬁrm’s
equity, which is then ﬁtted to a time series of stock price data from which teh ﬁrm asset
parameters are estimated. The credit spread is then predicted from the resulting ﬁrm
asset parameters. Their method only applies a time-series restriction on the likelihood
function whereas weestimate model parameters directly from the history of credit spread
term structures. The EKF method also has the advantage of handling missing data and
measurement error that an exact likelihood method cannot.
2.7 Selection of Models for Testing
To extend and contrast EHH, we parameterise several alternative models treating the
log-solvency ratio as truly unobserved. The models considered are an extended Merton
model (EM), a single factor LS model (LS 1) and two-factor LS model (LS 2), the LT
and CDG models, and lastly a single-factor CEV model.
Themodels arechosen tobecomparable withearlier empirical studies, wheretractable
solutions are available, that represent the range of structural modelling literature. The
EM closely mirrors a similar ad hoc implementation of the Merton model by EHH.64 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The LS1 model is a simple single-factor implementation of the LS model with a con-
stant interest rate. It is comparable to the LS base case model in HH. A two-factor
LS model allows comparison against the LS1 model to gauge the incremental beneﬁt
of the stochastic interest rate process to the models. The LT model is a parsimonious
endogenous boundary model previously tested by EHH and HH. The CDG model is
the most widely analysed model with debt targeting and debt market timing behaviours
drawn from the capital structure literature. Finally the CEV model offers a closed-form
solution with a time-varying local asset volatility.Chapter 3
Method
Inthis section wedescribe our method for estimating structural models. Unlike the proxy
variable methods of JMR and EHH,and loss calibration method ofHH, weshow how the
ﬁrm’s asset process can be implied from the observed time series of ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit
spreads. The models are therefore ﬁtted to observed term structures of credit spreads
with minimum prediction error. We treat the ﬁrm’s asset process as truly unobserved
and estimate its stochastic properties, and its path through time, implicitly as a latent
process. By doing so, we allow each model to be estimated as well as it can within the
limitations of its theoretical construction. No errors are introduced through the use of
inappropriate observable proxy variables. We can therefore compare the relative perfor-
mance of models, on a level playing ﬁeld, where each model is permitted to perform
with a minimum of bias. Any errors remaining are likely to represent theoretical spec-
iﬁcation errors only, which are then subject to further tests for model robustness. Our
method provides a sharper instrument to test the performance of structural models than
has hitherto been used.
Our model estimation method follows closely (Duffee 1999), which we adapt for
estimation of structural, as opposed to reduced-form, credit models. However, unlike his
study, we use actual trade data instead of month-end broker quotes, and we control for
the effect of non-default related premiums directly as a component of the credit spread.
We refer to these components of the credit spread loosely as the ‘liquidity’ premium.
Three methods of controlling for the liquidity premium are conducted: no premium for
comparison with prior studies; a constant premium component of the bond spread; a
constant premium component and a time-varying premium that is a linear factor of the
Refcorp 10 year maturity bond spread. A selection of ﬁrms is made choosing ﬁrms that
have bonds that actively trade across a broad range of maturities.
The credit models are ﬁtted with respect to minimising the error in predicted ver-
sus observed credit spreads, as opposed to predicting bond values. The latter is likely
to contain error related to estimation of the risk-free yield curve, and our main focus is
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on isolating the errors related to credit risk valuation, we prefer to optimise model ﬁt
to observed credit spreads. Observed credit spreads are calculated by deducting from
corporate bond yields, the equivalent maturity Treasury bond yields, with the same ma-
turity on the date of the trade. Since the credit data may contain some recording errors,
we explain a method of cleansing extreme outliers. In Section 3.1, the source, sampling,
and preparation of the corporate bond data is described.
Section 3.2 describes the method of ﬁtting the credit models to the bond data. In
particular, we extend (Duffee 1999) to deal with unequally spaced observations. The
credit models are estimated by ﬁrst converting them into state-space form comprising
two equations: a dynamic measurement equation inclusive of a measurement error, and
a latent log-solvency ratio that is related to the observed measurement error. So while we
cannot observe the ﬁrm’s log-solvency process directly, we can infer with conﬁdence its
path and parameters from the observed path taken by the ﬁrm’s term structure of credit
spreads, and with knowledge of the theoretical model that determines the form of the
log-solvency process. By use of an EKF, quasi maximum likelihood estimates of model
parameters are obtained from the time series of observed credit spread term structures.
A similar method is shown in Section 3.3 to estimate the risk-free rates for use in the
two-factor credit models.
3.1 Data
In Section 3.1.1, the source of traded bond data is discussed. The selection criteria of
ﬁrms and bond issues is described in Section 3.1.2, the method of converting bond prices
to credit spreads is explained in Section 3.1.3, and the treatment of outlier observations
is discussed in Section 3.1.4. The resultant cleaned sample data set of credit spreads is
described in Section 3.1.5. The data and method used for calculating the Refcorp bond
yield spreads is described in Section 3.1.6.
3.1.1 Credit data sources
Secondary market price data, on North American corporate bonds, is sourced from the
Fixed Income Securities Database for Academia (FISD). The FISD data contains trade
prices reported by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), sup-
plemented with additional issue and ﬁrm characteristics supplied by LJS Global Ser-
vices, Inc. Warga (2000) provides a further description of the NAIC data.1 The sample
period is from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2000.
Prior to the availability of the NAIC data, the extant empirical literature for reduced-
form, and structural credit modelling, has predominately used month-end bid quotes
1A product of the Fixed Income Research Program at the University of Houston, College of Business
Administration.3.1. DATA 67
originated by Lehman Brothers traders, quoted for the purpose of regular construction
of the Lehman Brother’s bond indexes, as reported in the Fixed Income Database (FID),
and described further by Hong & Warga (2000). Much of our empirical knowledge
comes from this single data source, for example, Duffee (1999), Eom et al. (2004),
Mueller (2000), Bakshi et al. (2001), Ericsson & Reneby (2002), Elton et al. (2001), and
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Martin (2001).
Insurance companies are required by the National Association of Insurance Compa-
nies to provide a record of all bond transactions via quarterly submission of Schedule D
reports. Included in the report is the date of the transaction, the par amount traded and
the total market value of the transaction. Prices are recorded for the day of the trade. We
can be conﬁdent that the data is representative of a broader bond-trading market. Hong
& Warga (2000) report that insurance companies account for roughly 25 percent of the
market for non-investment grade debt, while their share of trading in the investment-
grade debt market is around 40 percent.
For estimating continuous time models we ideally want to use data that is close to
be continuously observed, in other words, the data has a small interval between obser-
vations. In particular, the EKF used by Duffee (1999) and by this study, linearises the
non-linear relationship between the model pricing function (the measurement equation)
and the ﬁrm’s log-solvency transition (the transition equation). The smaller the observa-
tion interval, the better the approximation. In contrast to Duffee (1999), we use NAIC
sample data, which comprises actual corporate bond prices trade prices recorded for the
date of trade. We therefore have, on average, a shorter observation period more suited
for calibrating continuous-time credit models.
3.1.2 Sample Selection
Unlike the extant empirical literature of EHH, Lyden & Saraniti (2000), and JMR, we
do not have the objective of selecting only ﬁrms with simple capital structures and few
bonds on issue. Instead we select ﬁrms with a broad range of maturities traded so that we
obtain the most information possible across bonds and across the term structure. That
tends to direct our sampling toward more frequently traded ﬁrms.
The NAIC database comprises all ﬁxed interest trades by North American insurance
companies including Treasury and corporate debt trades over the period commencing
1 January 1994 to 31 December 2000. Before combining bought and sold trades, the
data comprises over 734,000 trades. For our purposes we require panel data from a
smaller subset of corporate ﬁrms that exhibit relatively frequent trading, and have several
outstanding bonds with remaining maturities that span a term structure, with a history
of trading over an extended period of time. Unlike early empirical studies we do not
restrict ourselves to ﬁrms with debt structures that approximate the zero-coupon Merton
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of corporate issuers, tempered only by the limitations of data availability and accuracy.
Weexclude government entities (FISD industry code 04), banks (FISD industry code
20), and savings and loan institutions (FISD industry code 25). Deposit-taking institu-
tions have a special role in the economy and bond pricing may be inﬂuenced by the
implicit government guarantee arising from the moral hazard associated with their fail-
ure. Since ﬁnancial ﬁrms are a major source of bond issues, we have chosen to include
them in the sample.
Where issuing ﬁrms are non-listed subsidiaries of a listed parent, the parent’s market
capital and balance sheet data is used. Where there is more than one subsidiary within
a corporate group with a unique CUSIP (for example, Ford Motor Company and Ford
Motor Credit Company), only one subsidiary is included in the sample.
The second level of ﬁltering removes issues that may be subject to embedded option
features, or credit enhancements, not included in the theoretical models under consider-
ation. From issue-level data sourced from FISD we:
1. exclude bonds that are convertible, or redeemable (via call, IPO clawback, main-
tenance and replacement call or sinking fund), subject to puts, or are credit en-
hanced, for example by ﬁnancial guarantees; and,
2. include only ﬁxed-interest coupon bonds, and corporate debentures with semi-
annual compounding with 30/360 day convention, where there are no planned
future variation in coupons.
Further issue-level ﬁlters are then applied to minimise potential data errors. To un-
derstand what data errors may be present in the NAICdata we reviewed prior studies that
have utilised schedule D submissions from insurance companies. Hong & Warga (2000)
match the recorded bond prices between New York Stock Exchange’s Automated Bond
System (ABS), and Schedule D sourced NAIC price data supplied by Capital Access
Inc. (CAI), and compare with the closest-in-time bid quotes from Lehman Brothers as
reported in the FID. They ﬁnd that the transaction-based prices from the ABS and NAIC
sources are broadly in agreement with each other and with the month-end dealer quotes
given by Lehman Brothers dealers. A source of bias was identiﬁed in the recording
practices of NAIC, in which total transaction costs were rounded upward to the nearest
$1,000. Hong & Warga (2000) minimised the bias by restricting their sample to trades
with costs of $500,000 or more.2 Bedendo, Cathcart & El-Jahel (1994) exclude bonds
with transaction prices below $80 and above $135 as well as bonds with negative credit
spreads.
2Forexample, asalewiththevalue of$1,500,900 would bereportedas$1,501,000. Tolimitthepotential
upward bias in reported prices we adopt the same ﬁlter rule and exclude trades of less than $500,000 in total
cost which limits the maximum percentage error in reported price to be no more than 0.20 percent of the
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Chakravarty & Sarkar (1999) use CAI sourced NAIC data to compare spreads be-
tween government, corporate and municipal debt. In order to minimize incidences of
data entry error, they remove all observations where the transaction price is outside the
range $500,000 to $1,500,000. Some entries were observed on non-trading days and
were removed, and trades occurring on June 30, 1995, June 30, 1996, and December 31,
1997 are removed. Anecdotal evidence suggests insurance companies may have used
these dates for recording transactions that they had failed to report in a timely manner.
Consideration is made of the prior ﬁndings of errors in the NAIC data. We therefore
exclude observations if:
1. there are missing or invalid trade dates;
2. the credit spread is negative (due to measurement error or estimation error for the
matched Treasury rate);
3. the remaining maturity of the bond, at the time of the trade, is less than 12 months.
We exclude very short-dated bonds due to their sensitivity to small measurement
errors as suggested by Cooper & Davydenko (2004);
4. the remaining maturity is greater than 30 years because this is the maximum con-
stant maturity Treasury (CMT) risk-free maturity available;
5. total cost of the trade is less than $500,000 in total cost as per Hong & Warga
(2000); and,
6. trades occur on30June 1995, 30June 1996 and 31December 1997 asinChakravarty
& Sarkar (1999).
Where more than one trade occurs on a single day, we use a single representative obser-
vation calculated as the weighted average price, where the relative total transaction costs
form the weight. This removes duplicate records caused when insurance companies are
on both sides of the same transaction.
After these adjustments the data set comprises 1,373 issuers, with 8,799 issues and
96,472 trades. We then apply issuer-level ﬁlters to select ﬁrms with patterns of trading
suitable for robust panel estimation. We select ﬁrms with:
1. at least 3 bonds, where each averages at least 6 trades per annum, for a minimum
period of 12 months;
2. a broad range of remaining terms to maturity; and,
3. a complete balance sheet history on COMPUSTAT and stock prices from CRSP
over the sample period.This information is used for comparison with the ﬁrm’s
observable solvency ratio, and for deriving initial parameter estimates for the EKF.70 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
To reduce the dimension of the model estimation, no more than ten bonds are in-
cluded per issuer. Where more than ten bonds have met the ﬁlter rules, the most fre-
quently traded are chosen. Finally, the beginning, and end dates, of the issuer’s sample
period are chosen as the earliest, and latest dates respectively, that a cross-section of
maturities is evident. Consequently, the beginning and end dates of each issuer’s sam-
ple vary slightly. Our selection criteria is intended to result in a sample of observations
that are closely spaced in time and well represented across the dynamic term structure
of the issuing ﬁrm. The overall density of the observations provides cross-sectional and
time-series information best suited to ﬁtting continuous-time structural credit models.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the trading density for Northrop Grumman Corporation
(Northrop). Each point represents an observed trade from one of the four bonds in the
sample. Each bond has a different maturity causing the distribution of trades into a pat-
tern of distinct parallel lines. Two features in Figure 3.1 are noteworthy. Firstly, our
selection criteria results in trades with a broad distribution across the term structure rep-
resented by the vertical spacing of observations. Secondly, the horizontal axis shows the
passage of time and an overall shortening of the remaining maturities. The ﬁnal sample
comprises 32 issuers, 200 bonds, and 8,953 trades. Table 3.1 shows the ﬁnal sample of
ﬁrms and numbers of bonds and observations per issuer. Table C.1 details each bond’s
characteristics and descriptive statistics of the bond’s credit spreads. The relatively small
sample size is due mainly to merger and acquisition activity causing incomplete COM-
PUSTATand CRSPhistories, which are not strictly required for successful model ﬁtting,
but are necessary to compare implied solvency ratios with observed market leverage ra-
tios.
3.1.3 Calculating the Observed Credit Spreads
Similar to EHH, the observed credit spread is calculated as the difference between the
yield to maturity of the corporate bond and the par yield of an on-the-run Treasury bond
of the same remaining maturity. The corporate yield to maturity is calculated as the
rate that equates the present value of the contractual cash ﬂows (obtained from the FISD
database) with the trade price assuming by convention a semi-annual compounding and
a 30/360 day count convention. The Treasury yields are constant maturity Treasury
yield rates (CMT) sourced from the Federal Reserve H15 report and interpolated to the
remaining maturity matched to the corporate bond. We use the Nelson & Siegel (1985)
model for inteprolation and construct 1,753 risk-free term structures corresponding to
the number of unique trading days in the sample.
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Table 3.1: Shown arethe ﬁnal sample of issuers, number of bonds per issuer and number of observations per
issuer. CUSIP identiﬁes the issuer, and SIC is the Standard Industry Code (SIC) of the issuer, as reported
in the Fixed Income Securities Database. The Ticker is the stock exchange unique identiﬁer of the issuer,
if listed, and of its parent if unlisted. Where a ﬁnancial services issuer is a wholly owned subsidiary of a
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm, the industry sector refers to the predominate activity of the corporate group.
No. No.
Issuer CUSIP Ticker SIC Sector Issues Trades
Aetna Inc. 8117 AET 6324 Finance 3 88
Associates Corp. 46003 C 6141 Finance 10 316
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co. 48825 ARC 2911 Industrial 3 122
A T & T Corp. 1957 T 4813 Utility 3 160
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 73902 BSC 6211 Finance 10 349
Black & Decker Corp. 91797 BDK 3540 Industrial 3 180
Boeing Co. 97023 BA 3721 Industrial 3 151
Dayton Hudson Corp. 239753 TGT 5331 Industrial 10 328
Commonwealth Edison Co. 202795 UCM 4911 Utility 8 306
Enron Corp. 293561 ENE 5172 Industrial 6 186
Federated Department Stores 31410H FD 5311 Industrial 4 182
Ford Motor Co. 345370 F 3711 Industrial 9 365
General Motors 370442 GM 3711 Industrial 9 501
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp. 373298 GP 2600 Industrial 3 120
HCA Healthcare Corp. 19767Q HCA 8062 Industrial 4 135
IBM Corp. 459200 IBM 7370 Industrial 3 285
International Paper Co. 460146 IP 2600 Industrial 5 209
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 524908 LEH 6211 Finance 10 405
Merrill Lynch & Co. 590188 MER 6211 Finance 10 513
Motorola Inc. 620076 MOT 3663 Industrial 4 125
Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. 629527 NGH 2052 Industrial 6 381
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 653522 NMK 4931 Utility 4 206
Northrop Grumman Corp. 666807 NOC 3812 Industrial 4 214
Paine Webber Group Inc. 695629 PWJ 6211 Finance 9 326
Penney J C Co. Inc. 708160 JCP 5311 Industrial 6 263
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 718154 MO 2111 Industrial 10 529
Seagram Co. Ltd. 811850 VO 3652 Industrial 4 188
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. 812404 S 5311 Industrial 9 397
Service Corp. International 817565 SRV 7200 Industrial 8 250
Union Paciﬁc Corp. 907818 UNP 4011 Utility 8 321
Viacom Inc. 925524 VIA.B 4841 Industrial 3 259
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 931142 WMT 5331 Industrial 9 593











































Figure 3.1: Presented is a plot the structure of the Northrop Grumman Corporation’s sample data. Each
observation is an observed trade plotted by remaining maturity on the vertical axis, and the passage of time
along the horizontal axis. Evident is the irregular spacing of observations coinciding with actual trades,
and the.banding of observations into four parallel lines corresponding to the bonds on issue. The bonds
are identiﬁed by their Fixed Income Securities Database identiﬁer. Further details are shown in Table C.1.
Sample average remaining maturities are 6.4 yrs (16731), 8.2 years (69804), 18.0 years (69808), and 28.0
years (69822). The downward slope to the right is a result of the remaining maturity decreasing with time.
The ﬁrm sample period is 27 February 1996 to 22 December 2000.
Table 3.2: This table shows a summary of the distribution of bond characteristics per issuer. Further details
by issuer and issue are shown in Table C.1. Number of issues is the number of bonds sampled per issuer.
Sample period refers to the cumulative trading periods per issuer. Number of trades is the number of price
observations per issuer. The mean interval is the average time between observed trades. Mean maturity
refers to the average remaining maturity at each trade per issuer.
Across 32 Issuers
Issuer-level statistic Min. Median Max.
Number of issues 3 6 10
Sample period (yrs) 3.30 6.22 6.97
No. of trades 88 261 593
No. of trading days 84 233 486
Mean interval (yrs) 0.0141 0.0262 0.0550
Mean maturity (yrs) 5.54 8.12 21.43
Min. maturity (yrs) 1.00 1.12 12.00
Max. maturity (yrs) 10.01 19.71 29.99
Mean coupon (%) 6.41 7.21 9.923.1. DATA 73





where, the parameter set is Qr(t) = (b0,b1,b2,d1), and b0 > 0 and d1 > 0. For every
date of bond trading in our sample, new parameters are estimated by minimising the sum
of squared errors, between the model predictions and observed yield spreads, simulta-
neously across ten equally weighted maturities (3 and 6 months, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20,
and 30 years). The sample average parameter value set is ¯ Qr =(0.0630, -0.2612, 0.2528,
3.8128). The average RMSE is 8.5 basis points, which is comparable to the level of error
reported by Nelson & Siegel (1985).
3.1.4 Treatment of Outliers
A disadvantage of using actual traded bond prices is the potential for additional data
handling errors. This has not been a consideration in the extant empirical literature of
structural models due to the predominate use of month-end bid quotes. The greater
frequency of data recording, and large volumes of data handling, leaves the NAIC data
more at risk of containing recording errors. The ﬁlter rules described above help to
remove known problems, but idiosyncratic errors may still inﬂuence individual trade
prices, and therefore, observed credit spreads.
A review of the literature found little consistency in dealing with idiosyncratic out-
liers in the NAIC bond data, but did conﬁrm that data errors may be present. For ex-
ample, Bedendo et al. (1994), when ﬁtting spline curves to interpolate across the term
structure of credit spreads, found evidence of extreme observations that are, ‘suggestive
of obvious pricing errors’. They judgmentally remove outliers without applying an ob-
jective cleaning rule. Campbell & Taksler (2002) addressed the problem in the NAIC
data by excluding the top and bottom one percent of credit spreads. Motivated by these
studies we developed an objective cleaning method that resulted in minimal modiﬁcation
of the data.
We identify potential data errors by recognising that the deviation in credit spreads
expected across bonds of different maturities is likely to be much lower that the dif-
ferences arising from an incorrect data entry. We start by constructing issuer speciﬁc,
time-series of credit spreads, pooling all maturities together. Where more than one ma-
turity is traded on the same day, we use a simple average as a single observation for the
trade date. The ﬁrst differences in the resulting time-series are then standardised, and
absolute deviations greater than four, replaced by the mean of the adjacent observations
for the bond with the outlier. Consequently, outliers are cleaned only when large, in
ﬁrst difference terms, and directionally inconsistent, relative to adjacent trades across all
bonds. Our method of outlier data replacement improves on Bedendo et al. (1994) and74 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Campbell & Taksler (2002) since we use all the available price information on the ﬁrm’s
other bond prices. In total, only 70 out of 8,953 data points were cleaned representing
only 0.78 percent of the ﬁnal sample.
An example of the ﬁltered and cleaned data set for Northrop is shown in Figure 3.2.
Evident is an increase in spreads through the sample period, consistent with the market
trend as evidenced by a similar increase in the generic Baa Moody’s corporate spread











































Figure 3.2: Presented is a plot of the Northrop Grumman Corporation’s bond credit spreads, by time from
the beginning of the ﬁrm’s sample. The bonds are identiﬁed by their Fixed Income Securities Database
identiﬁer. Further details are shown in Table C.1. Average remaining maturities are 6.4 years (16731), 8.2
years (69804), 18.0 years (69808), and 28.0 years (69822). The ﬁrm sample period is 27 February 1996 to
22 December 2000.
3.1.5 Sample Description
As shown in Table 3.2, the median ﬁrm has 6 issues observed at various times over a
period of 6.22 years, with an average time step between trading days of 0.0262 years, or
approximately 10 calendar days. For the median ﬁrm, the term structure spans from a
minimum remaining term to maturity of 1.12 years to a maximum of 19.71 years. Note
that because more than one of the issuer’s bonds may trade on the same day, the median
ﬁrm’s number of trades of 261, exceeds the median ﬁrm’s number of trading days of
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Table 3.3: This table shows the frequency distribution of credit spread observations within the sample.
Industry refers to the industrial sector of the issuing ﬁrm, Issuers is the count of issuing ﬁrms, and Trades
are the counts of bond trades.
Issuers Issues Trades
Industry No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
Industrial 22 68.8 125 62.5 5,963 66.6
Finance 6 18.8 52 26.0 1,997 22.3
Utility 4 12.5 23 11.5 993 11.1
Totals 32 100.0 200 100.0 8,953 100.0
Duffee (1999, Table 1) applies a similar estimation method on 161 issuers reported
in the FID database. He uses month-end quotes and monthly time partitions compared
to our use of actual trades with a 10 day average interval between trades. His median
ﬁrm has 92 month-ends over 7.6 years, which equates to 227 bid quotes compared to our
261 actual trades. Thus, we have slightly more data per issuer, with information on the
ﬁrm’s default risk observed approximately three times as frequently.
Table 3.3 shows that industrial ﬁrms comprise 62.5 percent of our sample by num-
ber of issues, followed by ﬁnance at 26.0 percent, and utilities at 11.5 percent. EHH
exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms and their sample includes only 5.5 percent in transport and utili-
ties. Table 3.4 shows the sample credit spreads by rating and remaining maturity at the
time of their trade. As expected the median credit spread is higher for poorer ratings
and higher for longer dated maturities. Davydenko & Strebulaev (2004, Table II) report
similar results for credit spread levels and sample standard deviations across a larger
sample (43,402 trades in total compared to our 8,953) conﬁrming that our sample is rep-
resentative of the larger NAIC universe. Our median credit spread is 81 basis points,
increasing from 50 basis points for AA trades, 78 basis points for A, 97 basis points for
BBB, and up to 157 basis points for BB trades.3 Table 3.4 shows that spreads are on
average, monotonic with remaining maturity; spreads for AA and BBB are lower for the
medium tenors than the short maturities (4 basis points for AA and 13 for BBB medians)
and only one basis point higher for A rated issuers. The expected monotonic increase is
present in long maturities where we ﬁnd all spreads are greater than shorter maturities.
Table 3.5 shows the credit spread descriptive statistics, after controlling for gearing,
matching solvency and credit spreads on the date of trade. It is convenient to express sol-
vency in a manner that is consistent with structural credit modelling. We therefore use an
observable proxy that hereafter is referred to as the observed log-solvency ratio (S), de-
ﬁned as the natural log of the inverse of the observed leverage ratio, S = ln((D+E)/D),
where D is the total book value of debt, and E is the market value of equity. Book val-
3The comparable median spreads from Davydenko & Strebulaev (2004, Table II) are 51, 71, 103 and
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Table 3.4: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the sample credit spreads by issuer rating and
remaining maturity, coincident with the trade date. All credit spreads are reported in basis points.
All AA A BBB BB
Panel A: All
Mean 102 62 91 115 312
Median 81 50 78 97 157
Std. Dev. 124 36 51 109 486
5% quantile 31 23 34 45 86
95% quantile 201 132 189 218 1,465
n 8,953 1,691 3,704 3,263 295
Panel B: Remaining Maturity ≤7 years
Mean 102 61 89 117 378
Median 73 51 70 96 159
Std. Dev. 158 36 58 145 628
5% quantile 28 24 28 39 64
95% quantile 207 132 201 212 1,729
n 4,107 875 1,687 1,409 136
Panel C: Remaining Maturity 7−15 years
Mean 93 60 84 100 270
Median 75 47 71 83 155
Std. Dev. 93 36 45 68 328
5% quantile 32 20 40 48 97
95% quantile 182 129 175 185 1,285
n 3,407 727 1,266 1,276 138
Panel D: Remaining Maturity >15 years
Mean 120 77 108 142 166
Median 109 65 100 121 163
Std. Dev. 57 35 37 72 32
5% quantile 60 44 60 83 122
95% quantile 217 159 181 246 209
n 1,439 89 751 578 213.1. DATA 77
ues of debt are quarterly values reported by COMPUSTAT (items 45 and 51), and the
market value of equity is obtained from CRSP for the day of the trade. Lower values of
log-solvency measure greater levels of debt relative to ﬁrm value. As expected, Table 3.5
shows that, on average, higher credit spreads are associated with lower levels of solvency
as expected. The median spread in the upper quartile of log-solvency is 65 basis points
and 99 basis points in the lowest quartile. Also observable is a higher median spread
associated with longer remaining maturity for all quartiles of log-solvency except the
upper quartile (lowest default risk). In Figure 3.3 the time series of the median monthly
sample credit spread and Moody’s generic corporate spread indexes are shown. The me-
dian spread has a 90.4 percent correlation with the Moody’s Aaa index levels and 41.4
percent in ﬁrst differences with the index showing that our sample of ﬁrms exhibits simi-
lar time series behaviour relative to the wider universe of publicly traded debt. The level
of our median credit spreads aligns most closely with the Moody’s Aaa index although
our most frequently observed sample corporate rating is single A. This is possibly due to
our sample selection method that favors mature listed ﬁrms with frequently traded, and
therefore, relatively more liquid bonds.
Across our sample and the Moody’s indexes, there is a general upward shift in credit
spreads during the sample period. Most noticeable is the sharp increase in credit spreads
in August 1998 when the Russian default and LTCM bail-out triggered a rise in sec-
ondary market yields (hereafter we refer collectively as the LTCM crises). The effect of
the LTCM crises on market-wide bond credit spreads is shown in Table 3.6. Before 1
August 1998, the sample average credit spread is 70 basis points. After 1 August 1998,
the average increases to 159 basis points. Controlling for rating, the rise in spreads post
the LTCM crises is just over double the pre-crises values for ratings AA, A, and BBB.
The increase, is however much larger for the highest default grade BB, being an increase
of around six and a half times.
3.1.6 Refcorp Yield Spread
Motivated by the observation that our sample contains a potential systemic shift in credit
spreads due to the LTCMliquidity crises, we incorporate issue-speciﬁc and market-wide
liquidity components in the predicted credit spread. In addition to a constant yield spread
intercept term, we also wish to control for a time-varying liquidity premium. As a direct
measure of market-wide liquidity we follow Longstaff (2002) and construct a 10 year
constant maturity spread between bonds issued default free from the U.S. government
agency Refcorp, and on-the-run Treasury bonds.
Refcorp was established in 1989 to raise funds for the Resolution Trust Corporation,
in turn created to resolve insolvent savings and loans deposit-taking institutions in the
late 1980s. Refcorp issued USD 30 billion of debt from 1989 to 1991 with various
long-dated maturities, of which about 90 percent is traded in strip form (Reinhart &78 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.5: This table shows descriptive statistics of the sample credit spreads reported by remaining matu-
rity, and quartiles of observed log-solvency of the issuing ﬁrm, as measured on the trade date. We deﬁne
log-solvency as: S = ln((D+E)/D), where D is the total book value of debt, and E is the market value
of equity. Book values of debt are quarterly values reported by COMPUSTAT (items 45 and 51), and the
market value of equity is obtained from CRSP for the day of the trade. All credit spreads are reported in
basis points.
Quartiles of observed log-solvency (S)
All 100-75% 75-50% 50-25% 0-25%
Panel A: All maturities
Mean 102 74 92 106 135
Median 81 65 75 90 99
Std. Dev. 124 44 54 82 218
5% quantile 31 24 34 38 41
95% quantile 201 157 193 211 240
n 8,953 2,239 2,237 2,238 2,239
Panel B: Maturity 1-7 years
Mean 102 78 87 101 139
Median 73 67 64 76 89
Std. Dev. 158 49 57 102 270
5% quantile 28 24 67 32 37
95% quantile 207 173 189 218 243
n 4,107 1,121 883 945 1,158
Panel C: Maturity 7-15 years
Mean 93 63 80 100 131
Median 75 56 67 85 96
Std. Dev. 97 34 47 60 166
5% quantile 32 24 34 45 48
95% quantile 182 119 167 190 254
n 3,407 879 854 902 772
Panel D: Maturity 15-30 years
Mean 120 97 120 129 128
Median 109 88 104 111 125
Std. Dev. 57 41 49 65 65
5% quantile 60 45 63 77 77
95% quantile 217 166 218 240 195
n 1,439 239 500 391 309
Quartile ranges > 1.440 1.440− 0.775− < 0.367
of S 0.775 0.3673.1. DATA 79
Table 3.6: This table shows credit spreads by rating before and after 1 August 1998, approximately the date
of the LTCM crises on bond credit spreads. Credit spreads and issuer ratings are matched on the date of
trade. All credit spreads are reported in basis points.
All AA A BBB BB
Panel A: Spreads pre 1 August 1998
Mean 70 42 65 81 155
Median 63 41 62 77 139
Std. Dev. 37 14 26 33 59
5% quantile 28 21 30 42 83
95% quantile 133 66 106 135 271
n 5,797 1,107 2,361 2,087 242
Panel B: Spreads post 1 August 1998
Mean 159 100 138 174 1,030
Median 166 96 127 148 1,249
Std. Dev. 189 34 51 160 823
5% quantile 69 54 74 91 144
95% quantile 257 166 228 287 2,870
n 3,156 584 1,343 1,176 53
Sack 2002). Refcorp bonds are taxed at the same rate as Treasury bonds and Refcorp
is considered to be a default-free issuer; coupon payments are ultimately backed by
the U.S. Treasury, and principal payments are backed by pledged non-marketable zero-
coupon Treasury bonds. Despite their default-free status, the bonds are not as liquid as
Treasury bonds making their spread relative to on-the-run Treasury bonds suitable for
quantifying the change in general market preference for liquidity.
Our choice of Refcorp bonds as a measure of market-wide liquidity is motivated by
Longstaff (2002) and Reinhart & Sack (2002) who report a signiﬁcant increase in the
Refcorp spread post the LTCM crises in August 1998, which we also note to be a feature
of corporate credit spreads in Figure 3.3. Reinhart & Sack (2002) estimate the total liq-
uidity premium in AAA 10 year yield spreads to be between 14 and 34 basis points, and
in BBB 10 year yield spreads between 31 to 78 basis points and concluded that a height-
ened preference for liquidity during the hedge fund crises contributed at least as much
as credit risk to the widening of corporate credit spreads. Longstaff (2002) estimates
the Refcorp spread to range between 10 and 16 basis points, rising to 90 basis points at
the end of 2000. He shows that changes in the Refcorp spread are related to consumer
conﬁdence, ﬂows into money market and stock mutual funds, and foreign holdings of
Treasury bonds, and consequently interprets the Refcorp spread as a ﬂight-to-liquidity
premium. Recently, Longstaff, Mithal & Neis (2005) directly estimate the non-default
component of corporate credit spreads by comparing credit default swap premiums to
bond spreads. They estimate the non-default component to be time-varying and strongly
related to measures of individual bond liquidity, such as issue size and bid-ask spreads.80 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.7: This table reports descriptive statistics of the daily term structure strip yields.
Statistic Minimum Maximum No. obs.
Mean 3.6 29.5 26.5
Min 1.0 29.0 23
Max 7.5 30.0 29
n 1,753 1,753 1,753
Changes in the non-default component are found to be related to similar market-wide
liquidity factors that Longstaff (2002) also found as signiﬁcant regressors on changes in
Refcorp bond spreads. We therefore consider the observable Refcorp spread as a rea-
sonable observable measure of the time variation in a market-wide liquidity premium.
We enter the Refcorp spread into the predicted spread, scaled per issuer to accommodate
different ﬁrm sensitivities to changes in market-wide liquidity preferences.
To measure the Refcorp spreads we ﬁrst obtain bid yields from a sample of traded
bond strips sourced from Bloomberg (PXRS screen). Table 3.7 shows a summary of the
strips. The strip data is trimmed to include maturities between one and 30 years as at
the quotation date; in total, we have 46,416 prices for 34 Refcorp strips for the period
beginning 3 January 1994 to 29 December 2000. Table 3.7 shows the distribution of
yields available each trading day. On average, there are 26.5 yields available per day.
Theaverage minimum maturity is3.6years andthe maximum oftheminimum maturities
observed for all days is 7.5 years. The maximum sample maturity averages 29.5 years
with a minimum of 29 years. Consequently, we have insufﬁcient data to construct a
complete daily yield curve but we are able to interpolate the Refcorp yield between
maturities of 7.5 years and 29 years. We choose a 10 year constant maturity Refcorp
spread as our instrumental variable due to similarity with the median remaining maturity
of our sample data. Refcorp strip yields are quoted on a semi-annual compounding
convention as per Treasury bonds but with zero coupon payments. In contrast, the CMT
series is quoted as a par yield with coupons. We therefore convert the CMT rate to
an equivalent Refcorp basis before calculating the Refcorp spread. The CMT series is
initially boostrapped to spot rates and expressed as a semi-annual zero-coupon yield.
The Refcorp premium is then calculated as the difference in the linearly interpolated 10
year Refcorp bid yield and the 10 year zero-coupon adjusted CMT yield.
In Figure 3.3 the monthly mean 10 year Refcorp spread is plotted against our sample
of monthly median credit spreads measured over all ﬁrms and trades. The correlation
between Refcorp liquidity spreads and corporate bond spreads is high (85.4 percent cor-
relation in levels and 29.2 percent in ﬁrst differences). From 1995 to the beginning
of 1998, the spread on our sample of corporate bonds generally declined in a manner
matching the fall in Refcorp spreads; by the third quarter of 1998 the LTCM crises had
pushed spreads higher, from where they generally tended to increase for the remainder3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 81
Table 3.8: This table shows descriptive statistics of the Refcorp yield spread estimated daily for the pe-
riod 3 January 1994 to 29 December 2000. The spread is the difference between the 10 year constant
maturity zero-coupon Refcorp strip bid yields and the 10 year zero-coupon constant maturity on-the-run
Treasury bond. First differences of the spread is denoted by D10yr. AR(1) refers to the coefﬁcient on the
autoregressive lag. All spreads are reported in basis points and standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Statistic 10 yr D10 yr
Mean 24.28 0.01
Median 20.76 -0.01






of our sample. Interestingly, the LTCM crises did not impact the Refcorp spreads as
much as it did corporate credit spreads; the ﬂight-to-liquidity was coincidentally associ-
ated with an increase in perceived credit risk (ﬂight-to-quality). Thus, the average rise
in corporate credit risk post August 1998 cannot be fully accounted for by a change in
the market’s increased preference for liquidity.
Table 3.8 reports descriptive statistics for the daily 10 year Refcorp yield spread
level and ﬁrst differences. The mean 10 year Refcorp spread is 24 basis points, reaching
a maximum of 71 basis points and a minimum of -1.7 basis points. The presence of
negative spreads is also reported by Longstaff (2002) but is not frequent and the mean
spread is likewise found to be signiﬁcantly different from zero. Table 3.8 also shows
mean-reversion in Refcorp spreads as evidenced by the negative coefﬁcient on the ﬁrst
difference time-series.
Given the magnitude and time-variation in the Refcorp spread, wehave evidence that
a component of the corporate-Treasury credit spread is likely to be unrelated to changes
in idiosyncratic ﬁrm default risk; Refcorp and Treasury bonds have equivalent default
risk yet we see a time-varying price differential that Longstaff (2002) has shown to be
related to ‘ﬂight-to-liquidity’ measures, and in our own sample we see a similar increase
in Refcorp spreads associated with the LTCM crises.
3.2 Fitting the Credit Models
The credit models are ﬁtted to the observed ﬁrm-speciﬁc term structure of credit spreads
with key parameters estimated implicitly from bond price data. Section 3.2.1 introduces
the state-space framework. In Section 3.2.3 the empirical forms of the measurement
equations are described and the generic form of the underlying state process is described










































Figure 3.3: This is a plot of the monthly median credit spread sampled, against the monthly Moody’s
generic credit spreads, and monthly Refcorp 10 year constant maturity Treasury spread.
Section 3.2.5. Model speciﬁc details including the parameters, bond valuation functions,
and model-speciﬁc state-space equations are explained in 3.2.6.
3.2.1 Introduction to Model Estimation Method
Our estimation method follows Claessens & Pennacchi (1996), Cumby & Evans (1995),
and Duffee (1999), by use of an EKF to estimate an underlying stochastic model of
the observed term structure of credit yield spreads. Unlike these earlier studies, our
method uses corporate bond trade data and is applied to corporate structural models of
credit risk. A Kalman ﬁlter is a maximum-likelihood method widely used in ﬁnance and
economics for estimating term structure models, in which the observable data from the
market is used to infer the values for an underlying unobserved state process. The EKF
is a category of ﬁlter where the measurement equation is non-linear with respect to the
state process. The EKF has been applied to yield curve modelling by Lund (1997) and
in pricing sovereign bonds by Claessens & Pennacchi (1996), Cumby & Evans (1995),
Keswani (2005), and Dufﬁe et al. (2000). Its application to corporate debt credit mod-
elling has been limited to estimation of a two-factor reduced form model on monthly
bid-quotes by Duffee (1999). Further examples of the EKF’s use in ﬁnancial time-series
modelling is provided by Harvey (1989), and Durbin & Koopman (2001).
In our modelling, the state variable is the ﬁrm’s solvency. For all models except3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 83
the CEV model, the state variable is the natural log of the ratio of ﬁrm value to the
default boundary, x(t) = lnV(t)/K(t). For the CEV model, the state process is deﬁned
as the distance of the ﬁrm from the default boundary scaled by the default boundary,
X(t) = (V(t)−K)/K. The passage of the state variable to zero is the trigger for default.
We cannot observe the state variable directly, however we can observe the credit spreads
of the ﬁrm’s bonds as traded in the market, and from their time series behaviour, infer the
path taken by the ﬁrm’s solvency, and the most likely parameters governing the solvency
process under the respective credit model.
Before estimating the credit models by EKF, it is ﬁrst necessary to express them in
terms of a state-space framework comprising a measurement and transition equation.
Here we introduce the generic state-space framework into which all models ﬁt. Sec-
tions 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 further elaborate by incorporating bond and issue dependencies.
Let y(t) = (y1(t),y2(t),...,yn(t))
′
be a vector of time-t observed credit spreads for
i=(1 to n) bonds and let a(t) be the value of the state variable at time-t. Suppressing
dependence on other model parameters for clarity, we have the measurement equation
y(t) = d(t)+G(a(t))+ε(t), t = 1,...,t (3.2)
where d(t) is an n by one vector and ε(t) is an n by one vector of serially uncorrelated
disturbances with mean zero and n by n covariance matrix H(t), that is, E(ε(t)) = 0
and Var(ε(t)) = H(t). The function G( ) maps the state vector to the observed credit
spread.
The error term, e, in equation (3.2) is referred to as the measurement error. A feature
of the state-space set up is the inclusion of an error term separate from the variability
of the underlying state variable itself. The latter is governed by the variance of the state
process. The measurement error, on the other hand, recognises that the observation may
be imperfectly measured and hence an additional source of error is introduced into the
system via the measurement equation alone. In ﬁnance, measurement errors pertain to
incorrect recording of deals, rounding errors, etc.
The values of y(t) depend upon the path taken by the unobserved state variable. The
state variable transition equation is speciﬁed by the speciﬁc credit model but in all cases
follows a univariate ﬁrst-order Markov process of the general form
a(t) = ¯ T(t)a(t −1)+ ¯ c(t)+R(t)h(t), t = 1,...,t (3.3)
where ¯ T(t) is an autoregressive coefﬁcient, ¯ c(t) and R(t) are constants, and h(t) is an
independent and identically distributed error term with mean zero and variance Q(t),
that is, E(h(t) = 0) and Var(h(t)) = Q(t). The disturbances of the measurement and
transition equations are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other in all time periods
and with the initial starting value of the state variable, a(0).84 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
In Table 3.9 the parameters of the credit models and state variables are summarised.
The parameter set, y, is model speciﬁc and is comprised of implied model parameters
(Panel A) and implied state-space parameters (Panel B) that are inferred from maximum-
likelihood estimation. The latter are termed hyperparameters and the set is denoted yh.
Other model parameters include those that are exogenously set or otherwise known such
as bond cash ﬂow characteristics (Panel C).
Intheremainder ofthis section weelaborate onthemeasurement and transition equa-
tions, the state-space form of the models, and the method of quasi maximum-likelihood
estimation by EKF.
3.2.2 Calculating the Predicted Credit Spread
The predicted credit spread is calculated as the difference between the yield to maturity
of the risky corporate bond and an equivalent risk-free bond yield to maturity. The
equivalent risk-free bond yield is found by ﬁrst valuing the corporate bond as if it was a
Treasury bond. A risk-free value for the same promised cash ﬂows of the corporate bond
is calculated by discounting the corporate bond’s promised cash ﬂows at the relevant
Treasury spot rates. The Treasury spot rates are in turn taken from the Vasicek (hereafter
Vasicek) interest rate model, estimated at the trade date, for the term of the promised
cash ﬂow holding interest rate model parameters constant through the sample. In other
words, the interest rate model is not updated through time, but the forward estimates of
future interest rates update as we step through the sample.
We chose the Vasicek model for valuing an equivalent risk-free Treasury bond to
minimise error from the yield curve ﬁtting in the two-factor credit models, which use the
Vasicek model internally for discounting expected payoffs. Forthe sake of comparability
between models, we retain the same risk-free term structure for all models. The ﬁtting
of the Vasicek interest rate model is discussed further in Section 3.3.
Denote p(t,T) as the time-t value of a default-risky bond, maturing at time T with
face value of one-dollar, and B(t,T) as the risk-free equivalent Treasury bond value. The
bond has z = 1,2,...m promised payments at time t(z) with maturity at t(m) = T. The
continuous yields-to-maturity for the default-risky bond yc, and the equivalent risk-free












where c is the coupon, and the value of the default-risky bond is evaluated from the
relevant credit model and the value of the default-free bond equivalent value obtained3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 85
from the Vasicek term structure model.
To compare the model results with observed yield spreads, the continuous yield-to-
maturity estimates are converted to semi-annual compounding equivalent rates by
ys = 2(eyc/2−1) (3.6)
rs = 2(erc/2−1).
The predicted credit spread, before allowance for any liquidity premiums, is then cal-
culated as the difference between the default-risky yield-to-maturity and the riskless
equivalent yield-to maturity, conditional on all ﬁrm parameters and bond characteristics
g(t;yi) = ys−rs. (3.7)
Promised cash ﬂows are sourced from the FISD ﬁle.
3.2.3 Generic Measurement Equations
We are motivated by the empirical ﬁndings by Delianedis & Geske (2001), Elton et al.
(2001), and HH, that corporate bond credit spreads contain signiﬁcant non-credit related
premiums. We therefore construct three alternative empirical speciﬁcations to control
for their potential inﬂuence on model ﬁt and relative performance. The ﬁrst assumes no
liquidity and tax components in the credit spread as per the extant empirical literature of
JMR, Lyden & Saraniti (2000), EHH, and HH. The second includes a constant premium
for each bond in the measurement equation, thereby capturing differential tax, stationary
liquidity components, and other unexplained components of the credit spread. This al-
lows a comparison of spread errors with Duffee (1999), who likewise assumes a constant
unexplained spread component. Finally, the third method controls for additional time-
varying ﬂight-to-liquidity components of the credit spread that are related to changes in
the general market preference for liquidity as measured by the Refcorp ten year constant
maturity credit spread. The use of the yield spread differential between Refcorp bonds
and Treasury bonds has been shown by Longstaff (2002) and Longstaff et al. (2005)
to be an observable measure of the time-varying liquidity premium embedded in the
corporate-Treasury yield spread.
Henceforth, for ease of exposition, the empirical equations are referred to as having:
1) no liquidity premium, 2) a constant liquidity premium, or 3) a time-varying liquidity
premium, acknowledging that not all of the unexplained premium is necessarily liquidity
related.4
Expanding on equation (3.2), the elements of the generic measurement equation are:
4For example, it would also include model misspeciﬁcation86 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
1. No Liquidity Premium
yi,j(t) = g(aj(t);yi,j)+ei,j(t), (3.8)
where, yi,j is the time-t observed credit spread for bond i issued by ﬁrm j, ei,j(t)
is normal i.i.d error, g( ) is the model predicted credit spread, conditional on bond
and ﬁrm speciﬁc parameters yi,j, and the value of the state process, aj(t). This
speciﬁcation assumes that the theoretical model factors of ﬁrm leverage, asset
volatility, and bond cash ﬂow factors are sufﬁcient to estimate the Treasury bond
spread without bias,
2. Constant Liquidity Premium
yi,j(t) = di,j +g(aj(t);yi,j)+ei,j(t), (3.9)
where, in addition to the no-liquidity case, di,j ≥ 0 controls for issue-speciﬁc
idiosyncratic tax and liquidity, and other unexplained components of the credit
spread,
3. Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
yi,j(t) = di,j +bR
j Ref(t)+g(aj(t);yi,j)+ei,j(t), (3.10)
where, in addition to the constant liquidity case, bR
j > 0 is the sensitivity of the
ﬁrm’s average spread to market-wide liquidity measured relative to a 10 year con-
stant maturity Refcorp spread, Ref(t). This speciﬁcation follows the observation
that market liquidity, as measured by the Refcorp spread, is time-varying, and in-
dividual issuer’s bond spreads may have different sensitivity to changes market
liquidity.
At time-t we observe i = (1,2,    ,n(t)) yield-to-maturity credit spreads for ﬁrm j,
stacked into the n(t) by one vector yj(t). Likewise, we observe n(t) predictions from the
credit model stacked into the n(t) by one vector G(aj(t) due to each bond having differ-
ent remaining terms to maturity and coupon rates. The empirical equations (3.8),(3.9),
and (3.10) can therefore be expressed more succinctly as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc generic mea-
surement equation
yj(t) = dj(t)+G(aj(t);yj)+εj(t), t = 1,...,t (3.11)
where, for ease of notation, we let dj(t) be the n(t) by one stack of liquidity premiums
with each i-th element equal to di,j +bR
j Ref(t).
The mapping vector, G( ), depends on the speciﬁcation of the structural model. As3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 87
shown in Table 3.9 we have 6 different functional speciﬁcations corresponding to the
Merton, LT, CEV, CDG, and two forms of LS credit models.
Because we estimate model parameters using actual trade data, and not equally
spaced bid quotes as in Duffee (1999),the time between trades is variable. Lett(z) be the
time of the z-th observation for z = (1,2,...,m) where t = t(m). For notational clarity,
we hereafter refer to t(z) byt =z so that the sequence of trade dates (t(1),t(2),...,t(m))
is represented by the above notation of (1,2,...,t).
An additional consequence of using actual trade data is that the number of bonds
in the observation vector is variable with 0 < n(t) ≤ 10. The EKF procedure is robust
to missing data. Where partial data is missing from the observation vector, information
from the available bonds is used to predict the next set of observations. The method we
adopt for handling missing data is from Harvey (1989, p. 143) and Durbin & Koopman
(2001, p. 92). The size of Yj(t) is redimensioned at time-t according to the number
of bonds that traded on the day. Consequently, the size of the measurement error vec-
tor, εj(t) and its covariance Hj(t) is redimensioned to the size n(t). To facilitate the
redimensioning of the covariance matrix, we follow Duffee (1999) and assume that the
measurement error variance is the same for all of ﬁrm-j’s bonds. The assumption is rea-
sonable since measurement errors are likely to be random in nature and not related to
the speciﬁc characteristics of the bond. It follows that Hj(t) = I(t)s2
ε,j where I(t) is
an n(t) by n(t) identity matrix, the dimension of which varies with time, and sε,j is a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-inhomogeneous, standard deviation of the measurement error.
3.2.4 Generic State Transition Equation
In the state-space set up, the transition equation is a ﬁrst-order Markov process that links
the observed discrete pricing process to the unobserved capital structure process.
All models have the generic univariate transition equation
aj(t) = ¯ cj(t)+ ¯ Tjaj(t −1)+Rj(t)h(t), t = 1,...,t (3.12)
where aj is the latent state variable. From the theoretical foundations of the structural
credit models, the unobserved state variable process can be interpreted as a dynamic
solvency ratio of the ﬁrm.
3.2.5 Applying the Extended Kalman Filter
In this section, the EKF as applied to the credit models explained. We follow closely
the notation of Harvey (1989) and Duffee (1999). The theory and use of Kalman ﬁlters
in economics is further explained in Harvey (1989), Hamilton (1994), and Durbin &
Koopman (2001).88 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
The Kalman ﬁlter is a recursive procedure for inferring the optimal estimator, a(t),
of the true latent state-process, a(t), when the measurement equation is functionally
linear with respect to the state variable. For a linear Gaussian model, the Kalman ﬁlter is
directly equivalent solving the likelihood function (refer [p.126]Harvey (1989)). Where
the measurement equation is functionally non-linear, as is the case with structural credit
models, linearisation of the prediction equation provides only approximately optimal
estimates, as the errors are no longer multivariate Gaussian, and the EKF produces an
approximate quasi-likelihood function. Duan & Simonato (1999) demonstrates that the
quasi-likelihood properties remain reasonably reliable for non-linear Kalman ﬁlters in
small samples.
Let a(t −1) be the optimal estimator of a(t −1) given all observations up to and
including y(t −1), then the optimal prediction of a(t) is
a(t|t −1) = T(t)a(t −1)+ ¯ c(t), (3.13)
and the variance, or mean square error (MSE), of the state prediction error is





Moving through time from ﬁrst to last observations, once a new vector of observed
spreads, y(t), becomes available the prediction, a(t|t −1), is updated to give the best
inference of the unobserved state value using all information up to, and including, time-
t. The updating equation for the state vector is








F(t) = G(t)P(t|t −1)G(t)
′
+H(t). (3.16)
The EKF is distinguished from a linear ﬁlter by the linearisation of the measurement
equation using a Taylor series expression around the conditional mean of the state vector,
























where g(a(t);yi) is the predicted credit spread from the credit model for the i-th bond
at time-t conditional on the model parameters. The partial derivatives are evaluated3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 89
numerically at the prior period prediction of the state value. The MSE of the updated
state variable is then
P(t) = P(t|t −1)−P(t|t−1)G(t)
′
F(t)−1(t)G(t)P(t|t −1). (3.18)
The step-ahead prediction errors, or innovations, are
v(t) = y(t)−G(t)−d(t). (3.19)
The EKF is deﬁned as the system of prediction and updating equations as shown above.
Given starting values, for the initial state vector, a(0), and variance of the state vec-
tor, P(0), the EKF predictive and updating equations are applied on each trade date to
compute the time-series of step-ahead prediction errors and their variances. From a sin-














where the total number of non-missing observations is given by N = å
t
t=1+dn(t) given
that the size, n(t), of the observation vector varies with each trade date and d represents
a diffuse prior and is equal to one where used.
The log-likelihood function is conditional on the hyperparameters. The optimal set
of hyperparameters, ˆ yh, is found by numeric search performed to maximise the log-
likelihood function shown in equation (3.20). The optimisation is achieved by an initial
search using the simplex search method, followed by the well known Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) gradient descent search method that we apply using numeric
gradients. All code is implemented in OX software calling the MaxBFGS routine.5 The
simplex method has the advantage of not requiring gradients and reduces the risk of
locating a local minimum early in the search process. Transformations are made to the
hyperparameters to enforce economic restrictions on the range of permissible values.
Table 3.9, Panels A and B summarise the model parameter restrictions.
Asymptotic standard errors on the hyperparameters are estimated numerically via
inversion of the Hessian matrix of the log-likelihood function. The EKF provides only
approximate standard errors because of the non-linearity of the measurement equation
and hence error terms.
A pass through of the data for each ﬁrm, at the optimal hyperparameter set, gen-
erates a time series of state estimates, ˆ a(t), termed the ﬁltered estimates. It is the best
estimate of the state vector given all information up to time-t. However, an improved
5OX is a C based matrix language designed for econometric use. Further details are available at
http://www.doornik.com/products.html#Ox.90 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
inference of the state vector can be made with the additional information available after
time-t. Following Duffee (1999), a process termed smoothing is applied to the ﬁltered
estimate to give a better inference of the true underlying state process. The smooth-
ing method applied uses the full data set and is termed a ﬁxed-interval smoother and is
further described in Harvey (1989, p.154), and Hamilton (1994, Section 13.6).
Recall that the transition equation is autoregressive, the process of smoothing works
backwards from the ﬁnal prediction of the state vector, a(T), and its MSE, P(T). Let
a(t|T) denote the smoothed estimate of the state vector and P(t|T) its MSE, then the
smoothed estimates are given by
a(t|T) = a(t)+P∗(t)(a(t +1|T)−T(t +1)a(t)− ¯ c(t +1)), (3.21)
and





(t +1)P−1(t +1|t), (3.23)
with the initial values a(T|T) = a(T), and P(T|T) = P(T).
3.2.6 Model-Speciﬁc Implementation
In this section, the model-speciﬁc parameters and state-space equations for the credit
models are presented: the EM model (Section 3.2.6.1), the single factor LS1 model and
two-factor LS2 model (Section 3.2.6.2), the LT model (Section 3.2.6.3), the CEV model
(Section 3.2.6.4), and the mean-reverting two-factor CDG model (Section 3.2.6.5). A
summary of model parameters is shown in Table 3.9. The resultant smoothed estimates
are the best estimates of the underlying log-solvency process given all information in
the complete time series of credit spread term structures. Hereafter, when discussing the




























Table 3.9: This table shows the credit model parameters. Panel A shows parameters inferred from credit spreads with their restrictions. Panel B shows the state variable and other
implied parameters with restrictions, and Panel C shows other exogenously set parameters with their source or assumption. COMP refers to COMPUSTAT, AK is Altman & Kishore
(1996), Roberts is Roberts (2002), and Vasicek refers to estimates sourced from ﬁtting the Vasicek term-structure model to CMT data sourced from the Federal Reserve Board H15
report. FISD is the Fixed Income Securities Database.
Parameter Models: Merton LS1 LS2 LT CEV CDG
Panel A: Implied Model Parameters
Firm volatility sv > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 n/a > 0
Firm vol. scalar ¯ sv n/a n/a n/a n/a > 0 n/a
Firm vol. elasticity r n/a n/a n/a n/a < 1 n/a
Firm payout rate dv 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 n/a
Bankruptcy costs av n/a n/a n/a 0-1 n/a n/a
Mean reversion rate kv n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 0
Debt timing f n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a > 0
Panel B: Implied State-Space Parameters and State Variable
Measurement vol. sm > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Refcorp slope bR > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Spread constant d > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Latent state a(t) lnV(t)/K lnV(t)/K lnV(t)/K lnV(t)/K (V(t)−K)/K ln(V/K)(t)
Panel C: Known Model Parameters
Initial state x(0) COMP, CRSP COMP, CRSP COMP, CRSP endogenous COMP, CRSP COMP, CRSP
Writedown rate w n/a AK AK AK AK AK
Short-rate r(t) Vasicek Vasicek Vasicek Vasicek Vasicek Vasicek
Long-run rate q n/a n/a Vasicek n/a n/a Vasicek
Mean-reversion of r(t) kr n/a n/a Vasicek n/a n/a Vasicek
Asset-rate correl. rv,r n/a n/a 0 n/a n/a 0
Effective tax rate t n/a n/a n/a 0.155 n/a n/a
Average debt ratio PLT n/a n/a n/a COMP, CRSP n/a n/a
New bond maturity TLT n/a n/a n/a FISD n/a n/a
Target debt ratio n n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Roberts
Bond promised cash c, T FISD FISD FISD FISD FISD FISD92 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
3.2.6.1 Extended Merton Model
The ﬁrm follows the continuous-time capital structure process
dx(t) = (r−dv−s2
v/2)dt +svdWQ(t). (3.24)
where x(t) = ln(V(t)/K).
To estimate the model on discretely observed data, equation (3.24) is discretised
recognising that the time intervals between trades is variable, and permitting the risk-
free rate to vary deterministically through time
x(t) = x(t −1)+(r(t−1)−dv−s2
v/2)Dt +sv
√
Dth(t), h(t) ∼ N(0,1). (3.25)
It follows that the transition equation for the Merton model is the generic transition
equation (3.12) with the elements
a(t) = x(t), ¯ c(t) = (r(t −1)−dv−s2
v/2)Dt,




where Dt is the length of the time step, t(z)−t(z−1).
To start the EKF procedure we require an initial estimate of the ﬁrm’s implied sol-
vency level, a(0) ≡ x(0). Because the value of the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm’s default boundary
are not observable, we use an approximation from observable accounting and market
data. At the ﬁrst trade date in the sample, we take the last quarterly reported book value
of short-term and long-term debt (D) from COMPUSTAT(items 45 and 51 respectively),
and the market value of equity (E) sourced from CRSP. The observed log-solvency ratio




, and x(0) = S(0). (3.27)
The initial estimate for the variance of the state vector P(0) is
P(0) = ˆ sv
2(t(1)−t(0))×1000, (3.28)
where, ˆ sv is an initial estimate of the ﬁrm’s asset volatility, and t(1)−t(0) is the ﬁrst
time interval in the ﬁrm’s sample. For the implementation of all models we use a diffuse
prior and scale the initial state variance by 1000. The purpose of the diffuse prior is
to recognise that we do not have complete a priori knowledge of the true latent log-
solvency level, and therefore increase the initial state variance to allow for uncertainty
in our initial estimate (Harvey 1989, p. 121). In doing so, subsequent values of the
state process are less inﬂuenced by our initial choice. The spread prediction errors from
the ﬁrst prediction step are excluded from the log-likelihood function (Harvey 1989, p.3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 93
127), resulting in 8,953 spread observations excluding the initial observations. For ease
of comparison, all descriptive statistics for actual and predicted spreads, exclude the
initial observations.
The initial estimate of asset volatility is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc standard deviation of the
historical daily ﬁrm asset value return, measured over the sample period, and annualised
over 250 trading days. Observed market value is deﬁned as the sum of the quarterly book
value of debt D, and the daily market value of equity, E. The initial asset payout rate,
dv(0), is the mean estimate of 4.83 percent reported by EHH. The initial measurement
volatility sm(0) is set at 0.245 percent for all ﬁrms. The initial spread intercept term
di(0) is the average sample spread per ﬁrm, pooled across time and bonds of the issuer.
The Merton model, as originally speciﬁed, values only zero-coupon debt. We there-
fore adapt its use for application to coupon-paying bonds via the extension method of
EHH. Our results are therefore broadly comparable with their proxy variable method,
with the exception that, in keeping with the original model, the Merton writedown rate
isendogenously implied, whereas EHHforce thewritedown rate tobeexogenously spec-
iﬁed. Under the sum-of-zeros method, the bond is valued by summing the present value
of each promised cash ﬂow, treating the default-risky value of the coupon as if it was a
zero-coupon bond. The model permits default only at each coupon date and excludes
the possibility of default between coupon dates. The resultant model, incorporating the
sum-of-zeros and deterministic risk-free rate, is referred to as the extended Merton (EM)
model.
Let p(t,T;c) be the time-t value of a bond paying coupons of c at dates t(z), where
z = (1,2,...m), with maturity of t(m) = T. Suppressing the dependency of bond value






Thezero-coupon default-risky bond values, p(t,t(z)), are calculated from thelog-solvency
speciﬁcation of the Merton model shown in equation (2.8). The bond value is then con-
verted to an equivalent yield-to-maturity credit spread as shown in equation (3.7).
The EM model is ﬁtted to observed credit spreads with three different hyperparame-
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The hyperparameters are transformed to ensure estimates sit within economically rea-
sonable values. Asset and measurement volatility are restricted to be greater than zero,
asset payout is controlled to be between zero and one using the logit transformation,
spread constants are assumed greater than one, and the sensitivity of credit spread to the
Refcorp yield is assumed to be greater than zero. The risk-free rate is not part of the
hyperparameter set as it is treated as a known state variable.
3.2.6.2 Longstaff and Schwartz 1 and 2
Two forms of LS model are tested. The ﬁrst, LS1 model, is a single-factor implementa-
tion where the risk free rate is treated as non-stochastic; similar to HH’s base case model.
The second, LS2 model, assumes the risk-free rate is stochastic. The LS1 model is of
interest due to its analytic tractability having a closed-form solution to the ﬁrst passage
crossing time. The LS2 model must be solved numerically at considerable additional
computing cost and added approximation error. To aid identiﬁcation, and to facilitate
a comparison with the LS1 analytic solution, zero correlation between asset values and
the risk-free rate is assumed.
The LS1 model shares the same ﬁrm asset process as the EM model. Consequently,
the state-space equations are given by equation (3.11), and equation (3.26). The LS1
model differs from the EM in the speciﬁcation of the default boundary, recovery level,
and the interest rate process. The LS1 model permits early default, and assumes an
exogenous proportion of the face value of debt, equal to (1−w), is recovered at maturity.
The Merton model permits default only at maturity with an endogenous recovery (refer
equation (2.11)). In our extended implementation of the Merton model, the writedown
rate implicitly varies at each coupon date as a negative function of the log-solvency
level. In other words, the further the at maturity value of the log-solvency level, x(T),
falls below the default boundary, the greater the expected writedown rate. Holding all
else constant, the closer the ﬁrm is to default, the higher the expected writedown rate on
all the remaining coupons and face value in the event of default. Thus, our sum of zeros
extension to the Merton model permits some time-variation in the writedown rate, such
that it varies over time negatively correlated with the log-solvency ratio.
Industry-speciﬁc exogenous writedown rates are applied per ﬁrm using the prior re-
sults of Altman & Kishore (1996), (refer Table 3.10). Our across-ﬁrm sample average
writedown rate is 54.49 percent, with a minimum of 22.26 percent for utilities Com-
monwealth Edison Corp. and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., and a maximum of 79.50
percent for hospital operator HCA Healthcare Corp. In comparison, EHH and HH apply
a writedown rate of 48.69 percent of face value across all ﬁrms. Lyden & Saraniti (2000)
also rely on Altman & Kishore (1996), but apply the senior unsecured average of 52.3
percent across all ﬁrms.
The default probability for the LS1 model is calculated analytically using the known3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 95
solution for a single-factor ﬁrst crossing time problem (Harrison 1985). Suppressing
dependency on model parameters the risk-neutral cumulative probability of default at





















where the drift rate is m(t) = (r(t,T)−dv −s2
v/2) and N( ) represents the cumulative
standard normal function. The risk-free rate r(t,T) is the time-t spot rate for payment
to be received in the future at time T. The drift rate is therefore time-dependent and
assumed to evolve deterministically. The value of a zero-coupon bond per dollar of face
value is




and the time-t value of a bond paying coupons of c, at times t(z) for z=(1,2,   m), with
a face value of one-dollar payable at t(m) = T is given by equation 3.29 using the sum
of zeros approach previously described for the Merton model. The bond value is then
converted to an equivalent yield-to-maturity credit spread by equation (3.7).
The LS2 model introduces a stochastic risk-free rate and shares the same state-space
equations as the LS1 and EM models. It also shares the same writedown assumption as
the LS1 model. However, additional complexity is involved in the computation of the
crossing time, even though there is no correlation assumed between the risk-free rate and
ﬁrm return. Volatility in the risk-free rate and dependence of the ﬁrm’s solvency drift
rate on the risk-free rate, require that the crossing time be calculated on the path taken
by x(t) as a function of two stochastic processes. The numeric solution we use follows
the numeric grid method of CDG. Details are shown in Appendix B.1.
For the LS1 and LS2 models, the hyperparameters and initial values, are the same as
the EM model.
3.2.6.3 Leland and Toft
The LT model assumes the ﬁrm issues and retires debt continuously. At each point in
time, shareholders consider whether to continue to service the debt, which they do pro-
vided that the value of the ﬁrm exceeds debt servicing costs. Leland & Toft (1996) show
that the equilibrium default boundary, KLT, is therefore stationary through time, and Le-
land (2004) exploits this stationarity to demonstrate that valuation under the LT model
is equivalent to implementing a single-factor LS model with an endogenous writedown
rate. We therefore implement the LT model as a special case of the LS1 model.
The two key parameter differences from the LS1 model is that the starting value of
the log-solvency process, and writedown rate, are functionally related and endogenous96 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.10: Shown are the ﬁrm speciﬁc parameter assumptions used in model estimation. The writedown
rate, w, is sourced from Altman & Kishore (1996) matched to each ﬁrm on the basis of the ﬁrm’s SIC
code. The initial value of the ﬁrm’s asset volatility, sv(0) is the sample standard deviation of the daily
time series of the market log-solvency ratio. The initial value of the ﬁrm’s log-solvency ratio, denoted x(0),
is the ﬁrst observation in the sample of the ﬁrm’s market log-solvency ratio. The initial estimate of the
constant liquidity component of the credit spread is common across all ﬁrm’s bonds and is denoted d(0). It
is equal to the pooled sample mean credit spread measured across all the ﬁrm’s bonds. The volatility scalar
is computed from x(0) and sv(0) by equation (3.44).
Issuer SIC w sv(0) x(0) d(0) ¯ sv(0)
Aetna Inc. 6324 0.6132 0.2935 2.4007 0.0029 0.0498
Associates Corp. 6141 0.6132 0.5851 0.2819 0.0018 0.4008
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co. 2911 0.2809 0.1860 1.0831 0.0021 0.0135
A T & Tcorp. 4813 0.6543 0.3364 1.4409 0.0017 1.0742
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 6211 0.6132 0.2025 0.0477 0.0027 0.0172
Black & Decker Corp. 3540 0.5245 0.2061 0.5126 0.0024 0.0181
Boeing Co. 3721 0.6917 0.3572 1.9513 0.0020 0.0885
Dayton Hudson Corp. 5331 0.5545 0.3664 0.7136 0.0027 0.0955
Commonwealth Edison Co. 4911 0.2226 0.2313 0.4848 0.0027 0.0251
Enron Corp. 5172 0.6100 0.2696 1.3540 0.0028 0.0389
Federated Department Stores 5311 0.5545 0.2426 0.6941 0.0038 0.0288
Ford Motor Co. 3711 0.5245 0.1369 0.1866 0.0030 0.0058
General Motors 3711 0.5245 0.1378 0.4885 0.0027 0.0059
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp. 2600 0.5267 0.2274 0.8526 0.0036 0.0239
HCA Healthcare Corp. 8062 0.7950 0.2758 1.6425 0.0034 0.0416
IBM Corp. 7370 0.5245 0.2812 0.8089 0.0016 0.0440
International Paper Co. 2600 0.5267 0.2370 0.9467 0.0024 0.0269
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 6211 0.6132 0.2409 0.0259 0.0039 0.0282
Merrill Lynch & Co. 6211 0.6132 0.1745 0.0731 0.0022 0.0113
Motorola Inc. 3663 0.5245 0.3643 2.5651 0.0023 0.0938
Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. 2052 0.4558 0.2703 0.4609 0.0029 0.0392
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 4931 0.2226 0.2132 0.5322 0.0044 0.0199
Northrop Grumman Corp. 3812 0.5245 0.3189 1.1845 0.0036 0.0634
Paine Webber Group Inc. 6211 0.6132 0.1449 0.0452 0.0037 0.0067
Penney J C Co. Inc. 5311 0.5545 0.2178 1.2930 0.0043 0.0212
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 2111 0.4558 0.2887 1.4258 0.0031 0.0474
Seagram Co. Ltd. 3652 0.5245 0.2812 1.1444 0.0032 0.0440
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. 5311 0.5545 0.1766 0.5681 0.0027 0.0117
Service Corp. International 7200 0.5245 0.2902 0.9851 0.0104 0.0482
Union Paciﬁc Corp. 4011 0.6917 0.2037 1.1596 0.0035 0.0175
Viacom Inc. 4841 0.6543 0.4488 0.7170 0.0041 0.1756
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 5331 0.5545 0.3132 2.0136 0.0014 0.0601
Mean 0.5449 0.2663 0.9401 0.0031 0.0527
SD 0.1218 0.0929 0.6696 0.0015 0.0338
Min 0.2226 0.1369 0.0259 0.0014 0.0058
Max 0.795 0.5851 2.5651 0.0104 0.40083.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 97
to the model. We choose to implement a constant writedown rate, consistent with the
assumption of stationary default boundary. Following Leland (2004), the recovery rate
per ﬁrm is calculated as the fraction of ﬁrm assets available at default to bondholders,








where 0 < av < 1 is the sum of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs associated with
default. The writedown rate is constrained to be non-negative during the optimisation in
the event that KLT > ¯ D and av is insufﬁciently large. With no loss of generality, KLT and
¯ D are expressed per dollar of ﬁrm value, therefore ¯ D is equivalent to the ﬁrm’s average








The default boundary is then found as a function of the risk-free rate r, asset volatility sv,
asset payout rate dv, maturity of new issue debt Tm, the effective tax rate tx, bankruptcy
costs av, and debt level ¯ D
































































and the standard normal density function is denoted n( ), and the standard cumulative
distribution function is denoted N( ). The initial value of log-solvency at t=0 is x(0) =
ln(1/KLT) and is endogenously determined from the initial parameter estimates.
Because the default boundary is constant, the ﬁrm’slog-solvency evolves as per LS1,
and the cumulative risk-neutral probability of default is given by the same ﬁrst-passage
solution as LS1 (equation (3.31)), after a change in the initial starting value of x(0) from
ln(V(0)/K) to ln(V(0)/KLT). Valuation of the ﬁnite maturity coupon-paying bond is98 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
the same as for the LS1 model as shown in equations (3.7), (3.32), and (3.29).
Equation (3.35) requires knowledge of the average maturity of new debt issued. In-
spection of the data shows a systematic difference in the average new issue maturity.
Therefore, the remaining maturity is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and is calculated as the average orig-
inal contractual maturity of bonds on issue during the sample period. Bond maturity
and issue date is sourced from FISD; new issue maturity is measured as the difference
between the contractual maturity date and the issue date. The overall average new issue
maturity is 15.25 years, with the mean for industrial ﬁrms at 16.74 years, ﬁnancial ﬁrms
at 7.42 years and utilities at 18.80 years. The all-ﬁrm average is comparable with other
studies of debt maturity. For example, Guedes & Opler (1996, Table II) report a mean
new issue maturity, across all U.S.-based ﬁrms, of 12.2 years. Table 3.11 shows new
maturity averages per sample ﬁrm.
The effective corporate tax rate is assumed equal to 13.3 percent across all ﬁrms
as per Leland (2004). His rate includes an estimate of the effect on ﬁrm value after
personal shareholder tax. The coupon rate varies by ﬁrm and is equal to issue-average
of the ﬁltered bond rates. The overall average coupon rate is 7.20 percent per annum
(refer Table C). The initial level of bankruptcy costs is assumed to be a relatively high
75 percent. Experimentation with lower levels such as 30 percent as assumed by Leland
(2004) sometimes failed to result in convergence. A higher initial value led to rapid
convergence in all cases.
Unlike the exogenous boundary models, the initial log-solvency level is endoge-
nously determined from thehyperparameter set, and includes the inferred levelofbankruptcy
costs amongst other parameters. We therefore do not assume a diffuse prior, which
would be inconsistent with the theoretical model, but rather let it be endogenously de-
termined from the hyperparameter set, varying with each pass through the ﬁlter as the
implied level of bankruptcy costs is iterated.
The state-space equations are the same as the EM, LS1 and LS2 models. There are
three hyperparameter sets estimated. Suppressing dependency on the ﬁrm we have:
No liquidity:












In addition to the LS1 model, bankruptcy costs are included and constrained to lie be-
tween zero and one using the logit transformation.3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 99
Table 3.11: In the upper panel, shown is the descriptive statistics of the original contractual maturity of
all bonds on issue during the sample period from 5 January 1994 to 27 December 2000. In the lower
panel, descriptive statistics for the original maturity is shown by ﬁrms by industry sector. Means are issue-
weighted simple averages.
New Issue Maturity (years)
Name Mean Min Max No of Obs
Aetna Inc. 19.62 5.01 40.03 10
Associates Corp. 6.64 0.48 40.03 653
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co. 16.08 3.99 40.06 57
A T & T Corp. 20.97 2.02 60.07 33
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 3.48 0.81 29.97 1,118
Black & Decker Corp. 6.79 2.00 12.05 18
Boeing Co. 33.65 10.01 50.06 13
Dayton Hudson Corp. 19.67 2.01 40.01 48
Commonwealth Edison Co. 21.91 1.02 50.26 99
Enron Corp. 10.30 1.51 40.05 44
Federated Department Stores 16.90 5.03 30.06 26
Ford Motor Co. 26.76 5.02 100.09 30
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp. 17.42 3.03 40.07 33
General Motors 22.25 3.05 30.05 31
HCA Healthcare Corp. 20.95 3.02 100.05 26
IBM Corp. 8.38 1.00 100.06 88
International Paper Co. 12.86 1.63 30.05 30
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 5.27 0.80 39.92 410
Merrill Lynch & Co. 3.69 1.00 30.07 970
Motorola Inc. 26.09 5.02 100.05 14
Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. 17.78 3.97 37.07 13
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 18.63 1.04 31.02 59
Northrop Grumman Corp. 19.89 9.71 30.03 12
Paine Webber Group Inc. 5.82 0.98 20.24 197
Penney J C Co. Inc. 19.08 2.98 100.09 43
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 8.10 1.01 30.04 51
Seagram Co. Ltd. 18.43 7.04 30.04 5
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. 6.32 0.93 40.05 293
Service Corp. International 12.49 4.99 25.05 17
Union Paciﬁc Corp. 13.69 2.05 30.06 36
Viacom Inc. 15.87 4.73 50.05 13
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 12.11 1.08 30.06 33
All issues 15.25 3.06 45.53 4,523
Industrials 16.74 3.76 49.33 22
Financial 7.42 1.51 33.38 6
Utilities 18.80 1.53 42.85 4
All ﬁrms 15.25 3.06 45.53 32100 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
3.2.6.4 Constant Elasticity of Variance
The ﬁrm’s asset value is assumed to transition in continuous time by
dV(t) = (r−dv)V(t)dt + ¯ svV(t)rdW(v,t)Q, (3.37)
where r is the risk-free rate, dv is the ﬁrm asset payout rate, and ¯ sv is a volatility scalar.
The instantaneous variance of the ﬁrm is ¯ sv
2V(t)2r, and the variance of the ﬁrm’s return
is ¯ sv
2V(t)2(r−1).
The default boundary is assumed constant. Let the latent state variable be X(t) =
(V(t)−K)/K. Default occurs on the ﬁrst passage of X(t) to zero. For comparison with
the other structural models, the equivalent log-solvency ratio of x(t) = ln(V(t)/K), is
recovered from X(t), by the relationship x(t) = ln(X(t)+1). From Ito’s lemma and
equation (3.37), it follows that x(t) is also a CEV process
dX(t) = (r−dv)X(t)dt + ¯ svX(t)rdW(v,t)Q. (3.38)
When r approaches one, the CEV model approaches the single-factor LS1 model, how-
ever the two models are not strictly nested because, as discussed further below, r is
restricted to be less than one.
The CEV model has the convenient property that a closed-form solution for the



















where b = 2r, m(t) = (r−dv), nQ is a shape parameter and HQ is the evaluation point
in the standard complementary gamma function. A necessary restriction is that r < 1
in order for the boundary to be an absorbing state and therefore for the closed-form
crossing-time solution to be equivalent to the cumulative default probability. This is
because, when r <1, the local volatility of the proportional change in solvency becomes
inﬁnite as the ﬁrm approaches insolvency. Consequently, the CEV model is not strictly
nested within the LS model.
The time-t value of a one-dollar face value, default-risky, zero-coupon bond is given
by
p(t,T) = e(−r(t,T)(T−t)) 
1−wQ(t,T)
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where the risk-free rate is allowed to vary deterministically with time and is maturity
matched with the timing of the promised payment, Q(t,T) is the cumulative risk-neutral
probability of default at any time between times t and T, and w is the exogenously
determined writedown rate.
The valuation of a coupon bond follows the method used for the LS1 model, and is
solved for by the same sum of zeros approach, as shown in equation (3.29). The CEV
and LS1 models share common valuation assumptions conditional on the ﬁrm’s level of
solvency, but the potential paths are different. The CEV model’s ﬁrm volatility increases
as solvency reduces, whereas ﬁrm asset return volatility is independent of solvency level
in the LS1 model.
The elements ofthe transition equation are found by ﬁrstly expressing the continuous
state process shown in equation (3.38) into discrete time using the Eueler approximation
and time dependency on the risk-free rate
X(t) = X(t−1)+(r(t −1)−dv)Dt (3.41)
+ ¯ svX(t−1)r√
Dth(t), h(t) ∼ N(0,q(t)).
It follows that the transition equation for the CEV model is the generic transition equa-
tion (equation (3.12)) with the elements:
a(t) = X(t), ¯ c(t) = 0,
¯ T = 1+(r(t −1)−dv)Dt, R = ¯ svX(t−1)r√
Dt.
(3.42)
The initial value of the state variable, for each ﬁrm, is obtained from the observed market







where, x(0) is the initial sample value of the ﬁrm’s observed log-solvency ratio, shown
in Table 3.10.
No constraint is placed on the path that X(t) may take other than zero being an
absorbing boundary. Due to the discretisation, it is possible that X(t) may be projected
below zero during the ﬁltering procedure. Any prediction of X(t) below zero in the EKF
is trimmed to zero.
To initialise the variance of the state vector, the volatility scalar is ﬁrst estimated by
equation (3.44) using the observed sample asset return volatility, sv(0), and an assumed
initial elasticity parameter, r(0), taken from a prior result by Albanese & Chen (2005).
They ﬁnd that equity default swap prices can be explained, on average, by a CEV equity
diffusion model with r equal to -0.65. Since our state variable is deﬁned as the scaled
net worth of the ﬁrm, it is reasonable to consider a similar result may hold in our sample.102 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
The initial estimate of the volatility scalar is then given by
¯ sv(0) = sv(0)X(0)(1−r(0)) = sv(0)X(0)1.65. (3.44)
Having estimated ¯ sv(0), the initial diffuse variance of ﬁrm solvency is calculated as
P(0) = ¯ sv(0)2X(0)2r(0)(t(1)−t(0)) 1000, (3.45)
where (t(1)−t(0)) is the length of the ﬁrst observation time interval.
There are three hyperparameter sets conditional on the treatment of the non-credit
component of the credit spread. Suppressing dependence on the ﬁrm for notational clar-
ity, we have:
No liquidity:












As shown in equation (3.46), the volatility scalar and measurement errors are trans-
formed to be non-zero, and the elasticity parameter is transformed to constrain the op-
timal estimate to be less than one. The writedown rate is assumed to be exogenously
known, applying the same industry-speciﬁc values as applied to the LS1 and LS2 mod-
els, as shown in Table 3.10.
3.2.6.5 Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein
In the CDG model, the dynamic term structure of credit spreads is assumed to be a func-
tion of a bivariate stochastic differential process for the mean-reverting capital structure













dr(t) = kr(q −r(t))dt +srdW
Q
r,t.
As per the implementation of the LS2 model, we follow the two-step estimation method
of Duffee (1999) and ﬁt the risk-free rate process separately from the log-solvency pro-
cess, thereby ensuring that the same risk-free rate model parameters are applied equally
to each ﬁrm. The risk-free rate is then assumed to be exogenously known and the log-
solvency process implied from the observed credit spreads using the optimal estimates of
the risk-free rate, ﬁtted from a prior ﬁltration. Consequently, the state-space framework3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 103
simpliﬁes to be univariate and the transition equation is the generic transition equation
(equation (3.12)) with the elements:
a(t) = x(t), ¯ c(t) = kv¯ x(t)Dt,













The ﬁrst-passage crossing time of the log-solvency state variable must be numerically
solved due to the CDG model having two stochastic processes. The numeric grid method
of CDG is used, details of which are described in Appendix B.1. The time involved
in searching for an implicit solution for the CDG model is substantial with processing
times, for a single ﬁrm solution, varying from 5 hours for the no-liquidity case, to 24
hours for the time-varying liquidity case.6 An important numerical simpliﬁcation made
is that we value only the principal cash ﬂows and not the coupons of each bond. The
simpliﬁcation proved to be reasonable because of the panel nature of the data, there are
sufﬁcient bonds to span the term structure for each ﬁrm. Further, we seek to minimise
the prediction error of the credit spread, valuing both the risky and risk-free values of
the bond using the same set of promised cash ﬂows. Thus, the simpliﬁcation is present
in the value of both sides of the credit spread calculation.7
To aid estimation, further simplifying assumptions can reasonably be made. Firstly,
the asset payout rate is assumed to be zero following the ﬁnding of EHH, that the effect
ofthe payout ratio on debt pricing inthe CDGmodel isexactly cancelled by the inclusion
of a target debt-ratio. The amount of payout in interest, dividends, capital raisings and
share repurchases are subsumed into management’s choice of the speed of adjustment
toward a target debt-ratio and level of the target.
Secondly, the asset-interest rate correlation is assumed to be zero. EHH report a
correlation of -2 percent and ﬁnd that CDG model’s credit spread prediction errors vary
little with respect to correlation. Table 3.14 shows the correlation between daily changes
in the 3-month CMT rate and daily changes in the observed log-solvency ratio to be 0.38
percent.
Finally we consider the problem of identifying the solvency-ratio dynamic param-
6In comparison, the LS1 model times range from 4 minutes to 38 minutes. All computations were
performed in OX software using a desktop PC running Windows XP on a Pentium 4, 2.53 GHz processor.
7Testing showed no material difference in the estimates of the LS1 model when shifting from valuing all
cash ﬂows to just the principal cash ﬂows. We can draw further comfort that no signiﬁcant errors have been
introduced by referring to the results shown in Table 4.7. The standardised step-ahead prediction errors are
of comparable magnitude between the analytically calculated LS1 model with no cash ﬂow simpliﬁcation,
and the numerically solved LS2 model with only the principal amounts valued.104 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
eters, n, f, and kv. The extant empirical estimation method is exempliﬁed by EHH
and Suo & Wang (2006). It involves estimating the parameters of the CDG asset pro-
cess from a regression of observed ﬁrm-speciﬁc leverage ratios and interest rates. In
the remainder of this section we explore this regression method as a potential means of
identifying initial parameter estimates.
The regression equation for the CDG model is obtained by ﬁrst expressing the log-












Let ax = m −d −s2
v/2+kv(n −fq) then,
dx(t) = (ax+kvfr(t)−kvx(t))dt +svdWP
v,t. (3.50)
Equation (3.50) is then discretised by the Euler approximation
x(t)−x(t −1) = (ax+kvfr(t −1)−kvx(t −1))Dt +sv
√
Dth(t), (3.51)
where h(t) ∼ N(0,1). For estimation purposes, equation (3.51) is then expressed as a
linear equation on the risk-free rate and the lagged observed log solvency ratio, S(t),
with a normal i.i.d. error term e(t)
S(t)−S(t −1)
Dt
= a+bS(t −1)+cr(t −1)+e(t) (3.52)
where a ≡ ax, b ≡ −kv, and c ≡ kvf. Parameter estimates are then obtained from the
slope coefﬁcients: ˆ kv = −b, and ˆ f = −c/b. To ﬁnd an estimate of n from the regression
method it is also necessary to know the ﬁrm’s expected asset return. Let





Then, m can be further expressed as the sum of the risk-free rate and a market risk
premium on the ﬁrm’s assets.
EHH regress 10 years of monthly data and ﬁnd an average mean-reversion rate of
0.1. The expected asset return, m, is obtained from the monthly 10 year historical ﬁrm
value return and on average is 24 percent. They recognise that this is an ex-post measure
not necessarily the market’s required return and ﬁnd that their model prediction errors
are sensitive to the choice of m. EHH suggest that the high absolute spread prediction
errors they ﬁnd with the CDG model may be a result of their estimation method. Alter-
natively, they suggest ﬁtting an implied level of n from credit spreads. Unfortunately,
no regression statistics or sample estimate of n is reported to conﬁrm the signiﬁcance3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 105
of their result. Suo & Wang (2006) ﬁnd a mean reversion rate close to zero, and conse-
quently, their implementation of the CDG model is little different to the LS model.
As an alternative to regression, HH simply assume the long-run risk-neutral log-
solvency level, ¯ x, to be 0.38, which gives an estimate for n of 0.55 based on other as-
sumed parameters including an asset risk premium.8 CDG similarly assume n to be be-
tween 0.5 and 0.6 which equates to a target debt-ratio of similar magnitudes. The target
debt level chosen by CDG for illustrative purposes appears very conservative and may
result in an over-estimation of long-term credit spreads. Opler & Titman (1994) report
similar debt levels for ﬁrms in the top 20 percent of population gearing levels. For other
ﬁrms in normal industry conditions the debt-ratio is 0.193 giving a log-solvency level of
1.65. More recently, using the same data sources and time period as our study, Davy-
denko & Strebulaev (2004) report a higher mean debt-ratio of 0.322, which is equivalent
to mean log-solvency ratio of 1.13.
The result of applying equation (3.52) to our sample of ﬁrms is shown in Table 3.13.
Data is observed quarterly, over the sample period, to match the release of COMPUSTAT
balance sheet debt ﬁgures. The rate of mean-reversion is found, on average, to be 0.79
per quarter across all ﬁrms, with estimates ranging from -0.54 to 3.56, with a median
of 0.70. In most cases the estimate of mean reversion is not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Theaverage mean-reversion rate ismuch higher than the capital structure empirical
literature has found for the debt-ratio dynamics in recent years. For example, Roberts
(2002, Table 3) reports 0.16 using a similar deﬁnition of leverage. In comparison, CDG
and HH assume the average ﬁrm mean-reversion rate to be 0.18.
Table 3.13 also shows that the observed sensitivity of the ﬁrm’s log-solvency to the
slope of the yield curve is negative as often as it is positive. This observation contradicts
the debt market timing hypothesis of CDG, which assumes that changes in the ﬁrm’s sol-
vency are positively related to the slope of the risk-free yield curve slope. However, in
no case is the estimated parameter, ˆ f, signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The across-ﬁrm
mean value of ˆ f is -12.67 with a very high standard deviation of 60.8 and a median of
0.64. EHH do not report their regression estimate. HH adopted an implicit assumption
that f is zero by omitting the parameter as evident in their speciﬁcation of the CDG
model (Huang & Huang 2003, Appendix A, equations (23) and (24)). For illustrative
purposes CDG assume f to be 2.8. We initialise f at the ﬁrm-wide median regression
estimate of 0.64 and restrict its value to be positive consistent with the theoretical re-
striction in the CDG model. However, given these results, it is not expected that f will
be signiﬁcant in the ﬁltered model estimates.
Faced with limited results from the regression model we have little choice but to
consider alternatives to the standard empirical estimation methods for the other asset pa-
8Estimate is based on HH assumptions of: r=8 percent, dv = 6 percent, kv = 0.18, sv = 26.5 percent,
and an asset risk premium of 4.9 percent.106 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.12: This table shows the average target log-solvency levels assumed in the CDG model imple-
mentations. Data is sourced from Roberts (2002) and is matched to ﬁrms by second level SIC. The target
log-solvency level is denoted n and the initial starting value of log-solvency is denoted x(0) and is the ﬁrst
observed log-solvency ratio in the sample period. Observed log-solvency is the sum of total book debt
(COMPUSTAT items 45 and 51) and market equity capital (from CRSP), divided by total book debt.
Sector No. of Firms n x(0)
Industrial 21 1.42 1.12
Finance 6 0.46 0.48
Utility 4 0.19 0.90
Total 31 1.36 0.94
rameters. Twoalternatives wereconsidered. Theﬁrstuses theproperty that the LSmodel
is nested in the CDG model. The mean ﬁltered estimate of x(t) from the LS2 model may
be used as a reliable estimate of the average level of latent log-solvency, which we know
will match the CDG model, as mean-reversion rate approaches zero. The advantage of
this method is that the target log-solvency level is treated as a latent ﬁrm-speciﬁc vari-
able. The disadvantage is that it is a measure of the sample ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean only,
and not necessarily a target that is pursued by management. Only over a longer sample
period, and across more ﬁrms, can we abstract sufﬁciently from idiosyncratic factors.
The second method, which we adopt, uses an estimate of n under the mild assumption
that debt timing is not material; an assumption well supported by our earlier regression
of the observed changes in log-solvency as shown in Table 3.13. From equation (3.54) it
can be seen that n has a directly observable physical interpretation. Ignoring debt-timing
behaviour for simplicity, CDG posits that management changes the level of debt so that
the log-solvency ratio mean-reverts to n where n is a target level of log-solvency. To
see this consider the dynamics of the default boundary in the absence of debt timing
behaviour. The natural log of the default boundary then follows the process
dlnK(t) = kv(x(t)−n)dt +sdWP
t . (3.54)
To use the sample speciﬁc mean level of x(t) from the LS model would, for example,
underestimate the ex-ante target level of solvency of a ﬁrm that ex-post suffered a dete-
rioration in value. Rather, an industry-level observed log-solvency level is a better proxy
for management’s desired target. The industry mean is preferred over the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
sample averages since it is less inﬂuenced by idiosyncratic shocks from target, and when
averaged over many ﬁrms and time, is more likely to represent a long-run equilibrium
level. The use of industry is a natural conditioning variable since Opler & Titman (1994)
ﬁnd that target debt-ratio levels vary systematically with industry-speciﬁc business con-
ditions. Each ﬁrm’s physical target level is set equal to the industry-speciﬁc 1980 to
1998 average of the observed log-solvency ratio as reported by Roberts (2002, Table3.2. FITTING THE CREDIT MODELS 107
1). His study of debt-ratio dynamics is useful for our purposes because it draws on a
similar sample of ﬁrms over the same time period. Firms are mapped to industries by
their second level SIC codes. The rate of mean-reversion is then included in the hyper-
parameter set using the Roberts’s (2002) industry-wide average to initialise, and ﬁxing n
to the industry average observed log-solvency ratio. Attempts at searching implicitly for
both parameters was found to be infeasible due to multicollinearity. Our sample average
value of n is 1.36 implying a mean target debt-ratio of 0.27. In Table 3.12 the variation
by industry sector is shown along with the initial values of log-solvency. For industrial
ﬁrms, our initial parameterisation suggests a decrease in leverage over time, little change
for ﬁnance companies, and an increase over time for utilities.
Conditional on the treatment of the non-credit component of the credit spread, the















Further parameters are: dv = 0, rv,r = 0.
3.2.7 An Example of the Method Applied to Northrop
We now provide an example of the outcomes from applying the estimation method.
An example of the observed, and step-ahead predicted, credit spreads is plotted for
Northrop in Figure 3.4 using predictions obtained from the EM model ﬁtted without
liquidity premiums. The predicted credit spread is the optimal prediction based upon
the Taylor series projection of the latent log-solvency ratio, given all information about
the underlying state process up to that point in time including its variance. Our start-
ing value x(0) was initially the observed log-solvency ratio, but as new predictive error
information is added, the forecast for the latent log-solvency ratio is updated incorporat-
ing the direction of the past predictive error and the degree of conﬁdence that the new
observation contains information in excess of the expected level of variation in the state
variable. As new information is received from the subsequent observation, expectations
are updated for the next step-ahead prediction. The EKF procedure therefore reﬂects
the behaviour of market participants who rationally update their knowledge of the credit
worthiness of the ﬁrm using all available trade data across the term structure of credit
spreads. The path followed by the latent log-solvency ratio process is shown in Fig-108 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.13: This table shows the results of estimating the CDG ﬁrm process by ordinary least squares
regression of
DS(t)
Dt = a+bS(t −1)+cr(t −1)+e(t), where a, b, and c are constants, Dt is 0.25 years,
S(t−1) is the observed log-solvency lagged one-quarter, and r(t −1) is the 3 month CMT rate lagged one-
quarter. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The estimate of the log-solvency mean-reversion rate
is given by ˆ kv = −b, and the estimate of the sensitivity of changes in log-solvency with the term structure
slope is ˆ f =−c/b. Data issourced from CRSPand COMPUSTATfor the period from 1994:Q2 to2000:Q4.
Observed log-solvency is the sum of total book debt (COMPUSTAT items 45 and 51) and market equity
capital divided by total book debt.
Issuer a b c ˆ k ˆ f
Aetna Inc -0.60 (1.93) -0.87 (0.51) 37.76 (31.85) 0.87 43.31
Associates Corp 0.08 (0.79) -1.17 (0.61) 7.01 (15.43) 1.17 6.02
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co 0.72 (0.93) -0.51 (0.38) 1.04 (16.24) 0.51 2.05
A T & T Corp -0.20 (0.38) 0.54 (0.56) 2.95 (7.96) -0.54 -5.46
Bear Stearns Comp Inc 0.17 (0.09) -3.56 (0.81) -0.15 (1.26) 3.56 -0.04
Black & Decker Corp -0.07 (1.19) -0.70 (0.38) 17.66 (22.19) 0.70 25.22
Boeing Co 0.31 (1.18) -0.68 (0.41) 22.23 (20.08) 0.68 32.63
Dayton Hudson Corp 2.18 (1.07) -0.21 (0.23) -35.06 (20.29) 0.21 -163.63
Comm Edison Co -0.04 (0.52) -0.72 (0.50) 9.09 (8.36) 0.72 12.58
Enron Corp 0.04 (1.20) -0.70 (0.67) 19.25 (23.81) 0.70 27.47
Fed Dept Stores 0.67 (1.12) -0.59 (0.43) -3.59 (18.45) 0.59 -6.13
Ford Mtr Co 0.21 (0.39) -0.72 (0.46) -0.30 (6.68) 0.72 -0.42
General Mtrs 0.54 (0.55) -0.92 (0.63) -4.83 (7.79) 0.92 -5.25
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp 1.59 (0.99) -0.68 (0.67) -21.49 (14.61) 0.68 -31.47
Columbia / Hca Corp 0.12 (1.11) -0.83 (0.48) 18.99 (17.02) 0.83 22.77
IBM Corp 1.72 (0.90) -0.32 (0.23) -20.86 (17.82) 0.32 -64.65
Int Paper Co 3.09 (1.28) -1.84 (0.65) -29.38 (18.73) 1.84 -15.98
Lehman Bros Hldgs Inc -0.23 (0.12) -0.14 (0.77) 4.65 (2.25) 0.14 33.76
Merrill Lynch & Co -0.05 (0.15) -0.12 (0.40) 1.56 (3.11) 0.12 13.25
Motorola Inc 5.97 (2.32) -1.20 (0.70) -63.14 (34.34) 1.20 -52.76
Nabisco Grp Hldgs Corp -0.43 (1.04) -1.32 (0.82) 26.17 (22.42) 1.32 19.85
Niagara Mohawk Corp 0.38 (0.42) -1.33 (0.48) 1.77 (6.53) 1.33 1.33
Northrop Grumman Corp -0.76 (1.26) -1.41 (0.65) 43.61 (27.08) 1.41 31.03
Paine Webber Grp Inc -0.18 (0.17) 0.17 (0.41) 3.68 (3.33) -0.17 -21.88
Penney J C Co Inc 0.42 (1.27) -0.44 (0.46) -2.80 (19.64) 0.44 -6.36
Philip Morris Comp Inc 1.17 (1.38) -0.83 (0.43) 6.42 (22.34) 0.83 7.75
Seagram Co Ltd 0.35 (1.59) -1.72 (0.67) 38.05 (25.28) 1.72 22.13
Sears Roebuck Acc Corp 0.65 (0.78) -1.34 (0.65) 3.87 (11.17) 1.34 2.88
Service Corp Intl -2.23 (1.48) 0.14 (0.33) 37.62 (25.92) -0.14 -268.43
Union Paciﬁc Corp 0.45 (0.91) -0.50 (0.38) -0.26 (14.43) 0.50 -0.52
Viacom Inc 1.60 (1.64) -0.32 (0.33) -19.40 (33.01) 0.32 -61.24
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 1.12 (1.85) -0.45 (0.38) -2.33 (29.98) 0.45 -5.23
Mean 0.59 -0.79 3.12 0.79 -12.67
SD 1.37 0.74 22.53 0.74 60.80
Median 0.33 -0.70 2.36 0.70 0.64
Min -2.23 -3.56 -63.14 -0.54 -268.43
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Table 3.14: Shown is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc within sample correlation coefﬁcient between the ﬁrst differences
in the observed log-solvency ratio, S(t), and the ﬁrst differences in the 3-month constant maturity Treasury
risk-free rate. Observed log-solvency is the sum of the quarterly total book debt (COMPUSTAT items 45




Atlantic Richﬁeld Co. -0.0179
A T & T Corp. -0.0009
Bear Stearns Companies Inc. 0.0406
Black & Decker Corp. -0.0180
Boeing Co. 0.0190
Dayton Hudson Corp. 0.0673
Commonwealth Edison Co. -0.0103
Enron Corp. -0.0225
Federated Department Stores 0.0508
Ford Motor Co. 0.0068
General Motors -0.0008
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp. -0.0229
HCA Healthcare Corp. 0.0342
IBM Corp. 0.0184
International Paper Co. -0.0063
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 0.0068
Merrill Lynch & Co. -0.0122
Motorola Inc. 0.0775
Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. 0.0671
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. -0.0519
Northrop Grumman Corp. 0.0047
Paine Webber Group Inc. 0.0150
Penney J C Co. Inc. -0.0056
Philip Morris Companies Inc. 0.0039
Seagram Co. Ltd. 0.0101
Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. -0.0006
Service Corp. International 0.0166
Union Paciﬁc Corp. -0.0029
Viacom Inc. -0.1143
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Figure 3.4: Predicted and observed credit spreads for Northrop Grumman Corporation. The model imple-
mented is the EM model with time-varying non-default components of the credit spread. Each panel shows
the path of predicted and observed credit spreads by bond on issue.
ure 3.5. We compare this with the observed log-solvency ratio. Evident is the decline in
both ratios midway through the sample period. However, while the observed solvency
ratio corrected towards the end of the sample period, the latent solvency ratio contin-
ued to decline suggesting the market was pricing in more default risk than the observed
capital structure changes of the ﬁrm would have predicted.
3.3 Fitting the Vasicek Risk-Free Model
In this section we describe the method used to estimate the Vasicek model using a linear
Kalman ﬁlter. Our method follows James & Webber (2001) and Babbs & Nowman
(1999).
Under the physical measure of actuarial probability densities, the risk-free rate is
assumed to follow the stochastic differential process
dr(t) = ar(q −r(t))dt +srdWP
r,t. (3.56)
The equivalent martingale process under risk-neutrality is
dr(t) = (ar(q −r(t))−lrsr)dt +srdW
Q
r,t, (3.57)3.3. FITTING THE VASICEK RISK-FREE MODEL 111
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Figure 3.5: This shows the estimated latent versus observed ratios of solvency. for Northrop Grumman
Corporation. The top panel shows the smoothed estimate of the latent log-solvency ratio x = ln(V/K),
implied from the EM model, assuming time-varying non-default components of the credit spread. The
lower panel shows the observed log-solvency ratio, S = ln(D+E)/D, where D is the book value of debt
and E is the market value of equity.112 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
Table 3.15: This table shows the summary statistics of the zero-coupon Treasury yields. Data is boot-
strapped CMT Treasury yields, extracted on each Wednesday, from the U.S. Federal Reserve H15 data
series for the period 3 January 1994 to 29 December 2000.
Maturity
(yrs) Mean Std Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
0.25 0.0516 0.00611 0.0301 0.0636 - 0.797 1.585
0.5 0.0526 0.00609 0.0317 0.0648 - 0.630 1.144
1 0.0545 0.00624 0.0347 0.0715 - 0.303 0.969
2 0.0570 0.00664 0.0397 0.0748 - 0.106 0.559
3 0.0585 0.00691 0.0402 0.0759 - 0.084 0.325
5 0.0604 0.00715 0.0414 0.0770 - 0.042 0.164
7 0.0615 0.00719 0.0426 0.0781 0.022 0.052
10 0.0625 0.00714 0.0446 0.0791 0.114 - 0.129
20 0.0641 0.00703 0.0492 0.0808 0.263 - 0.549
30 0.0648 0.00710 0.0511 0.0816 0.305 - 0.718
where lr is a constant market price of interest rate risk, sr > 0 is the volatility of the
interest rate, q ≥ 0 is the long-run risk-free rate level, and ar > 0 is the speed of mean-
reversion towards q. The market price of risk represents the equilibrium compensation
required by risk-averse investors to hold interest rate risk.
Term structure data is sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Con-
stant Maturity Treasury (CMT) H15 data series.9 These yields are interpolated by the
U.S. Treasury from the daily yield curve based on the closing market bid yields on ac-
tively traded Treasury securities in the over-the-counter market. We select weekly data
(Wednesdays) to avoid weekend effects and observed 10 yields with maturities of: 3,
6 months, and; 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30 years. The sample period is 3 January
1994 to 29 December 2000 giving 361 observed yield curves. The 3 and 6 month rates
represent zero-coupon bond yields, and the longer rates are expressed in terms of semi-
annual coupon-paying Treasury bonds. The latter are bootstrapped and then added to the
risk-free rates to produce an equivalent riskless term structure of spot rates. Summary
statistics are reported in Table 3.15. The term structure is plotted in the ﬁrst panel of
Figure 3.6 and the term-spread, deﬁned as the difference between the 30 year yield and
the 3 month yield, is plotted in the second panel. From the second panel, and table 3.15,
it can be seen that the term structure has been very ﬂat, with the term-spread gradually
decreasing before turning negative. The term-spread compensating investors for 30 year
risk has averaged only 132 bp for the sample period.
In the estimation of the credit risk model parameters, it is feasible within the state
space framework to estimate the parameters of the risk-free model and the credit model
jointly. This can be achieved by expanding the measurement equation to include the
observed credit spread and risk-free rate term structures.
9CMT yields are sourced from the Federal Reserve and are available at
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However, as noted by Duffee (1999), this unfortunately leads to the problem of hav-
ing as many different estimates of the risk-free rate as there are ﬁrms in the sample.
We therefore follow Duffee (1999) and Dufﬁe et al. (2000) and estimate the risk-free
rate independently from the credit model. Having obtained the underlying smoothed
estimates of the unobserved risk-free rate, r(t), and the optimal interest rate parameter
set ˆ yr, we treat the risk-free rate process as known and true in the ﬁlter of the credit
process. All discounting is performed using the Vasicek model, discounting to time-t,
cash ﬂows promised after time-t. As per EHH, we also relax the theoretical constraint
of the constant interest rate models that the risk-free rate is time-invariant, and allow
the discounting to be dependent on the predicted term structure at time-t, and let r(t) be
updated at each trade date, however, the other model parameters are held constant. The
same risk-free rates are used in all models, and consistent Vasicek model parameters are
applied in the two-factor models. Since our main focus is the performance of the credit
models, allowing some ad hoc updating reduces error introduced by the performance of
the risk-free model and enables a more even comparison between the one and two-factor
credit models.
Our estimation method follows recent convention with maximum likelihood estima-
tion of parameters obtained from linear Kalman ﬁltering on panel data (Pennacchi 1991).
It has the advantages that: the risk-free rate and other factors are treated as truly unob-
servable without proxy error, all bonds in the term structure can be assumed to have mea-
surement error, serial and cross-sectional constraints implied by the theoretical model are
enforced, many more bonds than underlying factors can be ﬁtted. The Kalman ﬁltering
method has shown to be particularly robust for term structure estimation. Duan & Si-
monato (1999) perform Monte Carlo simulation of the Vasicek and CIR models and ﬁnd
the method to be reasonably reliable for sample sizes as small as 150.
At time t, we observe the vector of CMT Treasury yields, Yt = y(t,t) for t =
(0.25,0.5,1,2,3,5,7,10,20,30) where t = T −t is the maturity of the bond. The 3 and
6 month yields are expressed as annualised Treasury bills and the longer dated yields
represent par coupon paying Treasury notes and bonds. The longer dated CMT yields









where D(t,t) is the time t value of a riskless zero-coupon bond maturing at time t +t.
To ﬁnd the time t term structure, Treasury yields are bootstrapped beginning with the
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Subsequent semi-annual yields are interpolated from the yield curve using the polyno-
mial function of Nelson & Siegel (1985) ﬁtted onYt by ordinary least squares regression.









Theterm structure attimet isthen described bythe vector Rt whereR(t,t)=−1
t lnD(t,t).
The Vasicek model endogenously predicts the term structure based upon a set of
parameter values, Yr = (sr,q,a,lr), and the stochastic path followed by rt. Since we
do not observe continuous trading it is necessary to approximate the transition process
in discrete time which we do by simple Euler approximation,10
rt+Dt = ar(qr −lrsr)Dt +(1−arDt)rt +sr
√
Dtht, ht ∼ N(0,1). (3.61)
The measurement equation is linear with respect to the transition equation, making
Kalmanﬁltering of thetime series straightforward, and withGuassian errors, the Kalman
ﬁlter yields an exact maximum likelihood estimation of the model parameters (Harvey
1989, page 104)
Dufﬁe & Kan (1996) show that the Vasicek model belongs to the class of one-factor
exponential afﬁne models in which the value of a zero-coupon bond is conveniently
given by the following linear function,





























10Because the state variable transition equation is linear Gaussian, an exact transition density is known




2a (1−exp(−2aDt))ht. Testing (unreported) provided no material
difference from the Euler approximation results presented in tables 3.16 and 3.17.3.3. FITTING THE VASICEK RISK-FREE MODEL 115










































































Wefollow accepted convention and assume thatthe measurement errors arecross-sectionally
independent so that H is a 10 x 10 diagonal matrix with elements hi (i = 1...10) that
vary by maturity to account for potential differences in trading activity and associated
bid-ask spread (Duffee 1999, Duan & Simonato 1999, Geyer & Pichler 1999).11
A further necessary assumption for the Kalman ﬁlter is that the measurement er-
rors are serially uncorrelated, e(t,t)e(t +i,t) = 0, Ñi = 1...n−1. We also assume
homoskedasticity.
Starting values for the ﬁltering process are estimated from ﬁtting equation (3.61) on
the 3 month rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate using a naive method suggested by
James & Webber (2001, page 122). Estimates of a, b, and the variance of the prediction
error, Var(et), are estimated by ordinary least squares regression of the AR(1) model,




, ˆ q =
a
1−b





The parameters a = 0.001390 and b = 0.9744 are signiﬁcant with standard errors of
0.0004075 and 0.007849 respectively. The estimate of b is indicative of the 3 month
rate being close to a random walk and implies ˆ ar = 1.33. The error variance is low,
Var(et) = 8.230 10−7 giving ˆ sr = 0.0065. The long-run risk-free rate level is obtained
by assuming the initial market price of risk to be zero so that, ˆ q = a/(1−b) = 0.0544.
The measurement error is usually found to be small in other studies applying Kalman
ﬁltering (for example, Duan & Simonato 1999, Babbs & Nowman 1999, De-Jong 2000),
11As discussed in Geyer & Pichler (1999), the alternative assumption of a single measurement error
is convenient when the number of observed bonds and their maturities vary over time. We utilize this
alternativespeciﬁcationintheestimationof thedefault-risky model parameters duetomissingdataresulting
from unequal trading dates.116 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
and the starting assumption is 10 bp for all maturities.
These estimates serve only as a starting point for maximum likelihood estimation.
Limitations of the orindary least squares procedure for unbiased and consistent estima-
tion include: lack of theoretical cross-sectional restrictions on a and q and a potential
upward bias in the estimate of a when equation (3.66) is close to having a unit root
(Ball & Torous 1996); and the failure of orindary least squares regression to ensure et
is standard normal and independent and identically distributed (James & Webber 2001,
p.122).
Parameter estimates for the ﬁltered Vasicek model are shown in Table 3.16 and the
latent path followed by the smoothed estimate of the risk-free rate, during the sample pe-
riod, is plotted in Figure 3.7. All parameters except lr and qr are found to be signiﬁcant.
The speed of mean-reversion is low at 0.02324, implying a half-life of 29.8 years, de-
ﬁned as the expected time for the risk-free rate to return halfway from its long-run mean.
The mean reversion rate is similar to extant studies; 0.0222 in De-Jong (2000, table 2C),
0.1908 in Babbs & Nowman (1999, table 2), and 0.0463 in Duan & Simonato (1999).
The Vasicek model predicts the risk-free rate to converge to qr, but it is evident from
Table 3.15 that the sample standard deviation of weekly rates is similar across all matu-
rities. Thus, a small a(t) is necessary to match the observed variance in 30 year yields.
The estimated half-life for the risk-free rate of 29.8 years is much longer compared to
the high degree of persistence observed in the serial data for the 3 month rate.
The insigniﬁcant value for lr is a consequence of the very ﬂat, and partly inverted
yield curves, observed during our sample period. The market price of risk can only
be identiﬁed from bond prices measured across the yield curve, but at an average term
spread of only 132 basis points for a 30 year investment period, the implied price of risk
is necessarily small. Finally, lr and qr strongly interact via their inﬂuence on the risk-
neutral drift of the risk-free rate, and without greater cross-sectional restriction, neither
is found to be signiﬁcant.
Table 3.17 shows the step-ahead prediction errors of the zero-coupon spot rates for
each maturity. The prediction errors exhibit a U-shaped pattern; highest at 3 months at
75.5 basis points, decreasing to 14.3 basis points at 3 years, then increasing to 51.8 basis
points at 30 years. A similar pattern and magnitude of errors is reported by (Babbs &
Nowman 1999, Table 1).3.3. FITTING THE VASICEK RISK-FREE MODEL 117
Table 3.16: This table reports estimated parameters from the one-factor Vasicek term-structure model. The
instantaneous risk-free rate is assumed to follow the risk-neutral process: dr(t) = ar(q −r(t)−lrsr)dt +
srdW
Q
r,t. Estimation method is linear Kalman ﬁlter applied to weekly panel data over the period 5 January
1994 to 27 December 2000. Data is zero-coupon yields bootstrapped from US Treasury constant maturities
from U.S. Federal Reserve H15 data series. H(r(t)) is the half-life of the risk-free rate where H(r(t)) =
ln(2)/ar. The entry (*) signiﬁes that a standard error could not be calculated.


















Table 3.17: This table reports the weekly step-ahead yield prediction errors from ﬁtting the one-factor
Vasicek model. Errors are the predicted yields from a linear Kalman ﬁlter less the actual zero-coupon spot
yields. RMSE is the root-mean-squared error and MAE is the mean-absolute error. All ﬁgures are reported
in basis points. Yields are estimated from zero-coupon yields bootstrapped using US Treasury constant
maturity data sourced from H15 data series, for the period 5 January 1994 to 27 December 2000.
Maturity (yrs) Mean RMSE MAE
0.25 -40.48 75.34 58.13
0.5 -33.42 61.48 47.40
1 -19.99 39.58 29.94
2 -5.718 17.74 13.32
3 6.4x10−6 14.30 10.38
5 1.238 23.13 16.92
7 -2.156 30.20 22.28
10 -8.392 37.68 37.68
20 -13.89 48.65 48.65
30 6.712 51.83 51.83118 CHAPTER 3. METHOD
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Figure 3.6: Plotted is the zero coupon risk-free term structures over time of U.S. Treasuries for the period 5
January 1994 to 27 December 2000. Source data is author’s calculations derived from zero-coupon yields
bootstrapped from US Treasury constant maturity rates, in turn sourced from the Federal Reserve H15 data



















Figure 3.7: Plotted is the daily smoothed estimate of the risk-free rate (Vasicek Smoothed), computed
from a linear Kalman ﬁltering of the Vasicek model. Also plotted is the observed constant maturity 3
month Treasury rate (3 Month CMT). Source data is author’s calculations derived from zero-coupon yields
bootstrapped from US Treasury constant maturity rates, in turn sourced from the Federal Reserve H15 data
report. Sample period is 5 January 1994 to 27 December 2000.Chapter 4
Results
In this chapter we review and discuss our ﬁndings. The aims of our research is to ﬁrstly
establish whether, through latent estimation of capital structure dynamics, we can reduce
the high variability in prediction errors noted by EHH, thus providing a clearer picture
of the systematic biases present in structural model speciﬁcations. Secondly, we test our
hypothesis that the prediction errors evident in structural models are related to omitted
factors identiﬁable from stylised facts selected from the extant capital structure literature.
Finally, we examine the estimated form asset parameters for economic reasonableness
using benchmarks for the ﬁrm asset volatility, the implied default boundary, and the rate
of solvency mean-reversion.
In Section 4.1, the average credit spread prediction errors of the competing struc-
tural models are compared with each other, and with the prior empirical literature of
LYS, EHH, and HH. To aid comparison with these studies, we report goodness of ﬁt
statistics; Mean Percentage Error (MPE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE).
Further, to assess the relative impact of controlling for liquidity, and to provide a direct
comparison with the ﬁndings of EHH, we report model performance separately for the
three alternative measurement equations.
Our testing of model performance is guided ﬁrstly by EHH. Given the similarity
of our study, but competing estimation method, it is important to show our results in a
comparative manner. However, due to our state-space estimation method we are able
to apply additional speciﬁcation tests not available to EHH. In Section 4.2 we follow
diagnostic methods described inHarvey (1989, p.256), Durbin & Koopman (2001, p.33),
and as applied to interest rate term structure modelling by Geyer & Pichler (1999), to test
the standardised residual prediction errors for consistency with the cross-sectional and
time-series assumptions of the competing credit models. In other words, we test whether
the credit spread prediction errors, including the standardised error as recommended by
Harvey (1989), are unbiased with respect to ﬁrm and bond characteristics, are serially
uncorrelated, and are normally distributed. We are not aware that similar performance
test have been applied to structural credit models previously.
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Lastly, because we are inferring model parameters from credit spreads, we may ﬁnd
that we achieve a high level of ﬁt but with parameter values that are economically unre-
alistic. To conﬁrm whether this is the case, the implied model parameters are checked
against observable benchmarks in Section 4.3. Using our ﬁtted measurement equations,
in Section 4.4 we estimate the extent to which the observed level of credit spread is ex-
plained by the various structural models and estimate how much is due to non-default
related liquidity premiums.
4.1 Credit Spread Prediction Accuracy
In this section, we consider the ability of the models to predict step-ahead market credit
spreads is discussed controlling for: no liquidity premium (Section 4.1.1), constant liq-
uidity premium (Section 4.1.2), and time-varying liquidity premium (Section 4.1.3).
Step-ahead prediction errors are reported in Table 4.3, percentage spread step-ahead
prediction errors in Table 4.4, absolute percentage prediction errors in Table 4.5, and
standardised prediction errors in Table 4.6.
4.1.1 With No Liquidity Premium
In this section we report the overall credit spread prediction accuracy of the tested mod-
els, with no control for a liquidity premium, so that we can directly compare our results
with the results of extant studies. Our method of implicit parameter estimation involves
optimisation of model parameters to maximise model ﬁt to observed credit spreads. It
is therefore expected that the average prediction error will be close to zero. We are
therefore interested in determining, whether as a consequence of our implicit estimation
method, whether we ﬁnd a lower level of error than the extant studies of EHH and HH.
Our results are shown in Panel A of Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. A comparison of
our results with EHH and HH is shown in Table 4.1.
In Panel A of Table 4.3 we report the unstandardised prediction error, measured in
basis points, calculated simply as the predicted credit spread less the observed credit
spread. Standard deviations of the prediction errors are shown in parentheses and are
also reported in basis points. Pooled mean prediction errors are shown by model, ex-
ternal rating, and remaining maturity of the bond at the time of the trade. From the
second column, it is evident that, as expected, the average prediction error for all mod-
els is small. The extended Merton model exhibits the smallest error of only -0.29 basis
points, and the CEV model the most at 4.02 basis points. In comparison, LYS report
an average spread prediction error for the Merton model of -61.15 basis points, and -
8.78 basis points for a single-factor LS model with constant risk-free rate (equivalent
in speciﬁcation to our LS1 model), and -25.37 basis points for the two-factor LS model
with stochastic interest rates (equivalent in speciﬁcation to our LS2 model). HH also122 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
report underprediction of credit spreads for the one-factor LS model with an estimated
error of -100 basis points for an A-rated bond with a 10 year maturity, and -108.5 basis
points with a stochastic interest rate. HH show the LT model to have a spread prediction
error of -84.5 basis points. For the CDG mean-reverting leverage model, HH report a
spread prediction error of -100.5 basis points. Ericsson, Reneby & Wang (2005) apply a
maximum-likelihood approach using rm-specic balance sheet and market data on stock
prices to ﬁt the Leland (1994), Fan & Sundaresan (2000), and LT models. They ﬁnd
average credit spread prediction errors of -108, -91, and -56 basis points respectively. It
therefore appears that our approach of estimating structural models directly from ﬁrm-
speciﬁc credit spread term structures achieves a less biased ﬁtting of the models, on
average, than achieved by: estimation of the ﬁrm process from equity prices alone (Eric-
sson et al. (2005)), proxy variables with no optimisation (LYS and EHH), or ﬁrm process
parameters calibrated to match predicted with observed historical default rates (HH).
An alternative measure of the prediction accuracy is the mean percentage prediction
error (MPE), which we calculate by deducting the observed credit spread from the pre-
dicted, and then scaling by the observed credit spread. The MPE has the property of
being invariant to the size of the observed credit spread and is therefore a comparable
measure of error across different levels of observed credit spread.
Turning to column two of Panel A of Table 4.4, we show that the EM model under-
predicts credit spreads, with a mean percentage error of -6.66 percent. The LS1 and LT
models show slightly less average bias at -6.25 percent and -6.09 percent respectively,
the CEV model shows very slight average underprediction at -2.23 percent, followed by
the LS2 model at -1.71 percent. The most biased model, on average, is found to be the
CDG model, which overpredicts with a MPE of 11.46 percent. However, the standard
deviations of the MPE, which are shown in parentheses, indicate that our MPE estimates
are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
In Table 4.1 we compare our MPE results against the extant literature of EHH and
HH. The EM model is reported by EH to have a MPE of -50.42 percent. EHH ﬁnd
that the LT model overpredicts with a MPE of 115.69 percent, however, HH report the
model to underpredict with a MPE of -68.70 percent. Directionally, we agree with HH,
with our absolute level of error is less than either study. A similar result is obtained
for the two factor LS2 model. EHH report overprediction with a MPE of 42.93 percent
and HH a MPE of -88.21 percent. We ﬁnd little difference in prediction bias between
the one factor (LS1) and two factor (LS2) versions of the LS model. Finally, we see
overprediction in the CDG model but less than HH at 71.11 percent and an order of
magnitude less than EHH who report a MPE of 269.78 percent An important feature of
Table 4.1 is the relative consistency in MPE that we ﬁnd between models. The mean and
standard deviation of the MPEs show a much higher degree of similarity than reported
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model at 63.95 percent to the highest being the LS2 model at 82.80 percent. In contrast,
EHH report standard deviations of MPE ranging between a low of 71.84 percent for
the EM model, and a high of 490.19 percent for the LT model. In terms of the mean
spread prediction error, HH report errors in the range of -68 percent to -88 percent for
the models comparable to our LT,LS1, and LS2model implementations. Our percentage
errors are approximately ten times lower than HH, but otherwise show a similar level of
relative error between models. The improved accuracy is most likely due to our more
direct method of ﬁtting the models to credit spreads whereas HH ﬁt a representative
average rated company to historical default rates.
The similarity in error levels between models is also evident in the mean absolute
percentage errors (MAPE) of the credit spreads shown in Panel A, column two of Ta-
ble 4.5. The MAPE is deﬁned as the absolute value of the difference between the pre-
dicted and observed credit spread, divided by the observed credit spread. Compared
to the MPE, the MAPE penalises variance in the prediction error. A smaller value of
MAPE indicates a more consistently accurate prediction independent of the level of the
observed credit spread. The lowest MAPE belongs to the EM model at 25.51 percent
and the highest MAPE is shown by the CDG model at 34.88 percent. Once again, EHH
report considerably greater MAPE for the same models as shown in Table 4.1. For the
extended Merton model, EHH report MAPE of 78.02 percent and 319.31 percent for the
CDG model; approximately nine times greater than our result.
Given our results, the variance in prediction errors shown by EHH are surprising.
Since we have calibrated to market spreads, and HH calibrated to their models to his-
torical average default rates, it is likely that we should achieve similar consistency in
results to HH notwithstanding our higher level of prediction accuracy. In contrast, EHH
do not attempt to calibrate model parameters and rely upon the adequacy of their proxy
variables to match ﬁrm-speciﬁc model parameters. Our result suggests that in failing
to optimise model ﬁt to either default rates or credit spreads, additional error may have
been introduced into their spread predictions. On the other hand, we are able to demon-
strate from Tables 4.3 to 4.1 that our estimation method provides the least biased, and
most consistently estimated set of structural models achieved to date. The advantage of
achieving consistently low average prediction biases, is that the remaining biases are not
obscured by the excessive levels of error, seen for example by the CDG and LT results
in the EHH study. We have therefore provided each model with its best opportunity to
perform accurately with as little average error as possible.
We now turn to the MPE related to the issuer’s rating. As shown in Panel A of
Table 4.4, a negative relationship between MPE and rating is evident amongst the single-
factor models; higher ratings are associated with relatively greater underprediction of the
yield spread. The EM model exhibits underprediction for BB trades of -3.07 percent, but
-10.55 percent for AA rated trades. The LS1, LT, and CEV models also have a negative124 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.1: This table shows a comparison of model accuracy between the no-liquidity premium model
implementation, with the results of Eom et al. (2004) (EHH) and Huang & Huang (2003) (HH) for equiva-
lently speciﬁed models. MAPE is the mean absolute percentage credit spread preedcition error. MPE is the
mean percentage credit spread prediction error. All numbers are in percentages.
Comparative Studies
Comparative No Liquidity EHH HH
Model Model MPE MAPE MPE MAPE MPE
EM EM -6.66 25.51 -50.42 78.02 -
(69.12) (64.58) (71.84) (39.96) -
LT LT -6.09 31.38 115.69 146.05 -68.70
(80.52) (74.40) (490.19) (481.97) -
LS1 LS (Base Case) -6.25 28.36 - - -81.06
(74.97) (69.68) - - -
LS2 LS (1-day CMT) -1.71 31.24 42.93 124.83 -88.21
(82.80) (76.70) (171.63) (125.07) -
CDG CDG (Baseline) 11.46 34.88 269.78 319.31 71.11
(63.95) (54.81) (370.41) (328.42) -
Table 4.2: This table shows the mean percentage spread prediction errors by rating reported by (Huang
& Huang 2003, Tables 2, 3, 4, and 6) for a 10 year maturity bond. Calculations are the author’s and all
numbers are in percent. LS Base refers to a non-stochastic interest rate LS model and LS (CMT 1-day)
refers to a two-factor LS model with daily updating of the risk-free rate.
Rating LS Base LS (CMT 1-day) LT CDG
AA -84.40 -90.55 -62.13 -83.63
A -81.06 -88.21 -68.70 -81.71
BBB -70.88 -80.10 -69.35 -73.04
BB -39.91 -51.91 -48.22 -42.91
rating bias, although less pronounced. The CEV model has the least rating bias amongst
the single factor models, varying from -8.55 percent for AA bonds to 1.06 percent for BB
bonds. Compared to the one-factor models, the two-factor models exhibit an opposite
rating bias. The LS2 mostly underpredicts the BB rated trades with -5.04 percent error,
andunderpredicts theAArated trades by-0.36 percent. Anexamination ofthe prediction
errors shows that the model did not converge as well as the LS models in the absence of
a liquidity premium in the measurement equation. The rating bias of the LS2 model is
similar to the LS1 model when a liquidity premium is included (refer Panels B and C),
therefore, the n Panel A result for the LS2 model should be viewed with caution. The
CDG model is found to overpredict for all ratings, but mostly for the AA rated trades
where MPE is 15.83 percent and by 5.10 percent for the BB trades.
The MPE rating bias is also present in the estimates by HH, although the level of our
error is lower. For ease of reference, HH’s spread prediction MPE by rating is shown
in Table 4.2. It is generally acknowledged that structural models underpredict credit4.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 125
spreads on bonds with short maturities. In Panel A of Table 4.4 we show the MPE by
remaining maturity, as measured from the date of the trade, to the contractual maturity,
for the respective bond being priced. For the shortest tenor range of less than 7 years, the
CEVmodel exhibits the least bias with a small mean percentage underprediction of -1.13
percent. The CDG model has the largest short tenor percentage error of 31.31 percent,
which shows that much of the model’s average overprediction is due to excessively high
predictions of short-term credit spreads. All models exhibit a common pattern of pre-
diction error in which the mid-maturity bonds, with 7 to 15 years of remaining maturity,
exhibit the largest relative underprediction of credit spreads. The LT and LS1 models at
-11.46 and -11.29 percent respectively are the most biased in this respect, showing the
greatest levels of underprediction for this maturity. For the longer maturity bonds, with
remaining maturities in excess of 15 years, most models report relatively small abso-
lute mean percentage errors. The exception is the LT model, which has a tendency for
relatively large overprediction with an average mean percentage error of 12.56 percent.
Finally, in Panel A of Table 4.5 we show the absolute percentage spread prediction
errors (MAPE) by rating and remaining maturity. The most accurate model is also the
simplest EM model with a MPE of 25.51 percent, and the least accurate is the CDG
model with a MAPE of 34.88 percent. By rating, it is evident that prediction accuracy
is best for the lowest rating; at the BB rating the lowest MAPE is 15.04 percent for the
EM model and the highest MAPE is the LS2 model 22.38 percent. Prediction accuracy
is therefore greatest when default risk is highest and the credit spread levels are the
greatest. In the maturity dimension, it is clear that accuracy is greatest for the long-dated
maturities for all models; when remaining maturity exceeds 15 years,the most accurate
model is the EM model with a MAPE of 14.95 percent, and the least accurate is the
LT model with a MAPE of 24.18 percent. Consequently, we ﬁnd that structural models
all share the characteristic that their greatest accuracy occurs at low ratings and long
maturities, i.e., when it can be expected that default risk is at its greatest.
An important view put forward by EHH is that the introduction of stochastic interest
rates into the structural modelling literature has decreased prediction bias (by raising the
level of the predicted credit spread), but in doing so, has substantially reduced prediction
accuracy. In Table 4.1 we compare the MAPE from Panel A of Table 4.5 with the
EHH results for the models where direct comparison is possible. While we do ﬁnd
the EM model has the most, and the CDG model the least accuracy as represented by
their relative values of MAPE, we do not ﬁnd the same degree of substantial inaccuracy
found by EHH. Our observed deterioration in MAPE between the EM and CDG models
is 25.51 percent to 34.88 percent, compared with EHH who report 78.02 percent to
319.31 percent respectively. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the two-factor
stochastic interest rate models are substantially less accurate, but we can state that they
do not improve accuracy relative to the EM model, and therefore have failed to achieve126 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
their aim of improving structural model prediction accuracy.
In the next section we review whether these results hold when a liquidity premium
is introduced into the measurement equation.
4.1.2 With Constant Liquidity Premium
In this section we examine the prediction errors with a constant liquidity premium in-
cluded in the measurement equation. By doing so, the average level of credit spread is
explained by the liquidity premium variable and not by the structural model. Thus, the
structural model parameters are optimised to explain the changes in the level, and the
slope of the ﬁrm’s credit spread term structure over time.
In Panel B of Table 4.3, the step-ahead credit spread prediction errors, reported in
basis points, are shown permodel by rating and remaining bond maturity. TheEMmodel
has the smallest error of 0.26 basis points, and the CDG model has the largest average
error equal to 13.30 basis points. Given the levels of standard deviation, as shown in
parentheses, the errors are not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
A better measure of relative prediction bias is given by the MPE as shown in Panel
B of Table 4.4. Compared to the no-liquidity premium case shown in Panel A, the
MPE is found to be negative for every model with an average underprediction bias that
varies from -6.09 percent for the CDG model to -8.78 percent for the LS1 model. The
overprediction bias of the CDG model as reported above for the no-liquidity premium
case is no longer evident suggesting that it was caused by the model parameters over-
emphasising short term term default risk in order to compensate for the lack of aliquidity
premium. Similarly, including a liquidity premium changes the pattern of the maturity
bias so that it is generally monotonically increasing in underprediction as the maturity
shortens. The pattern is consistent for all models except the CDG model where the 1 to
15 year maturity band is the least biased. Thus, compared to Panel A, we can see that
including aliquidity premium results ingreater consistency inthe levels and directions of
underprediction biases between the models. This result shows the importance of ﬁtting
the structural models to only that part of the credit spread that is likely to be related to
ﬁrm default risk.
Finally, in Panel B of Table 4.5 weshow the MAPEerrors. Compared with Panel A it
is evident that by including a liquidity premium in the measurement equation, prediction
accuracy improves in all cases, and that the lowest ratings and longest maturities have
the greatest prediction accuracy. On average, the most accurate model is the EM model
with a MAPE of 21.74 percent, and the least accurate is the CDG model with a MAPE
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4.1.3 With Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
Panel C of Table 4.4 shows the MPE for the third empirical equation that includes the
time-varying Refcorp spread in addition to a constant premium. Compared to Panel B of
Table 4.4, we ﬁnd the level of underprediction to be less, on average, for most models.
The improvement in prediction bias is not large, being in the order of less than half of
one percent. The exception is the CEV model, which is little improved by the addition
of the Refcorp spread within the measurement equation, and the CDG model, which in
contrast to the other models, increases its tendency to underpredict.
The lack of improved ﬁtfor the CEVmodel suggests that the model is already able to
explain much of the time variation in the average level of credit spreads without the need
for an additional time dependent explanatory variable. The model’s ability to better cap-
ture average spread variation over time, relative to the other models, is most likely due
to its speciﬁcation that allows the local volatility to vary with the level of log-solvency.
The pattern of relative error across ratings and term-to-maturity dimensions follows
closely the pattern reported in Panel B for the constant liquidity empirical equation
demonstrating that the omission of time-variation in the liquidity premium is not the
likely cause for the maturity and rating biases present in the structural models tested.
Panel C of Table 4.5 summarises the MAPE by model. The absolute errors are found
to be very similar between models and reduced slightly by the inclusion of the Refcorp
spread relative to the constant liquidity premium models. The model with greatest pre-
diction accuracy is the EM model with a MAPE of 21.42 percent, and the highest MAPE
is the CDG model at 25.86 percent. Thus, the simplest model, with the lowest number of
parameters, is found to have the highest relative prediction accuracy, and the model with
the highest number of parameters, exhibits the lowest relative prediction accuracy. Un-
like EHH, the variation between model accuracy, is nonetheless, relatively low. Given
the standard deviations of MAPE (shown in parentheses), we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in prediction accuracy between structural models despite wide differences in
underlying theory and speciﬁcation. The relatively large standard deviation in MAPE
demonstrates that improvement in forecast accuracy remains to be achieved, and the the-
oretical developments, embodied in the structural models tested in this paper, have not
yet been able to realise the potential gains in accuracy.
Shown in Figures 4.1 to 4.6 are plots of predicted versus actual credit spreads by
rating and term-to-maturity. These ﬁgures are presented in the same style as EHH to
facilitate comparison. The vertical axis is a log scale of the credit spread shown in basis
points, and the horizontal scale is the remaining term to maturity of the bond. The top
panels show predicted and actual spreads for combined A and AA issuer rated bonds
measured at the time of the trade. The middle panels show predicted and actual credit
spreads for BBB rated bond results, and the bottom panels show the same for BB rated
bonds.128 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.3: This table shows the mean credit spread prediction error in basis points by model. Error is
deﬁned as the predicted credit spread less the observed spread. Means are reported on the pooled sample,
categorised by the issuer’s rating and remaining term-to-maturity, measured coincident with the observed
trade. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Model All AA A BBB BB ≤ 7 yrs 7−15 yrs > 15 yrs
A: No Liquidity Premium
EM -0.29 0.46 -0.08 0.68 -17.84 -1.33 -1.49 5.52
(67.66) (22.38) (30.08) (43.84) (321.67) (95.23) (28.12) (26.26)
LS1 -1.75 1.60 -0.09 -0.33 -57.49 -4.80 -2.57 8.89
(131.45) (26.50) (49.85) (53.16) (675.41) (186.92) (51.57) (36.85)
LT 0.94 1.00 1.96 1.90 -22.95 -3.02 -1.85 18.83
(68.24) (25.74) (45.10) (54.24) (281.27) (91.37) (37.53) (37.84)
CEV 4.02 1.81 3.01 6.32 4.03 3.75 2.13 9.29
(63.30) (26.91) (40.74) (59.23) (240.70) (86.62) (32.69) (30.87)
LS2 3.08 4.36 3.30 1.60 9.35 6.93 -1.69 3.37
(57.76) (27.91) (38.43) (62.79) (186.24) (69.86) (45.89) (41.83)
CDG 3.72 4.36 2.87 3.97 8.10 5.35 2.93 0.95
(1.76) (2.51) (1.58) (1.66) -(0.55) (0.95) (3.59) -(0.66)
B: Constant Liquidity Premium
EM 0.26 0.40 -0.38 -0.02 10.55 -0.20 0.95 -0.09
(38.61) (18.70) (26.42) (43.66) (115.46) (49.81) (26.30) (23.55)
LS1 -2.32 0.59 -1.65 0.07 -53.79 -6.06 0.89 0.78
(113.56) (20.72) (51.46) (41.33) (578.88) (161.41) (45.52) (30.15)
LT -1.34 0.44 -1.05 -0.48 -24.86 -4.41 1.66 0.28
(63.43) (19.52) (38.40) (45.75) (279.17) (87.70) (30.52) (28.78)
CEV 1.35 1.50 0.82 2.15 -1.74 -0.99 3.52 2.87
(68.70) (21.75) (27.61) (98.32) (155.24) (94.57) (32.95) (35.26)
LS2 -0.91 1.59 1.05 0.87 -59.66 -2.79 0.13 1.98
(199.09) (21.62) (31.92) (52.60) (1075.7) (291.59) (36.60) (27.93)
CDG 13.30 13.65 13.16 12.83 18.47 26.90 2.42 0.26
(51.83) (29.45) (37.36) (51.16) (173.65) (64.05) (33.87) (36.24)
C: Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
EM -0.59 0.73 -0.22 -0.08 -18.52 -1.82 0.62 0.03
(62.36) (18.21) (25.43) (38.16) (303.08) (88.13) (25.57) (21.72)
LS1 -1.59 0.81 -0.97 0.00 -40.62 -4.11 0.47 0.73
(101.77) (19.09) (39.35) (37.52) (525.86) (145.53) (37.85) (23.86)
LT -1.10 0.61 -0.82 -0.22 -24.05 -3.78 1.53 0.35
(61.45) (18.88) (34.86) (41.22) (279.67) (85.00) (29.88) (26.91)
CEV 1.27 1.08 0.69 2.56 -4.47 -0.17 2.73 1.95
(57.75) (21.45) (26.55) (51.57) (245.91) (80.53) (27.07) (22.38)
LS2 1.37 1.18 1.17 0.93 9.89 1.24 1.39 1.72
(42.99) (20.25) (27.41) (38.66) (166.75) (55.95) (28.14) (26.32)
CDG 4.22 4.62 4.08 3.80 8.30 5.58 3.82 1.30
(46.76) (21.84) (32.06) (42.08) (176.64) (59.92) (31.99) (30.32)
n 8,953 1,691 3,704 3,263 295 4,107 3,407 1,4394.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 129
Table 4.4: This table shows the mean percentage credit spread prediction error by model. Error is
deﬁned as the predicted credit spread less the observed spread, divided by the observed spread. Means are
reported on the pooled sample, categorised by the issuer’s rating and remaining term-to-maturity, measured
coincident with the observed trade. All numbers are in percentages and standard deviations are shown in
parentheses.
Model All AA A BBB BB ≤ 7 yrs 7−15 yrs > 15 yrs
A: No Liquidity Premium
EM -6.66 -10.55 -6.18 -5.53 -3.07 -7.38 -9.59 2.32
(69.12) (77.49) (62.83) (73.82) (25.30) (87.59) (55.08) (23.35)
LS1 -6.25 -8.29 -5.68 -5.89 -5.74 -5.96 -11.29 4.84
(74.97) (80.24) (73.32) (76.28) (42.96) (88.36) (70.05) (29.94)
LT -6.09 -10.71 -5.16 -4.90 -4.49 -8.18 -11.46 12.56
(80.52) (75.44) (87.41) (77.78) (34.16) (103.56) (59.30) (31.29)
CEV -2.23 -8.55 -1.74 0.18 1.06 -1.13 -6.27 4.19
(77.18) (79.54) (81.10) (74.29) (25.27) (99.56) (58.46) (24.63)
LS2 -1.71 -0.36 -0.11 -3.93 -5.04 2.92 -8.86 1.99
(82.80) (98.09) (60.26) (96.10) (71.49) (95.12) (81.08) (32.83)
CDG 11.46 15.83 13.39 7.57 5.10 31.31 -5.43 -5.24
(63.95) (88.93) (54.00) (61.08) (24.19) (64.74) (66.37) (31.24)
B: Constant Liquidity Premium
EM -7.96 -10.23 -7.45 -7.81 -3.14 -11.28 -5.92 -3.35
(62.29) (68.59) (60.25) (63.67) (18.39) (77.85) (51.26) (23.74)
LS1 -8.78 -11.26 -9.24 -7.22 -5.89 -12.65 -6.50 -3.11
(68.50) (71.45) (73.16) (63.58) (34.38) (82.81) (61.33) (25.15)
LT -8.30 -10.37 -8.37 -7.36 -6.10 -11.81 -5.48 -5.01
(70.94) (70.37) (79.71) (62.47) (37.56) (91.44) (52.87) (27.76)
CEV -7.04 -8.12 -6.23 -7.79 -2.70 -11.82 -3.57 -1.62
(67.38) (72.81) (60.86) (73.88) (22.15) (84.71) (54.48) (24.89)
LS2 -8.89 -11.98 -8.36 -8.08 -6.62 -14.79 -5.94 0.98
(67.81) (73.46) (67.56) (64.63) (71.34) (86.30) (52.77) (23.42)
CDG -6.09 -7.98 -5.80 -5.88 -1.20 -9.88 -2.75 -3.17
(65.37) (75.74) (67.51) (59.46) (21.74) (79.24) (57.77) (26.37)
C: Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
EM -7.58 -10.00 -6.88 -7.44 -4.02 -10.51 -6.13 -2.65
(62.93) (72.80) (58.97) (64.15) (24.48) (77.97) (53.51) (21.40)
LS1 -8.26 -10.36 -8.09 -7.72 -4.23 -11.15 -7.35 -2.14
(67.85) (75.44) (69.39) (64.16) (32.75) (82.94) (59.76) (22.20)
LT -7.97 -10.15 -7.91 -7.16 -5.03 -11.15 -5.72 -4.18
(70.36) (74.80) (74.45) (65.23) (39.00) (89.18) (55.71) (26.52)
CEV -7.05 -10.49 -7.11 -5.72 -1.29 -11.52 -4.45 -0.47
(67.73) (77.98) (66.75) (65.79) (21.59) (84.52) (56.50) (21.95)
LS2 -8.65 -12.28 -8.09 -8.10 -0.91 -13.38 -6.70 0.24
(69.86) (83.22) (64.72) (70.74) (19.05) (86.44) (59.28) (23.93)
CDG -6.22 -8.13 -6.38 -5.52 -1.00 -8.83 -4.34 -3.24
(68.99) (85.66) (66.54) (64.70) (21.33) (80.81) (65.32) (28.97)
n 8,953 1,691 3,704 3,263 295 4,107 3,407 1,439130 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table4.5: Thistableshows themean absolutepercentage creditspreadpredictionerrorby model. Error
is deﬁned as the absolute of the predicted credit spread less the observed spread, divided by the observed
spread. Means are reported on the pooled sample, categorised by the issuer’s rating and remaining term-
to-maturity, measured coincident with the observed trade. All numbers are in percentages and standard
deviations are shown in parentheses.
Model All AA A BBB BB ≤ 7 yrs 7−15 yrs > 15 yrs
A: No Liquidity Premium
EM 25.51 32.60 24.57 23.84 15.04 30.89 23.47 14.95
(64.58) (71.07) (58.16) (70.08) (20.56) (82.29) (50.75) (18.08)
LS1 28.36 35.49 28.03 25.78 20.09 34.01 26.47 16.70
(69.68) (72.44) (67.99) (72.03) (38.38) (81.76) (65.83) (25.31)
LT 31.38 34.95 31.92 29.76 22.05 36.97 27.68 24.18
(74.40) (67.70) (81.54) (72.03) (26.44) (97.08) (53.68) (23.49)
CEV 28.62 34.72 28.23 26.97 17.00 36.56 24.20 16.42
(71.72) (72.06) (76.05) (69.23) (18.71) (92.61) (53.58) (18.83)
LS2 31.24 39.91 28.96 30.14 22.38 35.70 29.72 22.08
(76.70) (89.60) (52.85) (91.34) (68.07) (88.21) (75.95) (24.37)
CDG 34.88 48.35 32.41 32.25 17.68 44.86 28.78 20.80
(54.81) (76.30) (45.22) (52.41) (17.25) (56.21) (60.05) (23.89)
B: Constant Liquidity Premium
EM 21.74 27.28 20.92 20.64 12.59 26.13 20.36 12.49
(58.91) (63.76) (56.99) (60.74) (13.75) (74.20) (47.41) (20.46)
LS1 24.13 29.57 24.42 21.64 16.89 29.19 22.52 13.53
(64.70) (66.00) (69.58) (60.22) (30.51) (78.52) (57.41) (21.43)
LT 23.05 27.83 22.69 21.57 16.69 27.44 21.22 14.89
(67.60) (65.46) (76.87) (59.09) (34.18) (88.02) (48.73) (23.96)
CEV 23.37 28.51 21.53 23.71 13.16 28.60 21.49 12.88
(63.59) (67.48) (57.27) (70.41) (18.00) (80.60) (74.00) (21.35)
LS2 26.00 33.06 25.47 23.72 17.33 32.04 23.27 15.21
(63.26) (66.68) (63.13) (60.67) (69.51) (81.48) (75.00) (17.83)
CDG 26.61 33.20 27.39 23.42 14.34 31.78 24.82 16.10
(60.02) (68.54) (61.97) (54.97) (16.36) (73.25) (52.24) (21.12)
C: Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
EM 21.42 27.69 20.49 19.97 13.23 25.70 20.34 11.78
(59.65) (68.07) (55.72) (61.42) (20.98) (74.36) (49.88) (18.06)
LS1 22.89 28.54 22.33 21.33 14.76 27.17 22.29 12.08
(64.40) (70.60) (66.19) (61.00) (29.52) (79.15) (55.93) (18.74)
LT 22.69 27.90 22.43 20.87 16.24 27.05 21.23 13.69
(67.08) (70.14) (71.43) (62.21) (35.80) (85.71) (51.82) (23.09)
CEV 22.99 29.75 22.15 21.35 12.76 28.00 21.70 11.70
(64.10) (72.84) (63.36) (62.50) (17.45) (80.58) (52.35) (18.57)
LS2 25.18 32.25 24.41 23.50 12.78 30.11 23.66 14.69
(65.73) (77.70) (60.48) (67.21) (14.14) (82.12) (54.76) (18.89)
CDG 25.86 32.90 26.10 22.99 14.25 29.84 25.63 15.03
(64.26) (79.50) (61.54) (60.73) (15.89) (75.61) (60.24) (24.98)
n 8,953 1,691 3,704 3,263 295 4,107 3,407 1,4394.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 131
Comparing between models, it can be seen that there is a generally close match
between predicted and actual spreads, with a similar pattern of observations exhibited
by all models. Like EHH, we ﬁnd that there is greater dispersion of predicted spreads
at shorter maturities, and likewise, there is a much wider dispersion of actual spreads at
shorter tenors too.
Turning to the EM model, EHH ﬁnd evidence of extreme underprediction and ex-
treme overprediction of spreads with the underprediction cases more prevalent (EHH,
Fig. 1). Their frequency of underprediction is greatest at the short maturities where rat-
ings are BBB or better. Referring to the top panel of Figure 4.1, we also ﬁnd that there
is a higher occurrence of underprediction when the rating is high and the maturity less
than 10 years. In such cases, the ﬁrm’s leverage is likely to be low and with a short term
to maturity, it is apparent that the assumption of geometric Brownian motion of the asset
process speciﬁed under the EM model, fails to predict a sufﬁciently large probability of
default when the time to diffuse is small. Our result adds weight to EHH’s ﬁnding of
prediction bias since we have controlled for liquidity premiums and allowed the model
to ﬁt the data by quasi maximum likelihood, thereby removing a potential source of
contributory bias to EHH’s results.
Our results, however, differ from EHH in the degree of under and over prediction
found. Unlike EHH, there is no evidence of systematic extreme prediction errors. Refer-
ring to the middle and lower panels of Figure 4.1, we can see that actual credit spreads
increase, as is to be expected due to the lower ratings, but the predicted spreads generally
align well, whereas EHH report high levels of underprediction for BBB rated bonds, and
extensive over and underprediction for BBB and lower rated bonds. At lower ratings,
the EM model is able to match market spreads well even at short maturities. Thus, our
estimation method provides a clearer view of the inherent bias in the structural models
compared to the proxy empirical ﬁtting method. By ﬁtting the implied default boundary
and asset volatility from panel data, we impose time-series restrictions on the change
in credit spreads implied from the underlying asset process, which limits the extent to
which the asset volatility can be increased to match cross-sectional short-term spreads.
Interestingly, for higher default risk ﬁrms, the closer match of predicted to actual, as
shown in Figure 4.1, suggests that the EM model is able to match both cross-sectional
and time-series predictions of credit spreads with little bias.
A similar pattern of spread prediction dispersion is evident in the other structural
models as shown in Figures 4.2 to 4.6. There is a common tendency for underprediction
of spreads at short maturities for well rated bonds, with the bias disappearing as the
rating worsens, or maturity lengthens.
The prediction biases we have identiﬁed, related to rating and maturity, conﬁrm
EHH and suggest a speciﬁcation problem common to structural models. The models
commonly assume that default risk arises from a continuous stochastic diffusion of ﬁrm132 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
asset value to a default boundary, and it appears that in the absence of asset value jumps
to default, or excessive asset volatility, that not all cross-sectional short term market
spreads can be explained fully. When the ﬁrm is well rated and the distance to default is
high, there is insufﬁcient asset volatility necessary to bridge the gap between predicted
and actual. The result is underprediction of the credit spread even though we have con-
trolled for a potential liquidity premium in the spread. Our ﬁnding is potentially more
robust than prior studies since we have allowed the models to ﬁt the data to the best of
their abilities in accordance with model speciﬁcations.
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Figure 4.1: EM predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.4.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 133
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Figure 4.2: LS1 predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.134 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
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Figure 4.3: CEV predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.4.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 135
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Figure 4.4: LT predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.136 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
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Figure 4.5: LS2 predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.4.1. CREDIT SPREAD PREDICTION ACCURACY 137
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Figure 4.6: CDG predicted versus actual credit spreads by remaining term-to-maturity and rating. Predicted
credit spreads are estimated with a time-varying liquidity premium using the Refcorp spread as a control.138 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.2 Credit Model Speciﬁcation Tests
In this section we discuss formal tests for model miss-speciﬁcation. If the structural
models are properly speciﬁed, then the prediction errors from the EKF should be in-
dependent and normally distributed. To examine this property, Harvey (1989, p.257)
recommends construction of the standardised prediction error deﬁned as
˜ v(t) = F(t)−1/2v(t), t = 1,...n. (4.1)
The size of the prediction error is potentially inﬂuenced by the presence of measurement
errors in the observed data, and by the mean level of the credit spread since higher credit
spread errors are associated with higher credit spreads. For these reasons, diagnostic
testing of model speciﬁcation is preferable using the standardised prediction error. The
average standardised prediction errors are reported in Table 4.6.
If the models are correctly speciﬁed, the standardised prediction error should be
normally distributed, with mean zero and standard deviation of one, and be serially in-
dependent with constant variance. In Table 4.7 descriptive statistics are reported along










where n is the number of observations, Sk denotes the sample skewness, and Ku denotes
the sample kurtosis. The BS statistic is asymptotically c2 distributed with two degrees of
freedom with a null hypothesis that the distribution is normal (Durbin & Koopman 2001,
p.34).
Table 4.7 shows that all BS tests exceed a one percent critical level conﬁrming that
the standardised errors are not normally distributed. The means and standard deviations
of the standardised errors are close to expected values, but there is a positive bias and
skewness in the errors.
The skewness of the standardised error distribution is expected to be zero, however,
in all models tested, and in all forms of measurement equation, the standardised errors
exhibit positive skewness; there is a tendency for larger overprediction on a standardised
basis than there is underprediction, resulting in a longer tailed distribution to the right.
Thetendency for positive skewness is also revealed in Figure 4.7 in which the histograms
of the standardised prediction errors by model are plotted with a comparison against an
equivalent normal density plot with the same sample mean and standard deviation.
The skewness levels for the models ranges from 0.56 for the LT model with no liq-
uidity (Panel A), to 1.09 for the CEV model with constant liquidity (Panel B). There
appears to be no systematic inﬂuence as to whether the model includes a liquidity pre-
mium or not, with the LT model generally exhibiting the least skewness.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 139
Table 4.6: This table shows the mean standardised credit spread prediction error by model. Error
is deﬁned as the predicted credit spread, divided by the ﬁltered standard deviation of the prediction error.
Means are reported on the pooled sample, categorised by the issuer’s rating and remaining term-to-maturity,
measured coincident with the observed trade. Sample standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Model All AA A BBB BB ≤ 7 yrs 7−15 yrs > 15 yrs
A: No Liquidity Premium
EM 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.23
(0.98) (0.98) (0.99) (0.97) (1.16) (1.05) (0.90) (0.96)
LS1 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.30
(0.97) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (1.19) (1.07) (0.84) (0.90)
LT 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.51
(0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (0.98) (1.09) (1.02) (0.89) (1.02)
CEV 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.09 0.31
(0.95) (0.96) (0.94) (0.93) (1.10) (1.03) (0.84) (0.93)
LS2 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.28 0.03 0.18
(0.94) (0.93) (0.93) (0.95) (1.06) (1.00) (0.81) (1.04)
CDG 0.38 0.47 0.42 0.30 0.41 0.74 0.11 0.03
(1.02) (0.98) (1.00) (1.05) (1.11) (1.07) (0.82) (0.97)
B: Constant Liquidity Premium
EM 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.01
(1.03) (1.01) (1.02) (1.03) (1.20) (1.07) (0.97) (1.02)
LS1 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04
(1.02) (1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.31) (1.08) (0.93) (1.03)
LT 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.01
(1.02) (1.01) (1.02) (1.01) (1.16) (1.03) (0.96) (1.11)
CEV 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.09
(1.00) (0.99) (0.98) (1.03) (0.98) (1.03) (0.94) (1.01)
LS2 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.13
(1.02) (1.02) (1.00) (1.03) (1.09) (1.11) (0.91) (1.00)
CDG 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.06
(1.06) (1.04) (1.05) (1.07) (1.28) (1.17) (0.91) (1.07)
C: Time-Varying Liquidity Premium
EM 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.00
(1.03) (1.01) (1.01) (1.03) (1.29) (1.09) (0.97) (0.99)
LS1 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.04
(1.02) (1.00) (1.00) (1.03) (1.29) (1.09) (0.96) (0.97)
LT 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00
(1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.13) (1.04) (0.97) (1.08)
CEV 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.10
(1.00) (1.00) (0.98) (1.01) (1.14) (1.08) (0.92) (0.95)
LS2 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.11
(1.03) (1.01) (1.02) (1.04) (1.12) (1.11) (0.92) (1.00)
CDG 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.05
(1.08) (1.04) (1.06) (1.09) (1.30) (1.17) (0.95) (1.07)
n 8,953 1,691 3,704 3,263 295 4,107 3,407 1,439140 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
From Figure 4.7 we can see that the standardised prediction errors have an empirical
density that is more peaked than the normal distribution. The prediction errors exhibit
fatter tails than expected under the normal distribution. Table 4.7 conﬁrms the tendency
to fat tailed errors with an excess kurtosis that is very pronounced for each model. The
excess kurtosis ranges from a low of 4.08 for the CDG model without a liquidity pre-
mium (Panel A), to 8.26 for the CEV model with constant liquidity (Panel B), relative to
an expected value of zero.
Thus, we ﬁnd that the standardised prediction errors exhibit fatter, more positive
tails, than expected. This result suggests that, even after limiting the effect of noisy
data via the standardisation of prediction errors, the structural models tested tend to
under and overestimate spreads to a higher degree than expected under their theoretical
speciﬁcation.
The relative effectiveness of controlling for liquidity in model speciﬁcation can be
judged by comparing results across the panels of Table 4.7. The highest mean error bias
is associated with Panel A. Introducing a control for liquidity premiums in Panels B and
C result in lower mean errors providing support for their inclusion. However, skewness
and kurtosis levels are of similar magnitude regardless of liquidity premium treatment,
with all models evidencing non-normality.
The skewness evident in the standardised error is opposite in sign to the unstandard-
ised error. As shown in Table 4.8, the prediction errors exhibit a negative skew consistent
with our ﬁnding of underprediction of spreads at short maturities and high ratings. The
positive skewness of the standardised errors is most likely a result of our sample data.
Where there are sudden rises in market credit spreads, the step-ahead prediction error
is negative, but because we ﬁnd that these movements are associated with periods of
high volatility in spreads, the prediction errors are scaled relatively more when standard-
ised compared to sudden falls in market spreads. Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plots of the
standardised errors are shown in Figure 4.8. The straight line in the QQ plot maps the
expected standardised data under the normal cumulative frequency distribution against
the observed cumulative distribution of errors. The upward curvature of the observed
data in the upper right of the plots shows that positive prediction errors that would be ex-
pected to be three standard deviations from the mean are, for all models, approximately
ﬁve standard deviations from the mean. However, other than the tails being fatter than
expected, Figure 4.8 shows that the errors for all models are reasonably similar to the ex-
pected normal distribution. The behavior of the standardised prediction errors across
maturity and rating dimensions is illustrated in Figures 4.9 to 4.14. In the top panels
the standardised prediction errors are plotted against the remaining maturity at the date
of trade for bonds rated AA and A. The middle panels includes BBB rated bonds, and
the bottom panels comprise BB rated bonds. The vertical axes are measured in standard
deviations. The pattern exhibited by all models is remarkably similar with all bonds4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 141
Table 4.7: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the standardised step-ahead prediction errors pooled
across all trades by model. Sample means, standard deviations (SD), minimums, and maximums are re-
ported in basis points. BS refers to the Bowman & Shenton (1975) sample test statistic for normality.
EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Panel A: No Liquidity
Mean 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.38
SD 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.94 1.02
Skewness 0.86 0.99 0.56 0.90 0.98 0.85
Exc. Kurtosis 5.33 5.99 4.57 6.87 5.26 4.08
Min -5.69 -5.48 -6.83 -9.82 -4.36 -4.48
Max 7.78 7.48 7.35 8.22 8.54 8.61
BS 11,703 14,866 8,252 18,806 11,749 7,287
Panel B: Constant Liquidity
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.16
SD 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.06
Skewness 0.94 1.05 0.88 1.09 0.98 1.02
Exc. Kurtosis 6.08 5.79 5.62 8.26 5.21 4.96
Min -5.53 -4.83 -6.82 -7.16 -5.07 -5.21
Max 8.58 8.46 8.23 11.24 9.18 8.89
BS 15,118 14,164 12,923 27,215 11,568 10,727
Panel C: Time-Varying Liquidity
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.14
SD 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.08
Skewness 0.89 0.94 0.79 0.95 0.96 0.87
Exc. Kurtosis 6.09 6.05 5.43 6.40 5.60 5.17
Min -5.68 -5.02 -5.94 -5.22 -5.41 -5.55
Max 8.69 8.62 8.44 8.43 9.23 8.87
BS 15,029 14,978 11,933 16,631 13,057 11,090
n 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953142 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.8: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the step-ahead prediction errors pooled across all
trades by model. Sample means, standard deviations (SD), minimums, and maximums are reported in basis
points. BS refers to the Bowman & Shenton (1975) sample test statistic for normality.
EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Panel A: No liquidity
Mean -0.20 -1.08 1.50 4.47 3.01 13.65
SD 67.54 129.31 65.79 61.21 57.24 50.95
Skewness -39.83 -47.51 -19.74 -20.14 -8.47 -7.21
Exc. Kurt. 2,526.40 2,674.10 752.32 1,326.50 274.08 426.40
Min -4,566.30 -7,849.30 -2871.10 -3,521.50 -1,996.90 -2,182.60
Max 709.47 904.44 628.09 1,408.60 867.59 830.47
BS 2 109 3 109 2 108 7 108 3 107 7 107
Panel B: Constant Liquidity
Mean 0.50 -1.83 -0.90 1.67 -0.84 4.64
SD 37.85 111.84 60.61 68.35 199.43 45.67
Skewness -0.51 -41.96 -26.01 -23.32 -87.38 -12.47
Exc. Kurt. 313.07 2,085.80 1,110.40 1,694.60 8,040.60 746.74
Min -1,378.60 -6,101.40 -3,037.80 -4,051.30 -1,8354.00 -2,266.50
Max 1,062.40 773.19 557.18 2,182.70 1390.00 734.81
BS 4 107 2 109 5 108 1 109 2 1010 2 108
Panel C: Time-Varying Liquidity
Mean -0.38 -1.25 -0.70 1.48 1.39 4.09
SD 62.14 100.75 59.07 57.57 42.99 45.32
Skewness -43.50 -48.92 -27.35 -28.19 -11.00 -12.75
Exc. Kurt. 2,890.10 2,925.70 1,217.40 1,938.20 680.30 768.93
Min -4,358.20 -6,753.90 -3,037.70 -3,654.20 -2,085.30 -2,266.20
Max 728.87 785.09 557.17 1,396.10 817.35 733.92
BS 3 109 3 109 6 108 1 109 2 108 2 108
n 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953 8,9534.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 143




































Figure 4.7: Histogram of the pooled sample standardised step-ahead spread prediction error by model with
time-varying liquidity premium. Comparative density is normal with the same mean and variance.






































Figure 4.8: Shown is a Normal Quantile-Quantile plot of the pooled sample standardised step-ahead spread
prediction error by model with time-varying liquidity premium. Horizontal axis is the expected sample
quantile assuming a normal distribution and vertical axis is the quantiles of the observed sample.144 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS









































































Figure 4.9: EM standardised spread prediction errors by rating and remaining term-to-maturity with time-
varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and maturity is
in years.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 145









































































Figure 4.10: LS1 standardised spread prediction errors by rating and remaining term-to-maturity with time-
varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and maturity is
in years.146 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS









































































Figure4.11: CEVstandardised spread predictionerrorsby ratingand remainingterm-to-maturitywithtime-
varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and maturity is
in years.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 147









































































Figure 4.12: LT standardised spread prediction errors by rating and remaining term-to-maturity with time-
varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and maturity is
in years.148 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS









































































Figure 4.13: LS2 standardised spread prediction errors by rating and remaining term-to-maturity with time-
varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and maturity is
in years.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 149









































































Figure 4.14: CDG standardised spread prediction errors by rating and remaining term-to-maturity with
time-varying liquidity premium. Prediction error is shown in standard deviations of basis points and matu-
rity is in years.150 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.9: This table shows the mean autocorrelation function of the standardised prediction errors for lags
one to three, averaged across two hundred bonds in the sample.
Lags EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Panel A: No liquidity
1 0.158 0.195 0.270 0.216 0.231 0.230
2 0.084 0.106 0.161 0.113 0.147 0.126
3 0.081 0.090 0.133 0.099 0.119 0.107
Panel B: Constant Liquidity
1 0.144 0.216 0.210 0.176 0.278 0.270
2 0.065 0.116 0.115 0.090 0.185 0.162
3 0.054 0.081 0.090 0.068 0.142 0.136
Panel C: Time-varying Liquidity
1 0.137 0.164 0.181 0.156 0.264 0.159
2 0.062 0.084 0.094 0.079 0.175 0.078
3 0.045 0.058 0.066 0.059 0.131 0.056
showing a wide dispersion centered around zero. The errors reach approximately plus or
minus ﬁve standard deviations consistent with the ﬁnding of excess kurtosis, and is only
slightly greater for short maturities.
Next we consider whether the longitudinal speciﬁcation of the structural models
is correct by examining whether the standardised errors are serially independent. Se-
rial correlation in the standardised errors would indicate that a systematic movement
in the observed credit spreads remains unexplained by the model’s dynamic speciﬁca-
tion implying the presence of a missing factor inﬂuencing credit spread inter-temporal
behaviour. There are 200 separate bonds in the sample on which the autocorrelation
functions (ACFs) are computed for the ﬁrst, second, and third lags. To summarise the
results across the large number of bonds, the bond speciﬁc sample ACF values for one
to three lags are compared with their respective 95 percent conﬁdence levels computed
as 2/
√
n for n trades per bond. The number of bonds with signiﬁcant ACFs are then
counted. Because the time steps between trades are unequally spaced, the ACF signiﬁ-
cance tests are approximate only. However, since each model is ﬁtted to the same data,
counting the number of issues with signiﬁcant ACFs is suitable for comparing the rela-
tive extent of autocorrelation between models and measurement equation speciﬁcations.
The mean ACFs are reported in Table 4.9 and the counts of signiﬁcant ACFs is shown
in Table 4.10. Table 4.9 shows that all models exhibit some degree of serial correlation
in their standardised errors. The highest levels are associated with models ﬁtted without
liquidity premiums, as shown in Panel A. The LT model has the largest mean ﬁrst lag
correlation at 27.0 percent, and the lowest is the EM model at 15.8 percent. The level
of ACFs drop as the lags are increased demonstrating that, on average, the errors are
stationary and likely to be an AR(1) process. Turning to Panel A of Table 4.10, the cor-4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 151
Table 4.10: This table shows the count of bonds with autocorrelation functions of the standardised predic-
tion errors that exceed 95 percent conﬁdence. The relative sample frequency of bonds with signiﬁcant lags
is shown in parentheses. Total number of sample issues is two hundred.
Lags EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Panel A: No liquidity
1 48 56 84 67 74 67
(24.0) (28.0) (42.0) (33.5) (37.0) (33.5)
2 30 36 48 40 43 36
(15.0) (18.0) (24.0) (20.0) (21.5) (18.0)
3 27 28 38 27 34 29
(13.5) (14.0) (19.0) (13.5) (17.0) (14.5)
Panel B: Constant Liquidity
1 38 59 57 47 85 80
(19.0) (29.5) (28.5) (23.5) (42.5) (40.0)
2 28 35 37 22 53 47
(14.0) (17.5) (18.5) (11.0) (26.5) (23.5)
3 12 23 21 16 37 36
(6.0) (11.5) (10.5) (8.0) (18.5) (18.0)
Panel C: Time-varying Liquidity
1 36 44 46 41 85 41
(18.0) (22.0) (23.0) (20.5) (42.5) (20.5)
2 22 30 28 21 45 19
(11.0) (15.0) (14.0) (10.5) (22.5) (9.5)
3 10 15 15 16 31 12
(5.0) (7.5) (7.5) (8.0) (15.5) (6.0)152 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
responding counts of signiﬁcant ACFs shows that the LT model has 84 from 200 bonds
where the ﬁrst lag ACF is signiﬁcant at 95 percent conﬁdence. This count represents
42 percent of the sample of bonds and is displayed in parentheses. In contrast the EM
model has only 48 bonds that have signiﬁcant ACFs, which represents 24 percent of the
sample. By the third lag, the EM model mean ACF declines to 8.1 percent and the LT
model mean ACF to 13.3 percent. In terms of counts, the EM model has 13.5 percent of
the sample with signiﬁcant ACFs, and the LT model 19.0 percent.
With the introduction of a constant liquidity premium, the overall average level of
ACFs drops as show in Panel B of Table 4.9, indicating that structural models ﬁt the
time-series of observed credit spreads better when the allowance is made for a liquidity
premium in the credit spread. At ﬁrst order lags, the EM model and CEV models have
the lowest ACFs at 14.4 percent and 17.6 percent respectively. The LS2 model has the
highest ACF at 27.8 percent.
The introduction of a time-varying liquidity premium is expected to further decrease
serial correlation since it should control for common ﬁrm-level time variation in credit
spreads caused by exogenous ﬂight-to-liquidity events such as the Russian bond-LTCM
crises. Panel C of Table 4.9 conﬁrms a further reduction in serial correlation is achieved
as expected, indicating a further improvement in model ﬁt. However, some autocorre-
lation remains. The best ﬁtting model is the EM model with a ﬁrst lag ACF of 13.7
percent, which corresponds to 36 bonds with signiﬁcant ACFs representing 18 percent
of the sample. By the third lag the EM model’s mean ACF has fallen to 4.5 percent,
or 10 bonds representing 5 percent of the sample. Thus, the EM model exhibits modest
autocorrelation in errors. The next best ﬁtting model is the CEV model, followed closely
by the CDG model. The worst performing model is the LS2 model suggesting that the
introduction of stochastic interest rates has not improved model performance relative to
a single factor LS1 model.
The relatively good time-series behaviour of the EM model’s errors is surprising.
The model is in all respects the same as the LS1 model, except that the recovery rate
is endogenous, being a function of the ﬁrm’s distance from the default boundary, asset
volatility, and term. Furthermore, by applying the sum of zeros method of valuation, we
allow the recovery rate to vary across the term structure with each coupon valued, and
with time as the latent solvency of the ﬁrm changes. This additional ﬂexibility appears
to be the main reason for the Merton model’s relatively better time-series behaviour of
its prediction errors.
4.2.1 Goodness of Fit
In this section we consider which model ﬁts the data best. Because we have models with
different numbers of parameters it is important when comparing the relative goodness
of ﬁt between models that we control for the different number of parameters used in4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 153
each model. Simple measures of ﬁt, such as the mean percentage error (MPE) and root
mean squared error (RMSE), tend to overstate the goodness of ﬁt of models that have
the largest number of parameters. For this reason we also quote the widely used Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) to give a better relative comparison of ﬁt between models.
The AIC is deﬁned as
AIC = 2(LogLikelihood)+2K,
where K is the number of estimated parameters included in the model. A lower value
represents a better ﬁt.
In Table 4.11 we show the mean RMSE and mean AIC per model, measured across
the 32 sample ﬁrms, assuming no liquidity premium. We ﬁnd that the EM model is
the best ﬁtting having both the smallest RMSE of 33.97 basis points and lowest AIC of
-10.51. The next best ﬁtting model is the LS1 model with a RMSE of 43.66 basis points
and AIC of -10.08. The worst performing model is the CDG model which achieves a
reasonable RMSE of 40.98 basis points, but does so using more parameters, therefore
increasing its AIC to -9.52.
In Table 4.12 we show the mean RMSE and mean AIC where the measurement
equation includes a constant liquidity premium. Compared to the no liquidity case,
overall ﬁt is found to improve. The EM model remains the best ﬁtting with a RMSE of
28.76 basis points and AIC of -10.76. The second best model is now the LT model with
an RMSE of 38.66 basis points and AIC of -10.50. The worst performing model remains
the CDG model despite having the second lowest RMSEwith an AIC of -10.15, showing
that the range of disparity between models has decreased with the addition of controls
for non-default related components of the spread. Lastly, Table 4.13 shows results for
the models estimated with both a constant term and Refcorp-Treaury spread as controls
for time varying liquidity. Across the board, all models improve in ﬁt, in particular the
CDG model improves to be third ranked behind the EM and LS1 models based on AIC.
The EM model remains the best ﬁtting mode with a RMSE of 28.76 basis points and
AIC of -10.76. The worst ﬁtting model is the LS2 model with a RMSE of 31.57 basis
points and an AIC of -10.43.
A criticism raised against structural models is that they cannot match real world
spreads. For example, Lyden & Saraniti (2000, Table III) report a mean RMSEof 107.44
basis points for the Merton model, 199.34 basis points for an LS1 equivalent model, and
200.64 basis points for an LS2 equivalent model. It is therefore important to compare
our results against another study that ﬁts the alternative reduced-form model approach
with a similar implicit estimation. Duffee (1999), also use an EKF on similar data and
reports a median RMSE of 9.38 basis points for a two-factor square-root reduced-form
model. In comparison, the median RMSE we achieve for the EM model ranges from
14.06 basis points (constant liquidity) to 20.13 basis points (time-varying liquidity) (re-
fer Tables 4.12 and 4.13). Obviously, direct comparisons are not possible due to different154 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
samples and periods, in particular, our data set includes additional spread volatility as-
sociated with the credit downturn of 2000 which may bias our model error upwards. On
balance, our results therefore appear reasonable with respect to Duffee (1999), thereby
conﬁrming that, at least, some of the criticism of structural models is a consequence of




































Table 4.11: This table presents the cross-sectional means and medians of the estimated model parameters, ﬁtted with no liquidity premium. All parameters are implicit estimations
from application of quasi-maximum likelihood via EKF (i.e. hyperparameters). Mean RMSE refers to cross-sectional average root mean squared error of the credit spread
prediction. Mean Log-Lik. is the cross-sectional average of the maximised log-likelihood function value under the hyperparameter set. Mean AIC is the cross-sectional average of
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc Akaike Information Criterion.
EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Parameter Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean
sv 0.2305 0.2668 0.2393 0.2505 0.1774 0.2079 - - 0.1386 0.1411 0.1161 0.1326
sm 0.0018 0.0020 0.0022 0.0022 0.0026 0.0028 0.0024 0.0028 0.0024 0.0026 0.0029 0.0032
d 0.0502 0.0425 0.0000 0.0173 0.0587 0.0558 0.0399 0.0341 0.0000 0.0006 - -
a - - - - 0.4804 0.4236 - - - - - -
r - - - - - - - 0.8866 - 1.2727 - - - -
kv - - - - - - - - - - 0.1004 0.1221
f - - - - - - - - - - 0.0000 0.0000
Mean RMSE 17.68 33.97 20.21 43.66 22.28 44.83 20.30 37.22 36.56 45.37 35.47 40.98
Mean Log-Lik. 1,108.6 1,267.1 1,079.2 1,228.4 1,037.3 1,202.5 1,053.7 1,212.4 1,043.1 1,200.0 1,005.2 1,164.2



















Table 4.12: This table presents the cross-sectional means and medians of the estimated model parameters, ﬁtted with constant liquidity premium. All parameters are implicit
estimations from application of quasi-maximum likelihood via EKF (i.e. hyperparameters). Mean RMSE refers to cross-sectional average root mean squared error of the credit
spread prediction. Mean Log-Lik. is the cross-sectional average of the maximised log-likelihood function value under the hyperparameter set. Mean AIC is the cross-sectional
average of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc Akaike Information Criterion.
EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Parameter Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean
sv 0.2477 0.2807 0.1711 0.1773 0.1449 0.1672 - - 0.1541 0.1538 0.1480 0.1641
sm 0.0015 0.0018 0.0017 0.0020 0.0017 0.0019 0.0016 0.0023 0.0018 0.0023 0.0021 0.0024
d 0.0154 0.0238 0.0000 0.0201 0.0276 0.0251 0.0135 0.0181 0.0000 0.0016 - -
a - - - - 0.5014 0.5010 - - - - - -
¯ sv - - - - - - 0.3443 1389.1906 - - - -
r - - - - - - -1.4361 -1.9605 - - - -
kv - - - - - - - - - - 0.1375 0.1318
f - - - - - - - - - - 0.0000 0.0000
c(1) 0.0045 0.0044 0.0052 0.0053 0.0048 0.0050 0.0055 0.0054 0.0061 0.0059 0.0039 0.0039
c(2) 0.0041 0.0040 0.0050 0.0050 0.0046 0.0049 0.0051 0.0053 0.0061 0.0058 0.0031 0.0036
c(3) 0.0043 0.0046 0.0055 0.0060 0.0052 0.0061 0.0057 0.0062 0.0055 0.0054 0.0034 0.0030
c(4) 0.0040 0.0046 0.0057 0.0057 0.0058 0.0058 0.0052 0.0064 0.0055 0.0060 0.0030 0.0035
c(5) 0.0037 0.0039 0.0045 0.0049 0.0042 0.0046 0.0052 0.0052 0.0054 0.0057 0.0041 0.0036
c(6) 0.0040 0.0039 0.0050 0.0051 0.0048 0.0050 0.0050 0.0053 0.0044 0.0054 0.0013 0.0022
c(7) 0.0039 0.0043 0.0052 0.0059 0.0050 0.0058 0.0056 0.0058 0.0049 0.0054 0.0029 0.0037
c(8) 0.0034 0.0040 0.0043 0.0053 0.0046 0.0051 0.0045 0.0052 0.0046 0.0057 0.0033 0.0038
c(9) 0.0049 0.0050 0.0060 0.0063 0.0060 0.0065 0.0061 0.0061 0.0049 0.0050 0.0030 0.0031
c(10) 0.0037 0.0037 0.0040 0.0042 0.0049 0.0046 0.0054 0.0048 0.0050 0.0050 0.0000 0.0005
Mean RMSE 14.06 27.10 16.36 38.66 15.97 35.77 15.21 32.73 27.59 44.48 26.93 32.29
Mean Log-Lik. 1,151.4 1,318.9 1,125.4 1,293.8 1,132.6 1,309.1 1,133.0 1,296.5 1,160.8 1,280.7 1,065.9 1,252.1




































Table 4.13: This table presents the cross-sectional means and medians of the estimated model parameters, ﬁtted with time-varying liquidity premium. All parameters are implicit
estimations from application of quasi-maximum likelihood via EKF (i.e. hyperparameters). Mean RMSE refers to cross-sectional average root mean squared error of the credit
spread prediction. Mean Log-Lik. is the cross-sectional average of the maximised log-likelihood function value under the hyperparameter set. Mean AIC is the cross-sectional
average of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc Akaike Information Criterion.
EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG
Parameter Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean
sv 0.2657 0.2827 0.1886 0.1830 0.1386 0.1662 - - 0.1559 0.1418 0.1375 0.1498
sm 0.0015 0.0017 0.0016 0.0018 0.0017 0.0019 0.0016 0.0020 0.0020 0.0022 0.0020 0.0023
d 0.0063 0.0212 0.0000 0.0161 0.0254 0.0240 0.0000 0.0142 0.0000 0.0028 - -
a - - - - 0.5628 0.4905 - - - - - -
¯ sv - - - - - - 0.3073 9.5517 - - - -
r - - - - - - -1.0333 -1.6268 - - - -
kv - - - - - - - - - - 0.1457 0.1422
f - - - - - - - - - - 0.0000 0.0031
Ref 0.3875 0.4450 0.4672 0.5818 0.5822 0.7607 0.6119 0.6397 1.0911 1.1175 0.8529 0.8061
c(1) 0.0042 0.0038 0.0043 0.0041 0.0036 0.0038 0.0040 0.0043 0.0043 0.0041 0.0024 0.0026
c(2) 0.0037 0.0035 0.0038 0.0040 0.0034 0.0037 0.0041 0.0043 0.0037 0.0041 0.0021 0.0026
c(3) 0.0039 0.0041 0.0045 0.0047 0.0044 0.0049 0.0045 0.0050 0.0043 0.0039 0.0024 0.0026
c(4) 0.0036 0.0038 0.0044 0.0045 0.0049 0.0046 0.0041 0.0051 0.0037 0.0043 0.0026 0.0030
c(5) 0.0032 0.0034 0.0035 0.0041 0.0035 0.0035 0.0037 0.0039 0.0040 0.0041 0.0024 0.0027
c(6) 0.0037 0.0034 0.0045 0.0043 0.0037 0.0040 0.0040 0.0043 0.0029 0.0034 0.0009 0.0019
c(7) 0.0036 0.0038 0.0049 0.0053 0.0045 0.0049 0.0046 0.0049 0.0038 0.0041 0.0017 0.0027
c(8) 0.0032 0.0034 0.0040 0.0047 0.0037 0.0041 0.0032 0.0043 0.0033 0.0038 0.0026 0.0032
c(9) 0.0044 0.0044 0.0051 0.0051 0.0051 0.0052 0.0057 0.0051 0.0031 0.0036 0.0024 0.0033
c(10) 0.0034 0.0034 0.0038 0.0040 0.0046 0.0041 0.0047 0.0041 0.0039 0.0038 0.0047 0.0041
Mean RMSE 20.13 28.76 21.61 34.40 23.18 33.80 22.07 29.49 24.85 30.90 26.52 31.57
Mean Log-Lik. 1,157.3 1,323.5 1,159.7 1,313.7 1,140.7 1,317.8 1,142.8 1,306.5 1,165.9 1,288.3 1,067.9 1,266.1
Mean AIC -10.86 -10.76 -10.76 -10.67 -10.79 -10.64 -10.77 -10.61 -10.43 -10.43 -10.80 -10.66158 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.2.2 Regression of Prediction Errors
In the preceding section it was noted that the models exhibit cross-sectional prediction
biases related to rating and maturity, and autocorrelation in the time-series of predic-
tion errors. In this section we use multivariate regression analysis on the pooled spread
prediction errors to identify what plausible factors are related to the biases.
Our analysis considers three measures of error as the dependent variable: the unstan-
dardised prediction error, the percentage prediction error, and the standardised prediction
error. The unstandardised error is the simplest measure of prediction error, however, it is
dependent on the size of the predicted spread, since the same relative error when spreads
are large gives rise to larger errors. Within the sample, it is therefore weighted to the
high default-risk bonds and periods of ﬁnancial stress. The percentage spread predic-
tion error scales for the relative size of the error, and is therefore more representative
of all bonds in the sample, however, it is also strongly inﬂuenced by extreme jumps in
observed spreads. The standardised prediction error is the most robust test of model
speciﬁcation within the Kalman ﬁlter framework, since each error is scaled by its stan-
dard deviation, which dampens the inﬂuence of measurement error and extreme outlier
observations in the data.
The behaviour of the different error measures can be seen from Fig. 4.15 where the
errors from the EM model are plotted across time. Shown in Fig. 4.15(a) is the full
sample of observed credit spreads in sequential order of the trade date. The maximum
sample credit spread observed within a year, increased during 1995-1996, at the end of
1998, and ﬁnally in late 2000. These dates coincide with a period of economic slowing
in 1995-1996 (as seen in the fall in GDP growth in Fig. 4.16(a)), the LTCM and Russian
bond crises of 1998, and the lead up to the recession of 2001.1 The sample variance of
prediction errors also increase in these periods as shown by the increased scatter of ob-
servations around zero in Fig. 4.15(b), but was reasonably symmetrical with under and
overpredictions occurring. The percentage error, on the other hand, falls signiﬁcantly
in 1995-1996 and again in 2000 (refer Fig. 4.15(c)). This highlights that the greatest
relative errors occurred during periods of economic downturn and were not inﬂuenced
by the liquidity crises of late 1998. The large negative percentage error observations are
associated with ﬁrm-speciﬁc downgrading and rise in default risk, and is more prevalent,
in our data set, during contractionary periods. The distribution of the percentage error
is not symmetric; there are no sudden relative decreases in our sample to balance the
sudden increases. Finally, the standardised error shown in Fig. 4.15(d), has a similar in-
tertemporal behaviour to the unstandardised error, and shows that the range of observed
errors is outside that expected if the prediction errors were normal. The sample vari-
ance of the standardised error increases in the stress periods, responding to liquidity and
1U.S. recessions as dated by the NBER occurred from July 1990 to March 1991 and from March 2001
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economic conditions indicating heteroskedasticity in the pooled sample.
From an economic perspective, ﬁnancial market participants are most concerned
with a model’s percentage prediction error, however, if the models are well speciﬁed,
no exogenous factors or bond characteristics should be systematically related to any of
































































































(d) Standardised Prediction Errors
Figure 4.15: Shown in panel (a) is the actual credit spread by year for the pooled sample of all bonds ﬁtted
with time-varying liquidity parameterisation of the EM model. Panels (b) through to (d) are measures of
error by year. Prediction error is the observed credit spread, less the step-ahead prediction, expressed in
basis points. Percentage prediction error is prediction error scaled by the observed spread. Standardised
prediction error is the prediction error scaled by the standard deviation of the error, expressed in standard
deviations.
the three dependent variables and six structural models. For brevity, we restrict the
analysis to the errors arising from the time-varying liquidity premium parameterisation
of the models. Each regression is performed on pooled data of 8,953 prediction error
observations, comprising 200 bonds issued by 32 ﬁrms.
Our choice of explanatory variables is informed from several sources. Firstly, we
include bond characteristic and variables that are observable proxies for the ﬁrm asset
process. It is not expected that these variables will be signiﬁcant because their latent160 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
counterparts are included in the model speciﬁcations, however, previous research has
identiﬁed related biases (JMR, EHH). We are observing whether these biases persist
after the change from observable proxy to implicit estimation method. These variables
are:
TENOR The remaining term to contractual maturity of the bond measured in years
from the date of the trade. JMR, LS, and EHH report underprediction of credit
spreads at short tenors, indicating a likely positive correlation with spread predic-
tion error.
TEN5YR A dummy variable that takes the value one if the tenor is less than ﬁve years,
or zero otherwise. As observed previously, spread underprediction is most preva-
lent in the very short maturity bonds where we also observe a number of extreme
percentage errors. The absence of a jump component limits the ability for a struc-
tural model to match severe real-world changes in spreads at short maturities. We
therefore control for this known weakness to separately quantify the very short
term from any longer term tenor bias. It is expected that the coefﬁcient on regres-
sions against either spread levels or spread prediction errors will be negative, in
other words, spreads will be lower and errors will be more negative, than average,
when the variable takes the value of one.
SOLV The observed log-solvency ratio is deﬁned previously in equation (3.27), and is
calculated as the log of the sum of book debt (sourced from COMPUSTAT), plus
stock market capitalisation (sourced from CRSP), divided by book debt. Book
debt is updated quarterly and the stock data is the daily value as at the trade date.
Based on the structural model arguments, the higher the solvency the lower the
default risk and credit spread, implying a negative relationship with spread levels.
JMR and EHH ﬁnd greater underprediction is associated with very safe bonds
issued by ﬁrms with low leverage. If consistent with prior ﬁndings, prediction
errors will be negatively related to solvency.
COUPON The annualised coupon rate of the bond as sourced from the FISD database.
Elton et al. (2001) note that bonds with higher coupons are taxed more through
their life than bonds with lower coupons, thus increasing their required market
spread in compensation. A negative relationship with prediction error is therefore
implied. EHH conﬁrm a negative relationship with percentage spread error in all
models except their implementation of the LT model.
VOL This variable is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc, 150-day moving average annualised equity re-
turn standard deviation. Data is obtained from CRSP. Campbell & Taksler (2002)
show that idiosyncratic ﬁrm equity volatility explains as much cross-sectional
variation in corporate bond yields as ratings; the higher the ﬁrm’s equity volatility4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 161
the higher the required spread due to associated higher ﬁrm asset volatility and
increased default risk. JMR and EHH ﬁnd underprediction of credit spreads with
ﬁrms of low equity volatility. All models, except the CEV model, assume asset re-
turn volatility to be time-invariant and this may also be a source of additional error.
Higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc asset volatility, and the presence of stochastic asset volatility,
is likely to be associated with increased asset risk, higher default risk and credit
spreads, implying a negative relationship with spread prediction errors. Similarly,
ﬁrms with high historical equity volatility are likely to ﬁnd the equity markets
expensive and delay issuing equity, thereby increasing leverage and default risk.
CMT3 The daily constant maturity 3 month Treasury spot rate sourced from the Federal
Reserve H15 report. Consistent with structural models, a higher risk-free rate
increases ﬁrm asset growth and decreases leverage, thereby reducing expected
default risk and credit spreads, implying a negative relationship with spread levels
and a positive relationship with prediction errors if omitted from a structural credit
model.
VOLR The moving average standard deviation, measured over the prior 150 days, of
the CMT 3 month spot rate. The single factor models assume no interest rate
volatility, and the two-factor models (LS2 and CDG) assume a constant volatil-
ity. As shown by (Longstaff & Schwartz 1995), interest rate volatility is likely to
increase the level of credit spreads. Insufﬁcient control for this effect, or its com-
plete absence in the case of the single-factor models, is likely to cause a negative
relationship with prediction error. Any prediction error should be less negative, or
insigniﬁcant, in the LS2 and CDG models.
Secondly, we include possible missing explanatory variables not included in the
models.
TERM The 3 month less the 30 year constant maturity Treasury spot rates, measured
on the trade date. Data is sourced from the Federal Reserve H15 report. Estrella
& Mishkin (1998) demonstrate that the yield curve slope is predictive of future
recessions when looking more than one-quarter into the future. They ﬁnd a fall in
long-term yields, relative to short-term yields, is an accurate predictor of slowing
economic growth. Thus, we expect that credit spreads will rise in association with
the yield curve ﬂattening and the TERM variable increasing. The only model we
test that includes a Treasury yield curve slope variable is the CDG model. For
the other models, we expect the prediction error to be negatively correlated with
TERM to the extent that the bond market uses the slope of the yield curve to
condition their expectation of future default risk, and hence their pricing of bonds.
However, Jalilvand & Harris (1984) report that ﬁrms adjust their capital structure162 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
in response to the interest rate outlook. They propose that expectations of lower
long term interest rates in the future (a rise in TERM) causes postponement of
the issuance of long term debt, with ﬁrms increasing short term debt and equity
ﬁnancing, thereby decreasing leverage. Therefore, if debt timing is a signiﬁcant
inﬂuencing factor on management, and the bond market anticipates this behaviour,
then credit spreads should fall as TERM increases because the bond market an-
ticipates future decreasing leverage, thereby implying a positive correlation with
prediction errors for all models except the CDG model. The CDG model em-
bodies the stylised debt-timing behaviour of Jalilvand & Harris (1984) with the
assumption that TERM and credit spreads are negatively correlated. We do not
expect TERM to be related to CDG prediction errors if debt timing behaviour is
factored into bond market expectations.
Thus, we are faced with two contradictory relationships between TERM and pre-
diction errors. If the business cycle information content of the yield curve domi-
nates bond market prices, the spread prediction errors are likely to be negatively
related to TERM on all models. On the other hand, if the debt-timing hypothesis
dominates, then positive coefﬁcients against TERMcan beexpected on allmodels,
except the CDG model, where the coefﬁcient should be insigniﬁcant from zero.
RATING A variable that takes a numeric value depending upon the external rating of
the issuer. For example, our sample is over the set AA+=1, AA=2, AA-=3, A+=4,
..., BB-=13. A rating represents an independent view of the creditworthiness of
the issuer and is a major determinant of observed credit spreads. Clearly, credit
spreads levels are expected to be positively related. We include it in the error
regressions for any default-risk related inﬂuences not explained by the models.
JMR and EHH ﬁnd that underprediction of credit spreads is more common with
well rated ﬁrms implying a positive error correlation.
MTB The market-to-book ratio at the trade date calculated as the daily equity capital-
isation (sourced from CRSP) divided by the most recent quarterly reported to-
tal assets (sourced from COMPUSTAT). There are two possible mechanisms by
which MTB inﬂuences credit spreads. Firstly, Hovakimian et al. (2001) ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with high MTB tend to issue more equity and decrease leverage. Firms with
high MTB ratios may therefore be expected to decrease future leverage implying
a reduction in future default risk and lower long-term credit spreads. The absence
of MTB in structural models implies that the prediction error is expected to be
positively related to MTB.
Secondly, Varma & Cantor (2004) report a positive relationship between ﬁrm
MTB and bond recovery rates; ﬁrms with higher than average MTB one-year prior
to default were found to have higher recovery rates, perhaps because the market4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 163
believed these ﬁrms had continued growth potential, or persistent franchise value
post default. If the market factors a ﬁrm’s present MTB into debt pricing, an in-
crease in MTB would be associated with a fall in market credit spreads, but if not
included in the credit model speciﬁcation, a positive prediction error results.
Via both mechanisms, credit spread levels are expected to be negatively related to
MTB and prediction errors are expected to be positively related.
NYU The Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond Index return. It is the monthly 90 day cumu-
lative return interpolated within the month to the trade date. Data is source from
Altman & Pompeii (2003, Table A1). Since our models assume a constant recov-
ery rate (excluding the EM model), realised cyclical variation may be related to
systematic prediction error. A rise in the index should be associated with a fall
in credit spreads as the market anticipates higher expected recovery values for the
ﬁrm in default. This implies a positive spread prediction error across all models,
except possibly the Merton model, where the recovery rate is endogenously linked
to ﬁrm value.
VIX The daily value of the Chicago Board of Exchange VIX index, divided by 100.
The VIX index is the implied volatility of a synthetic at-the-money option on the
S&P 500 index.2 It is a widely used benchmark measure of the market’s expecta-
tion of risk. It is possible that the VIX index may inﬂuence credit spreads through
two channels. The ﬁrst is through expected recovery values. Tr¨ uck, Harpaint-
ner & Rachev (2005) ﬁnd evidence that the VIX index can explain up to 80 per-
cent of future aggregate yearly recovery rates on defaulted bonds. They ﬁnd that
low recoveries are historically anticipated by high implied volatility in historical
stock options. Using principal components analysis on recovery rates extracted
from credit default swap prices, Das & Hanouna (2006) give support, ﬁnding that
the level of interest rates, which we proxy by CMT3, and VIX together, explain
87 percent of variation in implied recovery rates as estimated from credit default
swap prices. The second channel is via changes in market-wide expectations of
contagious defaults in response to unexpected market-wide credit events. Bierens,
Huang & Kong (2003) determine that jumps play an important role in explain-
ing the dynamics of Merrill Lynch daily series of option-adjusted credit spreads,
and that the jump intensity depends on the lagged level of the VIX index. Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) show changes in VIX to be highly signiﬁcant in explaining
the changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit spreads, particularly at short tenors. A pos-
sible reason for the importance of the VIX index in explaining credit spreads is
provided by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Helwege (2003) who ﬁnd evidence of
2Refer http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf164 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
a jump-to-default risk component in the credit spread that varies over time in re-
sponse to unexpected credit events. Therefore, an increase in credit event risk may
reasonably be expected to be associated with a rise in the VIX, thereby causing the
index to be positively related to credit spreads, and negatively related to prediction
errors due to the absence of a time-varying measure of event risk in the structural
models. We expecte that ﬁrms that attempt to time the equity market will not do
so when the VIX is high due to the expense of raising equity.
CGDP The seasonally adjusted quarterly time series of real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), expressed in chained 2000 dollars, sourced from the Federal Reserve.3
The change in GDP is a measure of concurrent and recent past business condi-
tions. We measure the quarterly change in GDP by calculating the percentage
change in quarter by quarter GDP. Linear interpolation is used to ﬁt the data to
each trade date between quarters. Expansionary economic conditions can be ex-
pected to increase ﬁrm asset worth and recovery rates leading to reduced credit
spreads. For example, Frye (2000) shows that in a recession, aggregate recov-
ery is approximately one-third lower than during an expansion, however, Altman,
Brady, Resti & Sironi (2005) ﬁnd GDP growth to be only signiﬁcant in explain-
ing aggregate defaulted bond recovery rates when annual GDP growth was less
than 1.5 percent p.a. Acharya, Bharath & Srinivasan (2003) conﬁrm GDP growth
effects are quite small, but default rates and equity returns are economically mate-
rially associated with average recovery. Models that omit CGDP can be expected
to carry positive spread prediction errors.
REF The 10 year constant maturity spread between Refcorp bonds and Treasury yields.
It is a measure of time-varying market premium for liquidity risk. A rise in the
Refcorp spread can be expected to directly increase corporate credit spreads, since
credit spreads are calculated using Treasury yields as the reference rate. The ab-
sence of market liquidity premiums implies a negative correlation with corporate
credit spread prediction errors.
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables are shown in Table 4.14 and sample
correlations in Table 4.15.
Reasonably, ﬁrm-speciﬁc historical equity volatility and the VIX are positively cor-
related at 47.5 percent. However, the VIX is -33.5 percent correlated with interest rate
volatility. The cause is evident to different behaviour at the beginning of the sample
period. In Figure 4.17(d), volatility in the 3-month rate shows a spike in 1994-1995,
when Figure 4.16(c) shows that the VIX was at its lowest. In late 1998, both time series
evidence an increase in response to the LTCM crises.
3The chained dollar measure is an average of the prices of goods and services in successive pairs of year,
and is therefore subject to less distortion over time than a single year constant dollar measure.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 165
Table 4.14: Shown is the sample descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the regressions
of the prediction errors.
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max
TENOR 9.348 6.830 7.470 1.000 29.990
TEN5YR 0.270 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000
SOLV 0.922 0.690 0.775 0.015 3.110
COUPON 0.073 0.009 0.072 0.053 0.109
VOL 0.340 0.123 0.311 0.076 0.997
CMT3 0.051 0.005 0.052 0.030 0.064
TERM -0.012 0.007 -0.012 -0.038 0.008
VOLR 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005
RATING 6.808 2.286 6.000 2.000 13.000
PTB 2.561 1.771 2.059 0.163 13.061
NYU -0.008 0.096 0.011 -0.386 0.201
VIX 0.208 0.062 0.205 0.099 0.457
CGDP 0.010 0.003 0.010 -0.001 0.018
REF 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.007
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc market-to-book ratio and log-solvency ratio are found to be highly
positively correlated at 68.9 percent due to covariation in ﬁrm capital values. Higher
values of both are associated with ﬁrms with higher net worth and better debt ratings.
We ﬁnd a small negative relationship of -6.9 percent between defaulted bond return
and economic growth, with the two series only showing a parallel decline from late 1999
onwards (refer Figures 4.16(a) and 4.16(b)). Expected recovery rates are more strongly
inﬂuenced by market risk aversion as shown by the negative correlation of −45.9 percent




















Table 4.15: Shown is the sample correlations between independent variables used in the prediction error regressions.
TENOR SOLV COUPON VOL CMT3 TERM VOLR RATING MTB NYU VIX CGDP REF
TENOR 1.000 -0.028 0.093 -0.160 -0.059 -0.089 0.006 0.043 -0.098 0.015 -0.043 0.036 -0.047
SOLV 1.000 0.100 -0.192 0.025 -0.005 -0.017 -0.272 0.689 0.016 -0.030 -0.022 -0.021
COUPON 1.000 -0.180 0.068 -0.129 0.033 0.103 -0.012 0.057 -0.139 -0.007 -0.070
VOL 1.000 -0.103 0.399 0.197 -0.060 0.005 -0.198 0.475 -0.053 0.464
CMT3 1.000 0.454 -0.004 0.025 -0.058 0.062 -0.335 -0.529 0.087
TERM 1.000 -0.098 0.032 0.071 -0.272 0.408 -0.323 0.334
VOLR 1.000 -0.025 -0.025 -0.098 -0.027 -0.325 0.317
RATING 1.000 -0.436 -0.022 0.009 0.011 0.020
MTB 1.000 0.014 0.090 0.003 0.027
NYU 1.000 -0.459 -0.069 -0.231
VIX 1.000 0.294 0.253
CGDP 1.000 -0.067
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Figure 4.16: Shown are the time series plots of ﬁrm structure related independent variables used in regress-
ing prediction errors. CGDP refers to the linearly interpolated, quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real change
in Gross Domestic Product. NYU refers to the linearly interpolated, 3-month cumulative return on the
Altman-NYU defaulted bond index. VIX refers to the daily Chicago Board of Exchange volatility index
divided by 100. VOL is the 150-day historical ﬁrm-speciﬁc equity return volatility, using stock return data
sourced from the Center for Research in Security Prices.
To conﬁrm that the candidate independent variables are related to credit risk as ex-
pected, we conduct univariate regressions in which the dependent variable is the ob-
served credit spread, pooled across ﬁrms and over time, and the independent variables as
deﬁned above. Two types of relationship are shown in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. The ﬁrst is
the coefﬁcient ‘Beta’ deﬁned as the percentage change in the regression prediction for a
one standard deviation increase from the mean of the independent variable. It measures
the sensitivity of the credit spread to change in the independent variable. The second
measure is the R-squared of the regression, which is the percentage of the variation in
the sample of credit spreads explained by variation in the independent variable.
Table 4.16 presents results for ﬁrm speciﬁc and bond characteristic variables. As
shown by the Beta of the VOLvariable, a one standard deviation increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc
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Figure 4.17: Shown are the time series plots of yield related independent variables used in regressing
prediction errors. REF is the daily spread between 10-year constant maturity bonds issued by Refcorp and
Treasury 10-year constant maturity rates. Refcorp data is sourced from Bloomberg. TERM is the daily
annualised 3-month constant maturity yield less the 30 years constant maturity yield. CMT3 is the daily
constant maturity annualised 3-month yield. VOLCMT is the average 150-day historical standard deviation
of the 3-month constant maturity yield. All constant maturity Treasury yields are sourced from the Federal
Reserve H15 report.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 169
comparison, credit rating (RATING) has a lower Beta of 34 percent. In conﬁrmation
of the importance of leverage and ﬁrm volatility in the structural model theory, ﬁrm
solvency (SOLV) is also strongly related with a Beta of -20 percent. The ﬁrm’s market-
to-book ratio (MTB) is similar in direction with a Beta of -23 percent. Apart from
remaining tenor (TENOR) and COUPON, which show little explanatory power, all co-
efﬁcient signs are as expected. The remaining tenor of the bond is signiﬁcant only when
the bond is less than 5 years (TEN5YR).
Regression results of market-wide factors are shown in Table 4.17. All variables are
signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on the slope of the yield curve, TERM, is positive supporting
the argument that it is viewed by market participants as a leading indicator of future eco-
nomic activity. An increase in TERM is a consequence of the term structure ﬂattening,
accompanied by an increase in credit spreads. Note that this is directly opposite to the
CDG model’s speciﬁcation which assumes a negative relationship between credit spread
levels and TERM via the assumption of reduced debt issuance and decreasing leverage
when the short rate rises relative to the long term interest rate. Thus, within our sam-
ple period, the debt-timing hypothesis of the yield curve is dominated by expectations
of future economic conditions contained within the yield curve slope. We ﬁnd that the
Refcorp spread (REF) is the most closely related to observed credit spreads with a Beta
of 41 percent, followed by TERM as the next most explanatory variable with a Beta of
28 percent. The least explanatory variables is the change in GDP (CGDP) and the level
of the 3-month constant maturity interest rate (CMT3). All market-wide variables carry
correct expected signs except the interest rate (CMT3). Figure 4.17(c) illustrates that,
on average over the sample period, credit spreads increased as interest rates increased.
In particular, the rapid rise in spreads at the end of the sample period, was accompanied
by an increase in the short rate and a ﬂattening of the yield curve. Next we perform
multivariate regressions on the prediction errors. The results are discussed as follows by
model.
4.2.3 Multivariate Error Regression
In the previous section we conﬁrmed that the candidate independent variables are gener-
ally related to the sample levels of credit spreads as expected. In this section we examine
whether the same variables are related to the residual step-ahead prediction errors. If the
structural models have fully explained credit spreads, we do not expect that the variables
will be related to the prediction errors. To test this hypothesis, we construct three multi-
variate equations using the same independent explanatory variables, and three different
speciﬁcations of the prediction error as the dependent variable. The dependent variables
are: the step-ahead credit spread prediction error (refer equation (3.19)), the step-ahead
credit spread prediction percentage error, which is the prediction error expressed as a
fraction of the observed credit spread, and the standardised step-ahead credit spread pre-170 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.16: Shown is the estimated coefﬁcients from univariate OLS regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and bond
characteristic. The dependent variable is the observed credit spread, and t-stats are shown in parentheses.
Results are from sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms, 200 bonds, and 8,953 observations. Coefﬁcient Beta
is the change in credit spread associated with a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.
Coefﬁcient Coefﬁcient
Expected Beta R2
Variable Sign Constant Coefﬁcient (%) (%)
TENOR + 0.0099 0.0000 2.56 0.03
(38.98) (1.75)
TEN5YR - 0.0100 0.0008 3.49 0.06
(57.27) (2.39)
SOLV - 0.0130 -0.0030 -20.05 2.10
(52.56) (-13.87)
COUPON + 0.0110 -0.0112 -1.02 0.01
(9.45) (-0.70)
VOL + -0.0042 0.0423 50.91 13.57
(-10.21) (37.49)
RATING + -0.0004 0.0016 34.84 6.36
(-0.84) (24.65)
MTB - 0.0136 -0.0013 -22.7 2.70
(52.44) (-15.76)
Table 4.17: Shown is the estimated coefﬁcients of univariate OLS regressions of ﬁnancial market and
economic independent variables. The dependent variable isthe observed credit spread, and t-statsareshown
in parentheses. Results are from sample data is pooled across 32 ﬁrms, 200 bonds, and 8,953 observations.




Variable Sign Constant Coefﬁcient (%) (%)
TERM +/- 0.0153 0.4272 28.07 4.13
(51.57) (19.63)
CMT3 - 0.0004 0.1916 8.77 0.40
(0.22) (6.02)
VOLR + 0.0069 1.871 19.77 2.05
(24.66) (13.67)
NYU - 0.0101 -0.0189 -17.73 1.65
(67.76) (-12.24)
VIX + 0.0032 0.0336 20.22 2.14
(6.19) (14.00)
CGDP - 0.0126 -0.2471 -8.46 0.38
(28.94) (-5.80)
REF + 0.0018 3.601 40.54 8.61
(5.41) (29.03)4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 171
diction error (refer equation (4.1)). We discuss the prediction errors for the regressions
by independent variable in turn, and for the sake of brevity, limit the discussion to the
case where all models include a time-varying Refcorp liquidity premium in the measure-
ment equation.
4.2.3.1 Simple Spread Prediction Error
The coefﬁcients and t-stats (in parentheses) obtained from performing multivariate OLS
ofthe credit spread prediction error aredisplayed incolumns twoand three inTables 4.18
to 4.23. The credit spread prediction error is deﬁned as the model estimate less the
observed credit spread.
For the single factor models that ignore stochastic interest rates, the prediction errors
are commonly related to the Refcorp spread (REF) and implied equity market volatility
(VIX). The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on the REF variable indicates that despite the
inclusion of a the 10 year Refcorp spread into the measurement equation we have not
managed to fully control for the inﬂuence of time-varying liquidity on credit spreads.
Examination of the time series of Refcorp spreads in Figure 4.17(a) shows that the liq-
uidity premium jumped strongly in the ﬁrst half of 2000, coinciding with a market-wide
rise in credit spreads, and associated with underprediction of market credit spreads by
the EM model. Our speciﬁcation places a time-invariant coefﬁcient against the 10 year
Refcorp spread that appears to have underestimated the sensitivity of credit spreads to
the rise in the market liquidity premium observed during this period.
On the other hand, the rise in market spreads in 2000 was also associated with a
decline in the VIX index from its post-LTCM high in late 1998. Our expectation under
a structural credit model is that a rise in credit spreads would be associated with a rise in
equity volatility, since the ﬁrm’s equity volatility is directly a result of the ﬁrm’s underly-
ing asset value volatility, however, our sample includes a period of sharply rising credit
spreads as the recession of 2001 neared, but occurring commensurate with declining
equity market volatility. The result is an unexpected positive coefﬁcient on the VIX in-
dex caused by the opposite movements in market pricing seen between the bullish equity
markets and the more bearish view of average ﬁrm value held by the credit markets. This
effect is present in all our regression results for all structural models. In addition to the
above systematic errors, the single-factor LT and LS1 models also exhibit a signiﬁcant
negative prediction bias related to remaining maturity (TEN5YR).
Thetwo-factor structural models of LS2and CDGexhibit additional sytematic errors
that are related to the risk-free interest rate process. The errors of the CDG model are
positively related to the level of the 3-month constant maturity interest rate (CMT3), and
its volatility (VOLR), and to the slope of the yield curve (TERM). Further, the LS2 and
CDG models prediction errors exhibit a positive relationship with asset volatility that
was not present in the single-factor models.172 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.2.3.2 Percentage Spread Prediction Error
Results of the regression of independent variables against the percentage spread predic-
tion error of the EM model is shown in columns four and ﬁve of Table 4.18. Unlike
the simple spread prediction error, the percentage error is invariant to the size of the
observed spread, however, it is more sensitive to any common component jump in credit
spreads, such as a liquidity premium, when the observed credit spread is low.
Like the spread prediction regression, we ﬁnd the Refcorp spread is signiﬁcant, how-
ever, the VIX is not. A wider range of variables now enter the regression signiﬁcantly.
For the single-factor models we ﬁnd that generally across all single-factor models that
the prediction error is positively related to remaining maturity (TENOR), positively re-
lated to the slope of the yield curve (TERM), and positively related to the ﬁrm’s proxied
asset volatility (VOL). For the two-factor models of LS2and CDG, additional systematic
errors are found to be positively related to the market-to-book ratio (MTB), positively to
the rating (RATING), and positively to interest rate volatility (VOLR).
The ﬁrst interesting observation from this ﬁnding is that the contention of JMR that
the Merton model’s accuracy can be improved by the inclusion of a stochastic interest
rate process is not strongly supported. Rather, we ﬁnd the models that include a sec-
ond stochastic interest rate process result in additional systematic errors on the factors
that they were meant to correct. Secondly, we expected that the CDG model’s predic-
tion errors would not be related to the yield curve slope, yet column ﬁve of Table 4.23
shows that the TERM has the most signiﬁcant t-stat of all independent variables tested.
Thus, we ﬁnd that the CDG model does not fully control for the inﬂuence of the yield
curve slope on credit spreads, despite its speciﬁc inclusion in the ﬁrm’s solvency process
speciﬁcation. Finally, it is useful to compare our results with EHH, who also conduct
multivariate analysis on the percentage prediction error (refer Table 5, EHH). Across
models, we agree with EHH that percentage prediction errors are positively related to
proxied asset volatility, but only ﬁnd a negative relationship with solvency for the two-
factor models and not for the single-factor models. In contrast, EHH ﬁnd leverage to be
a strong explanatory variable of prediction error. Unlike EHH we ﬁnd no relationship
with coupon, but do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship with remaining tenor for all
models except the LT and CDG models. The additional parameter controlling mean-
reversion in the CDG model appears to be corrected this error. In both our results and
EHH’s results, the LT model has the lowest number of systematic errors identiﬁed by
regression of the percentage prediction errors. EHH did not test for liquidity or slope
of the term structure, however, we ﬁnd the Refcorp spread to be signiﬁcantly negatively
related to prediction error in all models. Likewise, the slope of the term structure is very
strongly positively related to prediction error in all our models. Both effects appear to
a result of our sample period that includes a credit cycle downturn coinciding with an
inversion of the yield curve.4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 173
From our review of the capital structure literature, the ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio
is hypothesised to be positively related to the spread predication error. We ﬁnd some
supportive evidence with the MTB variable signiﬁcantly positively related to prediction
error in the prediction error regressions for the LS1, CEV, LS2, and CDG models, but
not signiﬁcant for the EM or LT models.
4.2.3.3 Standardised Spread Prediction Error
In this section analyse the standardised error to test our hypothesis that missing factors
identiﬁed from the capital structure literturte are related to model misspeciﬁcation.
The standardised prediction error scales the prediction error relative to the size of
the observed spread and standard deviation of the predicted credit spread. It is therefore
less sensitive to large changes in the observed credit spread, since large increases in
prediction errors results in higher estimates of the standard deviation of the step-ahead
predicted credit spread. Results of regressing the standardised spread prediction error
against our independent variables are shown in columns six and seven of Tables 4.18 to
4.23. The standardised prediction error regressions show that the models are well ﬁtted
for the ﬁrm and bond parameters that are speciﬁed in the models. For example, ﬁrm
solvency, ﬁrm asset volatility, ﬁrm rating, and bond coupon rate are mostly unrelated to
the standardised error. Only the LS1 model shows some mild positive relationship with
asset volatility.
For all one-factor models, except the LT model, the remaining maturity is unrelated
to the standardised error. This suggests that much of the earlier documented prediction
bias is related to the structural model’s inability to predict sudden relative increases
in credit spreads at short maturities. The standardisation of the prediction estimates,
within the EKF, places lower conﬁdence on these estimates, which decreases the size
of the standardised error relative to the percentage prediction error. Visually we can
see the greater variance of observed credit spreads at short maturities displayed in the
plots of sample credit spreads by remaining maturity as shown in Figures 4.1 to 4.6. We
are not able to identify why there are large changes in relative credit spreads at short
maturities, however, changes in a ﬁxed component of the credit spread, related to the
Refcorp spread, is a possible cause. Our regression results indicate that an increase in the
Refcorp spread is associated with periods of underprediction as shown by the negative
relationship of REF with the standardised prediction error.
We identifed that market timing behaviour as important features of capital structure
management. We expect that the omission of debt market timing from a structural model
would result in a positive coefﬁcient against TERM, which we conﬁrm to be the case
across all models. The CDG model also shows this error despite including debt timing
in its speciﬁcation. For equity market timing we expect that the coefﬁcient against VOL
and VIX are negative since an increase in either would tend to increase the cost of equity174 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
issuance and delay equity raising. In contradiction to equity timing behaviour, we ﬁnd
the opposite signs. The ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio is also found to be unrelated to
standardised errors despite the theoretical support that management of the ﬁrm’s capital
structure is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s relative equity value. The signiﬁcance of VOL, VIX,
and TERM is our multivariate regressions suggests that the signs our results are possibly
inﬂuenced by multicollinearity.
We also ﬁnd that the one and two-factor model standardised errors are related to the
interest rate process, whereas this is not evident in our percentage error regressions of
the one-factor models. Thus, the standardised error reveals that the structural models
are miss-speciﬁed without inclusion of a stochastic interest rate process, yet the LS2 and
CDG models that include a stochastic short-rate model, fail to remove the systematic
error bias.
The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the CGDP variable across all models
shows that positive pricing errors occur when both values are high as expected when
the variables are interpreted as decreasing future default risk or increasing expected fu-
ture recovery in default. The present market value of recovery in default is proxied by
the secondary market recovery rate on defaulted bonds measured by the NYU variable.
Unlike CGDP, there is weaker role for defaulted bond return with only the LS1 and EM
models showing signiﬁcance. The general lack of relationship with secondary market
bond prices, but strong positive relationship with the change in CGDP, suggests that
the market is placing greater informational value on the general business climate when
assessing ﬁrm asset value.
4.2.3.4 Model Error Regressions Compared to Merton
As measured by the simple and percentage prediction errors regressions, the EM model
exhibits the lowest level of systematic error. When standardised errors are regressed,
the CEV, LT, and LS1 models perform equally as well. We ﬁnd that the structural mod-
els share many of the same prediction biases despite being derived from fundamentally
different theoretical underpinnings. The original Merton model in its extended form per-
forms remarkably well in comparison to newer structural models designed to overcome
its theoretical shortcomings.
Compared to the EM model, the LS1 model exhibits a very similar pattern of regres-
sion errors (refer Table 4.19). Therefore, the relaxation of default at maturity to early
default in the LS1 model appears to add little to speciﬁcation improvement in practice
over the Merton model. We ﬁnd that the LT model has no tendency to overpredict longer
maturities, but it does consistently underpredict short-term maturity debt spreads (refer
Table 4.20). EHH report that the LT model percentage errors increase with market lever-
age, but ﬁnd no evidence of a leverage related prediction bias. The CEV model exhibits
greater percentage errors related to ﬁrm leverage than the EM model (refer Table 4.21).4.2. CREDIT MODEL SPECIFICATION TESTS 175
Table 4.18: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
Merton (1974) (EM) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results are from multivariate
OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the dependent variable Error,
which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent variable Percentage Error,
which is the prediction error expressed as a fraction of the observed credit spread; equation (iii) has the
Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by scaling the predic-
tion error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in the ﬁrst column
and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient on the indepen-
dent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980) adjusted robust
estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘*’, and signiﬁcance at the 1% level by ‘**’.
Dependent Variable
(i) (ii) (iii)
Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const -0.077 (-0.203) 0.113 (0.592) -1.125 (-3.824) **
TENOR 0.000 (0.534) 0.002 (3.876) ** -0.001 (-0.585)
TEN5YR -0.035 (-1.803) -0.065 (-3.104) ** -0.038 (-1.272)
SOLV 0.003 (0.347) -0.008 (-0.579) 0.027 (1.200)
COUPON 0.488 (1.098) -0.073 (-0.091) -0.240 (-0.189)
VOL -0.005 (-0.023) 0.140 (2.789) ** 0.215 (1.530)
CMT3 1.424 (0.317) -3.576 (-1.348) 17.201 (4.283) **
TERM 1.927 (1.673) 9.041 (6.545) ** 11.035 (3.857) **
VOLR -2.156 (-0.169) 14.593 (1.513) 39.516 (2.892) **
RATING -0.007 (-1.297) 0.006 (1.891) -0.009 (-1.736)
MTB -0.002 (-0.503) 0.005 (1.031) -0.005 (-0.532)
NYU 0.050 (0.843) 0.040 (0.525) 0.277 (1.994) *
VIX 0.509 (4.360) ** 0.206 (1.477) 1.831 (6.088) **
CGDP -0.367 (-0.053) 6.314 (1.445) 14.082 (2.756) **
REF -23.598 (-4.837) ** -48.126 (-5.097) ** -71.863 (-5.471) **
Adj R2 (%) 0.301 1.308 4.405
F(14, 8,938) 10.255 13.486 12.338
n 8,953 8,953 8,953176 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.19: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) (LS1) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results are from
multivariate OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the dependent
variable Error, which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent variable Per-
centage Error, which is the prediction error expressed as a fraction of the observed credit spread; equation
(iii) has the Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by scaling
the prediction error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in the ﬁrst
column and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient on the
independent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980) adjusted
robust estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘*’, and signiﬁcance at the 1% level by ‘**’.
Dependent Variable
(i) (ii) (iii)
Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const 0.463 (0.722) 0.214 (1.070) -0.732 (-2.523) *
TENOR 0.001 (0.911) 0.003 (4.545) ** -0.001 (-0.332)
TEN5YR -0.074 (-2.321) * -0.069 (-3.074) ** -0.043 (-1.443)
SOLV -0.006 (-0.343) -0.021 (-1.407) -0.002 (-0.089)
COUPON 1.065 (1.495) 0.267 (0.305) 0.590 (0.466)
VOL -0.239 (-0.713) 0.155 (3.127) ** 0.340 (2.456) *
CMT3 -5.756 (-0.752) -5.524 (-1.957) 9.201 (2.340) *
TERM 5.395 (2.880) ** 12.579 (7.891) ** 16.565 (5.794) **
VOLR -9.965 (-0.483) 20.173 (2.011) * 58.396 (4.301) **
RATING -0.012 (-1.2900 0.007 (2.301) * -0.003 (-0.637)
MTB 0.005 (0.933) 0.009 (2.042) * 0.010 (1.009)
NYU 0.056 (0.619) 0.085 (1.038) 0.368 (2.651) **
VIX 0.505 (2.898) ** 0.122 (0.824) 1.485 (4.952) **
CGDP -5.096 (-0.452) 7.180 (1.538) 14.890 (2.961) **
REF -28.147 (-3.822) ** -52.949 (-5.461) ** -81.593 (-6.299) **
Adj R2 (%) 0.365 1.624 2.554
F(14, 8,938) 9.658 16.086 15.128
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Table 4.20: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
Leland & Toft (1996) (LT) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results are from multi-
variate OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the dependent variable
Error, which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent variable Percentage
Error, which is the prediction error expressed as a fraction of the observed credit spread; equation (iii)
has the Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by scaling the
prediction error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in the ﬁrst
column and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient on the
independent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980) adjusted
robust estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘*’, and signiﬁcance at the 1% level by ‘**’.
Dependent Variable
(i) (ii) (iii)
Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const -0.068 (-0.189) -0.108 (-0.297) -0.836 (-2.790) **
TENOR 0.000 (-0.409) 0.001 (0.932) -0.004 (-1.888)
TEN5YR -0.076 (-3.635) ** -0.095 (-3.614) ** -0.111 (-3.799) **
SOLV -0.004 (-0.390) -0.019 (-1.106) 0.030 (1.375)
COUPON 0.510 (0.846) 0.428 (0.414) 0.236 (0.192)
VOL -0.112 (-0.544) 0.087 (1.574) 0.248 (1.885)
CMT3 2.180 (0.498) 0.505 (0.104) 15.021 (3.615) **
TERM 4.871 (3.511) ** 11.952 (6.601) ** 17.445 (6.088) **
VOLR 9.293 (0.776) 25.739 (1.945) 58.139 (4.225) **
RATING -0.009 (-1.732) 0.005 (1.638) -0.010 (-1.927)
MTB 0.000 (0.040) 0.005 (0.887) -0.019 (-1.905)
NYU 0.086 (1.381) 0.060 (0.672) 0.078 (0.564)
VIX 0.611 (3.925) ** 0.334 (1.571) 1.674 (5.547) **
CGDP 2.925 (0.488) 10.398 (1.868) 14.136 (2.770) **
REF -33.120 (-5.609) ** -60.468 (-6.096) ** -98.676 (-7.603) **
Adj R2 (%) 0.882 1.639 3.217
F(14, 8,938) 8.938 11.696 15.914
n 8,953 8,953 8,935178 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.21: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results are
from multivariate OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the depen-
dent variable Error, which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent variable
Percentage Error, which is the prediction error expressed as a fraction of the observed credit spread; equa-
tion (iii) has the Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by
scaling the prediction error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in
the ﬁrst column and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient
on the independent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980)




Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const -0.244 (-0.743) 0.217 (1.111) -0.915 (-3.236) **
TENOR 0.001 (1.333) 0.003 (4.9230 ** 0.002 (0.902)
TEN5YR -0.032 (-1.737) -0.087 (-3.772) ** -0.039 (-1.338)
SOLV -0.002 (-0.191) -0.040 (-2.528) * -0.014 (-0.655)
COUPON 0.794 (1.832) 1.054 (1.215) 1.422 (1.142)
VOL 0.240 (1.329) 0.174 (3.480) ** 0.252 (1.835)
CMT3 2.457 (0.626) -6.672 (-2.432) * 11.738 (3.043) **
TERM 1.919 (1.435) 10.594 (7.143) ** 13.176 (4.664) **
VOLR 3.060 (0.279) 17.311 (1.665) 70.236 (5.258) **
RATING 0.001 (0.313) 0.010 (3.282) ** 0.001 (0.110)
MTB 0.000 (-0.014) 0.014 (3.106) ** 0.012 (1.198)
NYU 0.006 (0.097) 0.013 (0.157) 0.099 (0.712)
VIX 0.313 (2.594) ** 0.086 (0.587) 1.642 (5.650) **
CGDP -0.158 (-0.027) 3.879 (0.846) 8.858 (1.796)
REF -25.816 (-5.394) ** -48.229 (-4.805) ** -91.326 (-7.131) **
Adj R2 (%) 0.438 1.649 2.543
F(14, 8,938) 9.361 14.528 13.967
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Table 4.22: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) (LS2) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results are from
multivariate OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the dependent
variable Error, which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent variable Per-
centage Error, which is the prediction error expressed as a fraction of the observed credit spread; equation
(iii) has the Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by scaling
the prediction error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in the ﬁrst
column and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient on the
independent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980) adjusted
robust estimates. Signiﬁcance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘*’, and signiﬁcance at the 1% level by ‘**’.
Dependent Variable
(i) (ii) (iii)
Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const -0.197 (-0.892) 0.612 (2.92) ** 0.379 (1.319)
TENOR 0.002 (3.282) ** 0.005 (8.77) ** 0.006 (2.986) **
TEN5YR 0.016 (1.165) -0.057 (-2.43) * 0.060 (2.054) *
SOLV 0.008 (1.093) -0.036 (-2.24) * -0.003 (-0.117)
COUPON 0.678 (1.889) 1.262 (1.46) 1.305 (1.053)
VOL 0.380 (3.162) ** 0.201 (3.93) ** 0.552 (4.117) **
CMT3 -0.239 (-0.090) -14.061 (-4.85) ** -13.158 (-3.300) **
TERM 4.210 (4.590) ** 15.834 (10.23) ** 25.126 (8.901) **
VOLR 34.410 (4.481) ** 48.349 (4.85) ** 148.504 (10.716) **
RATING 0.005 (1.419) 0.011 (3.18) ** 0.004 (0.690)
MTB 0.001 (0.437) 0.019 (3.60) ** 0.017 (1.813)
NYU 0.053 (1.031) -0.003 (-0.04) 0.283 (1.949)
VIX 0.113 (1.121) -0.160 (-1.03) 0.677 (2.292) *
CGDP 4.436 (1.135) 2.643 (0.61) 12.798 (2.632) **
REF -39.908 (-8.558) ** -62.625 (-7.00) ** -119.123 (-9.452) **
Adj R2 (%) 1.955 2.592 4.544
F(14, 8,938) 16.544 32.047 24.912
n 8,953 8,953 8,953180 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.23: Shown are the results of three multivariate regressions on the prediction errors for the extended
Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein (2001) (CDG) model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium. Results
are from multivariate OLS on sample data pooled across 32 ﬁrms and 200 bonds. Equation (i) has the
dependent variable Error, which is the step-ahead yield prediction error; equation (ii) has the dependent
variable Percentage Error, which isthe prediction error expressed asa fraction of the observed credit spread;
equation (iii) has the Standardised Error, which is the step-ahead standardised prediction error calculated by
scaling the prediction error by the standard deviation of the prediction. Independent variables are shown in
the ﬁrst column and the regressions include a constant term. Coeff. is the estimated regression coefﬁcient
on the independent variables. T-stats on the coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses and are White (1980)




Error x 100 Percentage Error Standardised Error
Independent
Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
const -0.639 (-2.687) ** -0.014 (-0.066) -1.360 (-4.526) **
TENOR -0.001 (-2.092) * 0.000 (0.735) -0.006 (-3.030) **
TEN5YR 0.003 (0.201) -0.093 (-4.170) ** 0.006 (0.216)
SOLV -0.003 (-0.312) -0.060 (-3.913) ** -0.064 (-2.848) **
COUPON 0.586 (1.422) 1.256 (1.452) 1.450 (1.167)
VOL 0.357 (2.831) ** 0.203 (3.983) ** 0.583 (4.103) **
CMT3 8.343 (2.882) ** -2.346 (-0.829) 18.138 (4.367) **
TERM 6.827 (6.394) ** 18.250 (11.253) ** 27.748 (9.623) **
VOLR 19.490 (2.374) * 29.803 (3.086) ** 98.122 (6.978) **
RATING 0.001 (0.403) 0.007 (2.119) * -0.010 (-1.729)
MTB -0.003 (-0.873) 0.019 (3.828) ** 0.012 (1.183)
NYU -0.050 (-0.985) -0.026 (-0.306) -0.152 (-1.054)
VIX 0.565 (5.540) ** 0.391 (2.571) * 2.417 (8.094) **
CGDP 8.642 (2.057) * 10.850 (2.567) * 28.777 (5.644) **
REF -25.896 (-5.473) ** -56.482 (-6.574) ** -89.710 (-6.856) **
Adj R2 (%) 4.139 3.547 8.823
F(14, 8,938) 28.347 33.505 45.499
n 8,953 8,953 8,9534.3. ESTIMATED MODEL PARAMETERS 181
It tends to underpredict spreads on well rated ﬁrms, and on ﬁrms with high solvency.
The market-to-book ratio is also signiﬁcant due to high correlation with ﬁrm solvency
and rating.
The percentage prediction error performance of the two-factor models is relatively
poor compared to the EM model. The LS2 model, with stochastic interest rate, exhibits
additional errors related to the level and volatility of the 3-month CMT rate (refer Ta-
ble 4.22). The CDG model also suffers from additional errors related to the interest-rate
process (refer Table 4.23). The differences between one and two-factor models is less
evident when we consider the standardised errors. An innovation of the CDG model is
the linkage of longer-term default risk with the slope of the yield curve. All measures
of prediction error are found to be strongly positively related to the slope; implying that
overprediction of spreads is greatest when the risk-free rate is low relative to the long-
rate. The CDG model imposes a positive coefﬁcient on the yield curve slope implying
higher credit spreads when short-term rate is low, which we ﬁnd in our data set to be
counterfactual, as shown by regression results in Table 4.17 and time series plots in Fig-
ures 4.15(a) and 4.17(b). Part of the poor relative performance of the CDG model may
therefore be due to the absence of debt-timing behaviour evident in our sample of data.
4.3 Estimated Model Parameters
In this section we discuss the parameters implied from our estimation procedure. Our
maximum likelihood estimates of the latent ﬁrm process parameters are compared with
independently estimated parameter values using observable proxies in the manner of
JMR, LYS, HH, and EHH. If the observable proxy for the ﬁrm process is similar in
level and dynamics, then the observable proxies may serve as useful means of deriving
model estimates. If not, then debt pricing cannot be accurately performed without latent
estimation of the structural model’s parameters.
4.3.1 Firm Asset Volatility
In this section we compare the average ﬁrm implied asset volatility with an approxima-
tion of ﬁrm asset volatility. To construct an observable proxy for the asset volatility,
we collect the daily equity capitalisation for each ﬁrm sourced from CRSP, and add the
total book debt sourced from COMPUSTAT, which is updated quarterly. From the con-
structed time series of approximate ﬁrm market value, we calculate the daily log-return
for each ﬁrm over the full sample period. The observed standard deviation per ﬁrm is
then the annualised sample standard deviation of the daily log-returns. Shown in the
last row of Table 4.24 is the descriptive statistics of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility estimates
pooled cross-sectionally over the sample of 32 ﬁrms. The average annualised ﬁrm asset
return volatility, estimated from the observed proxy value of the ﬁrm, is 26.62 percent,182 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table4.24: Thistable shows thedescriptive statisticsof implied asset volatilityand ﬁrmsolvency ratiocom-
pared with a market value proxy for the ﬁrm. The implied asset volatility and sample average smoothed
ﬁltered estimate of the solvency ratio (V(t)/K(t)) are obtained from application of an EKF to the term
structure of credit spreads. For comparison, descriptive statistics for the daily time series of an indepen-
dently estimated proxy for the ﬁrm value is shown in ‘Observed’. The observed time series of ﬁrm value is
calculated as the sum of the ﬁrm’s market capitalisation and total book debt, and the ﬁrm’s solvency is the
observed ﬁrmvalue divided by total book debt. Data for book debt isquarterly sourced from COMPUSTAT,
and ﬁrm equity capital is daily frequency sourced from CRSP. The observed ﬁrm volatility is the sample
standard deviation of daily log returns of observed ﬁrm value. SD is standard deviation. Correl refers to
the correlation coefﬁcent between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc sample average observed and implied estimates of asset
volatility, and ﬁrm solvency. All numbers are in percent.
Firm Asset Volatility sv Mean Solvency Level (V(t)/K(t))
Implied Implied
Model Mean SD Median Correl Mean SD Median Correl
Panel A: No Liquidity
EM 26.68 11.13 23.05 17.19 2.82 2.53 1.71 34.78
LS1 25.05 8.05 23.93 19.30 3.06 1.87 2.42 65.41
LT 20.79 10.14 17.74 1.34 2.53 0.89 2.23 41.18
CEV 1,278.84 7,042.15 20.57 9.32 5.29 9.06 2.39 51.72
LS2 14.11 4.10 13.86 -12.44 1.51 0.41 1.40 30.25
CDG 13.26 4.60 11.61 -1.33 3.80 3.35 2.75 45.41
Panel B: Constant Liquidity
EM 28.07 12.73 24.77 10.29 4.66 6.91 2.49 18.24
LS1 17.73 6.11 17.11 27.10 3.02 2.09 2.45 78.14
LT 16.72 8.03 14.49 7.89 2.21 0.97 1.84 31.78
CEV 15.24 7.50 14.62 -16.40 4.21 6.64 2.48 71.04
LS2 15.38 4.80 15.41 23.03 2.29 1.20 1.93 56.79
CDG 16.41 5.45 14.80 -7.16 4.72 3.63 3.67 50.55
Panel C: Time-Varying Liquidity
EM 28.27 10.48 26.57 22.21 3.72 3.23 2.82 47.53
LS1 18.30 6.75 18.86 27.18 2.88 1.99 2.31 76.70
LT 16.62 9.62 13.86 1.29 2.27 1.48 1.91 24.84
CEV 15.03 6.56 15.35 -23.26 4.16 6.65 2.49 72.05
LS2 14.18 5.89 15.59 33.21 2.47 1.41 1.94 64.94
CDG 14.98 5.53 13.75 -4.58 5.07 3.83 3.58 39.95
Observed 26.62 9.29 25.61 100.00 3.15 2.43 2.30 100.004.3. ESTIMATED MODEL PARAMETERS 183
with a standard deviation of 9.21 percent, and a median of 25.61 percent. The descrip-
tive statistics of the maximum likelihood estimates of the latent ﬁrm value volatility are
shown in Panels A to C in Table 4.24. In Panel A results are shown excluding a liquidity
premium in the measurement equation, Panel B includes a constant liquidity premium,
and Panel C assumes a constant and a time-varying liquidity component of the credit
spread that is directly proportional to the 10 year Refcorp spread.
Because of the inﬂuence of outlier observations associated with the local rise in
asset volatility under the CEV model, we use the median as the most appropriate central
tendency measure to compare volatilities across models. With no liquidity premium as
shown in Panel A of Table 4.24, the EM model at 23.05 percent, and LS1 model at 23.93
percent, are quite close in value to the observed median proxy volatility of 25.61 percent.
The medians of the LT and CEV models are lower at 17.74 percent and 20.57 percent
respectively. The two-factor models are noticeably lower due to the additional spread
volatility that is contributed by their stochastic interest rate process. The medians of the
LS2 and CDG models are only 13.86 percent and 11.61 percent respectively. In Panel B
of Table 4.24 we can see that the median of the EM model’s volatility remains close to
the observed proxy, but all the other models reduce the implied level of asset volatility.
With the addition of time-varying liquidity premium in Panel C of Table 4.24 the EM
model median asset volatility is clearly higher than the other models at 26.57 percent,
with the next highest the LS1 model at 18.86 percent. From this result it is evident
that using an observed proxy for the implied ﬁrm asset volatility is reasonably robust
on average for pricing under an extended Merton model, but is excessive on average for
other structural models, particularly for two-factor models.
Next we compare the sample ﬁrm-wise correlation between the implied asset volatil-
ity estimates obtained from our EKF, with estimates from the observed proxy method.
Correlations are shown in column ﬁve of Table 4.24 where we can see that the correla-
tions vary widely between models. With no liquidity premium, the LS1 model has the
highest degree of across ﬁrm correlation at only 19.30 percent. The LS2 model records
a negative correlation at -12.44 percent. The situation shows little improvement with
the introduction of controls for liquidity premiums in the measurement equation. For
example, with time-varying liquidity in Panel C of Table 4.24 the correlations vary from
-23.26 percent for the CEV model to 33.21 percent for the LS2 model. Consequently,
there is little consistent correlation evident between the latent estimated asset volatility
and the observed proxy volatility, so that even though on average the measures appear
similar, the proxy variable will give rise to signiﬁcant errors when used to price individ-
ual ﬁrm bonds.
As a further check on the reasonableness of the level of the implied asset volatilities,
we compare the ﬁrm-wise implied asset volatility estimates with the ﬁrm’s historical
equity volatility. As Merton (1974) demonstrated, a ﬁrm’s equity value is equivalent184 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
to a call option on the ﬁrm’s underlying assets, therefore its equity volatility should be
strictly greater than the ﬁrm’s asset volatility when the ﬁrm is leveraged. We therefore
expect that our implied asset volatility estimates are less than the sample equity volatil-
ity. Table 4.25 presents results for sample of 32 ﬁrms for each of the six models tested.
In the ﬁnal two rows we show the number of times that a ﬁrm estimate of asset volatility
exceeds its equity volatility and the relative frequency that this occurs in the sample. The
ﬁrst point to note is that the means and medians of the implied asset volatilities are below
the corresponding central tendencies of the equity volatility as expected. However, if we
consider how many times that the ﬁrm level estimate of asset volatility exceeds the ﬁrm’s
equity volatility, clear differences between models become evident. The EM model on
eight occasions, or 25 percent of the sample, has implied ﬁrm asset volatilities that are
excessive relative to the ﬁrm’s observed equity volatility. In contrast, the LS1 and LS2
model ﬁrm estimates are never excessive. The LT model also shows three breaches, or
9.38 percent of the sample. The EM and LT models have much greater variability in ﬁrm
estimates as evidenced by higher sample standard deviations than the other models. It is
therefore evident that the EMmodel, and to a lesser extent the LTmodel, achieve calibra-
tion to market observed credit spreads by implying excessive asset volatility necessary
generate sufﬁciently high credit spreads. A similar conclusion was reached by EHH,
but they did not control for liquidity premiums that might have otherwise encouraged
reliance on excessive asset volatility to match market credit spreads. We reach the same
conclusion in respect of the EM model, in particular, even after controlling for market
liquidity. Importantly, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that the implied asset volatilities
of the LS, CEV, or CDG are excessive.
4.3.2 Level of the Firm’s Default Boundary
Our estimation method provides an estimate of the path taken by the ﬁrm’s state variable,
which identiﬁes implicitly when the ﬁrm is expected to default under different structural
model speciﬁcations. In this section we consider whether the estimated average levels of
ﬁrm solvency are well approximated by an observable proxy for market solvency. Fur-
ther, we compare the reasonableness of our implied default boundary with the directly
observed empirical estimates by Davydenko (2005).
The implied solvency ratio per ﬁrm, is the across time average of the transformed
smoothed estimate of the state variable. For all models, except the CEV model, the
state variable is deﬁned as x(t) = ln(V(t)/K(t)) for all trades from t = 1 to t = T.
From the EKF we obtain a smoothed estimate of the state variable, a(t|T) = x(t), as
described in equation (3.21). Transforming the state estimate by exp(a(t|T)) gives our
best estimate of the path taken by the ﬁrm’s solvency ratio, V(t)/K(t), that underpins
the predicted term structure of credit spreads. For the CEV model, the state variable is
X(t) = ln(V(t)−K(t))/K(t), so we transform the smoothed state variables to an equiv-4.3. ESTIMATED MODEL PARAMETERS 185
Table 4.25: This table shows the implied asset volatility, per model, for the sample of 32 ﬁrms ﬁtted with
a time-varying liquidity premium. The ﬁnal column shows the sample average historical annualised daily
equity return volatility for the issuing ﬁrm. Summary descriptive statistics per model are shown in the
second panel. The lower panel shows the count of ﬁrms where the asset volatility estimate exceeds the
sample average equity volatility, and the associated relative frequency that this occurs in the sample. All
numbers other than the counts are shown in percentage.
Implied Asset Volatility Obs
Issuer EM LS1 LT CEV LS2 CDG Eq Vol
Aetna Inc 33.55 23.03 11.07 11.15 27.01 18.74 35.16
Associates Corp 21.81 9.37 18.10 7.72 11.69 10.10 37.08
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co 24.09 20.26 11.74 13.96 17.02 21.28 24.21
A T & T Corp 31.03 23.77 15.32 7.17 19.98 16.53 35.69
Bear Stearns Comp Inc 8.92 8.84 13.79 14.09 0.71 11.55 41.05
Black & Decker Corp 28.14 13.46 31.01 10.35 2.51 14.42 30.96
Dayton Hudson Corp 17.86 14.64 2.30 6.22 12.13 1.91 36.67
Comm Edison Co 25.39 20.74 24.74 16.74 14.47 15.35 23.00
Enron Corp 17.96 19.35 5.52 6.87 17.79 12.27 32.36
Fed Dept Stores 43.28 26.26 22.41 18.45 16.80 12.13 37.56
Ford Mtr Co 22.82 8.37 10.47 15.90 11.80 11.95 30.98
General Mtrs 26.43 14.44 12.11 16.44 12.95 11.00 31.91
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp 35.27 25.05 28.74 16.94 16.88 14.82 34.04
Hca Healthcare Corp 26.72 18.35 12.65 13.01 19.39 13.38 36.86
IBM Corp 15.68 20.88 53.42 8.08 13.16 14.69 35.04
Int Paper Co 12.11 11.08 10.69 14.80 14.37 14.11 33.60
Lehman Bros Hldgs Inc 23.33 11.22 19.53 17.89 7.31 12.71 49.24
Merrill Lynch & Co 21.81 8.45 13.53 9.59 6.27 9.87 42.39
Motorola Inc 48.45 36.76 16.02 18.65 21.12 21.82 40.20
Nabisco Group Hldgs Corp 37.00 18.32 10.95 21.02 15.52 12.88 37.85
Niagara Mohawk Corp 17.63 25.77 13.93 36.27 13.94 31.41 29.75
Northrop Grumman Corp 36.22 23.66 7.78 19.26 18.19 18.89 32.36
Paine Webber Grp Inc 19.47 6.94 9.27 10.88 0.00 13.10 45.72
Penney J C Co Inc 29.39 19.43 20.72 23.85 19.90 21.95 34.17
Philip Morris Comp Inc 31.69 16.82 25.12 16.08 17.61 13.10 33.91
Seagram Co Ltd 25.50 18.38 7.72 17.18 11.97 18.59 32.37
Sears Roebuck Acc Corp 32.15 16.91 19.38 16.60 10.61 9.07 38.50
Service Corp Intl 59.03 12.56 15.30 29.49 16.01 27.50 55.53
Union Paciﬁc Corp 32.60 19.35 12.85 13.21 15.95 12.81 29.44
Viacom Inc 37.90 22.28 18.65 16.07 15.70 15.11 38.32
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 24.46 24.59 27.58 7.07 19.46 11.97 35.06
Mean 28.27 18.30 16.62 15.03 14.18 14.98 35.74
Std Dev 10.48 6.75 9.62 6.56 5.89 5.53 6.43
Median 26.57 18.86 13.86 15.35 15.59 13.75 35.05
Count Asset Vol > Equity Vol 8 0 3 1 0 1
Rel Frequency 25.00 0.00 9.38 3.13 0.00 3.13186 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
alent ﬁrm solvency ratio by exp(a(t|T))+1 for t = 1 to t = T.
For comparative purposes an observable proxy of the ﬁrm solvency is constructed
using the approximate market value of the ﬁrm divided by the book value of debt. The
ﬁrm value is calculated as above for the estimation of the observed asset volatility, by
the sum of the ﬁrm’s market capitalisation and total book debt. The ﬁrm’s observed
solvency ratio is the observed ﬁrm value divided by total book debt. Book values of debt
are quarterly values reported by COMPUSTAT (items 45 and 51), and the market value
of equity is obtained from CRSP for the day of the trade.
For each ﬁrm we average the implied and observed estimates of ﬁrm solvency for
across the trade dates. Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm averages, measured across 32
ﬁrms, is shown in Table 4.24. Forillustration, plots of the paths taken by x(t) and S(t) are
shown in Appendix D for the EM model ﬁtted with a time-varying liquidity premium.
Panels A to C of Table 4.24 show the descriptive statistics for the smoothed estimate
of the average implied ﬁrm solvency, controlling for different liquidity treatment, and
the last row of Table 4.24 shows the descriptive statistics of the observed proxy of the
average ﬁrm solvency. The cross-sectional observed solvency mean is 3.15 with a stan-
dard deviation of 2.43 and median of 2.30. Therefore, on average, our sample of ﬁrms
have asset values 3.15 times greater than the book value of debt, or conversely, book
debt is on average 1/3.15, or 31.7 percent, of ﬁrm value.
In comparison, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the average ﬁrm implied
level of solvency in th absence of a liquidity premium. The median solvency ratios vary
from 1.40 for the LS2 model to 2.42 for the LS1 model. The across ﬁrm correlation
with the observed solvency ratio ranges from 30.25 percent for the LS2 model to 65.41
percent for the LS1 model. Unlike asset volatility, there is greater consistency between
observable and implied levels of solvency. Panels B and C introduce liquidity premiums
into the measurement equation. From Panel C we can see that the correlation with the
observed solvency ratio improves to range between 39.95 percent for the CDG model
to 76.60 percent for the LS2 model. The additional liquidity component in the credit
spread also increases the average implied solvency level since less of the observed credit
spread must be explained by default risk. Implied solvency levels now range from 2.27
percent for the LT model to 5.07 percent for the CDG model. From these results we
can conclude that the use of an observable proxy, and assumption that the default barrier
is well approximated by the book value of debt, is reasonable on average for pricing
purposes, if no liquidity premium is included in the predicted credit spread. However,
ﬁrm speciﬁc differences remain, and the use of a proxy solvency ratio will not be an
accurate measure of the default boundary for any individual ﬁrm’s bond pricing.
A further question we address is whether the implied solvency levels appear to be
economically reasonable. The observed solvency ratio is a direct proxy for the ﬁrm’s
solvency ratio if default occurs when ﬁrm assets equal the face value of debt, i.e. K = D.4.3. ESTIMATED MODEL PARAMETERS 187
However, evidence suggests that ﬁrms do not default when the asset reach the book
value of debt. For example, in order to match observed historical recovery rates and
bankruptcy costs, Huang & Huang (2003) set the default boundary to be 60 percent of
the face value of debt. Davydenko (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms, on average, default when
the market value of assets, measured using the same proxy measure of ﬁrm value we
have employed, is 65 percent of the face value of debt. Our observed solvency ratio
in Table 4.24 is therefore likely to be biased downward relative to the empirical de-
fault boundary. To adjust to a more appropriate benchmark we assume that on average
K = 0.65D and multiply our observed solvency ratios by 1/0.65 or 1.54. The adjusted
observed mean solvency ratio benchmark becomes 4.85 with a median of 3.54.
In Panel A of Table 4.24 we can see that the mean implied solvency ratio varies by
model and are well below the adjusted benchmark. However, when a constant liquidity
premium is introduced as shown in Panel B,the resultant average implied solvency levels
are much closer to the adjusted benchmark. The closest implied levels to the benchmark
of 4.85 are the EM and CDG models with means of 4.66 and 4.72 respectively. With a
time-varying liquidity premium, the CDG model average increases to 5.07 with a me-
dian of 3.58. Thus, the implied level of the default boundary appears to be the most
economically reasonable when a liquidity premium is included into the predicted credit
spread. The models that most closely match a reasonable empirical benchmark are CDG
model followed by thee CEV model. Other models such as the LS1, LS2, EM, and LT
models, imply default boundary levels that are too large, on average, relative to empirical
evidence.
4.3.3 Solvency mean-reversion Rate
In Section 2.5 we provided theoretical and empirical support for the stylised fact that
ﬁrms debt-ratios can be expected to mean revert. This is supported under both the trade-
off theory, which emphasises the role of management targeting a preferred debt-ratio,
and the dynamic version of the pecking order theory, in which auto correlated net ﬁnanc-
ing deﬁcits result in mean-reversion in the level of debt without management speciﬁcally
targeting adebt-ratio. TheCDGmodel explicitly includes an assumption ofcapital struc-
ture mean-reversion. In this section we compare the implied CDG mean-reversion rate,
obtained from ﬁtting the CDG model to credit spread term structures, with the capital
structure empirical evidence. For brevity, we restrict our discussion of results to the
measurement equation that includes a time-varying liquiﬁty premium.
As reported in Table 4.28, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant levels of log-solvency mean-reversion
rates in the CDG model. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameter estimates of the mean-reversion
rates, and equivalent half-life statistics, are shown with asymptotic t-stats reported in
parentheses. In 31 out of 32 ﬁrms we ﬁnd that the mean-reversion rate is highly sig-
niﬁcant. The average mean-reversion rate is 0.142 per annum with a half life of 5.392188 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.26: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc log-solvency mean-
reversion ratesbyindustry sector of theissuing ﬁrm. PanelA summarises themean-reversion rateparameter
(kv) of the log-solvency ratio, x(t) = ln(V(t)/K(t)), estimated by ﬁtting the CDG model to the credit
spread term structures of n = 32 ﬁrms, assuming a time-varying liquidity premium. Panel B summarises
the equivalent half life of the log-solvency ratio mean-reversion expressed in years. Half life is calculated
as ln(2)/kv.
Finance Industrial Utility All
Panel A: Implied Mean-Reversion Rate (kv)
Mean 0.179 0.135 0.126 0.142
Std Dev 0.033 0.042 0.036 0.043
Median 0.175 0.142 0.114 0.146
Min 0.132 0.055 0.099 0.055
Max 0.215 0.230 0.178 0.230
Panel B: Half Life of Mean-Reversion (H(kv))(yrs)
Mean 3.996 5.701 5.785 5.392
Std Dev 0.771 2.135 1.408 1.960
Median 3.965 4.881 6.138 4.756
Min 3.219 3.007 3.890 3.007
Max 5.259 12.691 6.976 12.691
n 6 22 4 32
years. The minimum reversion rate found is 0.055 per annum and the maximum is 0.230
per annum. Our results are very close, on average, to the results of Fama & French
(2002) who ﬁnd ﬁrm-speciﬁc debt-ratios to be mean-reverting at a rate of between 0.07
and 0.18 per annum. Similarly, Frank & Goyal (2003) report an average ﬁrm debt-ratio
mean-reversion rate of 0.124 per annum with small ﬁrms averaging 0.115 and larger
ﬁrms 0.104 per annum. It appears therefore, that the market implies levels of mean-
reversion in ﬁrm solvency similar to levels that are historically observed by debt-ratio
movements.
In Table 4.28 we also show that the log-solvency mean-reversion rates vary by ﬁrm,
and in Table 4.26 we show that the average mean-reversion rates vary by industry.
Faster mean-reversion, ceteris paribus, implies a ﬂatter term structure of the ﬁrm’s credit
spreads. It is clear that ﬁnancial ﬁrms have the fastest rate of implied mean-reversion
with an average estimated half life of 4.0 years, followed by Industrial with an average
half life of 5.7 years, with utilities showing the slowest mean-reversion rate with a half
life of 5.8 years. To better understand the causes of the cross-sectional differences in the
average mean-reversion rate between ﬁrms, we conduct a multivariate regression of the
estimated mean-reversion rate with ﬁrm and bond characteristics. As discussed previ-
ously in Section 2.5.5, the capital structure theory suggests that ﬁrms that are more debt
constrained have a greater concern with targeting a debt-ratio. Therefore, we consider
whether the expected mean-reversion rate of the ﬁrm’s solvency, as implied from the
CDG model, is consistent with the capital structure literature.4.3. ESTIMATED MODEL PARAMETERS 189
We apply a linear multivariate regression across the pool of 32 ﬁrms. The inde-
pendent variable is the natural log of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimated mean-reversion rate
parameter, kv, and the independent variables are deﬁned as follows:
1. The ﬁrm’s average debt rating. The ﬁrm’s rating is assigned a numeric score that
takes the values AA+=1, AA=2, AA-=3, A+=4, ..., BB-=13. Because the ﬁrm’s
rating may change over time, a sample weighted average rating is calculated by
averaging the numeric score coincident with each observed trade date. Firms with
low (high) average rating scores are likely to be less (more) debt constrained and
therefore can be expected to have lower (higher) implied mean-reversion rates.
2. The sample average annualised daily equity return volatility for the ﬁrm. Firms
with higher (lower) in sample equity volatility may carry higher (lower) default
risk and therefore be more (less) debt constrained and exhibit faster (slower) im-
plied mean-reversion rates.
3. The sample average of the daily ratio of the ﬁrm’s observed solvency ratio. This
is calculated as the sum of the ﬁrm’s equity capital (sourced from CRSP daily)
and the ﬁrm’s book debt (sourced from COMPUSTATquarterly), divided by book
debt. Firms with higher (lower) average solvency are expected to be less (more)
debt constrained therefore exhibit lower (higher) implied mean-reversion rates.
4. The sample average of the ﬁrm’s daily market-to-book ratio. Firms with a high
(low) average MTB tend to target debt-ratios less (more). If the bond market fac-
tors this into debt valuation we can expect lower (higher) implied mean-reversion
rates.
5. The natural log of the sample average of the ﬁrm’s daily market capitalisation as
sourced from CRSP. Larger (smaller) ﬁrms can be expected to have greater (less)
access to capital markets and are therefore may be less (more) concerned with debt
targeting and exhibit lower (higher) implied mean-reversion rates.
6. The sample average of the ﬁrm’s remaining tenor of its bonds. Included as a
control variable to test whether the implied rate of mean-reversion is robust to the
ﬁrm’s average length of bond maturity. It is not expected be signiﬁcant if the CDG
model is ﬁtted without bias by our selection of bonds.
7. A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the issuer is a ﬁnancial ﬁrm, oth-
erwise zero. A control variable included to test whether industry related factors,
in addition to ﬁrm solvency, are signiﬁcant.
8. A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the issuer is a utility ﬁrm, other-
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Table 4.27: This table shows the results of multivariate linear regression. The dependent variable is the
natural log of the implied mean-reversion rate, kv, obtained by ﬁtting the CDG model by EKF to the credit
spread term structures on a sample of 32 ﬁrms. Parameter estimation was performed assuming that the
credit spread includes a time-varying liquidity premium related to the Refcorp spread. t-stats are shown in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance of the mean-reversion rate at the 5 percent level is signiﬁed by ‘*’.
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient t-stat
constant -2.547 (-1.981)
Weighted Average Debt Rating -0.001 (-0.010 )
Average Daily Equity Volatility 0.035 (0.074)
Average Daily Observed Solvency Ratio (V/K) -0.065 (-2.076) *
Average Daily MTB ratio 0.077 (1.110)
Natural Log of the Average Daily Market Capital 0.040 (0.544)
Average Remaining Bond Tenor -0.009 ( -0.504)
Finance Industry Dummy 0.241 ( 1.457)
Utility Industry Dummy -0.006 (-0.034)
Adj R2 (%) 10.939
F(8, 23) 4.344
n 32
As reported in Table 4.27 we ﬁnd that the only signiﬁcant independent variable is
the ﬁrm’s average solvency level. The negative coefﬁcient suggests that as expected,
less solvent ﬁrms are priced by the bond market with greater expected levels of mean-
reversion in the ﬁrm’s capital structure. The dummy variables for industry are not sig-
niﬁcant suggesting that the apparent difference in mean-reversion rates by industry, as
shown in Table 4.26, is due to the average differences in ﬁrm solvency across industries.
Therefore, our exogenous setting of the ﬁrm’s target solvency level, made necessary for
estimation purposes, using industry average debt-ratios, does not appear to have sys-
tematically biased our estimates of mean-reversion. Importantly, other measures of debt
constraint, such as the ﬁrm’s rating, are not signiﬁcant. This suggests that allowing ﬁrm-
speciﬁc estimation of solvency levels and mean-reversion rates, is sufﬁcient to capture
the effects of debt constraint as priced by the bond market. Importantly, we ﬁnd that the
expected mean-reversion rate of the ﬁrm’s solvency is a signiﬁcant factor in the market’s
pricing of debt across the term structure. Unlike the extant capital structure literature
our estimates of capital structure mean-reversion represent a new insight into the debt
market’s expectation of ﬁrm behaviour. Our estimates are obtained by inverting the mar-
ket’s expected reversion rate implied in the credit spread term structure shape, and not by
direct observation of the ﬁrm’s debt-ratio. We ﬁnd that the debt market, on average, an-
ticipates and prices into a ﬁrm’s term structure of credit spreads, anticipated changes in
leverage in manner comparable with observed debt-ratio mean-reversion rates. The rate
of mean-reversion is found to be greater for ﬁrms with lower solvency levels consistent
with these ﬁrms behaving with more concern for debt-targeting. We cannot conclude
that these ﬁrms are more capital constrained since other proxy measures of capital con-4.4. COMPOSITION OF THE CREDIT SPREAD 191
straint were not found to be signiﬁcant explanatory variables. The negative relationship
between solvency and implied solvency mean-reversion rate is found to be robust to
other measures of ﬁrm capital constraint and industry membership.
4.4 Composition of the Credit Spread
In this section we use the results of the time-varying model speciﬁcation to address the
question of how much of the observed credit spread is explained by structural credit
models. In predicting credit spreads, we have introduced additional control parameters
for liquidity premium components of the spread. A question therefore arises as to how
much of the credit spread is explained by the ﬁrms capital structure and asset risk, and
how much is not. A better ﬁtting model can be expected to explain more of the credit
spread in terms of default risk related parameters.
Using a method of calibrating to real default probabilities, HH concluded that credit
risk only explained a small proportion of the observed spread; typically around 20 per-
cent to 30 percent for investment grade bonds, and decreasing as maturity shortens. For
sub-investment grade bonds, the proportion explained by structural credit models in-
creases. The HH method has some shortcomings. The models were ﬁtted to average
realised default rates, reported by rating, however for investment grade debt the under-
lying default rate level will be downwardly biased due to the low-frequency of observed
defaults. The second problem is that some of the model parameters are proxied by ob-
servable variables, and any poor ﬁt that results from the choice of proxy, can lead to the
mistaken conclusion that structural models do not sufﬁciently explain the credit spreads.
A particularly difﬁcult aspect of their method is the need to estimate the unobserved
market price of risk. Since we calibrate to observed bond prices and not to historical
average default rates, we avoid the empirical difﬁculties of having to estimate the market
price of credit risk.
In contrast to HH, our estimation method ensures that the structural models are ﬁtted
in with minimal credit spread prediction bias. Thus, we are able to present an alterna-
tive method for decomposing credit spreads: a component that is related to a liquidity
premium, which is exogenous to the ﬁrm’s default risk; the amount that is related to the
ﬁrm’s default risk, as predicted by the structural models; and, the residual component
that is not predicted by way of liquidity premium nor predicted default risk.
Recall the measurement equation with time-varying liquidity is
yi,j(t) = di,j +bR
j Ref(t)+g(aj(t);yi,j)+ei,j(t). (3.10)
From equation (3.10) the following components of predicted spread are estimated at192 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.28: This table shows the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc log-solvency mean-reversion rates. kv is the esti-
mated mean-reversion rate parameter of the log-solvency ratio, x(t) = ln(V(t)/K(t)), estimated by ﬁtting
the CDG model to the credit spread term structures of n=32 ﬁrms, assuming a time-varying liquidity pre-
mium. H(k) is the equivalent half life of the log-solvency ratio mean-reversion expressed in years. Half life
is calculated as ln(2)/k. Asymptotic t-stats of the mean-reversion rate are shown in parentheses.
Issuer k t-stat H(k) (yrs)
Aetna Inc 0.132 (7.467) 5.259
Associates Corp 0.215 (0.320) 3.219
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co 0.055 (21.790) 12.691
A T & T Corp 0.125 (11.554) 5.550
Bear Stearns Companies Inc 0.186 (21.410) 3.733
Black & Decker Corp 0.139 (22.800) 4.983
Boeing Co 0.155 (10.930) 4.466
Dayton Hudson Corp 0.178 (15.627) 3.890
Commonwealth Edison Co 0.103 (17.016) 6.725
Enron Corp 0.123 (10.892) 5.630
Federated Dept Stores 0.183 (12.564) 3.795
Ford Mtr Co 0.168 (25.780) 4.135
General Mtrs 0.161 (22.607) 4.316
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp 0.152 (13.061) 4.554
Hca Healthcare Corp 0.160 (13.698) 4.339
IBM Corp 0.186 (9.555) 3.719
International Paper Co 0.113 (16.970) 6.150
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc 0.165 (29.105) 4.197
Merrill Lynch & Co 0.213 (28.720) 3.249
Motorola Inc 0.091 (20.526) 7.646
Nabisco Group Hldgs Corp 0.145 (21.946) 4.779
Niagara Mohawk Pwr Corp 0.099 (16.191) 6.976
Northrop Grumman Corp 0.095 (16.578) 7.290
Paine Webber Group Inc 0.160 (18.917) 4.320
Penney J C Co Inc 0.087 (32.836) 7.941
Philip Morris Companies Inc 0.146 (13.015) 4.733
Seagram Co Ltd 0.093 (33.324) 7.479
Sears Roebuck Accep Corp 0.230 (14.997) 3.007
Service Corp Intl 0.100 (30.394) 6.954
Union Paciﬁc Corp 0.178 (17.039) 3.890
Viacom Inc 0.107 (29.959) 6.465
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 0.107 (13.911) 6.464
Mean 0.142 5.392
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each trade date, t, for bond, i, and ﬁrm, j, scaling by the observed credit spread:
(i) Constant Liquidity Premium = di,j/yi,j(t),
(ii) Time-Varying Liquidity Premium = bR
j Ref(t)/yi,j(t),
(iii) Model = g(aj(t);yi,j)/yi,j(t),
(iv) Prediction Error = ei,j(t)/yi,j(t).
(4.3)
The sum of components (i) and (ii) is our estimate of the proportion of the observed
credit spread at time-t attributable to a liquidity premium, component (ii) is the propor-
tion of the observed credit spread attributed to default risk, and component (iii) is the
unexplained proportion of the observed credit spread.
The time-t estimates of the four components described above in equation (4.3) are
pooled across time, bonds, and ﬁrms. The mean and standard deviations (shown in
parentheses) of the components are reported in Table 4.29.
Panel A shows the results for the total pooled sample, Panel B the results for bonds
with remaining maturities of less than 7 years, Panel C the results for remaining ma-
turities between 7 and 15, and Panel D the results for bonds with remaining maturities
greater than 15 years. Table 4.31 compares our results with HH for the models where a
direct comparison can be made.
The average proportion of credit spread explained by a structural model is found to
vary by model. Beginning with Panel A of Table 4.29, the lowest proportion of the credit
spread explained by a model is by the CEV model at only 17.85 percent, which increases
to a maximum of 43.72 percent for the EM model. Across models, the average credit
spread explained by structural models is 31.95 percent. Our estimates, therefore, are at
the upper end of HH’s estimates of 20 to 30 percent but gives support to their view that
the only a small proportion is attributable to default risk. The amount of credit spread
explained by the structural models increases as the remaining tenor is lengthened. For
trades with remaining maturity of greater than 15 years, the average across all models
is 36.10 percent with the lowest being the LT model at 22.48 percent and the highest
being the CDG model at 53.59 percent. HH report that the default risk component of the
spread decreases as remaining maturity decreases.
The proportion of the credit spread explained by structural models also increases as
the rating declines. In Table 4.30, the means and standard deviations (shown in paren-
theses) of the credit spread components of equation (4.3) are reported by the issue rating
attributed to the bond at the date of trade. Results for AA rated trades are shown in Panel
A, A rated trades in Panel B, BBB rated trades in Panel C, and BB rated trades in Panel
D. For AA rated trades, the across model average proportion of the credit spread ex-
plained by the models is 26.71 percent, with the LS2 model the lowest at 15.77 percent,
and the EM model the highest at 33.03 percent. For BB rated trades, the across model
average increases to 50.56 percent, with the CEV model the lowest at 40.20 percent, and194 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
the CDG model the highest at 59.63 percent.
Thus, the proportion of the observed credit spread that structural models explain to
be related to default risk is on average 31.95 percent, but improves with lengthening
maturity or declining rating. Both results are characteristic of the models unable to
generate sufﬁciently high probabilities of default when the ﬁrm’s assets have only short
time to diffuse to the default boundary, or the ﬁrm is sufﬁciently solvent for ﬁrm assets
to be distant from the default boundary. For higher default risky BB rated issues, the
structural models performed noticeably better explaining on average 50.56 percent of
the credit spread.
The time-varying spread component measures the percentage of observable spread
that varies in proportion with the Refcorp spread, and is found to be, on average, nearly
of similar magnitude as the model component, varying between 19.25 percent for the
LS1 model, to 33.26 percent for the CEV model. Thus, we ﬁnd that time-varying liquid-
ity, is of almost equal magnitude to that explainable by ﬁrm default risk. The constant
liquidity component ranges from the smallest average at 36.11 percent for the CDG
model to the highest at 58.61 percent for the CEV model.
The amount of spread attributable to the constant term includes effects not sufﬁ-
ciently speciﬁed in the structural model. The fact that we see some variation between
models shows that we cannot conclude that the model component is all due to default
risk, rather it is the amount of spread explained by the model. HH, on the other hand, at-
tribute the modelled component all to default risk, thus assuming that structural models
fully explains default risk.
The LS1 and LT models show similar average explanatory behaviour, which is not
surprising given their similarity in speciﬁcation. The CEV model is particularly poor
in comparison to the other models. The marginal effect on explanatory power from the
added complexity of a stochastic interest rate process can be made by comparing the
model component of the LS1 model and LS2 model. Panel A of Table 4.29 shows that
the LS1 model, on average, predicts that default risk comprises 10 percent less of the
spread than the LS1 model that has deterministic interest rates. HH report a similar
result as shown in Table 4.31. We therefore, ﬁnd that the introduction of stochastic
interest rates into the LS model reduces the estimated default risk component. Rather
than predicting more of the observed spread, the additional complexity of the model only
lessens the proportion of the credit spread predicted by the model. In Table 4.30 weshow
the average spread components reported by the issuer rating extant at the date of trade.
For the highest rating of AA, the model component ranges between 15.77 percent for
the LS2 model up to 33.03 percent for the EM model. Our model component estimates
compare with HH who report 15.6 percent for AA rated 10 year debt for their LS Base
case model, 16.4 percent for the CDG model, and 37.9 percent for the LT model. Unlike
HH,we ﬁnd that, with the exception of the LS2model, most of our models explain 25-304.4. COMPOSITION OF THE CREDIT SPREAD 195
Table 4.29: This table shows the average composition of the observed credit spreads by remaining contrac-
tual maturity. Component (i) is the mean predicted constant liquidity premium expressed as a percentage of
the observed credit spread. Component (ii) is the mean predicted time-varying liquidity premium expressed
as a percentage of the observed credit spread. Component (iii) is the mean structural model predicted credit
spread (excluding liquidity premiums) expressed as a percentage of the observed credit spread. Component
(iv) is the mean credit spread prediction error, measured as predicted less actual yield to maturity credit
spreads, expressed as a percentage of the observed credit spread. Descriptive statistics are based on pooling
across all ﬁrms, trades, and time. Remaining tenor is the difference in the contractual maturity of bond and
the date of the trade. Sample standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant Time-varying Model Prediction Error
Panel A: All
EM 49.80 (35.49) 14.06 (25.71) 43.72 (43.92) -7.58 (62.93)
LS1 56.69 (37.26) 19.25 (41.30) 32.32 (40.73) -8.26 (67.85)
LT 53.80 (36.10) 21.53 (36.30) 32.65 (45.84) -7.97 (70.36)
CEV 58.61 (46.75) 30.59 (84.55) 17.85 (88.63) -7.05 (67.73)
LS2 53.11 (37.71) 33.26 (47.12) 22.29 (30.90) -8.65 (69.86)
CDG 36.11 (39.73) 27.27 (47.57) 42.84 (44.06) -6.22 (68.99)
Panel B: Remaining Maturity ≤ 7 years
EM 52.31 (38.55) 16.51 (29.47) 41.69 (53.19) -10.51 (77.97)
LS1 54.74 (39.89) 22.70 (52.97) 33.71 (46.90) -11.15 (82.94)
LT 50.23 (39.36) 23.31 (45.95) 37.62 (60.54) -11.15 (89.18)
CEV 59.47 (58.98) 32.66 (79.86) 19.40 (97.05) -11.52 (84.52)
LS2 56.62 (42.38) 38.51 (57.02) 18.26 (31.86) -13.38 (86.44)
CDG 49.43 (44.84) 32.87 (58.95) 26.53 (38.55) -8.83 (80.81)
Panel C: Remaining Maturity 7−15 years
EM 48.62 (35.41) 12.62 (25.33) 44.89 (36.73) -6.13 (53.51)
LS1 59.51 (39.13) 17.44 (31.78) 30.41 (38.62) -7.35 (59.76)
LT 54.56 (35.87) 20.22 (28.95) 30.95 (28.99) -5.72 (55.71)
CEV 56.72 (36.89) 34.48 (104.56) 13.25 (95.09) -4.45 (56.50)
LS2 54.02 (34.98) 31.57 (41.79) 21.12 (29.73) -6.70 (59.28)
CDG 23.23 (32.33) 23.13 (39.84) 57.98 (45.10) -4.34 (65.32)
Panel D: Remaining Maturity > 15 years
EM 45.43 (24.27) 10.47 (9.05) 46.75 (26.64) -2.65 (21.40)
LS1 55.55 (21.01) 13.69 (11.80) 32.90 (22.33) -2.14 (22.20)
LT 62.16 (23.10) 19.54 (13.03) 22.48 (21.04) -4.18 (26.52)
CEV 60.66 (20.82) 15.46 (11.12) 24.34 (22.16) -0.47 (21.95)
LS2 40.93 (25.35) 22.27 (14.09) 36.56 (26.44) 0.24 (23.93)
CDG 28.56 (25.54) 21.10 (15.38) 53.59 (40.08) -3.24 (28.97)196 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
percent of the AA spread, with the LT model proving similar in performance to the LS1
model. At the other end of the rating spectrum, we ﬁnd the models explain relatively
more of the credit spread. As seen in Table 4.31,we ﬁnd that our estimates of the model
component of the credit spread are very similar to HH for the lowest BB rating. HH
estimate the default risk component on a 10 year maturity BB rated issuer for an LS1
equivalent model to be 60 percent, 51.8 percent for the LT model, and 57.1 percent for
the CDG model. We ﬁnd that the CDG model explains the most of the observed BB
rated spreads with 59.63 percent, and the CEV the least at 40.20 percent. The LS1 and
LT models explain approximately 50 percent of the observed BB rated spread. Thus,
we are able to afﬁrm the ﬁndings of HH, with the exception that we ﬁnd the one and
two factor LS models, and the CDG model, explain more of the spread at higher ratings.
In summary we ﬁnd less variation between models and ratings than estimated by HH,
but agree with the relatively lower explanatory power of the LS models and with the
presence of a positive relationship between percentage of spread explained and rating.
Structural models vary in their ability to explain credit spreads, but for the best ﬁtting
EM and CDG models, between 30 percent to 60 percent of the spread is explained by
ﬁrm-specic default risk.4.4. COMPOSITION OF THE CREDIT SPREAD 197
Table 4.30: This table shows the composition of the observed credit spreads by issuer rating. Component (i)
is the mean predicted constant liquidity premium expressed as a percentage of the observed credit spread.
Component (ii) is the mean predicted time-varying liquidity premium expressed as a percentage of the
observed credit spread. Component (iii) is the mean structural model predicted credit spread (excluding
liquidity premiums) expressed as a percentage of the observed credit spread. Component (iv) is the mean
credit spread prediction error, measured as predicted less actual yield to maturity credit spreads, expressed
as a percentage of the observed credit spread. Descriptive statistics are based on pooling across all ﬁrms,
trades, and time. Rating refers to the issuer’s rating for the bond recorded on the date of the trade. Sample
standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant Time-varying Model Error
Panel A: AA
EM 59.67 (45.12) 17.30 (37.65) 33.03 (33.07) -10.00 (72.80)
LS1 61.72 (45.84) 23.30 (45.83) 25.33 (31.41) -10.36 (75.44)
LT 59.28 (44.91) 19.51 (34.97) 31.36 (30.47) -10.15 (74.80)
CEV 63.29 (46.02) 23.55 (42.32) 23.66 (38.20) -10.49 (77.98)
LS2 51.25 (40.84) 45.26 (57.65) 15.77 (26.82) -12.28 (83.22)
CDG 32.20 (40.06) 44.81 (63.30) 31.12 (46.76) -8.13 (85.66)
Panel B: A
EM 48.36 (30.71) 14.94 (22.96) 43.58 (43.53) -6.88 (58.97)
LS1 56.13 (31.47) 19.38 (35.67) 32.58 (48.60) -8.09 (69.39)
LT 52.31 (34.47) 22.21 (28.28) 33.39 (60.04) -7.91 (74.45)
CEV 58.90 (31.57) 22.49 (37.27) 25.73 (41.68) -7.11 (66.75)
LS2 54.04 (35.53) 32.69 (43.98) 21.37 (30.68) -8.09 (64.72)
CDG 38.07 (40.61) 24.90 (41.40) 43.41 (45.19) -6.38 (66.54)
Panel C: BBB
EM 47.18 (34.73) 11.87 (21.42) 48.39 (48.79) -7.44 (64.15)
LS1 55.82 (38.86) 17.94 (46.03) 33.96 (33.83) -7.72 (64.16)
LT 53.52 (33.02) 22.78 (45.25) 30.86 (31.01) -7.16 (65.23)
CEV 57.04 (60.54) 44.79 (129.49) 3.89 (3.89) -5.72 (65.79)
LS2 53.95 (39.12) 29.66 (45.13) 24.49 (31.95) -8.10 (70.74)
CDG 36.23 (39.31) 22.53 (44.21) 46.76 (41.05) -5.52 (64.70)
Panel D: BB
EM 40.13 (25.29) 8.76 (10.11) 55.13 (33.50) -4.02 (24.48)
LS1 44.37 (25.58) 8.82 (9.88) 51.04 (41.43) -4.23 (32.75)
LT 43.99 (26.84) 10.51 (10.70) 50.53 (46.76) -5.03 (39.00)
CEV 45.68 (28.77) 15.42 (16.14) 40.20 (28.99) -1.29 (21.59)
LS2 42.77 (26.31) 11.29 (10.01) 46.85 (29.24) -0.91 (19.05)
CDG 32.50 (27.71) 8.87 (12.94) 59.63 (29.51) -1.00 (21.33)198 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.31: This table compares the percentage of the credit spread explained by structural models, by
issuer rating, against comparable ﬁndings reproduced from Huang & Huang (2003)(HH). All numbers are
in percentage.
Model Component (%)
Model HH Model AA A BBB BB
LT 31.4 33.4 30.9 50.5
LT 37.9 31.3 30.6 51.8
LS1 25.3 32.6 34.0 51.0
LS (Base Case) 15.6 19.0 29.1 60.0
LS2 15.8 21.4 24.5 46.9
LS (1-day CMT) 9.4 11.8 19.9 48.1
CDG 31.1 43.4 46.8 59.6
CDG (Baseline) 16.4 18.3 26.9 57.1Chapter 5
Conclusion
Structural models of credit risk are well known to perform poorly at predicting observed
credit spreads. In a series of studies by JMR, LYS, and recently, EHH, the Merton model
has been found to generally underpredict credit spreads; more so for short tenor bonds
and for default risk remote bonds issued by highly rated ﬁrms. The structural credit
modelling literature has subsequently developed along the path of theoretical extensions
to address these biases and to relax the strong assumptions made by Merton. The result
is a plethora of theoretical models but relatively little empirical work to verify the contri-
bution made by these developments. In an important recent study by EHH they conclude
that newer structural credit models improve on the average credit spread underprediction
problem, but do so at the cost of losing considerable predictive accuracy. The common
view, therefore remains, that structural credit models cannot adequately explain mar-
ket bond yield spreads and that recent theoretical developments have not improved their
performance at predicting credit spreads.
In this study we tested the hypothesis that the apparent poor predictive accuracy ap-
parent across a wide range of structural credit models is due to the assumption made
in extant empirical models that the ﬁrm’s log-solvency process can be adequately ap-
proximated by the use of observable proxy variables. In other words, the assumption is
commonly made that the ﬁrm’s solvency level is fully, or in part, observable. Secondly,
we test the hypothesis that having ﬁtted a range of structural models assuming more cor-
rectly that ﬁrm solvency is truly unobserved, that the remaining biases will be related
to missing factors identiﬁable from the extant capital structure theory and empirical evi-
dence of dynamic management behaviour.
We make several contributions to the extant literature of JMR, LYS, EHH, and HH.
Firstly, this is the ﬁrst study to apply a quasi maximum likelihood estimation technique
to ﬁt a broad range of structural credit models on actual corporate bond trade data where
the ﬁrm’s log-solvency is properly treated as truly unobservable. We improve on prior
studies by avoiding potential errors and biases introduced by the ad hoc choice of proxy
variables. Our improved method ensures that the cross-sectional and time-series restric-
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tions implied by the models is fully included in the estimation of the models, and thus,
provide the most extensive and robust test of structural credit models to date. We there-
fore provide new insight into the relative performance of the models. We also present,
for the ﬁrst time, model error speciﬁcation tests in addition to the usual discussion of
prediction error biases. We also introduce controls for liquidity and are able to show
their impact on model miss-speciﬁcation.
Secondly, as a consequence of our model ﬁtting method, we present a new insight
into the decomposition of the credit spread into explained and unexplained components.
Our method differs from HH in that we decompose the credit spread using ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information from the credit spread term structures and avoid the empirical difﬁculty that
HH have of converting risk-neutral probabilities of default to physical probabilities. We
thus avoid an important source of calibration error inherent in HH.
Finally, we demonstrate how the implied default boundary of the ﬁrm can be ex-
tracted from market information thus providing new insight into the implied default point
for non-defaulted ﬁrms.
In the remainder of this chapter we presents our main ﬁndings of model accuracy in
Section 5.0.1, speciﬁcation robustness in Section 5.0.2, and potential missing factors in
Section 5.0.3. Related ﬁndings and a suggested direction for future research is discussed
in Section 5.0.5.
5.0.1 Predictive Accuracy
We asked the question as to whether the implicit estimation of ﬁrm solvency and model
parameters improves the predictive accuracy, relative to the extant literature, across a
range of structural credit models. We conﬁrm this to be true using a number of measures.
We ﬁnd that by using EKF we can achieve mean levels of prediction error that are
comparable with the reduced-form literature as evidenced by a comparison with the re-
sults of Duffee (1999). We ﬁnd that, after inclusion of a time-varying liquidity premium,
the average level of prediction error across models is essentially zero, ranging from be-
tween -0.59 basis points and 4.22 basis points across models. The RMSE is likewise
similarly small across models, ranging between 28.76 percent and 34.4 percent across
models. Some evidence of average underprediction is conﬁrmed with negative MPE re-
ported for all models ranging between -6.22 percent to -8.65 percent. In general, these
errors are very small with little variation between the models, unlike the ﬁndings of EHH
and HH.
A concern raised by EHH is the apparent wide variance in model error for structural
models generally. By using implicit estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc model parameters we
have reduced the variance in prediction errors dramatically. We observe an across ﬁrm
mean MAPE per model of around 22 percent with no signiﬁcant difference between
models. In contrast, EHH report a mean MAPE ranging from 78 percent to 319 percent201
across different models.
5.0.2 Speciﬁcation Problems
The improved accuracy of our ﬁtting enables us to examine more carefully the struc-
ture of prediction errors across models. Beginning with the MPE, we conﬁrm that two
generic biases are evident in all models tested, as has been previously noted in the extant
literature. The models tend to underpredict credit spreads more on short-term debt than
on long-term debt. Similarly, the models generally underpredict credit spreads more
on bonds from well rated issuers than they do on lower rated issuers. Default under
a structural model only occurs with the passage of the ﬁrm’s asset values to a default
boundary, and it appears that the assumption of a smooth diffusive process tends to un-
derstate the probability of default when the distance of the ﬁrm from default is great or
the passage of time allowed for diffusion is small. Our result is robust for two important
reasons. Firstly, asset volatility is estimated using jointly the level implicit in the model’s
debt valuation, across the full term structure, and in the time-series behaviour of credit
spreads. Thus, we do not allow the asset volatility to artiﬁcially inﬂate to match short
term market spreads. Secondly, the biases are evident after controlling for a liquidity
premium in the credit spread.
In a novel examination of speciﬁcation errors, we examined the standardised predic-
tion errors for consistency with the usual assumption of normal errors in the theoretical
models and state-space framework. We ﬁnd that all the models exhibit non-normal pre-
diction errors. Standardised errors are fatter tailed than expected under normality, and
exhibit positive skewness. It appears that the models are unable to explain large positive
deviations in credit spreads that occur rapidly, but are nonetheless prevalent in the data.
The problem is evident even after controlling for a time-varying liquidity premium. An
investigation of autocorrelation in the standardised errors reveals that all models exhibit
signiﬁcant autocorrelation that rapidly decays with timelags. Inclusion ofa time-varying
liquidity premium, based on the 10 year Refcorp spread, reduced the level of autocor-
relation conﬁrming its usefulness in improving model speciﬁcation. The presence of
autocorrelated prediction errors suggests that there is a missing factor related to time-
variation in spreads yet to be properly speciﬁed in the models.
The evidence of excess-kurtosis in the standardised errors, when taken together with
evidence of percentage prediction biases at short bond maturities and high credit ratings,
suggests that the diffusive asset process should be augmented with a ﬁrm asset value
jump necessary to explain sudden changes in credit spreads.202 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
5.0.3 Potential Missing Factors
We asked whether structural credit model prediction errors are related to missing factors
identiﬁable from the capital structure literature. From our review of the theory and
evidence, important stylised facts concerning the expected evolution of ﬁrm solvency
are mean-reverting debt behaviour and market timing. Most structural models ignore
these behaviours, with only the CDG model including debt targeting and debt market
timing behaviour.
Totestour hypothesis wechose asetofindependent variables torepresent potentially
missing variables, together with other factors that prior studies had found important,
and regressed these against the prediction errors of the models. For the standardised
prediction error, wefound thatthe models arewellﬁttedfor theﬁrmand bond parameters
that are speciﬁed in the models. For example, ﬁrm solvency, ﬁrm asset volatility, ﬁrm
rating, and bond coupon rate are mostly unrelated to the standardised error. Only the
LS1 model shows some mild positive relationship with asset volatility.
Our hypothesis was that debt market timing is important was conﬁrmed by a gen-
erally signiﬁcant relationship with the risk-free term structure. Unexpectedly, the CDG
model also carried this relationship. The equity market timing variables, VIX and ﬁrm
equity volatility, were less conclusive. Whilst generally signiﬁcant, they carried the
wrong signs as we would have expected that an increase in both would have decreased
equity issuance and resulted in higher credit spreads and underprediction. We ﬁnd the
opposite. However, we cannot dismiss equity timing as an important omitted feature.
During our sample period, equity volatility increased but the equity market had a bull
run. Perhaps the use of volatility is not a sufﬁcient measure of equity value. As an alter-
native measure of relative equity value, we expected that the MTB would be signiﬁcant
but in most cases it was not.
We also test for explanatory values that may affect the speed of mean-reversion in
log-solvency under the CDG model. We ﬁnd that the implied speed of mean-reversion
is related to debt constraint to the extent that more highly leveraged ﬁrms have faster
implied levels of mean-reversion implied into their terms structures of credit spreads.
Other measures of capital constraint were not found to be signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd the levels
of mean-reversion to be on average comparable with those reported from direct mea-
surement of capital structure by by Fama & French (2002).
A strong relationship was found with the change in GDP and spread errors across
all models. The result suggests that the market anticipates an improvement in ﬁrm asset
value with improved business conditions. A less reliable relationship was found with the
secondary market return on defaulted assets. It is possible that the return in this market
is also inﬂuenced by current supply and demand conditions which are less relevant for
non-defaulted ﬁrm valuation.
Finally, we ﬁnd that errors are related to the risk-free rate level and volatility. How-203
ever, the two-factor models do not adequately address the speciﬁcation problem and the
errors prevail in the two-factor LS2 model and CDG model. It appears that stochastic in-
terest rates are yet to be adequately addressed by structural credit models and is possibly
due to the simplistic nature of the single-factor Vasicek model.
5.0.4 Related Findings
As an extension to HH we report a decomposition of the observed credit spread and
ask how much of the credit spread is explained by structural models. We ﬁnd that,
on average, the component of the observed credit spread explained by structural credit
models is 31.95 percent. The percentage explained varies by model, with the highest
achieved by the EM model at 43.72 percent and the lowest from the CEV model at
17.85 percent. The amount of the spread explained is related to the predictive accuracy
of the models, and improves with lower credit ratings and longer remaining maturities.
For the lowest BB rating, our estimates of the default risk component are very similar
to HH, but we ﬁnd that the LS1, LS2 and CDG models explain considerably more of
the credit spread for AA rated ﬁrms than previously reported by HH. Also of additional
interest is our ﬁnding that time-varying liquidity, is of almost equal magnitude to that
explainable by ﬁrm default risk. Taking the modelled time-varying liquidity premium
and model estimate suggests that we can account for approximately half of the credit
spread through time variation in ﬁrm default risk and time-varying liquidity premiums.
As a consequence of estimating the models by EKF we are able to estimate the most
likely path taken by the ﬁrm’s latent log-solvency ratio. This provides a measure of the
ﬁrm value relative to the default boundary through time. The average across models of
the ratio of ﬁrm value to default boundary is found to be 2.51 compared to the average
ratio of observed market value (using market equity capitalisation and book debt) of
2.30. Thus, we can infer that the default boundary is implied to be below the level of
book debt. There is considerable variation across ﬁrms and models with the correlation
between the implied solvency level and the market-accounting proxy sufﬁciently low
that by using a proxy variable for leverage, to input into a structural credit model, would
result in estimation error.
Finally, we compared the ﬁrm’s implied asset volatility with the ﬁrm’s observed
equity volatility. A simple test for an upper bound is that the ﬁrm’s asset volatility
should be below its equity volatility on average. The Merton model requires an asset
volatility, sufﬁcient to match market spreads, that is excessive under this test. While
the EM model performs with lowest prediction errors, we ﬁnd that the CDG model has
perhaps the most realistic description of the ﬁrm’s solvency dynamics, as evidenced by
reasonable levels of implied asset volatility, level of the default boundary, and speed of
mean reversion.204 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
5.0.5 Summary
In performing our testing we selected a representative range of models that have been
subject to prior empirical analysis and are tractable. Which model performed best? The
answer depends on the intended use of the model with no single model dominating under
all criteria.
Unexpectedly, the EMmodel has best prediction accuracy as evidenced by the lowest
MPE, lowest MAPE, lowest RMSE, and has the best overall goodness of ﬁt as measured
by the AIC. It also has the lowest autocorrelation in prediction errors. This is an im-
portant ﬁnding since the only difference between our EM and LS1 implementations is
that the EM model includes an endogenous writedown rate that is allowed some time
variation. Thus, the reduction in autocorrelation of errors appears to be attributable to
this feature of the model. Thus, for simple debt valuation purposes, we ﬁnd that the EM
model performs the best amonst the sample of structural models. However, to match
bond spreads, the implied level of asset volatility is excessive relative to the ﬁrm’s eq-
uity volatility. We therefore, do not consider that the EM model is the most realistic
description of the ﬁrm.
The LS1 model is a simple extension of the Merton model but performs worse than
the EM model in all speciﬁcation tests. Our ﬁnding lends support to similar results by
LYS and EHH. It has the highest RMSE of all models. It would therefore appear that
assuming the write-off rate to be time-invariant, and exogenous to the ﬁrm asset process,
has reduced the model’s performance relative to the EM model. What appeared to be a
simple and elegant extension to permit a more realistic description of ﬁrm default has
decreased model performance.
The LS2 model introduces a stochastic interest rate to the LS1 model but it offers
only a modest improvement in prediction accuracy over the LS1 model. We ﬁnd the
LT model has the worst RMSE but a relatively low MAPE. Its goodness of ﬁt is quite
similar to the LS1 model, which is not surprising given their common roots. The LT
model does improve on the LS1 model in speciﬁcation tests with errors that are more
normally distributed. The CEV model introduces local asset volatility but proves to
offer little advantage over the extant model time-homogenous asset volatility models.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the CDG model, which is the most complex model, suffers from
relatively low accuracy and has the worst AIC score of all the models tested. However,
the implied asset parameters appear reasonable, with mean-reversion rates and implied
default boundary close to expected values. Therefore, it appears that the CDG model
achieves its aim of describing a more realistic capital structure process than the Merton
model, but suffers from a large number of parameters that are difﬁcult to estimate. Along
with the LS2 model, it is not apparent that a stochastic interest rate process has added
much improvement. However, the mean-reversion of the ﬁrm’s solvency does enable
realistic levels of the default boundary to be achieved.205
Overall, we conclude that the more advanced theoretical extensions to the Merton
model have not been able to improve model performance signiﬁcantly beyond an ad hoc
implementation of the original Merton model. The most promising extension is the CDG
model, however, its improvements in performance are attributable to the mean-reversion
of the ﬁrm’s underlying solvency ratio. However, the assumption of exogenously ﬁxed
writedown rate and stochastic interest rate volatility do not appear in their own rights,
to enhance the speciﬁcation of the models despite being common features of the newer
structural models.
All the models demonstrate non-normality and autocorrelation in errors, and a pos-
itive correlation in error with the business cycle. Relationships between market equity
timing variables and prediction errors did not hold as expected although prediction errors
are found to be related to market sentiment (VIX, Refcorp spread, and yield curve term
structure) and change in GDP. We therefore conclude that the ﬁrst part of our hypothe-
sis is supported; structural credit models provide similar levels of performance and bias,
when estimated implicitly, with signiﬁcantly higher accuracy than achieved in prior stud-
ies that relied on proxy variables for model ﬁtting. The second part of our hypothesis is
not supported as we are unable to conclusively determine that behaviours identiﬁed from
the capital structure theory and evidence, can satisfactorily explain our credit spread pre-
diction errors. Much work therefore remains to be done in order to better understand the
relationships found between the market and business variables and prediction errors.
This study can be extended in two further directions. Firstly, our data covers a pe-
riod of time when credit spreads began to rise sharply, but together with a rising eq-
uity market. Before drawing conclusions on the importance of market timing on bond
prices, it would be informative to lengthen the time series to more recent periods so
that a fuller credit and equity market cycle is included. Further, since commencing this
study, the credit default swap market has continued to deepen. A more recent sample
of data could use name speciﬁc credit default swap prices as a more reﬁned measure
of the name-speciﬁc liquidity premium. Secondly, in terms of guiding theoretical de-
velopment of future structural credit models, it is apparent that market and business
conditions are important missing factors. Possibly, changes in GDP can be used to con-
dition the ﬁrm’s asset value and a time-varying conditional write-off rate. The additional
complexity of stochastic interest rates does not appear to warrant further work without
introducing additional interest factors, which would result in an impractical model to ﬁt
with maximum-likelihood methods. Rather, the computational burden of an additional
stochastic factor is potentially better utilised in modelling external market asset value or
business cycle conditions. Finally, the use of mean-reversion in ﬁrm solvency appears
to be useful, resulting in realistic levels of the implied default boundary and additional
control over longer term credit spreads. The challenge remains however, to improve
goodness of ﬁt relative to the simplest model of them all.Appendix A
Derivation of Exogenous-Boundary
Dynamics
In this appendix we derive the stochastic differential process for the continuous latent
solvency of the ﬁrm. We deﬁne x(t) to be the log-solvency ratio, x(t) = lnV(t)−lnK
where V(t) is the market value of the ﬁrm’s assets and K is the ﬁrm’s re-organisation
boundary. Default occurs at the ﬁrst instance x(t) = 0. The boundary may be time-
varying or constant depending on the model’s assumptions.
A.1 Longstaff-Schwartz (1995)






Since the default boundary is constant, we know that the s.d.e. for x(t) is the same as for







Substituting (A.1) into (A.2) and simplifying gives







A.2 Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
The ﬁrm’s assets are assumed to evolve under the risk neutral measure in the same man-
ner as Merton and LS (refer (A.1)). Default occurs if the ﬁrm’s asset value equals the
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default boundary, K(t). The key assumption of CDG is that the boundary is actively











where, q is the long-run risk-free rate as per (Vasicek 1977), f is a parameter controlling
sensitivity of the drift to the current risk-free rate and k is the speed of management’s
adjustment of the boundary level, and n is a ﬁxed parameter representing the target level
of the boundary.























where kv ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, f ≥ 0 and q ≥ 0.









where the target solvency level is positively related to the level of the short-rate, implying












1CDG deﬁne the state process as the inverse of x(t).Appendix B
Solutions to the First-Passage
Crossing Times
B.1 Collins-Dufresene-Goldstein Model
In this section we reproduce the solution for the ﬁrst-passage crossing time for the two-
factor CDG model from (Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein 2001) Appendices C2 and C4.













dr(t) = kr(q −r(t))dt +srdW
Q
r,t.
Time is discretised into nT equal intervals of Dt, and date t(j) =
jT
nT ≡ jDt for j ∈
(1,2,...,nT). Similarly, the short rate space is discretised into nr equal intervals of Dr
bounded between an upper value of r and lower bound of r. Deﬁne r(i) = r+i Dr for
i ∈ (1,2,...,nr) and Dr =
r−r
nr .
The probability that default occurs at any time between time zero and time T is given









where r(t) is the short-rate and the log-leverage ratio is l(t) = ln(K(t)/V(t)) ≡ −x(t)
and the target log-leverage ratio ¯ l(t) = −¯ x(t).
Given the values of the functions y and Y, q(r(i),t(j)) is found recursively by the
scheme















∀i ∈ (1,2,...,nr),∀j ∈ (2,3,...,nT).
(B.3)
Under the T-forward measure, the means, variances and covariance of the transition of














































































































































where N( ) is the cumulative normal distribution function and p(r(t),t|r(s),s) is the210 APPENDIX B. SOLUTIONS TO THE FIRST-PASSAGE CROSSING TIMES
























In the interest rate dimension, the minimum rate is set to three standard deviations
below the long run level, of q = 16.05%, and the maximum rate equal to three times
above the long run level. The number of intervals in the short rate is six, resulting in
Dr = 2.68%. Disretisation in the time dimension depends upon the remaining maturity
of the bond, (T −t). If the term is less than two years, the number of equal intervals
is 8(T −t), and if the remaining maturity is greater than 2 years, the numbers of equal
intervals is 4(T −t).
B.2 Longstaff-Schwartz Model
In this section we reproduce the solution for the ﬁrst-passage crossing time for the two-
factor LS model as corrected and reported in (Collin-Dufresne & Goldstein 2001) Ap-
pendices C2 and C3.
The LS model has the bivariate form




dr(t) = kr(q −r(t))dt +srdW
Q
r,t.
The solution for the expected ﬁrst-crossing time follows the above solution for the
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Table C.1: This table shows the bonds sampled. FISD ID refers to the unique identiﬁer attached to each bond by LJS Global Information Services, as reported in the Fixed
Investments Securities Database (FISD). Coupon is the annualised semi-annual coupon rate, Mean (T −t) is the average remaining maturity measured in years, and Rank is the
ranking of the debt in the capital structure of the ﬁrm. The priority ranking of the bonds are: senior unsecured (SEN), senior secured (SENS), and senior subordinated (SS). The
number of observed trade prices is shown by n, and the sample period is the date between the First Trade and Last Trade. Mean Dt is the average time between observed trades
measured in years. The mean, median, minimum and maximum credit spread observed over the sample period is reported in basis points. SD refers to the sample standard deviation
of credit spreads and SD d(1) is the sample standard deviation of the ﬁrst differences.
Bond Characteristics Sample Characteristics Credit Spread Descriptive Statistics (basis points)
FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
ID (%) (T −t) Rank n Trade Trade Dt (yrs) Mean Median SD SD d(1) Min Max
Aetna Inc
42328 6.750 3.64 SEN 26 19-Aug-96 29-Sep-99 0.17 73.59 37.84 63.76 59.09 3.88 265.42
42329 7.125 8.66 SEN 32 15-Aug-96 01-Dec-99 0.15 85.90 70.19 39.17 23.67 40.59 178.11
42330 7.625 28.54 SEN 30 15-Aug-96 12-Nov-99 0.16 132.51 124.82 50.14 25.19 74.04 236.21
Associates Corp
1555 7.500 2.80 SEN 30 02-Feb-95 01-Apr-98 0.15 48.44 47.50 14.42 14.34 9.34 76.15
1563 6.000 3.17 SEN 27 28-Feb-95 11-Feb-99 0.21 54.09 48.66 25.76 27.36 21.15 136.86
1568 5.250 2.87 SEN 26 17-Oct-94 04-Mar-99 0.25 60.63 49.78 39.27 33.57 25.05 180.87
1569 5.750 6.46 SEN 27 22-Feb-95 30-Aug-99 0.24 62.96 54.25 37.58 34.22 11.58 184.69
1575 7.875 4.78 SEN 44 29-Sep-94 03-Jan-00 0.17 55.70 49.73 24.60 19.85 17.44 118.96
26127 6.625 8.69 SEN 38 05-Jun-95 18-Aug-99 0.16 57.54 49.74 24.56 21.50 21.77 134.65
31674 6.375 5.35 SEN 35 31-Oct-95 23-Nov-99 0.17 57.87 49.85 29.57 30.15 22.59 140.44
32803 6.000 5.52 SEN 32 04-Dec-95 16-Aug-99 0.17 58.85 52.48 25.66 15.50 31.17 127.65
45820 6.875 10.99 SENS 30 12-Nov-96 26-Feb-99 0.11 71.02 60.88 28.62 16.77 30.76 154.28
91982 5.800 4.73 SEN 27 14-Apr-99 17-Dec-99 0.04 83.91 80.91 17.98 14.80 54.37 134.29
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Bond Characteristics Sample Characteristics Credit Spread Descriptive Statistics (basis points)
FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
ID (%) (T −t) Rank n Trade Trade Dt (yrs) Mean Median SD SD d(1) Min Max
Atlantic Richﬁeld Co
1719 10.875 8.88 SEN 45 02-Mar-94 14-Mar-00 0.20 59.29 54.40 25.12 14.94 20.66 123.78
1724 9.875 19.58 SEN 37 25-Jan-94 12-Apr-00 0.25 71.55 69.65 16.77 15.88 43.20 130.62
1726 9.000 24.49 SEN 40 06-May-94 12-Apr-00 0.22 79.28 75.30 18.48 16.60 44.43 131.28
A T & T Corp
94 7.500 8.47 SEN 54 28-Feb-95 19-Dec-00 0.16 64.48 48.01 41.86 19.85 13.85 194.58
96 7.750 9.71 SEN 70 28-Feb-95 18-Dec-00 0.12 57.35 43.40 33.30 22.09 20.67 205.04
25597 7.000 8.13 SEN 36 08-May-95 04-Oct-00 0.22 50.94 39.55 32.81 25.11 14.83 177.86
Bear Stearns Companies Inc
2297 6.750 6.13 SEN 36 03-May-95 19-Jul-99 0.17 81.87 72.92 39.57 29.56 44.40 235.42
2300 6.625 6.75 SEN 55 24-May-95 13-Dec-99 0.12 82.78 73.78 32.30 28.40 36.52 213.95
28017 6.750 3.61 SEN 36 01-Aug-95 04-Jun-99 0.16 71.51 61.21 46.88 38.43 21.36 247.54
31069 6.875 8.04 SEN 33 02-Oct-95 09-Nov-00 0.23 92.01 73.23 41.24 24.35 43.49 217.31
36450 5.750 3.41 SEN 28 09-Feb-96 01-Oct-99 0.19 78.83 53.42 56.03 59.88 32.40 269.82
44710 7.250 8.86 SEN 38 08-Oct-96 03-Jul-00 0.14 93.37 64.81 54.92 31.75 49.90 261.38
50334 7.000 8.78 SEN 35 24-Feb-97 15-Dec-99 0.12 111.36 91.75 55.13 31.90 39.10 239.60
62272 6.625 6.14 SEN 36 14-Oct-97 01-Jun-00 0.11 92.86 80.04 34.62 21.12 35.03 174.26
68479 6.125 4.47 SEN 28 04-Feb-98 24-Nov-99 0.09 88.94 67.54 38.66 27.53 53.97 167.52
71515 6.200 4.35 SEN 24 24-Mar-98 10-Nov-00 0.16 107.59 113.65 43.80 33.42 42.95 197.99
Black & Decker Corp
2532 7.500 6.48 SEN 76 19-Jan-94 07-Jun-99 0.10 80.99 68.08 38.62 21.14 25.28 236.18
2533 6.625 4.04 SEN 48 01-Feb-94 30-Apr-99 0.16 74.32 63.75 37.97 24.64 14.51 226.38
2534 7.000 9.66 SEN 56 25-Jan-94 20-May-99 0.14 88.25 79.41 27.47 16.48 48.67 164.87
(continued on next page)2
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Bond Characteristics Sample Characteristics Credit Spread Descriptive Statistics (basis points)
FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
ID (%) (T −t) Rank n Trade Trade Dt (yrs) Mean Median SD SD d(1) Min Max
Boeing Co
2559 8.750 24.22 SEN 38 22-Mar-94 26-Dec-00 0.26 91.40 72.32 41.48 31.01 36.19 200.54
2561 8.100 9.32 SEN 55 02-Jun-94 06-Nov-00 0.17 58.02 44.92 32.78 20.65 11.23 137.95
2565 6.350 6.20 SEN 58 28-Feb-94 21-Dec-00 0.17 45.72 38.11 26.59 20.85 5.32 123.03
Dayton Hudson Corp
5613 9.750 5.75 SEN 32 22-Feb-94 03-Mar-00 0.28 68.42 64.41 22.56 18.10 37.86 126.51
5615 10.000 4.12 SEN 36 31-Mar-94 27-Oct-99 0.23 73.72 63.46 28.35 22.78 38.33 149.43
5621 8.600 15.24 SEN 38 24-May-94 26-Aug-99 0.20 99.63 96.30 25.54 26.58 57.24 206.99
5626 6.625 5.60 SEN 40 09-Jun-95 04-Jan-00 0.17 65.47 57.14 24.30 19.43 24.06 129.59
36560 6.400 5.32 SEN 52 09-Feb-96 05-Dec-00 0.14 82.04 66.03 41.23 24.56 36.93 234.59
41534 7.500 8.84 SEN 43 19-Jul-96 09-Aug-00 0.14 72.86 67.25 20.94 17.84 47.21 153.56
44611 6.800 3.65 SEN 33 04-Oct-96 04-Aug-99 0.13 66.80 60.19 24.39 14.78 35.22 121.34
66437 6.750 29.02 SEN 27 06-Jan-98 10-Nov-00 0.15 122.11 121.27 28.27 25.68 93.12 217.48
78300 6.650 29.47 SEN 16 06-Aug-98 06-Aug-99 0.09 133.96 131.22 18.75 20.92 105.56 173.95
83731 5.875 9.50 SEN 11 29-Oct-98 11-Oct-00 0.26 106.42 111.37 29.33 26.34 74.46 151.25
Commonwealth Edison Co
4989 8.000 11.74 SS 39 23-Feb-94 10-Apr-00 0.23 89.01 80.58 22.17 19.88 56.44 146.47
4994 7.375 5.49 SS 37 24-Aug-94 15-Nov-99 0.21 73.97 67.73 22.35 20.50 44.73 137.07
4998 6.500 3.75 SS 38 26-Jan-94 26-Feb-99 0.20 74.10 70.47 23.84 22.65 35.67 162.21
5002 7.000 8.72 SS 54 19-Jan-94 19-Nov-99 0.16 81.61 75.74 20.82 15.85 50.64 140.67
5003 7.500 16.47 SS 41 21-Jul-94 03-Feb-00 0.20 101.57 95.42 18.83 13.65 71.83 147.01
5004 6.375 4.09 SS 32 27-Jul-94 29-Jun-99 0.22 69.26 66.26 20.32 17.09 42.27 142.24
5007 6.400 8.94 SEN 38 03-Feb-94 11-Aug-99 0.21 108.03 105.75 18.71 19.59 82.03 171.56
48196 7.625 8.62 SEN 27 06-Feb-97 29-Nov-99 0.15 109.43 106.71 25.97 22.83 65.53 155.44
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Bond Characteristics Sample Characteristics Credit Spread Descriptive Statistics (basis points)
FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
ID (%) (T −t) Rank n Trade Trade Dt (yrs) Mean Median SD SD d(1) Min Max
Enron Corp
6408 9.125 5.48 SEN 39 08-Mar-94 04-Oct-00 0.25 96.43 78.19 38.94 23.42 37.88 169.36
6409 7.625 7.49 SEN 45 16-Feb-94 12-Jun-00 0.21 83.86 65.28 41.36 26.83 39.49 182.57
25750 7.125 10.31 SEN 40 17-May-95 12-Jun-00 0.19 61.12 57.42 27.19 19.58 18.54 162.91
59681 6.750 6.04 SEN 17 04-Dec-97 21-Dec-99 0.18 101.30 89.87 37.80 35.02 65.57 199.53
63932 6.450 2.88 SEN 23 13-Nov-97 08-Sep-00 0.18 101.24 98.59 42.70 43.04 51.70 205.00
64197 6.625 6.94 SEN 22 19-Nov-97 12-Apr-00 0.16 106.15 106.94 33.09 25.42 56.36 164.61
Federated Dept Stores
9573 10.000 3.34 SEN 30 14-Aug-95 11-Jan-00 0.21 107.35 100.25 65.55 33.58 27.81 249.72
31136 8.125 4.40 SEN 70 03-Oct-95 25-Oct-00 0.11 118.68 108.63 51.93 25.79 37.90 258.23
39610 8.500 4.53 SEN 44 16-May-96 30-Nov-00 0.15 135.24 130.88 56.59 21.91 40.33 251.24
57170 7.450 18.70 SEN 38 09-Jul-97 29-Dec-00 0.13 151.98 135.16 64.41 22.47 76.48 318.35
Ford Mtr Co
10164 9.500 14.55 SEN 40 13-Oct-94 25-May-99 0.17 88.35 75.65 34.88 25.26 54.68 216.46
10168 7.500 2.66 SEN 31 08-Dec-94 05-Nov-98 0.18 50.67 47.43 17.33 14.98 22.79 92.13
32037 7.125 28.46 SEN 35 20-Nov-95 05-Nov-99 0.17 94.14 83.78 26.02 13.61 57.61 162.93
41993 7.500 28.40 SEN 38 06-Aug-96 08-Nov-99 0.13 110.30 99.27 31.26 17.26 74.57 171.45
44330 7.250 10.69 SEN 73 27-Sep-96 09-Dec-99 0.06 71.94 68.54 23.01 14.44 38.04 126.39
69523 6.625 29.55 SEN 30 18-Feb-98 04-Nov-99 0.08 111.55 105.26 22.06 9.78 82.23 156.31
78374 6.500 19.48 SEN 25 22-Jul-98 03-Jul-00 0.11 118.25 116.20 25.07 19.83 80.36 176.09
81320 6.625 29.49 SEN 46 06-Oct-98 05-Apr-00 0.05 130.14 126.75 22.31 20.58 100.97 232.28
87654 6.375 29.57 SEN 47 02-Feb-99 02-Aug-00 0.05 128.43 120.50 25.82 14.71 90.40 236.85
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FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
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General Mtrs
11135 9.625 3.77 SEN 82 29-Sep-94 29-Nov-99 0.09 65.08 56.48 35.35 39.36 20.27 277.03
11138 9.125 4.38 SEN 69 07-Feb-94 01-May-00 0.13 72.38 64.92 41.23 52.86 21.73 280.37
11141 7.000 6.16 SEN 39 14-Mar-94 16-Nov-00 0.25 70.70 65.65 27.96 20.20 18.68 131.75
29100 7.400 28.12 SEN 73 06-Sep-95 01-Dec-00 0.10 104.61 90.55 32.05 22.90 67.09 243.93
37881 7.100 8.59 SEN 46 15-Mar-96 16-Aug-00 0.14 81.58 68.93 44.51 34.18 31.90 244.10
38580 7.700 17.91 SEN 64 10-Apr-96 05-Dec-00 0.11 111.40 108.48 37.33 24.73 56.37 243.36
72797 6.250 6.27 SEN 35 22-Apr-98 30-Oct-00 0.11 75.59 68.06 32.96 36.22 23.57 153.49
72798 6.375 9.13 SEN 40 22-Apr-98 18-Dec-00 0.10 100.19 96.80 35.84 18.58 43.27 184.52
72800 6.750 29.00 SEN 53 06-May-98 19-Dec-00 0.07 133.03 125.65 36.49 34.33 45.47 241.63
Georgia Paciﬁc Corp
11321 9.500 14.85 SEN 42 18-May-95 30-Nov-99 0.16 107.37 100.83 33.29 20.34 73.46 203.46
26145 7.700 18.53 SEN 47 05-Jun-95 22-Dec-99 0.14 124.23 121.16 26.22 17.13 82.07 202.67
32843 7.375 28.41 SEN 31 05-Dec-95 03-Feb-00 0.20 132.07 128.63 25.19 15.53 94.19 186.20
Columbia Hca Healthcare Corp
4718 6.500 2.92 SEN 30 16-Mar-94 27-Feb-98 0.19 63.67 50.14 49.49 25.18 23.94 244.47
4719 7.150 7.40 SEN 45 17-Mar-94 11-Feb-00 0.19 144.31 84.94 102.16 41.20 39.64 375.97
39572 7.250 10.56 SEN 44 15-May-96 01-Nov-00 0.15 133.33 62.09 109.14 45.85 39.04 389.20
40885 6.875 4.06 SEN 16 02-Jul-96 28-Sep-98 0.20 114.40 60.31 95.94 37.36 33.10 293.55
IBM Corp
13191 7.250 5.72 SEN 97 04-Mar-94 18-Jul-00 0.10 44.02 41.46 22.41 15.19 6.19 104.87
13192 6.375 3.67 SEN 107 13-Jan-94 10-Jun-99 0.07 43.30 39.62 21.93 17.61 2.11 119.62
13193 7.500 16.29 SEN 81 07-Jan-94 01-Nov-00 0.12 74.99 71.47 19.84 19.00 35.45 137.18
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FISD Coupon Mean First Last Mean
ID (%) (T −t) Rank n Trade Trade Dt (yrs) Mean Median SD SD d(1) Min Max
International Paper Co
13295 7.625 8.95 SEN 44 17-May-94 14-Sep-00 0.21 94.50 98.18 41.56 22.08 31.84 168.71
13298 7.500 7.50 SEN 40 19-May-94 20-Mar-00 0.21 72.04 59.99 33.46 30.23 21.78 160.86
13299 6.125 5.90 SEN 42 28-Feb-94 13-Dec-00 0.24 84.56 65.06 45.04 20.87 28.71 178.68
13302 7.625 7.50 SEN 38 04-Aug-94 20-Nov-00 0.24 79.91 66.66 45.26 36.21 18.99 177.72
40082 7.000 3.82 SEN 45 31-May-96 05-Apr-00 0.12 62.48 43.81 43.68 28.51 11.43 181.51
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc
14210 8.750 7.64 SEN 45 10-Mar-95 22-Nov-99 0.15 131.21 105.76 62.62 31.61 63.41 301.67
20228 8.875 5.21 SEN 43 10-Jun-94 03-Mar-00 0.19 106.03 98.53 47.61 41.29 40.69 264.88
20230 8.750 5.64 SEN 41 14-Jul-94 30-Jul-99 0.18 114.67 96.02 68.29 57.22 28.06 416.68
25524 8.500 9.63 SEN 48 02-May-95 11-Oct-00 0.17 135.22 103.54 71.38 64.11 49.85 423.05
44745 7.250 5.76 SEN 38 09-Oct-96 09-Nov-00 0.16 96.96 78.32 59.01 45.59 36.95 342.87
54022 7.375 5.66 SEN 42 08-May-97 04-Apr-00 0.10 130.97 113.98 79.29 46.31 39.69 414.48
59238 7.200 10.87 SEN 35 14-Aug-97 08-Oct-99 0.09 151.37 149.10 75.16 44.45 75.57 393.93
61527 6.500 4.02 SEN 35 01-Oct-97 09-Aug-00 0.12 134.27 114.27 87.53 52.05 44.67 437.92
72049 6.250 4.37 SEN 37 02-Apr-98 02-Aug-00 0.09 149.06 161.26 82.68 52.64 56.30 439.81
87559 6.625 6.44 SEN 41 29-Jan-99 06-Dec-00 0.07 166.02 161.27 42.56 35.48 107.60 295.24
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Merrill Lynch & Co
15207 7.000 3.36 SEN 40 01-Jul-94 29-Oct-98 0.16 57.59 49.59 30.79 27.58 6.44 201.28
15212 6.250 4.97 SEN 40 08-Jun-94 01-Aug-00 0.22 58.87 46.80 32.73 21.75 15.41 195.00
29589 6.640 5.96 SEN 40 13-Apr-94 15-Aug-00 0.23 77.11 75.75 30.53 29.83 21.00 171.28
39416 7.375 10.95 SEN 49 23-Jun-94 03-Jul-00 0.18 89.03 76.98 39.35 33.20 36.35 199.01
58248 6.550 3.32 SEN 31 27-Jul-95 21-Jul-99 0.19 65.68 53.14 35.73 21.59 27.48 175.34
68436 6.000 3.71 SEN 37 22-Feb-96 05-Jan-00 0.15 53.99 42.00 35.46 27.51 12.43 159.60
77781 6.500 8.48 SEN 45 10-May-96 22-Dec-00 0.15 73.86 61.39 34.56 20.54 31.04 152.72
83254 6.375 6.07 SEN 43 29-Jul-97 06-Dec-00 0.11 64.96 55.55 28.39 15.35 28.36 141.03
84897 6.875 4.07 SEN 86 04-Feb-98 12-Dec-00 0.05 91.13 88.06 41.22 24.18 25.71 201.56
88024 6.000 9.34 SEN 102 09-Feb-99 29-Dec-00 0.03 115.55 110.64 31.22 21.04 10.80 216.58
Motorola Inc
15835 7.600 8.55 SEN 42 02-Aug-95 06-Dec-00 0.19 69.10 64.65 41.55 27.16 22.40 201.92
15836 6.500 10.62 SEN 34 22-Mar-95 04-Aug-99 0.19 42.94 33.33 23.15 12.09 12.18 107.69
25589 7.500 27.07 SEN 33 24-May-95 04-Dec-00 0.24 98.81 92.15 47.73 21.42 49.37 224.35
82677 5.800 9.36 SEN 16 15-Oct-98 01-Nov-00 0.19 95.06 99.00 23.63 22.85 56.80 143.69
Nabisco Group Hldgs Corp
26811 6.700 4.99 SEN 76 22-Jun-95 05-Dec-00 0.10 83.42 76.38 37.90 21.26 19.94 187.80
26812 6.850 7.92 SEN 67 22-Jun-95 17-Aug-00 0.11 98.76 81.26 48.65 50.91 53.74 366.64
26813 7.550 17.69 SEN 81 22-Jun-95 01-Dec-00 0.10 145.30 118.99 59.76 37.15 82.52 335.43
26975 8.000 3.18 SEN 35 01-May-95 24-Mar-98 0.12 73.99 55.11 63.59 61.37 9.50 305.33
26977 8.300 2.55 SEN 41 16-Feb-95 08-Apr-98 0.11 70.15 54.78 59.45 47.02 16.09 297.13
27158 7.050 9.84 SEN 81 11-Jul-95 29-Sep-00 0.09 108.25 87.12 54.75 30.34 9.05 320.08
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Niagara Mohawk Pwr Corp
16471 7.375 6.55 SS 51 09-Feb-94 10-May-00 0.18 141.37 119.87 62.69 32.51 61.12 293.52
16475 5.875 5.51 SS 55 02-Mar-94 19-Dec-00 0.18 142.24 112.39 63.89 32.14 72.20 287.91
16476 6.875 4.00 SS 53 25-Feb-94 03-Feb-00 0.16 135.29 121.02 52.84 35.14 67.93 300.55
25729 7.750 8.28 SS 47 08-Aug-95 05-Oct-00 0.16 163.11 142.33 67.86 32.09 72.82 309.86
Northrop Grumman Corp
16731 8.625 6.42 SEN 40 28-Feb-96 19-Dec-00 0.18 101.95 85.78 45.48 36.24 35.39 189.16
69804 7.000 8.24 SEN 72 27-Feb-96 22-Dec-00 0.10 96.25 77.74 44.10 24.64 18.46 198.68
69808 7.750 17.99 SEN 43 27-Feb-96 20-Sep-00 0.16 143.92 108.02 55.90 28.41 83.06 245.81
69822 7.875 27.91 SEN 59 01-Mar-96 21-Dec-00 0.12 143.50 118.15 54.31 29.71 79.44 272.94
Paine Webber Group Inc
17692 7.750 5.69 SENS 40 01-Mar-94 02-Nov-00 0.24 111.06 107.99 52.63 51.73 20.77 243.06
17694 7.000 3.51 SEN 35 25-Feb-94 12-Jan-00 0.25 97.11 78.11 55.21 53.95 30.19 287.27
17696 6.500 8.58 SEN 60 24-Feb-94 27-Oct-00 0.16 112.59 97.02 40.25 28.10 56.15 211.50
17697 7.625 16.46 SEN 60 08-Feb-94 03-Nov-00 0.16 145.52 129.58 53.13 41.28 25.23 314.00
17698 8.875 8.20 SEN 33 20-Mar-95 20-Aug-99 0.20 124.50 127.83 40.56 28.13 64.92 211.92
72702 6.550 8.97 SEN 25 20-Apr-98 03-Nov-00 0.15 119.25 123.99 45.34 61.02 32.54 222.47
85254 6.450 4.25 SEN 33 25-Nov-98 28-Aug-00 0.08 139.67 134.94 31.80 32.65 52.83 206.58
94324 6.375 4.46 SEN 20 13-May-99 30-Oct-00 0.11 121.22 122.53 34.24 46.40 3.78 161.08
102067 7.625 9.69 SEN 22 24-Nov-99 31-Oct-00 0.06 155.64 148.76 22.08 20.98 129.51 233.25
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Penney J C Co Inc
17851 5.375 2.91 SEN 27 20-Jan-94 28-Oct-97 0.20 39.47 40.14 9.94 13.14 11.69 57.84
17852 6.125 6.04 SEN 59 02-Sep-94 04-Dec-00 0.15 181.75 64.04 337.62 174.37 15.56 1948.50
17853 7.125 26.31 SEN 41 15-Feb-94 04-Oct-00 0.24 161.18 106.42 139.21 52.52 48.04 643.71
17854 7.375 7.05 SEN 49 07-Jun-94 17-Nov-00 0.19 138.07 60.09 240.59 169.65 21.89 1617.50
42350 7.375 10.43 SEN 48 14-Aug-96 14-Dec-00 0.13 163.98 69.92 225.22 86.47 38.87 1261.10
42351 7.650 18.19 SEN 39 14-Aug-96 15-Dec-00 0.16 169.32 159.01 163.09 102.76 71.62 1055.40
Philip Morris Companies Inc
18221 8.250 6.40 SEN 73 11-Jan-94 26-Oct-00 0.14 97.31 81.71 43.96 50.59 10.77 264.90
18222 7.500 4.81 SEN 70 17-Feb-94 20-Dec-00 0.14 94.41 72.30 58.62 43.06 46.72 354.23
18226 7.625 4.71 SEN 43 04-May-94 28-Dec-00 0.23 92.98 77.39 46.23 28.40 36.89 217.93
18228 7.125 6.91 SEN 48 23-Mar-94 15-Aug-00 0.19 106.48 87.02 48.81 28.89 56.86 234.74
18231 7.250 5.80 SEN 58 10-Jan-94 19-Oct-00 0.17 89.29 73.73 40.05 28.77 42.80 213.40
40699 7.650 10.03 SEN 56 26-Jun-96 12-Dec-00 0.12 118.38 97.33 60.41 46.72 46.54 299.49
44048 7.250 3.89 SEN 35 19-Sep-96 27-Jan-00 0.14 81.03 63.42 42.37 34.29 36.10 223.21
47411 6.800 5.29 SEN 53 10-Dec-96 05-Dec-00 0.11 105.19 82.96 53.04 46.20 33.17 227.29
49572 7.200 8.61 SEN 45 07-Feb-97 19-Jul-00 0.11 114.20 98.18 54.47 32.24 52.67 315.37
57203 7.000 6.43 SEN 48 10-Jul-97 07-Dec-00 0.10 126.02 107.74 50.33 32.93 67.86 252.41
Seagram Co Ltd
20000 8.350 9.21 SEN 60 18-May-94 01-Dec-00 0.16 95.31 77.19 54.84 30.72 16.74 240.59
20002 8.350 24.88 SEN 44 20-Jan-94 01-Dec-00 0.23 120.64 101.79 50.20 29.13 78.18 272.22
20003 6.500 5.61 SEN 46 12-Jan-94 08-Dec-00 0.22 74.38 59.31 39.23 28.15 33.72 191.74
20004 6.875 25.31 SEN 38 12-Oct-94 01-Dec-00 0.24 136.45 119.24 51.31 31.86 75.53 264.99
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Sears Roebuck Accep Corp
26308 6.500 2.77 SEN 31 05-Sep-95 10-Mar-99 0.17 66.89 52.35 38.68 38.43 31.10 205.95
29172 6.750 8.05 SEN 47 11-Sep-95 13-Dec-00 0.16 80.33 57.08 50.61 29.55 30.39 212.58
34174 6.125 8.49 SEN 28 18-Jan-96 13-Jul-00 0.23 71.60 59.32 42.96 15.62 15.89 181.52
41876 6.900 5.27 SEN 29 02-Aug-96 05-Sep-00 0.21 76.22 49.71 50.37 45.63 27.07 224.77
46444 6.700 8.66 SEN 46 19-Nov-96 10-Nov-00 0.13 80.62 63.61 48.40 21.07 28.67 217.56
56492 7.000 8.77 SEN 100 25-Jun-97 27-Dec-00 0.05 93.98 80.55 48.03 23.94 27.29 258.33
60903 6.700 9.23 SEN 23 18-Sep-97 18-Jan-00 0.15 80.07 67.57 36.73 24.62 37.02 159.54
70992 6.000 4.04 SEN 56 13-Mar-98 21-Dec-00 0.07 95.05 97.60 34.90 26.74 33.40 180.70
93083 6.250 9.30 SEN 37 29-Apr-99 20-Dec-00 0.06 154.61 146.52 43.48 22.78 74.61 261.40
Service Corp Intl
20172 8.375 7.32 SEN 22 13-Jun-95 13-Mar-00 0.32 257.15 61.96 464.25 315.51 13.48 2033.80
31194 6.875 9.90 SEN 41 05-Oct-95 26-Sep-00 0.18 157.42 69.54 281.42 135.14 43.57 1356.80
31195 6.375 3.22 SEN 33 05-Oct-95 08-Sep-99 0.17 77.48 54.80 59.69 36.67 30.81 250.88
39942 6.750 2.83 SEN 28 23-May-96 12-Apr-00 0.20 700.38 99.57 1102.70 452.91 21.74 3348.60
39943 7.200 8.24 SEN 40 23-May-96 17-Oct-00 0.16 380.06 64.11 557.91 140.78 28.85 1644.30
52596 7.375 5.43 SEN 25 15-Apr-97 20-Sep-00 0.20 508.32 133.99 715.28 287.87 43.01 2125.30
52597 7.700 10.47 SEN 32 14-Apr-97 21-Sep-00 0.16 386.30 126.24 495.74 152.86 40.96 1382.80
70887 6.500 9.19 SEN 29 11-Mar-98 14-Dec-00 0.14 298.13 119.46 384.40 92.86 72.16 1352.70
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Union Paciﬁc Corp
25528 7.375 3.36 SEN 33 10-Jan-96 26-Jan-00 0.18 93.82 72.20 49.93 38.26 37.99 202.39
34274 6.400 7.77 SEN 46 23-Jan-96 27-Dec-00 0.16 94.59 80.80 43.06 25.55 31.89 201.01
34275 7.000 17.83 SEN 58 23-Jan-96 19-Dec-00 0.12 123.92 118.07 44.05 26.58 72.27 228.87
45340 7.250 10.34 SEN 53 22-Oct-96 21-Dec-00 0.11 110.90 98.31 49.69 24.61 49.23 199.45
47092 6.700 8.61 SEN 41 03-Dec-96 29-Nov-00 0.14 87.67 79.60 37.59 37.48 36.81 184.88
68031 6.625 8.84 SEN 43 29-Jan-98 19-Dec-00 0.10 127.71 106.41 35.89 23.51 77.37 198.50
68032 7.125 28.66 SEN 30 03-Feb-98 12-Dec-00 0.14 167.79 150.78 45.64 42.64 108.25 247.69
82805 5.780 2.18 SEN 17 16-Oct-98 05-Oct-00 0.17 132.72 132.36 32.34 26.32 93.51 209.17
Viacom Inc
25799 7.750 6.87 SEN 176 01-Dec-95 27-Dec-00 0.04 135.25 132.75 29.87 17.74 74.98 273.13
33080 6.750 4.22 SEN 46 12-Dec-95 28-Dec-00 0.16 120.54 115.72 24.56 23.23 81.20 174.65
33081 7.625 17.77 SEN 37 12-Dec-95 16-Aug-00 0.18 158.40 160.28 30.81 30.89 118.29 252.36
Wal-Mart Stores Inc
23421 9.100 3.83 SEN 50 26-Apr-94 09-Jul-99 0.15 41.58 34.48 21.26 14.12 17.15 107.11
23422 8.625 4.14 SEN 115 09-Mar-94 20-Mar-00 0.08 42.64 38.90 18.76 15.09 9.13 106.93
23425 6.125 3.25 SEN 37 15-Feb-94 13-Aug-98 0.18 33.36 31.25 11.17 14.05 12.92 59.10
23427 6.500 5.78 SEN 67 10-Mar-94 29-Dec-00 0.15 43.72 38.94 19.54 15.90 5.63 80.92
23429 7.250 15.38 SEN 45 28-Mar-95 27-Dec-00 0.19 65.41 59.49 23.06 13.14 33.06 135.09
23430 5.875 8.83 SEN 108 02-Mar-94 01-Dec-00 0.09 45.05 40.01 19.18 17.24 2.83 96.63
23432 7.500 7.22 SEN 84 18-May-94 06-Dec-00 0.11 48.83 42.17 24.73 20.05 5.26 163.56
23433 8.000 9.01 SEN 56 20-Sep-94 12-Dec-00 0.16 55.62 45.89 29.49 19.77 3.06 128.57
25644 6.750 5.14 SEN 31 10-May-95 08-Aug-00 0.25 37.38 36.80 15.39 13.59 4.93 71.10224 APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTION OF BOND DATA
Table C.2: This table details the Refcorp strip data sourced from Bloomberg. Shown are the summary
statistics of daily yields and available remaining maturities.
Maturity (yrs) Bid yields (%)
Bloomberg No. of Std.
ID Obs Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Dev.
76116EAR Govt 695 2.4 1.0 3.8 6.18 4.70 7.88 0.73
76116EAT Govt 804 3.2 1.0 4.8 6.30 4.90 7.94 0.71
76116EAV Govt 838 4.0 1.1 5.8 6.35 5.06 7.88 0.71
76116EAX Govt 871 5.0 1.0 6.8 6.47 5.12 7.90 0.67
76116EAZ Govt 857 6.0 1.8 7.8 6.56 5.02 8.00 0.66
76116EBB Govt 830 7.1 2.9 8.8 6.68 5.42 8.08 0.66
76116EBD Govt 828 8.1 3.9 9.8 6.81 5.60 8.20 0.64
76116EBF Govt 1753 7.3 3.8 10.8 6.46 4.41 8.43 0.79
76116EBH Govt 1753 8.3 4.8 11.8 6.52 4.48 8.46 0.78
76116EBK Govt 1753 9.3 5.8 12.8 6.57 4.51 8.48 0.78
76116EBM Govt 1753 10.3 6.8 13.8 6.61 4.56 8.51 0.78
76116EBP Govt 1753 11.3 7.8 14.8 6.66 4.60 8.55 0.77
76116EBR Govt 1753 12.3 8.8 15.8 6.70 4.71 8.58 0.76
76116EBT Govt 1753 13.3 9.8 16.8 6.75 4.83 8.62 0.75
76116EBV Govt 1753 14.3 10.8 17.8 6.80 4.94 8.66 0.75
76116EBX Govt 1753 15.3 11.8 18.8 6.84 5.06 8.71 0.74
76116EBZ Govt 1753 16.3 12.8 19.8 6.88 5.18 8.76 0.74
76116ECB Govt 1753 16.3 12.8 19.8 6.91 5.23 8.81 0.75
76116ECD Govt 1753 18.3 14.8 21.8 6.92 5.28 8.77 0.74
76116ECF Govt 1753 19.3 15.8 22.8 6.92 5.34 8.73 0.73
76116ECH Govt 1753 20.3 16.8 23.8 6.92 5.39 8.70 0.72
76116ECK Govt 1753 21.3 17.8 24.8 6.92 5.45 8.66 0.70
76116ECM Govt 1753 22.3 18.8 25.8 6.91 5.41 8.63 0.70
76116EGU Govt 1753 23.3 19.8 26.8 6.91 5.38 8.59 0.70
76116EGW Govt 1753 24.3 20.8 27.8 6.89 5.35 8.56 0.69
76116EGY Govt 1753 25.3 21.8 28.8 6.87 5.32 8.52 0.69
76116EHA Govt 1753 26.3 22.8 29.8 6.85 5.28 8.49 0.68
76116EHC Govt 1556 26.9 23.8 30.0 6.70 5.24 8.45 0.63
76116EHE Govt 1307 27.4 24.8 30.0 6.50 5.19 7.60 0.50
76116EHG Govt 1055 27.9 25.8 30.0 6.34 5.14 7.60 0.47
76116EHJ Govt 805 28.4 26.8 30.0 6.14 5.09 7.11 0.40
76116EHL Govt 554 28.9 27.8 30.0 6.24 5.32 7.11 0.42
76116EHN Govt 303 29.4 28.8 30.0 6.42 5.75 7.12 0.30
76116FAD Govt 53 29.9 29.8 30.0 6.19 5.91 6.45 0.17
Total 46416 16.6 1.0 30.0 6.71 4.41 8.81 0.74Appendix D
Example of Implied Firm Solvency
Paths
The following plots show the implied time-series path for each ﬁrm’s log-solvency ratio
and the corresponding observed log-solvency ratio. The implied path of solvency is from
the obtained from the smoothed estimate of the state process from ﬁtting the extended
Merton (1974) (EM) model with time-varying liquidity.
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D.1.xxxii Wal-Mart Stores IncAppendix E
Example Ox Code
The following programs are written in OX, a C-style matrix programming language
designed for econometric modelling. Further details of Ox are described in Doornick
(2002).
In the section, the extended Merton (1974) (EM) model with time-varying liquidity
is shown as an example. Other models vary in their state-space speciﬁcation and bond
valuations, but in all other respects, share common code. The main routine is contained
in Appendix E.1, and the subroutine function for calculating the credit spread, given
parameters passed to it, is contained in Appendix E.2.
E.1 Extended Kalman Filter for EM model
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER - Merton
This procedure returns the quasi-maximum likelihood estimates of
the Extended Merton model
Extended Merton’s specification. Coupon bond priced
as the sum of zeros (each valued with Merton zero-coupon model).
Spot rate is maturity matched smoothed estimate obtained from the Vasicek model.
Program returns parameter estimates, asymptotic standard errors
using Hessian method, smoothed estimates of historic latent log-solvency
ratio with upper and lower 95% confidence bounds. Includes constant risk premium
and time-varying liquidity premium.
State-space notation follows Harvey (1989):
Measurement equation: y=Z(t)+a(t)+d(t)+eps(t), Var(eps)=H(t)














static decl cm=1; //number of elements in state vector
static decl cg=1; //number of columns in R vector
static decl cN; //number of bonds issued by firm
static decl cT; //final time step indexed from zero
static decl mDt; //matrix of observed steps between trades in years
static decl my; //matrix of observed spreads
static decl mr; //array of smooth estimate short-rates
static decl mP_0; //initial log-solvency variance
static decl ma_0; //initial log-solvency value
static decl mypred; //predicted credit spread
static decl dFunc2; //storage for maximum likelihood
static decl ae; //standardised prediction errors
static decl d; //number of diffuse priors
static decl obs; //number of observations assuming no missing
static decl lag; //shifts row of data input
static decl cmethod; //optimisation method: 1=Simplex, 2=BFGS, 3=Simplex then BFGS
static decl smethod; //optimisation method used
static decl ct; //time step counter
static decl mvk; //filtered leverage ratio
static decl csumNt; //number of obs adjusted for missing values
static decl mindex; //missing observation index: 1 if missing, zero otherwise
static decl mse; //matrix of standardised prediction errors. Missing obs = .NaN
static decl mve; //matrix of prediction errors. Missing obs = .NaN
static decl mtenors; //array of remaining maturities
static decl g_a; //array of state vectors
static decl g_P; //array of state covariances
static decl g_P_prior; //array of prior state estimates (fwd filter)
static decl g_T; //array of transition matrices
static decl a_T; //array of prior state estimates (backward smoother recursion)
static decl P_T; //array of prior state covariance (backward smoother recursion)
static decl mcoupons; //array of coupon rates (p.a.)
static decl gr_sigma; //Vasicek short-rate volatility
static decl gr_theta; //Vasicek long-run short-rate
static decl gr_alpha; //Vasicek short-rate mean reversion rate
static decl gr_lambda; //Vasicek price of interest rate risk
static decl gx_0; //initial observed log-solvency
static decl mRefcorp; //array of 10 CMT Refcorp-Treasury spreads
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Extended Kalman Filter
Precedes the main function.
Returns the Log-Likelihood function value
--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
EKF(const vLP, const adFunc, const avScore, const amHessian)
{
g_a=new array[obs]; //array of state vectors
g_P=new array[obs]; //array of state covariances
g_T=new array[obs]; //array of transition matrices
g_P_prior=new array[obs]; //array of prior state estimates
ae=new array[obs]; //array of standardised prediction errors
decl ma=zeros(cm); //state vector = implied log-solvency ratio
decl mP=zeros(cm,cm); //state covariance
decl ma_prior=(cm); //prior estimate of state vector
decl mP_prior=(cm,cm); //prior estimate of state covariance
decl mT=(cm,cm); //transition matrix
decl mc=(cm); //constant liquidity spread premium
decl mQ=(cg,cg); //transition error covariance identity
decl mR=(cm,cg); //transition error covariance scalar
decl mZ; //measurement equation matrix
decl mH; //measurement equation error
decl mF; //prediction error covariance
decl mInvF; //inverse of mF
decl mInvH; //inverse of mH
decl mK; //Kalman gain
decl cL; //log-likelihood244 APPENDIX E. EXAMPLE OX CODE
decl ci; //counter
decl mv; //raw prediction error vector
decl me; //standardised prediction error vector
decl cNt; //no of time varying obs excluding missing obs, cNt<=cN
decl asign; //address of the log of the determinant of mF
decl cit; //measurement row counter excl. missing trades
decl v_delta; //asset payout rate
decl v_sigma; //asset volatility
decl m_sigma; //measurement volatility
decl v_constant; //constant spread premiums
decl refcorp; //Refcorp spread slope coefficient
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hyperparameters not in the state vector
are passed to global storage for calling








Kalman state matrices are dimensioned before calculation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
mvk=zeros(1,obs); //filtered leverage ratio
csumNt=0; //number of obs adjusted for missing values
mindex=zeros(cN,obs); //vectors of missing observation rows where element=1
mse=zeros(cN,obs); //matrix of standardised prediction errors including missing data = .NaN
mve=zeros(cN,obs); //matrix of prediction errors including missing data = .NaN
mypred=zeros(cN,obs); //predicted spreads
cL=0; //initialise log-likelihood store
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------





Index missing obs at each time step
*/ mindex[][ct]=isdotnan(my’[][ct]); //1 if missing, zero otherwise,
cNt=cN-sumc(mindex[][ct]); //Missing values are =0























Construct Z matrix with gradients of the state vector
for Extended Kalman filter. Dimensioned to remove missing
data rows. ci=original observation vector row number.E.1. EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER FOR EM MODEL 245
cit=compressed vector row number excluding missing obs.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
cit=0;
for (ci=0; ci<cN; ++ci) //inner loop across obs at time t
{
/*
Check if data not missing (mindex=0)
Construct Z on reduced dimension
Call predicted spread from sub-routine.
*/
if (mindex[ci][ct]==0) //mindex=0 for valid obs
{
decl spd=new SpreadFunctionMerton(ma_prior, mtenors[ct][ci],
v_sigma, v_delta, mr[ct], mcoupons[ci], gr_alpha, gr_theta, gr_sigma, gr_lambda);
decl spd2=new SpreadFunctionMerton(ma_prior+0.001, mtenors[ct][ci],











} //end inner obs loop at time t
mv=deleter(my’[][ct]-mypred[][ct]); //prediction error
mF=mZ*mP_prior*mZ’+mH; //variance of prediction error
mInvF=invertgen(mF); //inverse pred error variance
me=mv./(sqrt(diagonal(mF)’)); //standardised prediction error
/*
update state vector
*/ mK=mP_prior*mZ’*mInvF; //Kalman gain
ma=ma_prior+mK*mv; //update state prediction
mP=(unit(cm)-mK*mZ)*mP_prior; //update covariance vector
/*
prior estimates of state values
*/ ma_prior=mT*ma+mc; //next period prior estimate of state mean
mP_prior=mT*mP*mT’+mR*mQ*mR’; //next period prior estimate of state covariance
mvk[ct]=exp(ma[0]); //store path of filtered leverage ratio estimate
/*
Sum likelihood excluding diffuse priors
*/ if (ct>=d)
{
cL=cL-1/2*(logdet(mF,&asign)+ mv’* mInvF * mv);
}
/*
Store for backward recursive smoothing and residual analysis






Restore dimension of prediction errors for diagnosis of errors with missing data.
mse=matrix of standardised prediction errors diagnostics on
the matrix require removal of missing .NaN entries
me=matrix of standardised residuals dimensioned to compress missing data
*/ cit=0;













} //end re-dimensioning loop
} //filter loop ends
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Return log-likelihood
Note: log-likelihood uses valid number of obs
in numerator and number of time steps (summation) in denominator
-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
adFunc[0]=double((cL-1/2*csumNt*log(2*M_PI))/(obs-d));




Initial parameter starting values
Data input







decl dbase; //temp input data storage for reading Excel
decl v_sigma_0; //initial asset volatility
decl cmeasure_0; //initial measurement error
decl v_delta_0; //initial asset payout rate
decl m_sigma_0; //initial measurement volatility
decl v_constant_0; //initial constant liquidity premium
decl refcorp_0; //initial Refcorp slope coefficient
decl ir; //result of Ox maximisation routine. 1=success
decl dFunc; //maximised value of likelihood
decl mhess; //Hessian matrix of the logliklihood with respect to hyperparameters
decl vP; //transformed hyperparameters
decl stateout; //optimised parameter estimates
decl maxit; //maximum number of iterations in the maximisation search
decl ci; //counter per bond
decl cfirm; //counter for the issuer
decl vlabels; //text identifier of bond
decl sname; //text identifier of issuer
decl tvalue; //estimated t-value of parameter estimates
decl standerrors; //estimated standard error of parameter estimates
decl mlev; //observed log-solvency S(t)
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------










loop repeats for each firm loading name and bond identifer
else if (cfirm==31){
sname="walmart2";










MaxControlEps(1e-4,5e-3); //Maximisation convergence criteria:(1e-4,5e-3)
/*
State vector settings
*/ d=1; //number of diffuse elements
lag=2; //due to time differencing
/*























Set Vasicek parameters. Exogenously estimated.
*/ gr_alpha=0.0232; //interest-rate reversion
gr_theta=0.1605; //interest-rate long-run
gr_lambda=0.0043; //price of interest rate risk
gr_sigma=0.0147; //interest-rate volatility
/*
Set initial diffuse state vector variance
*/ mP_0=v_sigma_0[cfirm]^2*mDt[0]*1000; //arbitrary increase in variance
v_delta_0=0.0483; //initial as per mean reported by EHH
gx_0=mlev[0]; //initial observed log-solvency
refcorp_0=1; //arbitrary initial
/*
Transform hyperparameters to meet economic constraints
*/ vP=
log(v_sigma_0[cfirm]^2)| //log asset variance
log(m_sigma_0[cfirm]^2)| //log measure variance
log(v_delta_0/(1-v_delta_0))| //asset payout
log(refcorp_0)| //Refcorp slope
log(ones(cN,1)*v_constant_0[cfirm]); //constant liquidity premiums
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximise Loglikehood by calling EKF routine
Transformed hyperparameters passed through vP
Returned value for vP is at optimised estimates
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ir=MaxBFGS(EKF, &vP, &dFunc2, 0, TRUE);
}
if (cmethod>2) //Simplex then BFGS
{
smethod="Simplex then BFGS";
MaxControl(50, 1); // No. of simplex initial runs
MaxSimplex(EKF, &vP, &dFunc2, 0); //simplex Ox routine
MaxControl(maxit, 1); //maxit is limit on BFGS runs
ir=MaxBFGS(EKF, &vP, &dFunc2, 0, TRUE); //BFGS Ox routine
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed interval filter smoothing using whole data set
Refer Harvey (89) page 154, section 3.6.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
decl mP_star; //interim variable in recursion to get P_T. refer Harvey
decl vkvolsmooth; //stand. deviation of state estimate
decl vksmooth; //smoothed state
decl mysmooth; //smoothed predictions
a_T=new array[obs]; //array of prior state estimates









construct inital values including confidence levels
*/ vkvolsmooth[cT]=sqrt(P_T[cT][0][0]); //leverage estimate deviation
vksmooth[0][cT]=exp(a_T[cT][0][0]); //mean smoothed estimate of x(t)
vksmooth[1][cT]=exp(a_T[cT][0][0]+1.97*vkvolsmooth[cT]); //upper confidence of x(t)
vksmooth[2][cT]=exp(a_T[cT][0][0]-1.97*vkvolsmooth[cT]); //lower confidence of x(t)
/*
Backward recursion






vksmooth[0][ct]=exp(a_T[ct][0][0]); //smoothed mean x(t)
vksmooth[1][ct]=exp(a_T[ct][0][0]+1.97*vkvolsmooth[ct]); //upper confidence x(t)
vksmooth[2][ct]=exp(a_T[ct][0][0]-1.97*vkvolsmooth[ct]); //lower confidence x(t)
}
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------










exp(vP[1]/2)| //measurement error volatility
exp(vP[2])/(1+exp(vP[2]))| //asset payout
exp(vP[3])| //Refcorp slope
exp(vP[4:]); //constant liquidity premium
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------E.2. YIELD SPREAD FUNCTION FOR EM MODEL 249







print("\nEKF estimation of Extended Merton, run on ", date());
print("\nFirm: ",sname);
print("\nFile in: ",sfilein);
print("\nStarting values: \n", vP);
print("\nNumber of time periods = ", obs);
print("\nNumber of bonds = ",cN);
print("\nNumber diffuse = ",d);


























print average prediction errors
*/ print("\nAverage smoothed V/K =",meanr(vksmooth[0][:]));
print("\nMin smoothed V/K =",min(vksmooth[0][:]));




print log-solvency smoothed estimates
*/ println("Smoothed V/K");




E.2 Yield Spread Function for EM model
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Values coupon bond under extended Merton model
Arguments in:
x_0 = firm log-solvency=ln(V/K)
T = bond maturity
v_sigma = firm asset volatility
v_delta = firm payout rate
r_0 = risk-free rate
coupon = coupon rate250 APPENDIX E. EXAMPLE OX CODE
r_alpha = mean reversion rate of r
r_theta = long-term level of r
r_sigma = interest rate volatility
r_lambda = market price of interest rate risk
Returns:










SpreadFunctionMerton(const x_0, const T, const v_sigma,
const v_delta, const r_0, const coupon, const r_alpha,





SpreadFunctionMerton::SpreadFunctionMerton(const x_0, const T, const v_sigma,
const v_delta, const r_0, const coupon, const r_alpha,































Returns an array of bond coupons and time to receive
Arguments in:
years = years to maturity
coupon = semi-annual coupon rate
Argumensts out: T x 2 matrix [years to next cashflow][cash]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#include <oxstd.h>E.2. YIELD SPREAD FUNCTION FOR EM MODEL 251
#include <oxfloat.h>
cashflow(const maturity, const coupon)
{
decl n; //number of time steps
decl c; //counter
decl mcash; //cash matrix
n=trunc((maturity*2))+1; //years by 2 then round up to find number of rows
mcash=zeros(n,2); //initialise
mcash[n-1][0]=maturity; //last node = maturity in years
mcash[n-1][1]=(coupon/2)+1; //last payment including face value












Returns continuous ytm using bisection search
Arguments in:
payments: array of cash flows
value: bond value
upper: maximum boundary of ytm
Argument out:
annualised ytm with semi-annual compounding
-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
#include <oxstd.h>
/* Value to minimise to zero */
funval(const payments, const y, const value)
{
decl t,disc,cash,result;
t=payments[][0]; //time of cash in years
cash=payments[][1]; //cash
disc=exp(-y*t); //vector of discount rates
result=disc’*cash-value; //difference in calculated value from target
return result;
}
/* Bisection search to return ytm */
ytm(const payments, const value, const upper)
{






















if(fabs(b-a)<1e-20){break}252 APPENDIX E. EXAMPLE OX CODE
}
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